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Foreword
Several years ago, a group named Military History and Heritage Victoria 
formed to bring together those who were passionate about military 
history. After several years of examining military history up to the 1990s, 
we decided to look at more contemporary events; namely, the 1999 
Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET). In 2014, 
we brought together a tremendous collection of speakers to examine this 
key period in Australia’s military history. The Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre at The Australian National University partnered with us to make 
the event possible and, more importantly, to publish the proceedings with 
Melbourne University Press.1 We would like to think that this INTERFET 
conference and the publishing of the proceedings contributed to the 
decision to commence the next tranche of Australian official histories.
Flushed with success, we then embarked on a conference regarding 
Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Australian 
military has had a long involvement in the Middle East region, and 
Australian and coalition military involvement continues to this day in 
both countries. But we felt enough time had passed for us again to make 
a contribution by examining the period 2001–14.
We called the conference ‘War in the Sandpit: Reflections on Australia’s 
War in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001–2014’. The conference gathered a well-
qualified panel of speakers, many of whom were involved firsthand in 
the decisions and events described. Once again, the Strategic & Defence 
Studies Centre at The Australian National University partnered with us 
to make the event possible. The proceedings are published here to add to 
the historical record.
1  J. Blaxland (ed.), East Timor Intervention: A retrospective on INTERFET, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 2015. 
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We know that the official history, in production at the time of writing, will 
produce a more informed and perhaps different record and perspective on 
events, but, as ever, history is not a static phenomenon. Our objective 
remains to examine history and seek to learn from it, drawing from the 
experiences and perspectives of people involved ranging from Cabinet 
members down to the practitioners on the ground, in the air and at sea. 
We hope this volume achieves that.
I would like to thank my friend John Blaxland for his support and patience 
in bringing these projects to fruition. We have known each other since we 
both first marched into Duntroon in January 1983 and served together 
on operations in East Timor. His contribution to the understanding 
of military history and more contemporary security matters has been 
exemplary, and we at Military History and Heritage Victoria are pleased 
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This book would not have been possible without the collective efforts 
of the many contributors. It is a project bigger than one person, with 
the diverse voices that compile this book painting a truly unique and 
comprehensive portrait of Australia’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A key strength of the manuscript is the experiences of the authors, who 
were invited to participate in this project because of their close association 
with the topics discussed. It is a privilege and rare opportunity to be able 
to publish a book that includes the firsthand voices and assessments of 
historical participants, who include a former Minister for Defence, Chief 
of the Defence Force, Secretary of the Defence Department, Chief of 
Army, other senior Australian military and police personnel, a currently 
serving senator, journalists, academics and diplomats.
With such a diverse range of contributors, the manuscript covers a breadth 
of topics, ranging from the strategic and tactical elements of the military 
operations in question, and includes themes such as command, the 
media, and gender aspects. Its presentation of material in short chapters 
works well, and, given that some of the chapters rely more on the authors’ 
recollections, is appropriate. This mixture of experiences and expertise was 
a real strength of the 2017 conference ‘War in the Sandpit’ and remains 
perhaps the defining feature of the book.
The absence of references in some chapters might be particularly noticeable 
in a university publication such as this. We would stress, however, that 
this is characteristic of the lack of records in the public domain and is not 
an indication of a lack of academic rigour.
We, the editors, have sought to increase the book’s strength and appeal 
by inviting other experts to write chapters on topics that were not part of 
the conference. We are indebted to the contributors for their frankness, 
and for their perseverance in turning their speeches from the conference 
NICHE WARS
xiv
into polished chapters for this book. Regrettably, Dr Garth Pratten’s paper 
could not be included in this volume, but his talk, along with the other 
speakers’ talks, can be watched and heard at the Australian Army website, 
‘The Cove’.1
The conference would not have been possible without the support of the 
team from Military History and Heritage Victoria. Thanks must be given 
to Jason McGregor, Brent Taylor, Peter Fielding, Jim Barry, Peter Edwards 
and Michael Buckridge for their efforts in the organisation and delivery of 
the conference. We are also grateful to the Australian Army for the use 
of Enoggera Barracks in Brisbane for the conference, and the Strategic & 
Defence Studies Centre at ANU for its support of the conference and this 
publication.
We wish to express our gratitude to ANU Press for publishing this book 
and  for supporting publications of this nature. Particular thanks go to 
the peer reviewers and the ANU Press Asia-Pacific Security Studies series 
editor, Dr Greg Raymond.
We note this work was essentially complete and ready for publication 
prior to the revelations made public in the Brereton Report released in 
November 2020.2 The work here provides important context to much of 
what Brereton discussed.
Most importantly, thank you to all the men and women who served and 
sacrificed on behalf of Australia. To those who died serving their nation, 
and those who have returned bearing what John Cantwell called the ‘exit 
wounds’ that last well beyond the time on deployment, we hope this book 
helps to explain and do justice to your experience.
1  See ‘War in the Sand Pit Conference—Doctor Garth Pratten’, 19 July 2017, cove.army.gov.au/
search/node/war%20in%20the%20sand%20pit (retrieved 27 April 2020).
2 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Afghanistan Inquiry Report (‘the Brereton 
Report’), afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/IGADF-Afghanistan-Inquiry 
-Public-Release-Version.pdf (retrieved 24 November 2020).
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Map 3: Areas of Australian operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.
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On 11 September 2001, I was working as an integrated exchange officer 
of the US Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, DC. The day 
before, wearing my slouch hat, I had attended a ceremony held on the 
sunny lawns of the Washington Navy Yard. There, President George 
W.  Bush presented to Australia’s visiting Prime Minister John Howard 
the bell of the warship USS Canberra—itself a decommissioned US 
Navy warship. USS Canberra had been given the rare honour of being 
named after a  foreign nation’s capital to commemorate the close bonds 
built in the Pacific War between the two nations’ navies and to honour in 
particular HMAS Canberra, which was sunk while fighting alongside US 
warships in the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942. The gift marked the 
50th anniversary of the signing of the ANZUS Treaty between the United 
States, New Zealand and Australia.
As it turns out, the events that followed that fateful time would not demand 
of Australia the kind of commitment that Australians made during the 
two world wars. No conscription was necessary, and no mass recruitment 
drive was involved. Australians instead committed carefully selected 
force elements from their small and boutique all-volunteer defence force. 
With ongoing concerns closer to home, and mindful of the considerable 
contributions of other partners, the Australian Government chose to 
make a series of carefully calibrated niche contributions, alongside allies 
and coalition partners, on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Looking 
back, nearly 20 years on from that moment, this book sets out to capture 
some of the details of what happened, examining how Australia chose to 




Niche Wars provides a range of rigorous academic perspectives combined 
with a variety of views of prominent practitioners. Of note, this book 
cannot hope to cover all the activities that transpired between 2001 and 
2014. That is the work best left to the official historians, whose work 
is in progress. This book, instead, provides a snapshot of some of the 
problems, addressed largely thematically, without being comprehensive. 
To begin with, what follows is a synopsis of the contributions made by 
the elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) along the way. This 
is a  scene-setter for the reader, providing context for the chapters that 
follow. The  introduction then concludes with a brief overview of the 
structure and content of the book.
Context
Since 1885, when the colonies sent a contingent to support British objectives 
in the Sudan, Australians have engaged in distant military operations in 
the Middle East and neighbouring areas. Thereafter, Australians deployed 
on combat operations in the Middle East during both world wars and 
maintained a peacekeeping presence there for most of the years since. 
This reflected the consistent imperative to remain engaged with affairs in 
the region, particularly given the ongoing reliance of Australia on Middle 
Eastern oil and trade routes. Indeed, Britain remained Australia’s principal 
trade partner for decades after the Second World War, and the main trade 
route was via the Suez Canal. This was vital ground for Australia.
The Suez Crisis in 1956 was an inflection point. Egyptian President Abdul 
Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. Britain, France and Israel responded 
with force and, without knowing the details, Australia offered diplomatic 
support for Britain’s action. US President Dwight Eisenhower, blindsided 
by these surprise actions, threatened economic sanctions, which forced 
Britain to withdraw. This also led to the creation of the first large-scale 
peacekeeping mission to be sanctioned by the United Nations, which was 
an initiative spearheaded by the Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester 
B. Pearson.1 This ignominious moment saw Britain subsequently prepare 
to withdraw from east of Suez and Australia pivot towards working more 
closely on security issues in South-East Asia, but Australia’s interests in 
1  See J. Blaxland, Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British 
and American Empires, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 2006.
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the Middle East never went away. Trade, as well as the flow of oil and the 
call for support from allies, would continue to echo in Australia’s strategic 
consciousness for the rest of the 20th century and beyond.
In defence policy terms, for much of the latter years of the Cold War and 
the early post–Cold War years, defence of Australia was the top priority, 
but the Middle East had still featured occasionally, and Australia made 
niche contributions when required. The Australian Army, for instance, sent 
a select group of army officers on annual rotations to the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) covering Israel and Palestine. 
In addition, a small contingent of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
and Army personnel had served on rotations with the Multinational 
Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai on and off from the mid-1970s 
onwards. As the end of the Cold War approached, and as the Iran–Iraq 
War of 1980–88 came to a close, Australia contributed peacekeepers to 
the United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). 
Australia withdrew its contribution following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990.
Following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s forces, Australia 
was quick to join a UN-mandated coalition to liberate Kuwait. Australia 
supported this initiative but kept its military contribution modest, 
contributing some intelligence analysts, air transport and a rotation of 
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) warships. In that instance, three Australian 
warships participated in blockade operations in the Persian Gulf as part 
of a multinational naval interception force, to enforce the UN sanctions. 
Australia also provided a supply vessel, four medical teams and a mine-
clearance diving team that joined a protective screen, under US operational 
control, around aircraft-carrier battle groups in the Gulf.
In addition to naval units, Australian personnel took part on attachment 
to various British and US ground formations. A small group of RAAF 
photo-interpreters was based in Saudi Arabia, together with a detachment 
from the Defence Intelligence Organisation. Four medical teams were also 
despatched at the request of the United States. Although the ships and 
their crews were in danger from mines and possible air attack, Australia’s 
war was relatively uneventful, and there were no casualties.2
2  For an authoritative account of Australia’s involvement in the Gulf War, see D. Horner, The Official 
History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, vol. 2: Australia and the 
‘New World Order’, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2011.
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At war’s end, 75 Australians deployed to northern Iraq to assist in the 
provision of humanitarian aid to Kurds living in a UN-declared exclusion 
zone. The RAN continued its contribution to the interception operations, 
and several Australian naval officers commanded the multinational 
interception force. Australia later provided weapons inspectors in Iraq 
to monitor the discovery and disposal of prohibited nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons of mass destruction. From then on, Australia 
also maintained naval ships on station in the Persian Gulf on an almost 
continuous basis.
A decade later, and after having had apparently quick successes in 
Afghanistan, the ADF was better placed and more prepared to make 
a  more robust contribution to offensive, and inherently dangerous, 
military operations in Iraq. The Special Air Service Regiment contributed 
to a  combat search and rescue force in Kuwait in 1998 in support of 
US-backed UN initiatives to enforce sanctions. That experience 
demonstrated the ease of deployment and the evident utility of special 
forces for contentious deployments far from Australia’s shores. Howard 
wanted ‘quick and clean’ force contributions that could be ‘in at the 
pointy end and then out fast’.3
Events after 11 September 2001, or 9/11 as it came to be known, would 
see the Middle East return to centre stage. Government policy shifted 
in part in recognition of the need to protect and advance Australia’s 
national interests further from Australian shores than was envisaged in 
the preceding two decades.
These commitments, and the ones that would follow on a greater scale 
from 2001 onwards, exposed a historically deep-seated impulse to remain 
active far beyond Australia’s shores. By 2001, however, the dynamics had 
shifted, with Australia still seeing the Middle East as important while 
looking to its near north as a priority, particularly in view of burgeoning 
trade connections.
President Bush called it the ‘Global War on Terror’—perhaps in itself 
leading to a distracting focus on fighting a nebulous concept rather than 
a specific enemy. Sensing its awkwardness, Australia avoided endorsing 
the term. For Prime Minister Howard, however, 9/11 was a moment 
3  See J. Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 2014, pp. 218–19.
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worthy of invoking the 50-year-old ANZUS Treaty. Howard committed 
Australian forces, from all three services, to operations alongside US and 
coalition forces in the Middle East, a commitment that ended up being 
for a longer period than either of the two world wars. (See Appendix 1 
for a table of Australian units and formations deployed to Afghanistan 
and the Middle East, 2001–14.) But this time they did so while avoiding 
the politically contentious issues of conscription and heavy own-force 
casualties by making niche and calibrated force contributions and by 
utilising only a professional, all-volunteer force.
The United States identified Afghanistan as the primary target, being the 
state ruled by the Taliban, which was closely associated with the terrorist 
group al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden. The Taliban’s refusal to expel 
al-Qaeda triggered the allied attacks aimed at their overthrow. The attacks 
began on 7 October, and within five weeks the capital, Kabul, had fallen 
to the US-led coalition’s principal Afghan partners, the Northern Alliance.
A chronology of Australia’s military involvement in Afghanistan 
commencing in 2001 is located at Appendix 2.
Few Australians realised the fight would continue for years thereafter. 
In reality, it would mean multiple deployments of ground, maritime and 
air contingents to the Middle East for the better part of the following two 
decades. Australians would soon be found in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, 
the Persian Gulf, Qatar, Dubai and beyond, as well as in transit across the 
Indian Ocean and on deployments alongside US and other coalition 
counterparts in headquarters across the Middle East and in HQ Central 
Command in Florida.
In contrast to the commitments in the major wars in the Middle East 
in the early to mid-twentieth century, Australia did not rely on mass 
mobilisation of troops. Instead, as the chapters in this book illustrate, the 
Australian Government chose to make small contributions to generate 
carefully constrained strategic effects—notably in support of Australia’s 
major alliance partner, the United States. There were compelling reasons 
beyond the alliance relationship for Australia to engage with these security 
issues, as did many other powers. But with an eye to the political fallout 
from the Vietnam War commitment decades earlier, the government 
sought to minimise domestic political risk from an open-ended 
commitment. Each decision to commit forces therefore was evaluated for 
the tactical, operational and strategic consequences, as well as the political 
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consequences likely to be generated back home. Notwithstanding these 
overarching constraints, operations in the Middle East would provide 
a  wide range of unique additional challenges and opportunities for 
elements of the ADF to learn and adapt.
The deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq came in several iterations over 
the early years of the conflicts. At the outset, Prime Minister Howard 
wished to make a carefully calibrated, niche contribution to a US-led 
coalition, to ensure that Australia was not engaged in a protracted war 
and that it remained able to respond to any crises in our region should 
they arise. Hence the initial contingent deployed were special forces, with 
the first SAS Squadron being committed to operations in November 2001 
as part of a US Marine Expeditionary Unit. Campaigning in Afghanistan 
ended inconclusively in mid-2002, and the special forces soldiers were 
withdrawn promptly.
The early success of the special forces in Afghanistan led to a similar 
political calculus for the deployment to Iraq in 2003. Operations 
BASTILLE and FALCONER were the names given successively to the 
preparatory operation and then the actual conduct of ADF operations as 
part of the war in Iraq. (See Appendix 3 for a chronology of Australia’s 
involvement in Iraq, 2003–09.)
The controversy arising from the US Government’s approach to 
preparations for war in Iraq generated protests around the world, notably 
in the capital cities of the principal participants, especially the United 
States, United Kingdom and Australia. That controversy would reverberate 
for years afterwards as the principal declared rationale for removal of 
the Saddam Hussein regime was the claim that he was hiding weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). UN-sanctioned weapons inspectors had 
encountered increased wariness in Iraq, which appeared to point to Iraqi 
authorities having something to hide. Intelligence analysts working for 
countries for and against the projected war in Iraq agreed that Iraq must 
have a WMD program, but little thought was given to the internal logic 
of the Saddam regime’s fear of disclosure. In hindsight, it appears obvious. 
Saddam did not wish to declare that he no longer had a WMD capability 
as it would have emboldened neighbouring Iran. Then, as war looked 
increasingly inevitable, he was too proud to concede and too confident 




The Australian Government, sensing the mood in Washington, DC, 
eager to support its key ally and believing the reports of an enduring 
WMD capability, supported military planning as part of BASTILLE 
and in anticipation of the switch to offensive military operations as part 
of Operation FALCONER. Hence, when it came finally to supporting 
US offensive action, the preceding preparations made the transition to 
FALCONER a relatively seamless one.
For FALCONER, Australia planned to make useful but niche 
contributions. This included an SAS squadron group, which deployed to 
the Iraqi western desert, supported by a squadron of RAAF FA-18 Hornet 
fighter aircraft and RAN fleet elements working closely with their US and 
UK counterparts. This was a considerably more substantial contribution 
than the ADF had made for the Gulf War in 1991.
The Australian special forces, as well as the RAAF contributions, were 
warmly received by their US coalition counterparts, who were keen 
to have international partners. Their presence, however, was tightly 
constrained to the initial phases of the war, on the understanding that 
after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime they would be released for 
return to Australia. The realities of war in the Iraqi desert involved long 
distances to be covered travelling off-road, with the risk of encountering 
armoured opponents. Arguably, this task was better suited to Australian 
cavalry forces, but Prime Minister Howard was confident that the special 
forces could do the job and with the least risk of Australian casualties. 
Nevertheless the Darwin-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment, together with 
a  company of mounted infantry, did deploy to Iraq where they were 
retained to form an Australian Embassy Security Detachment in Baghdad.
Over the next two years, Australia maintained a low profile in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In time, however, with the war proving not nearly as conclusive as 
President Bush had anticipated, the security situation in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq deteriorated, and the United States applied considerable pressure 
for Australian forces to return to assist. In February 2005, therefore, 
Prime Minister Howard committed an additional force to southern 
Iraq, deployed to Al Muthanna working closely with coalition partners, 
including Dutch, Japanese and British troops.
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Similarly, in Afghanistan, having moved on from that theatre of 
operations to focus on Iraq, the US departure had allowed a resurgence 
of Taliban forces. By 2005, the calls for coalition partners to bolster 
the US position there were becoming stronger. As a result, Australia 
weighed its options. Eager to avoid a commitment that would expose 
Australia to a major force commitment, significant additional expense 
and a heightened risk of casualties, the Howard Government decided to 
recommit a Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) that year under the 
banner of Operation SLIPPER, this time to Uruzgan Province in central 
Afghanistan. Special forces had proven to be reliable as being readily 
deployable, highly professional and less likely to face significant numbers 
of casualties. Following three SOTG rotations, the 1st Reconstruction 
Task Force (RTF1) formed and deployed to Tarin Kowt, the central town 
in Uruzgan. There it worked to build up Afghan society as well as defeat 
the Taliban. In April 2007, a SOTG returned to operate alongside the 
RTF to provide a kinetic war-fighting capability.
As time passed, the focus for the RTFs turned from reconstruction 
to mentored reconstruction. Eventually, the focus shifted mostly to 
mentoring the Afghan National Security Force, with the aim of developing 
indigenous capacity-building. As part of this approach, efforts were made 
to ensure that initiatives funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and its Australian Aid projects were coordinated and that those 
undertaken by the Australian Federal Police were synchronised with the 
ADF initiatives as well. As some chapters of this book attest, this sounded 
good in principle but proved difficult in practice.
From one perspective, this carefully calibrated contribution made 
sense. The Australian commitment to operations in Uruzghan Province 
involved a defined physical area with agreed, limited force contributions 
and partnered with a prominent NATO member state, the Netherlands. 
Initially the Dutch would be in charge, not the Australians. This seemed 
to be a convenient way to ensure that the Dutch made a significant 
contribution to the international stabilisation operations in Afghanistan 
while keeping Australia’s contribution in check. It also meant that 
Australia did not have to contribute all the force elements for an effective 




Successive Australian governments renewed the commitment to the war 
in Afghanistan despite mounting losses. Over time, the ADF deployment 
in Uruzgan generated a growing number of casualties: 11 Australians died 
on operations in Afghanistan from 2002 to the end of 2009, 10 died in 
2010 and 11 in 2011.
A disproportionate portion of the load fell on the shoulders of Australia’s 
special forces soldiers who deployed in successive SOTG rotations. 
By 2014, many had been on several such deployments. Eventually, this 
would lead to over-exposure of these elite troops to the brutality and 
apparent unending nature of a campaign that lacked clarity of purpose. 
Consequently, their actions led to some highly questionable outcomes 
and accusations of war crimes that would prove corrosive to Australia’s 
special forces and the broader ADF.4 In hindsight, this probably should 
have been seen as the inevitable outcome of a flawed strategy. Without 
a  holistic counter-insurgency campaign for Afghanistan, let alone 
Uruzgan, much of the direction of tactical actions fell on the shoulders 
of soldiers and commanders. In the absence of a compelling overarching 
strategy, the main campaign plans left Australian and coalition forces 
with an inadequate raison d’être for the brutal fight they were tasked to 
undertake.
Beyond the SOTG rotations and the reconstruction and mentoring task 
forces, Australians were seconded to (i.e. embedded in) coalition units 
and headquarters in Tarin Kowt, Kabul, Kandahar, Bagram and in other 
locations across Afghanistan. In Tarin Kowt, under the Dutch-led Task 
Force Uruzgan Headquarters, Australian embeds assisted in coordinating 
missions, campaign planning and mission deconfliction among other 
duties, and used this experience in joint headquarters to inform Australian 
planning. This embedded experience allowed Australians not only to 
practice the art of military operations but also to utilise the information 
and experience they gained to inform planning and refine processes for 
future Australian deployments.
Meanwhile, the RAN and RAAF continued to gain excellent operational 
experience from their carefully calibrated force contributions, and their 
experience helped to generate momentum for development, introduction 
into service and refinement of significant capabilities. For the Air Force, 
4  See Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Killing Field’, Four Corners, 16 March 2020, www.
abc.net.au/4corners/killing-field/12060538 (retrieved 19 March 2020).
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this included advances in niche capabilities including airborne refuelling, 
airborne early warning and control, airborne surveillance, communications 
and identification systems capabilities as well as ground-based air traffic 
control through the RAAF’s deployable Control and Reporting Centre. 
Almost the entire RAN fleet undertook one or more deployment to 
participate in intervention and monitoring operations in and around the 
Persian Gulf for the entire period covered in this book and beyond. This 
experience helped to justify and refine technological advances, including 
weapons systems upgrades and enhancements to missile systems and 
phased array radars.
By 2014, about 1,550 Australian military personnel were stationed in 
Afghanistan as part of Australia’s military contribution to the international 
campaign against terrorism, maritime security in the Middle East Area 
of Operations (MEAO) and countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden, all 
under the banner of Operation SLIPPER. All of this was commanded by 
a Joint Task Force headquarters sited in the Persian Gulf and answerable 
to Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) back in 
Australia. An additional 830 ADF personnel were deployed across the 
broader MEAO, often alongside coalition partners, making discrete 
but important contributions. Australia also maintained a continuous 
maritime contribution to Operation SLIPPER, which included RAN 
frigates on rotation.5
The SOTG and the mentoring and reconstruction forces returned to 
Australia from Uruzghan in 2014. Australian forces had withdrawn from 
Iraq after Kevin Rudd’s election victory in 2007, but they stayed on in 
Afghanistan until 2014 when a major US force drawdown took place. 
Yet the decisions made in 2014 did not see the end of the matter in either 
Afghanistan or Iraq. Iraq saw the rise of the so-called Islamic State in 
2014 and a demand for a return to assist the government of Iraq alongside 
US and other coalition partners. How the situation arose, what transpired 
and how Australia responded is a separate story not recounted in these 
pages. Similarly, the post-2014 ADF mission in Afghanistan continued, 
but not in Uruzghan Province. That story, like the one for Iraq, is beyond 
the scope of this book.
5  See Australian War Memorial, ‘Afghanistan, 2001 to present’, www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/




Despite the publication of a number of works in recent times on 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which focus on US, UK and Canadian 
experiences, only a few works capture the Australian experience.6 This is 
in part due to the nature of the ongoing conflict and a general reluctance 
to analyse what is not yet complete; it is also due to the comparatively 
small role played by Australians compared to the larger coalition partners. 
Chris Masters, a leading voice on Australian Middle East operations, has 
written such works as No Front Line: Australian Special Forces at War in 
Afghanistan, which highlights special forces operations in Afghanistan, 
featuring experiences and testimonies gained during his 10-year 
investigation.7 Masters’ work also raised difficult questions that pointed 
to the controversial clouds hanging over operations undertaken by the 
Special Forces in Afghanistan—controversies that would be considered 
in searing detail in the Brereton Report of 2020.8 Karen Middleton’s 
An Unwinnable War provides insight into the political motivations for 
involvement in the Middle East and the critical decisions that led to 
Australian deployment and continued presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.9 
6  There are too many to list, but some examples from the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Canada are highlighted here. On the United States, see J.T. Hoffman (ed.), Tip of the Spear: US 
Army Small-Unit Actions in Iraq, 2004–2007, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 2010; S.A. 
Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 
2011; N.J. Schlosser, The Surge, 2007–2008: US Army Campaigns in Iraq, Center of Military History, 
Washington, DC, 2017; B. Neumann, L. Mundey and J. Mikolashek, Operations Enduring Freedom, 
March 2002–April 2005, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 2013; G.C. Schroen, First In: 
An Insiders Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Presidio Press, New 
York, 2005; D.P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2014; and T.E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure 
in Iraq, Penguin, New York, 2006. On the United Kingdom, see T. Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War 
in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, Vintage, London, 2018; C.L. Elliott, High Command: British Military 
leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Hurst, London, 2015; and F. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: 
British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2017. On Canada, see 
J.G. Steyn and E. Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, Penguin, Toronto, 2008; B. Horn 
and E. Spencer, Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 2016; B. Horn, No Lack 
of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 2010; S. Maloney, Enduring the 
Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2005.
7  C. Masters, No Front Line: Australia’s Special Forces at War in Afghanistan, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 2017.
8 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Afghanistan Inquiry Report (‘the Brereton 
Report’), afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/IGADF-Afghanistan-Inquiry 
-Public-Release-Version.pdf (retrieved 24 November 2020).




Al Palazzo’s manuscript on the Iraq War and his more recent edited work 
with Tom Frame, On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army 
Since East Timor, consider a range of practical tactical and operational 
factors, including command and control arrangements and logistics 
difficulties, encountered during Australian Middle Eastern deployments.10 
At the ‘War in the Sandpit’ conference, Garth Pratten delivered an 
excellent account of the Australian contribution to the coalition campaign 
(unfortunately not included here) in which he contextualised Australian 
operations in southern Afghanistan.11 In  addition, my own work, The 
Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, published in 2014, critically 
examines the development of the Australian Army since the Vietnam War 
and the influence of these developments on operations in the Middle East.
In addition to these secondary works, a range of autobiographical accounts 
have provided on-the-ground insight into Australia’s role in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, notably accounts from Majors General Jim Molan and John 
Cantwell,12 as well as Colonel Marcus Fielding.13 They all describe their 
experiences in frank detail, greatly adding to our understanding of the wars. 
In 2013, Victoria Cross recipient Corporal Mark Donaldson published 
his own autobiographical account entitled The Crossroad, in which he 
recalled the events that led to his receipt of the highest bravery honour.14 
Publishing via the Land Warfare Studies Centre in 2011, Colonel Peter 
Connolly painted a critical picture of his combat experience in Uruzgan 
and his concern over the lack of strategy from Canberra.15 Biographical 
accounts are not just written by our soldiers, with photographer Gary 
Ramage and defence writer Ian McPhedran’s Afghanistan: Australia’s War 
providing a photographic depiction of Australia’s efforts in the Middle 
East.16 McPhedran’s commentary on Ramage’s images is evocative and 
thought-provoking, providing details of an often unseen visual dimension 
to the wars.
10  A. Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010, Directorate of Army Research 
and Analysis, Canberra, 2011; T. Frame and A. Palazzo (eds), On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for the 
Australian Army Since East Timor, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2016.
11  G. Pratten, speech, ‘War in the Sandpit’ conference, cove.army.gov.au/article/war-the-sand-pit-
conference-doctor-garth-pratten (retrieved 30 March 2020).
12  J. Molan, Running the War in Iraq, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2008; J. Cantwell with G. Bearup, 
Exit Wounds: One Australian’s War on Terror, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2012.
13  M. Fielding, Red Zone Baghdad: My War in Iraq, Echo Books, Canberra, 2016.
14  M. Donaldson, The Crossroad, Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 2013.
15  P. Connolly, Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, 2009, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2011.
16  G. Ramage and I. McPhedran, Afghanistan: Australia’s War, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2014.
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The Official History of Australian Operations in the Middle East and 
East Timor is due to be published in 2022. In the interim, works such 
as this provide a new and expansive account of Australia’s experience in 
deploying forces and conducting operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Outline and contributors
This collection of papers covers a range of experiences of Australia’s 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, from maritime operations in the 
Gulf in the 1990s to the withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan 
in 2013. The authors come from a variety of backgrounds, and each 
contributes their unique perspectives and voices to further the efforts to 
achieve a more complete view of Australia’s operations in the ‘niche wars’ 
described here. The book is divided into four parts: policy and strategy; 
Afghanistan and Iraq; joint forces, enablers and partners; and lessons and 
legacies.
These chapters were all chosen for a specific purpose. Most of the authors 
were presenters at the ‘War in the Sandpit’ conference in May 2017, lending 
their expertise to debate and discussion there as they have to articulating 
their thoughts for this volume. Most importantly, they illuminate a human 
perspective on these operations not often otherwise considered.
The first chapter in Part 1 is the keynote and opening chapter by Professor 
Robert Hill, Minister for Defence from 2001 to 2006, who relates his 
impressions of the political lessons from Australia’s military involvement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hill summarises his involvement in key moments 
of the campaigns, including the decision to withdraw special forces, and 
debates on how many troops to commit. He concludes with poignant 
lessons for future campaigns for politicians, emphasising that committing 
the ADF is not always the most appropriate solution for a problem.
The chapter by former Secretary of the Department of Defence Ric 
Smith on perspectives and lessons on Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the 
conflict between strategic objectives and circumstances on the ground, 
and the ways in which successive governments have sought to maintain 
the overarching strategic objective of Australia’s alliance with the United 
States despite changing circumstances in the conflicts. Writing also of his 
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personal experience as Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
he provides immense insight into top-level decision-making from 2001 
to the withdrawal of combat forces in 2013.
Admiral Chris Barrie, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) from 1998 to 
2002, writes of his perspective on Australian military strategy following 
the 9/11 attacks. He relates his recollections of initial challenges relating 
to interoperability, and the general sentiment felt towards operations by 
politicians and members of the ADF. He concludes with a reflection that 
he believes the Australian experience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have fundamentally changed the Australian approach to war.
Part 2 opens with a reflection on the early days, and, as with any reflective 
analysis, it is important to distil experiences from specific operational 
units. Brigadier Dan McDaniel, former Commanding Officer of the 
Special Air Service Regiment, articulates the political imperatives and 
pressures that led to the initial deployment of special forces troops to 
Afghanistan in 2001. He explains that the commitment of special forces 
troops was not just made in an effort to maintain the US alliance but as 
part of a broader effort to demonstrate the Australian commitment to the 
global rules-based order, and as a way to demonstrate autonomous ADF 
military power under worldwide scrutiny. McDaniel outlines some key 
lessons from the deployment. He notes what he sees as the miscalculation 
of the operational and practical strength of the ADF relationship with 
its counterpart US forces, and the need for certainty in command and 
control arrangements.
Air Commodore Chris Westwood, writing about his experience in 
the RAAF Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) from 2007 to 2009 
in Afghanistan, provides a unique RAAF perspective on the conflict. 
He  identifies key lessons from the deployment, dividing them into the 
broad themes of strategic, operational and tactical lessons. Westwood 
concludes that a successful and niche deployment should not be left 
unscrutinised, and that the experiences of the CRC can be extrapolated 
to future deployments of cyber and electronic warfare elements, 
among others.
In discussing his experience in Iraq, Major General Anthony Rawlins, 
former task group commander, reflects on Operation CATALYST and 
his personal experience with what he saw as strategic-tactical dissonance. 
He  writes of the polarised perception of the effectiveness of stability 
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operations as practised by the Australians in Iraq. He claims that the 
Australians played a marginal role in southern Iraq from 2005 onwards, 
having only a limited—even at times negative—impact in Al Muthanna 
and Dhi Qar Provinces. He concludes that the command and control 
arrangements in Iraq were not the optimal way to proceed and set a 
disconcerting precedent for possible involvement in future conflicts. 
As a result, he urges a reappraisal of the form and substance of national 
command and control architecture to be applied in such circumstances.
Vice Admiral Peter Jones has played several and prominent roles leading 
Australia’s naval endeavours in the Middle East over a prolonged period, 
including as commander of Australian naval forces and the coalition’s 
Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander in the lead-up 
to and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He relates the maritime 
perspective of Australia’s involvement in the Middle East, broadening 
his focus to include the ways in which the RAN combatted piracy and 
smugglers as part of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF). He outlines 
in great depth the nature and composition of naval missions from 1990 to 
2003, highlighting some necessary adaptations that were made, and issues 
of interoperability and coalition command structures. He concludes that 
operations in the Gulf were largely a success in the Iraq War owing to the 
MIF’s existing knowledge of Gulf waters and to efforts to liaise effectively 
with ground forces.
One of Australia’s most famous integrated exchange officers, or ‘embeds’, 
Major General Jim Molan, provides a blunt but honest account of his 
experience as an embed in Iraq and the lessons Australian command 
and politicians can learn from his time. He emphasises the need for the 
ADF to understand the type of war they are fighting and what they are 
willing to sacrifice in the name of the US alliance in future conflicts, as this 
was a key point of contention in Iraq. He concludes with 11 generalised 
lessons from his time as an embed, which, he posits, can be applied in 
future conflicts.
Part 3, covering joint forces, enablers and partners, starts with a chapter 
on command and control. Major General Michael Crane has compiled 
his assessment of Australian command and control arrangements in 
the Middle East, leveraging his extensive experience as Commander of 
JTF 633 on two occasions, and at HQJOC and CENTCOM between 
2006 and 2012. He reflects on such issues as the establishment of 
discrete national commanders, and his interpretation of the successes 
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and limitations of these divergences in command structures from the 
arrangements employed by Australia’s coalition partners. He concludes 
by pointing to the wide array of issues that Australia has yet to resolve in 
establishing an approach to command and control of operations. He notes 
the difficulty of objective analysis of Australia’s involvement in the Middle 
East, given that individual perspectives are driven by the context of the 
observer’s unique experience.
Colonel Mick Lehmann’s chapter on the role of army intelligence 
in Afghanistan is understandably constrained by operational secrecy 
provisions; however, he manages nonetheless to provide a remarkable 
insight into the practical workings of intelligence in this campaign. 
He touches on the importance of actionable intelligence and the essential 
nature of the ‘Five Eyes’ relationship in Afghanistan.17 He also outlines 
some of the reasons for significant failings experienced by Australian 
intelligence operations. Ultimately Lehmann concludes that, despite solid 
tactical and operational successes, the overall impact of intelligence on the 
strategic outcome remains uncertain and hard to measure effectively.
Dr Alan Ryan, Director of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, has 
compiled a chapter that provides a unique and important assessment of 
civil–military relations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He relates the experiences 
of several civilian actors in these conflicts and the challenges faced in 
attempting to deliver humanitarian assistance. He concludes with seven 
recommendations that, despite being ambitious, outline a clear path 
towards greater coordination and effectiveness of civilian efforts in conflict.
The role of the media in Australia’s Middle East operations is of particular 
importance to debate. Karen Middleton, a political journalist, prominent 
war correspondent and author of An Unwinnable War, writes about her 
experiences as an embedded journalist on three separate occasions and 
how the ADF and Australian Government interaction with the media 
was starkly different from that of the United States. Karen emphasises 
the necessity of accurate and influential reporting from conflict zones 
and the responsibility of both journalists and the ADF not to obfuscate 
on operations.
17  ‘Five Eyes’ refers to the intelligence-sharing arrangements between the five English-speaking 
nations: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which is abbreviated 
to reflect the caveat used on shared classified documents thus: ‘AUS/CAN/UK/US/NZ Eyes Only’.
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Superintendents Col Speedie and Steve Mullins offer a comprehensive 
account of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) deployment to Afghanistan 
and the various opportunities and challenges that accompanied it. 
In particular, they note the ways in which police, who are not trained for 
warlike operational environments as their ADF counterparts are, managed 
to adapt to the environment effectively. Accordingly, they were able to 
negotiate bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements, create training doctrine 
and become an integral part of a coalition policing effort in Afghanistan.
David Savage reflects on the AusAID experience in Afghanistan 
and  the problems that arose from attempting to deliver effective 
aid and reconstruction in a highly dynamic conflict zone. He relates the 
difficulties present in creating ongoing relationships with stakeholders 
and communities, building trust and delivering aid to the areas that need 
it most. Ultimately, David concludes that, for all their hard work, the lack 
of continuity in Afghan leadership and absence of central government 
support for reconstruction and aid-driven projects meant that AusAID’s 
efforts had little or no overall long-term positive impact.
Australian Army Major Elizabeth Boulton provides a comprehensive 
account of gender issues and debates that have arisen from the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. She highlights a positive story that these wars saw 
the first mass employment of women in warlike operations, in combat-
related roles, in Australian history. However, Boulton also highlights that 
there was a strategic ‘gender’ blind spot, with the significance of women’s 
contribution of operational outcomes belatedly appreciated. Ultimately, 
Boulton argues, deployments can be greatly enhanced by a thorough 
understanding of the composition of the troops and of the human terrain, 
both of which have gendered dimensions. She makes clear that this should 
be focused on more intently in strategic planning.
Part 4 of the book covers lessons and legacies from the niche wars. William 
Maley, an ANU professor and respected scholar of the war in Afghanistan, 
approaches the question of the legacy of the war in Afghanistan from 
the perspective not only of lessons for the ADF but also the legacy for 
Afghanistan. He examines the psychological and societal impacts of the 
coalition forces’ intervention in Afghanistan on the Afghan people, and 
notes that the entirety of the legacy of the Afghan war cannot yet be 
realised. He divides lessons for military deployments into seven points, 
covering the necessity for deployments to be linked to political strategy, 
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the difficulties of unintentionally fostering violence when attempting 
to create stability, and the impact of the miscalculation of the nature of 
insurgency in Afghanistan.
In the next chapter on the US and British experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Professor Dan Marston articulates the importance of 
identifying military operational lessons and then analysing and debating 
these lessons. He criticises contemporary military leaders for rushing to 
declare ‘lessons learned’ when they have not rigorously analysed these 
issues in a way that is necessary if we are to avoid repeated failures in 
future conflicts. Marston identifies five themes that are common among 
the US and British experiences, and offers a starting point for further 
debates on these themes.
Lieutenant General (Retired) Peter Leahy was Australia’s Chief of Army 
from 2002 to 2008, when he became Professor of National Security Studies 
at the University of Canberra. Leahy divides his assessment of the lessons 
and legacies for the Australian Army from Iraq and Afghanistan into nine 
strategic and operational lessons and three broad legacies. He  extracts 
key similarities in lessons for Australia from the UK Iraq Inquiry 
released in 2016, and the pitfalls of maintaining an army unprepared for 
21st-century conflicts. He concludes that the absence of a cohesive and 
enduring strategic objective was the main contributor to failings in the 
Middle East and that such an objective is a necessary criterion to fulfil for 
future conflicts. Finally, he recommends a thorough re-evaluation of the 
procedures that lead to Australia committing troops to overseas conflicts, 
and a stronger effort to care for returned troops in Australia.
As the Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and East Timor, Craig Stockings concludes Part 4 by imparting his initial 
impressions of the Official History project. He outlines the unorthodox 
process that led to his remit and how he has planned to approach the task 
of documenting Australia’s involvement in these conflicts in six volumes.
We now turn to Part 1 and the opening chapter by the Honourable 
Senator Robert Hill.








My experiences of Australia’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are from 
a political perspective. My thoughts and recollections are not scholarly, and 
they might or might not be shared by others who were also part of 
the government at that time, but nonetheless allow me to relate some 
lessons learned.
These wars have been huge endeavours for Australia. They have touched 
so many Australians in different ways. And even though they continue 
today, it is worthwhile to pause and reflect on the experiences and lessons 
learned. Even to try to understand why we are still engaged, after the 
longest period of continuous deployment in our history, is important.
It was a privilege to be Australia’s Defence Minister, and I will forever 
be grateful to the men and women of the services who carried out the 
missions set by government with professionalism and determination. 
I equally appreciated the service of officials of the department who 
were critical enablers in all missions. I was lucky to have military and 
departmental leadership of the highest calibre. We shared some difficult 
moments, and they excelled themselves.
The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were a result of, and continue 
to be a result of, political decisions. I was one of the politicians making 
decisions at critical times, and appreciate that it is just as important for 
politicians to learn from past experiences as it is for the military.
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I came to Defence from the Environment portfolio. I was given the 
Environment ministry because it had always been a conflict zone for my 
side of politics. I won a few of the environment battles and settled a few 
more by peaceful means. Nevertheless, it might still seem for military 
people to have been an unusual path to Defence.
There is no minimum qualification to be Defence Minister, or even to 
be a politician. There is no one course of study. You have to go back 
a long way to find a Defence Minister with military service. Occasionally 
there is someone in the Cabinet with military experience, but again, it is 
rare. It  is even unusual to find someone with a background in strategic 
policy. It is therefore not surprising that the defence leadership sometimes 
finds the political world a bit bewildering, or at least untidy.
So how does a group of apparently unqualified individuals make a decision 
to take the country to war? Or, more particularly in the context of this 
conference, to deploy Australian forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 
in 2003? The latter decision is still the subject of critical debate in some 
circles. It is easy to say that politicians make a determination of what 
is in the national interest. But how do they determine what is in the 
national interest?
Each politician is influenced by individual values and experiences. In my 
case, I was trained in the law. I believed in a rules-based order, both 
domestically and internationally. In the early 1990s I was working to 
build democracies in the post–Cold War era because I believed in the 
basic freedoms that underpin democracy. Before that I focused on getting 
political prisoners out of jails in Cuba and elsewhere. I believed in universal 
human rights. I am also a globalist. I believe in the interdependency of 
nation-states. I also believe in alliances based on shared values. And I have 
always feared the indiscriminate and destructive power of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).1 I started working towards non-proliferation 
of WMD more than 40 years ago. From that background I assessed my 
attitude to our military participation in the wars in question.
1  That is, nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons that can cause mass killings or great 
damage.
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In relation to Afghanistan, the cruelty and barbarism and the 
inter-territorial nature of the 9/11 attacks on the United States had an 
enormous effect on me. Even today, I cannot stand on the World Trade 
Center site in New York without shaking my head in disbelief. How could 
this happen? What is the world coming to?
The attacks on the United Sates led our Prime Minister, John Howard, 
immediately to invoke the ANZUS Treaty, although in technical terms 
that was a decision for Cabinet, which we made a few days later on his 
return from the United States. We all saw this as not only an attack on 
our ally the United States but also, and fundamentally, an attack on our 
shared values.
I remember the meeting by telephone of the leadership group within 
Cabinet, held the morning after 9/11 when we took advice from our 
intelligence agencies and took decisions to ensure Australia’s immediate 
security. We saw the attack on the United States as equally directed at us, 
and sadly we were proven right sometime later, when those who shared 
the al-Qaeda ideology deliberately targeted Australians in Bali and Jakarta 
in 2002 and 2005, in neighbouring Indonesia, as well as in Afghanistan.
ANZUS might be primarily a commitment to consult, but in the 
circumstances I have just sketched it is not surprising that a short time 
later we took the decision to commit forces to Afghanistan and against the 
Taliban regime. In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was permitted bases and given 
support. To remove the threat also required the defeat of the Taliban. 
The Afghanistan response had United Nations Security Council support 
and was not particularly controversial. Removing the Taliban did run the 
risk of creating a vacuum in governance, but this was a responsibility 
the United Nations was willing to assume.
It is interesting to reflect on the fact that if the Taliban had not provided 
comfort and support to al-Qaeda, it might have been permitted by the 
international community to continue to abuse its own Afghan people for 
some time. In Australia this was regarded as an internal affair, even if we 




Australian troops were deployed after I became Defence Minister but 
pursuant to a decision made before my appointment. I remember visiting 
Kabul after the deployment and meeting the UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi. It was in part to brief him on 
the Australian mission objectives and in part to explore how Australia 
might assist the post-war reconstruction and transition in governance. 
It was all reasonably orthodox in an environment where the operations 
seemed to be going well.
I guess the first mildly controversial decision I was involved in was the 
government’s decision to withdraw special forces from Afghanistan. 
It was said by some that this was in preparation for pending operations in 
Iraq. In truth, both the government and I were concerned with avoiding 
mission creep. The advice of the Defence leadership was that the task for 
which our special forces were sent had been achieved.
The next big government decision in relation to Afghanistan was to return 
to the theatre with both special forces and a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT). I had been a strong advocate of the need for the international 
community to support the development of sustainable institutions and 
basic necessities such as health, education and infrastructure. It is not 
only a good thing to do in development terms but also guards against 
the return of another extremist regime. However, the overlap between 
the role of the military in providing security and civilians in providing 
humanitarian and development aid is complicated, even in seemingly 
straightforward circumstances. In this scenario, it was made more difficult 
by the fact that Afghanistan was never really post-conflict. Nevertheless, to 
me, development was essential if Afghanistan was to ever stand a chance 
of normalcy.
I took to the National Security Committee of Cabinet a bid for a PRT 
and came out with not only a PRT but also a government decision to 
return the special forces to Afghanistan. This was an acknowledgement of 
the need to transition to development and a recognition that the security 
situation was not as far advanced as we had earlier believed.
The role of the military in nation-building is not straightforward. With 
its ‘can do’ attitude, the military sometimes overestimates what it is 
able to achieve. It is for the politicians to set the mission parameters, 
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and they should be realistic in assessing what is for the military and 
what requires other elements. The challenge is to get the right mix. 
I do not think the international community invested enough in nation-
building in Afghanistan. But if they had, it still might not have worked. 
Unfortunately, Afghanistan will be a work in progress for a long time.
Iraq
Despite what some might say, the intervention in Iraq did not commence 
as an operation against terrorism. Certainly, for our part, it was not an 
operation to secure oil, but was a response to the perceived threat posed 
by Saddam Hussein’s WMD program.
Saddam Hussein had had WMDs, and even used them against his 
own people, at little international cost. What had changed was the risk 
threshold the United States was prepared to accept. As with Afghanistan, 
this related to 9/11. President Clinton knew al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
posed a threat, but his limited response had not removed that threat. 
No subsequent president could take the same risk after 9/11.
President Bush saw Saddam Hussein in the same light. He was a threat. 
He had previously invaded his neighbours and drawn the United States, 
Australia and others into that conflict. The inability of the UN processes 
to satisfy the US administration that Saddam had both forgone his 
mass destruction weaponry and complied with UN Security Council 
resolutions that he disarms and verify left a risk too great to accept.
History showed that conflict in the region flowing from Saddam Hussein’s 
unquenched expansionist goals would in all likelihood again draw us in. 
But this time it might subject Australian forces to chemical and biological 
weapons. This was a risk we felt was too great for us to bear. The national 
interest was therefore to support our ally in the heavy lifting and to 
protect against what might become a direct threat to Australians and 
their interests.
At the time of the Iraq invasion, did Saddam Hussein still possess 
weapons of mass destruction? I had watched the UN processes intently. 
There was always an ambiguity in Saddam Hussein’s response. He always 
seemed to be hedging. There were a lot of wise heads after the event, 
but my intelligence briefings at the time were that he did maintain those 
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capabilities, biological and chemical, but not nuclear. In fact, I was briefed 
on what was believed to be his command and control regime, including 
who would give the command for the use of those weapons. I will never 
forget the briefings. Defence insisted that I be inoculated against anthrax 
before travelling to Iraq.
Nevertheless, I wanted to hear different perspectives. I travelled to the 
United States and listened to their intelligence services. Their brief was 
similar, although in some aspects they were even more confident. I followed 
this with further briefings in the United Kingdom. Again I was presented 
with similar views, and their assessment was shared by intelligence services 
in France, Israel and Russia. So this was hardly an invention of politicians.
It is easy to be wise after the event, but decision-makers do not have 
the benefit of hindsight. It would seem that intelligence services around 
the world got it wrong. I accepted intelligence assessments that turned 
out to be wrong in their conclusions. That is no one’s fault. Intelligence 
assessment is not a precise science. Rather, it is a judgement based on the 
best available information at the time.
I certainly accept that Australia’s intelligence agencies were acting 
professionally and in good faith. But they were clearly influenced by 
Saddam Hussein’s past record, as were we. The complication here was 
that Saddam Hussein ruled through fear, and WMD and his willingness 
to use those weapons helped to safeguard his survival. It would seem that 
he had complied with the Security Council resolutions, but to ensure his 
authority internally and in the region, he chose to maintain an ambiguity.
Saddam Hussein apparently believed that leaving an element of doubt 
on the question of whether he had disposed of his WMD would not 
lead to a military intervention by the United States. This was a bluff he 
lost, because he failed to appreciate how the risk appetite in the United 
States had changed after 9/11. The Taliban had made a similar mistake in 
Afghanistan.
I also want to address the allegation made by some that we had committed 
to war in Iraq before the Cabinet decision that immediately preceded 
the  public announcement. There is a distinction between preparing 
for the decisions Cabinet might make and the making of such a decision. 
No decision was made until it was made by Cabinet.
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I had been party to decisions over some time to support the ADF being 
prepared in the event that Cabinet made a decision to commit Australian 
forces to combat. It always struck me as a sensible thing to do, and I said 
so on a number of occasions. Even without my endorsement, I would 
expect the ADF to be planning for various scenarios. It is what good 
militaries do. But some preparations, such as entering the US planning 
process, did require my political imprimatur.
I concede that this is a difficult area. If it came to pass that we chose to be 
part of a US-led military operation, the more we understood about the 
objectives and plans the better off we would be, not only in maximising 
the effectiveness of our contribution but also in minimising casualties. 
The worry is that by undertaking such preparations, our ally assumes 
a commitment that had not been made. It is even trickier if we are in fact 
contributing to the development of the plans. Therefore, the decision to 
enter preparations at this level had to have political endorsement.
The legal basis for the war was another area in which we were criticised by 
some. An Australian Government will not commit to military operations 
without being satisfied that the decision is sound in law. We believe in 
a rules-based international order. In this instance, the legal premise was 
Iraq’s failure to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions designed 
to remove the threat associated with Saddam Hussein’s WMD through a 
direction to disarm and verify. We decided that the UN processes designed 
to lead to a peaceful solution had been exhausted and that we should join 
a so-called coalition of the willing. This was a political judgement for 
which we must accept responsibility.
On a personal basis, I would argue that a contemporary interpretation of 
the doctrine of self-defence might also have provided a legal justification. 
It seemed to me that the construct of self-defence in relation to WMD is 
very different from a construct of what amounts to self-defence in relation 
to traditional threats.
One political lesson learned from this conflict was the need for a well-
developed plan to address the ‘day after’ issues. What was to happen the 
day after the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime? There was not 
going to be a UN Security Council administration. This was a coalition 
of the willing, and the partners had to have a plan for governance as well 
as security. It was on my mind, because it might be said that the ADF 
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was part of an occupying force and therefore had legal responsibilities. 
In the end, we sidestepped this responsibility, arguing that we were not 
an occupying party.
In this instance the plan was not as well developed as it should have 
been. I do not think the development of the plan should have been 
left to the United States. To accept responsibilities in a coalition of the 
willing should also include accepting a share of responsibility in what 
was to follow. To be fair, I do not think we were even consulted on what 
turned out to be two of the most unwise decisions following the conflict: 
to disband the Iraq army and the Ba’ath Party. On the other hand, I think 
we preferred to pass these responsibilities to others. Before the war, when 
talking about building democracies, I used to stress the importance of 
growing institutions. New institutions cannot simply be imposed if the 
goal is a democratic and stable state.
Another area that turned out to be quite challenging and in which there 
was overlap between the ADF and political decision-makers related to 
the rules of engagement. We of course made the decision that we would 
be part of a US-led force, but with Australian forces under Australian 
command and operating to Australian rules of engagement. The rules 
under which we operated would be different from some others who were 
not parties to the same humanitarian conventions.
By and large, from my perspective, the United States was respectful and 
accommodated the differences, particularly in the early years. Problems 
tended to develop more in the frustrations of the occupying power, as the 
war became an insurgency operation, particularly in relation to Australians 
embedded in US force structures. The Australian chain of command 
became more of a formality than a practice. Australia’s responsibilities 
in relation to prisoners was contentious and would have benefited from 
more forethought.
Lessons
There are a few lessons that I think should be learned by the political 
class. Both conflicts have demonstrated the effectiveness and limitations 
of military force. Routing al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from 
government on the one hand, and defeating the orthodox military 
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of Saddam Hussein and removing him from office on the other, were 
relatively straightforward and successful operations. Western military 
forces are good at such work.
Combatting the insurgencies that subsequently evolved, in part in 
response to the ongoing presence of foreign forces and the application of 
asymmetric warfare,2 proved much more difficult and should have received 
more thought. This reconstruction of the battlespace should have been 
anticipated. We were naïve to believe the Iraqi people would simply rise 
up and fill a vacuum, particularly after we disbanded their institutions.
Continuing military operations have been largely couched as counter-
terrorism when the real challenge has been nation-building, for which 
militaries are not well suited. Sometimes politicians over-rely on defence 
forces to solve problems for which force is not the best solution. A military 
presence might be necessary because of an ongoing security threat, but it 
must be a supportive element.
Both conflicts illustrated how little we in the West knew or understood 
about both societies, including the tribal divides in Afghanistan and the 
sectarian divides in Iraq. We do not fight wars in a vacuum, and politicians 
need to better appreciate the social and cultural environments to which 
we send our forces
2  Asymmetric warfare concerns warfare between forces with greatly differing power whereby one 







I should begin with two caveats. First, when I left Defence after four 
and a bit years as Secretary, I did not take with me a diary or any papers 
of consequence, and nor did I keep any from my time as Special Envoy 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. So what follows is a hybrid of personal 
memory, with all its faults, and from reading some of the writings, 
a few conversations with others who were engaged and, in the case of 
Afghanistan, at least some work I did for Defence—and ultimately for the 
National Security Committee of Cabinet—on the lessons to be learned 
from our ‘whole-of-government’ mission in Afghanistan.
Second, and more important, while I appreciate the reasons we are 
addressing the Iraq and Afghan conflicts together, we should not forget 
how different they were. The justifications for each, the international 
structures around them, the nature of their endorsement by the United 
Nations and their standing in international law, the way they were fought, 
the issues we were dealing with on the ground, and domestic or popular 
perceptions are unique. In short, one was a conflict fought in the context 
of what was then being described as the ‘Global War on Terror’, and the 
other was a war against a state; that is, the state of Iraq. And one—Iraq—
was arguably more a war of choice than the other.
There is a risk in works of this kind that we will find ourselves over-
analysing, and thereby complicating unduly, our accounts of significant 
events. In fact, government decision-making in most fields is usually 
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best understood in its simplest forms. For good or ill, what you see from 
government in these areas these days is mostly what you get, and that was 
so in the case of the original decisions about Afghanistan and Iraq.
Afghanistan I
Taking these in sequence, the first was of course the decision announced 
on 17 October 2001 to deploy a force to Afghanistan. For me, two points 
stand out about that decision and the way it was announced. The first is 
that it was placed squarely in the context of what the government saw as 
Australia’s commitment to the United States under the ANZUS Treaty, 
which of course had been invoked in the wake of 9/11. The decision was 
straightforward, and enjoyed wide public support.
The second point is this: in announcing the decision, the Prime Minister 
emphasised its limited nature, and referred to Afghanistan only once in 
a one-and-a-half-page statement—to say that the F/A-18 Hornet fighter 
aircraft being deployed would not operate in Afghanistan.1 In other 
words, the US alliance apart, the mission was primarily about terrorism, 
not Afghanistan.
In subsequent media comments, the Prime Minister and ministers 
emphasised that our commitment would remain limited in scope and 
time. For instance, Foreign Minister Downer said:
We don’t want to get … bogged down in Afghanistan. We don’t want 
Australian troops to be part of managing and running Afghanistan 
for the next five or six years … We don’t really have a great desire 
to get into the long-term management of Afghanistan.2
In part, statements of this kind reflected an abiding, in-principle 
reluctance to be drawn into long-term or open-ended roles in this distant 
theatre and,  in this sense, foreshadowed the initial positions we were 
to take a year later about post-conflict roles in Iraq. The government’s 
preferred approach in both cases was captured in John Howard’s later 
1  Prime Minister the Hon. J. Howard MP, ‘Australian troops to be deployed to Afghanistan’, 
statement, 17 October 2001.
2  P. Bongiorno, interview with Foreign Minister the Hon. A. Downer MP, ‘Meet the Press’, 
Network 10, 18 November 2001.
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statement that ‘the right combination was to provide sharp-edged forces 
for a limited period of time during the hot part but not get bogged down 
in long drawn-out peace-keeping operations’.3
But in my view, Downer’s remarks were also early signs of an underlying 
and persistent wariness about the Afghanistan project, reflecting a keen 
sense of the risks that Afghanistan posed. I will return to this point, 
but suffice for now to note that, in this event, these concerns not to be 
dragged into Afghanistan beyond the initial assault on terrorist positions 
were overridden as the conflict unfolded, as they were in Iraq.
After a year in Afghanistan as part of Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM,  the government was satisfied with what we had done 
and, consistent with its preferred approach, withdrew the deployment. 
In announcing this on 20 November 2002, Defence Minister Hill noted 
that ‘the focus of the operations has moved towards supporting the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan’;4 ipso facto, we were no longer involved. 
And so from April 2003 to August 2005, we had only two ADF officers in 
country: one in a liaison position with United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan, the other in the Mine Action Coordination Centre.
Iraq
By the time we withdrew from this first mission from Afghanistan, 
planning for a possible deployment to Iraq was well in hand. I did not 
take up duty as Secretary until 18 November 2002, but when I did, 
the first two orders of business were a briefing on the status of our 
contingency planning for Iraq and the announcement (two days later) 
of our withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The government had not by then made a decision to go to war in Iraq. 
It can be argued that this was only a technical matter and that the decision 
had effectively been made. But in fact many in government still hoped that 
Saddam Hussein would submit on the issue of WMD and that war would 
3  Quoted in Middleton, An Unwinnable War, p. 38.
4  Senator the Hon. R. Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘Australian special forces to return from 
Afghanistan’, media release, MIN 664/02, 20 November 2002.
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be avoided at the last moment. There was still a view, shared with the UK 
Government, and indeed with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, that we 
should have tried to put another UN Security Council resolution in place.
In the event that that was not achieved, the ADF leadership was concerned 
with being well positioned so that if the government made a decision to 
commit to conflict, we would not be caught with our forces unprepared 
or in a long transit. The government accepted this view.
In a frantic period, two things stood out for me. The first was the great 
care that the CDF and the service chiefs were giving to the selection 
of  the capabilities we would offer and to the personnel who would 
lead in  the  field. The capabilities would be niche, but they had to be 
in areas where their presence would matter and be noticed. The second 
was the intense effort, led by Defence but with the close involvement of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), to ensure access 
to basing and support facilities in the Gulf—a very successful effort, 
of course.
As to why we became involved in the war, what you saw was what you 
got. In a taxonomy that I heard for the first time only recently from a very 
senior figure in the government at the time, there was a justification for 
the war and a reason for our involvement in it. The justification was 
Iraq’s possession of WMD and the risks following from that, including 
the risk of terrorist groups gaining access to them, and Iraq’s refusal to 
comply with UN Security Council resolutions in respect of the WMDs. 
And the reason for our commitment was the policy imperative that the 
government saw to support our US ally.
The justification of course was to prove flawed, and the process around it 
exposed serious failings both in the US-led intelligence community and 
at the higher policy level in Washington, which led for instance to Colin 
Powell’s UN speech of 5 February 2003 in which he confidently stated 
that Hussein possessed WMDs. This was disillusioning for many of those 
involved, not least for Powell himself, and in the longer term embarrassing 
for others, in particular British Prime Minister Tony Blair and, arguably, 
to a lesser extent for our own government.
But for the Bush administration as a whole it might not have mattered 
so much at the time because other considerations were in play. As our 
ambassador in Washington, Michael Thawley, had told John Howard at 
the time, the 9/11 attack had ensured that ‘Iraq would be back on the 
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agenda for the Americans’.5 And in addition to retribution, US policy 
came to embrace regime change and democratisation as well as the 
WMD issue.
In my view, this was not the case for Australia. As I recall, neither 
formally nor in any informal discussions did the Howard Government’s 
deliberations embrace regime change as an objective in itself, evil as 
Saddam was seen to be. ‘Democratisation’ for its own sake was certainly 
not on our agenda, and any references to terrorism related not to 9/11 
but rather to the fear that WMDs might find their way from Iraq into the 
hands of terrorist organisations.
As Allan Gyngell puts it in his recently published, and excellent, history 
of Australian foreign policy, Howard’s speeches were ‘absent the moral 
universalism which informed Bush’s language when he spoke to the 
American people’.6 In my recollection, this was true of discourse among 
ministers, which was typically functional and prosaic.
Nor incidentally did I see or hear any reference to oil as a reason for us 
to be in the Middle East—at least not until the then Defence Minister 
Brendan Nelson made a comment in 2006 suggesting an oil motive, on 
which he was quickly corrected. The fact is that, as students of the Middle 
East will know, the United States’ obsession with the region goes back way 
beyond oil—and incidentally way before Israel. Anyway, oil supplies were 
not at risk under Saddam Hussein.
In short, there was no conspiracy in Australian policy. Some critics have 
difficulty accepting this, but the fact is that, right or wrong, for the 
Australian Government the WMD issue was the sole justification for 
the war, and at the time a sufficient one. Although the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation had noted some doubts about the claims made by Secretary 
Powell in his UN speech, it took time for the government to be convinced 
that there were no WMDs. As late as mid-April 2003, when the Defence 
Minister, CDF and I were preparing to go to Iraq, we were vaccinated 
against anthrax, as our troops had been, and we had professional teams in 
the field continuing the search long after hostilities concluded.
5  J. Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2010, 
p. 425.
6  A. Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia and the World Since 1942, La Trobe University Press, 
Melbourne, 2017, p. 259.
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Mistaken as that justification turned out to be, it does not follow that 
the reason for our involvement was invalid. We did provide support for 
our alliance partner. If there is argument on this matter, it relates more 
to what we actually did in Iraq. There is a view, fashionable among some 
in the ADF, that we did not do enough to win much kudos from the US 
armed forces, and indeed one very senior officer has claimed to me that 
our efforts actually attracted derision from his American counterparts. 
The credibility of our forces is always important, but it would surprise me 
if anyone was suggesting that the seriousness of our commitment should 
be measured in casualties.
Yes, our force for what was called Operation FALCONER was structured 
carefully for impact. It might well be that concerns were expressed in 
some quarters about the adequacy of our post-war roles. It would be 
wrong, however, to underestimate the value of what the SAS units did in 
western Iraq, especially in ensuring that no missiles could be launched at 
Israel, and the RAN’s work in the Al-Faw Peninsula, in the initial stages 
of the war.
More importantly, the government’s purpose was not to impress the 
American military commanders in the field—rather, it was to signal 
policy and political support for the Bush administration in a world in 
which it had few friends. And sustaining that support in the face of 
widespread international criticism at home and abroad added to the value 
of that support in Washington. In this regard, the Howard Government 
could argue that its objectives were met, whatever the view of American 
military commanders in the field, and I would expect that this remains 
John Howard’s view.
Through all of this there is one other consistent policy factor that proved 
a mitigating factor against a larger Australian contribution to the coalition 
in Iraq. While the Australian Government was always conscious that these 
Middle East operations were important to Australia’s policy interests, there 
were potential challenges closer to home that could at any time demand 
a response from the ADF and for which significant force elements needed 
to be kept available.
This was not mere rhetoric. During Australia’s time in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, additional deployments had to be made to East Timor and to 
Solomon Islands. This was not a matter of ‘defence of Australia’; rather, 
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it was well-founded prudence and, as Howard used to say, the most 
important contribution Australia could make to the Alliance would be to 
do what was needed in Australia’s own region.
It was not only in relation to the WMD intelligence issue that the 
US system  was found wanting. The absence of a credible post-victory 
plan—a plan for ‘phase 4’, as the Americans called it—was hardly less 
a  contribution to the huge problem that Iraq became, not least by 
leaving the way open to some poor—and poorly made—decisions about 
‘de-Ba’athification’ and the disbandment of the Iraqi army.
While Australian planners did not foresee the intelligence failure, there 
were concerns from the outset about the absence of a serious plan for 
‘phase 4’. Australian officers persisted in expressing these concerns up to 
the commencement of the war. I recall an especially frustrating meeting 
in Washington in late January 2003, to which we sent Canberra-based 
officers and officials from DFAT, AusAID and Defence. The United 
Kingdom, which of course had a considerably greater stake in the 
conflict than we had, pushed even harder but with no more success, and 
the State Department shared these concerns. In short, in Washington, the 
Pentagon—and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in particular—had run away 
with the game.
That said, it is worth recalling that while we were making known our 
concerns about the post-conflict situation, the Prime Minister and 
ministers were also making clear that Australia did not wish to be involved 
in any post-war occupation of Iraq beyond humanitarian aid, and possibly 
some military specialists. While our policy position in this regard might 
have been different had there been a well-developed post-war plan, in the 
absence of one it was thus consistent with the approach we had taken to 
Afghanistan—and proved no more enduring.
And so it was that we withdrew most of the force committed to Operation 
FALCONER from Iraq when the major hostilities ended in 2003. 
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom and Poland, we did not 
commit forces to post-war reconstruction until early 2005. In 2005, the 
government announced the deployment to Al Muthanna Province in 
what was called an ‘Overwatch’ role, which came to include training Iraqi 
forces as well. My own recollection of this is that while the United States 
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wanted us more engaged, it was in the end the British who leaned hardest, 
Al Muthanna being in the area of Iraq in which they were leading in the 
name of the Multi-National Division (South East) based in Basra.
Most of our remaining forces were withdrawn by June 2008 following 
the election of the Rudd Government in December 2007. By that time, 
I was no longer in government, but my sense was that while the Labor 
Party policy on withdrawal was unequivocal, Rudd tried to cushion the 
impact in Washington by taking some time over the decision, leaving at 
least some elements behind—and moving on to do more in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan II
In the meantime, a decision had been taken in mid-2005 to return to 
Afghanistan. This decision was taken not long after the government 
decided to take on the new role in Al Muthanna, but it was clearly 
a much bigger decision than the Al Muthanna decision, and it had very 
much greater implications.
There were two elements to the decision the Prime Minister announced 
on 13 July 2005. The first was about the deployment of a Special Forces 
Task Group to undertake a ‘security task very similar to the task that 
was undertaken by an SAS taskforce that went in 2001’. The second was 
confirmation that the government was considering ‘the possibility of 
sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] to Afghanistan’.7
I think it is on the public record that the Defence Minister’s initial proposal 
was for a contribution to a PRT. The decision that the Prime Minister 
announced was again more cautious, focusing on a renewed special forces 
deployment and only foreshadowing a possible PRT contribution.
There has been speculation about whether we had come under 
‘pressure’ from Washington to recommit to Afghanistan. This is not my 
recollection, at least as far as the policy and political levels of government 
were concerned.
It is worth reflecting in this regard on another aspect of the Prime 
Minister’s announcement of 13 July 2005. He said that Australia had:
7  Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP, ‘Troop deployment to Afghanistan’, press conference 
transcript, 13 July 2005.
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received requests, at the military level, from both the United 
States and others and also the Government of Afghanistan and we 
have therefore decided in order to support the efforts of others to 
support in turn the Government of Afghanistan to despatch … 
some 150 personnel …8
The emphasis on the requests having been made at the ‘military level’ 
is consistent with my recollection about the absence of pressure at the 
political level. The reference to our ‘supporting the efforts of others’ 
reflects the importance attached to our being part of the coalition—
by then a proxy term for the alliance—and at the same time suggests again 
a degree of wariness about the whole project.
We had of course been watching the changing picture in Afghanistan 
since 2002 closely, and were very much aware that the role of the coalition 
there—by 2005 called the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF)—had changed significantly and was taking on more ‘pacification’ 
or ‘stabilisation’ functions. Above all, the coalition had come under NATO 
leadership (formally at least) and grown very considerably to include roles 
for Canada and New Zealand, among many others.
There was therefore a sense among senior ministers that there was 
a legitimate and important international effort underway, backed 
unequivocally by UN Security Council resolutions, and that our non-
involvement sat oddly with the interests we shared with most coalition 
members and with our traditional view of Australia’s place in the world. 
As well at that time, there was, as a matter of policy, great interest at 
the political level and among the ADF leadership in getting closer to 
NATO.9 Indeed, the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
was welcomed in Canberra in the first part of 2005. As consideration of 
a PRT deployment continued through the latter half of 2005, Afghan’s 
President, Hamid Karzai, weighed in during a media conference with 
Prime Minister Howard, on a visit to Kabul, to encourage the idea.
As the PRT proposal firmed up in the course of these deliberations, the 
international politics became intense while we sorted out with NATO 
and individual members just who it was we would partner with. In the 
end, the Dutch won the prize, an outcome encouraged by NATO and 
especially, as I recall, by the United Kingdom.
8  Ibid.
9  An interest incidentally that I did not fully share at that time, and still do not.
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Thus, on 21 February 2006, the Prime Minister announced the deployment 
of an ADF Reconstruction Task Force incorporated in a Netherlands-led 
PRT in Uruzgan Province as part of ISAF’s Stage III expansion. A visit to 
Canberra by the Dutch Prime Minister followed in March 2006. From this 
beginning our contribution grew incrementally over the following seven 
or so years to encompass various reconstruction, mentoring and force 
protection roles, then a PRT leadership role, and eventually leadership of 
the Combined Team – Uruzgan as well as ‘embeds’ and others in Kabul 
and Kandahar.
2005–08
From a national policy point of view, what is especially interesting is 
how a limited and cautious decision in 2005 for the ADF to ‘help others 
help Afghanistan’ followed by another to deploy an ‘ADF Reconstruction 
Team’ evolved into a genuine whole-of-government effort, and why. This 
evolution took place in two stages. The first was from 2005 to 2008. 
By committing in early 2006 to join a PRT, and to partner with the Dutch 
in Uruzgan, we implicitly accepted the case for a broader civil–military 
approach. We wanted to do, and be seen to be doing, more or less what 
the others were doing, and once there, of course, we wanted to do it well.
This meant engaging agencies beyond the ADF. Institutionally, AusAID, 
DFAT and the AFP were not reluctant to take on roles, and indeed 
they had plenty of volunteers once their roles were established. But the 
government was always cautious, and very conscious of the costs and the 
risks. While the ADF was funded by the usual ‘no-win, no-loss’ financing 
provisions, funding to support non-Defence deployments remained 
parsimonious (‘out of hide’) through to about 2008.
Nevertheless, the aid program that had delivered some $94 million to 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 was stepped up. In the period 
2005–08, some $236 million was disbursed through AusAID, most of it 
through multilateral agencies and the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
in largely hands-off ways. However, some aid went directly into Uruzgan, 
and the ADF delivered aid worth about $117 million on the ground in 
the province, in large part with the aim of ensuring community support 
for our military presence. As the focus moved more to direct aid, the first 
AusAID civilian was posted to Uruzgan in 2008. In the same period, 
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to 2008, the ADF presence grew first to about 900, then to 1,100 through 
numerous evolutions of role and title: Reconstruction Task Force, then 
Mentoring Reconstruction Task Force and so on.
The AFP mission also grew, and from 2007 shifted to Regional 
Command South in Kandahar, where it played a useful role in counter-
narcotics support for the Afghan National Police. Whereas before 2005 
Australia’s ambassador to Afghanistan had been accredited to Kabul from 
Islamabad, in 2006 the government opened a small embassy in Kabul, 
first in the Serena Hotel until it was attacked, then located temporarily 
in ADF House. It subsequently relocated to a donga in the US Embassy 
compound, where it clung on until 2009 in circumstances that have to be 
described frankly as demeaning.
2009–13
Thus government concerns were eased, the idea of a PRT was acculturated 
at ministerial level, and the mission grew, leading to the second stage 
and to what became a whole-of-government endeavour, which lasted 
until 2013.
The biggest steps in this journey were announced by Prime Minister Rudd 
on 29 April 2009 in a major statement on Afghanistan in which he linked 
military and civil endeavours more explicitly than hitherto.10 The ADF 
role was further enhanced, and a significant increase in Australia’s aid 
commitment announced, with much more to be spent on the ground. 
This was together with an increased mentoring role for the AFP in Tarin 
Kowt, although at cost to the work they had been doing in regard to 
counter-narcotics work in Kandahar.
DFAT staff were to be posted to Tarin Kowt, more AusAID staff added 
and the embassy upgraded and relocated into its own premises. With 
increased force protection requirements, the ADF presence reached—and 
was capped at, officially at least—1,550, making the Australian force the 
10th largest in a coalition, which was growing towards 50 members.




Rudd also announced the appointment of a ‘Special Envoy for Afghanistan 
and Pakistan’, and that is where I came in. I was living in Washington, 
doing my own thing at the Woodrow Wilson Center, when the Prime 
Minister asked me to take on this ‘special envoy’ task. For the first two 
months I worked from there, visiting the State Department frequently, 
the Pentagon and other agencies as I could, and working especially with 
Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative.
Holbrooke’s appointment was significant. He had expected to be Secretary 
of State in a Hillary Clinton administration. His new position was created, 
I believe, because the Obama administration accepted that the war could 
not be concluded by military means alone, and that the State Department 
and its counterparts in coalition countries should be written into the 
script to help develop a different approach. This would be immensely 
time-consuming, and the Secretary herself would not be able to devote 
that time to the issue, so Holbrooke’s very senior position was created.
Australia, by now one of the larger contributors to the coalition, was asked 
explicitly to nominate a person to work with Holbrooke and an initially 
small group of ‘special representatives’ or envoys. Their role at the outset 
was one of statecraft, although over time—and especially after the United 
States began its drawdown—it evolved more in the direction of stagecraft.
Holbrooke’s formative years, incidentally, had been as a civilian adviser in 
Vietnam. He believed strongly in the need for a civilian role in delivering 
aid, fostering governance and working the political leadership, although 
he was realistic about the challenges in this area. He also thought there was 
an important role for regional countries, not least in trying to influence 
Pakistan and in reaching out to the Taliban. He believed personally that 
a political settlement would be necessary sooner or later, and, although 
I suspect Obama as well as Clinton agreed with this, the Pentagon effectively 
vetoed it as a policy. It was not until after Holbrooke died—tragically, 
from an aneurism suffered in Hillary’s office in December 2010—that she 
first spoke of a ‘negotiation’, by which she meant a negotiation to separate 
the Taliban from al-Qaeda. By then it was 2011, and the United States 
had reversed its 2009 surge. The United States was clearly preparing its 
way out, so the Taliban had no reason to talk seriously.
As to Australia’s mission, it quickly became evident to me as Special Envoy 
that while we had an all-of-government’ presence, it was not functioning 
optimally on the ground, and was not coming together quite as well as it 
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should in Canberra. There were the usual hardworking inter-agency task 
forces, but by then our commitment in people, treasure and policy capital 
demanded more than that.
So when I returned to Canberra in August, I helped put together an inter-
agency group that operated at the CDF/Secretary/agency-head level, 
chaired by the National Security Adviser in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, which met at least fortnightly. In time, that led 
to what I think was a pretty optimal all-of-government functioning in 
Canberra, better advice to the National Security Committee and a better 
connected performance on the ground in Afghanistan.
By the time the government decided to withdraw from Tarin Kowt in 
2013, ADF, DFAT, AusAID and AFP leaders on the ground were agreed 
that, after some pain along the way, the whole-of-government effort there 
was as good as we had ever had, including joint civilian–ADF leadership 
in Tarin Kowt and close working relationships in Kabul.
In the meantime, the government had taken three significant policy 
decisions about our presence. The first was to take over leadership of the 
PRT from the Dutch when they left in 2010, but to decline leadership 
of the Combined Team – Uruzgan, leaving that to the United States. 
The second was to reverse that decision in 2012 and agree to take over 
from the United States.
Why the reversal? It was never made explicit to us as officials, but my 
hunch, not entirely uninformed, is that the government feared that if 
we had taken over in 2010, the United States would have withdrawn its 
enablers from Uruzgan, leaving us to hold a much larger baby than we 
wanted or could afford. But by 2012 that concern had been mitigated, 
and it was clear we were on the way out anyway.
And the third great decision in this period was of course the ultimate 
one: to withdraw from Uruzgan at the end of 2013 after progressively 
handing over to the Afghan security forces throughout 2012 and 2013. 
Incidentally, once the decision was made to be out by the end of 2013, 
there was some surprise in government about the pace at which the ADF 
moved—the military planners in effect set policy over the closing months.
Why were we leaving? Because the cost had been great, and the coalition 
partners, especially the United States, were tiring and leaving. We—
that is, the coalition—had in the meantime given ourselves an ‘out’. 
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With  the Afghan security forces much improved through the training 
and mentoring of coalition partners, and now larger and more generously 
resourced than ever before, Afghanistan’s future could surely be placed in 
their hands.
All of the change that our presence in Afghanistan underwent in the 
period 2005 to 2013, and especially after 2008, has led to debate about 
whether Australia’s national strategic objectives changed in Afghanistan 
during the decade we were there. Having thought a lot about this, my 
answer is that they did not, and that what changed was the means by 
which the government, and the 50-member international coalition, 
sought to achieve those objectives. The two key themes had been reiterated 
consistently by government leaders from 2001 to 2013.
At the outset, Prime Minister Howard and his ministers had emphasised 
that the mission was aimed at ensuring that Afghanistan could not 
remain or become again a safe haven for international terrorists, and was 
undertaken in support of our alliance interests. These aims were restated 
when our enhanced deployment in 2005 was announced, although with 
additional (but passing) emphasis on the importance of safeguarding 
the elections about to be held in Afghanistan because, ‘if democracy 
takes root [in Afghanistan] … then a massive blow is struck in the war 
against terrorism’.11
In his major speech of April 2009, Prime Minister Rudd made the same 
points in his own language. He spoke about ‘the need to deny sanctuary 
to terrorists who have threatened and killed Australian citizens’, and 
about ‘our enduring commitment to the United States and the ANZUS 
Treaty’. He contended that what we were seeking was the ‘stabilisation 
of the Afghan state through a combination of military, police and civilian 
effort to the extent necessary to consolidate [the] primary mission of 
strategic denial’.12
In 2010, Prime Minister Gillard said explicitly that ‘Our mission 
in Afghanistan is not nation-building’, and in 2011 reaffirmed the 
government’s objectives: ‘there must be no safe haven for terrorists in 
11  Prime Minister the Hon. J. Howard MP, ‘Address to the Australian troops’, Campbell Barracks, 
Perth, 24 August 2005.
12  Rudd, press conference, 29 April 2009.
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Afghanistan. We must stand firmly by our ally, the United States.’13 
And in his speech in Tarin Kowt marking the closure of our base there 
in October 2013, Prime Minister Abbott again reflected the two key 
objectives of our mission when he said: ‘The threat of global terrorism 
is reduced. Our reliability as an ally is confirmed.’14 In short, while the 
rhetoric wandered about at times, and the nature of what we did on 
the ground went through many changes, the strategic policy objectives 
remained the two we had started with.
Let me conclude with three points. The first reflects the ‘lessons learned’ 
work I did with the Australian Civil-Military Centre, at Defence’s 
request, about government decision-making and whole-of-government 
processes in relation to Afghanistan.15 There were many lessons: about aid 
programs, communications, resourcing of agencies, working with allies, 
detainee management (a matter of particular sensitivity, incidentally)—all 
the things you would expect.
But one that I think matters particularly is this: we must accept that 
when we commit the ADF to operations abroad, significant whole-of-
government and foreign policy implications are bound to be generated. 
Rather than trying to retrofit additional machinery to an ADF operation, 
DFAT and other agencies as necessary should be fully properly engaged 
from the outset on the ground as well as in Canberra, and resourced 
through Defence-like ‘no-win, no-loss’ provisions.
Second, I referred earlier to my sense that there was always a degree of 
caution about Afghanistan at the highest levels in Australia. Governments 
of both kinds were highly sensitive to the risks implicit in the Afghan 
project, risks that were of three types: to personnel, later to the budget, 
and to policy interests—what could be achieved, and how distracting 
would it be? This is reflected not only in the statements made by prime 
ministers and ministers, but also in some of the lively exchanges I can 
recall with and among ministers about what Australia was doing and 
could achieve in Afghanistan.
13  Prime Minister the Hon. J. Gillard MP, Speech to the House of Representatives, Ministerial 
Statements, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 2010, pp. 692–4.
14  Prime Minister the Hon. T. Abbott MP, Address at Recognition Ceremony, Tarin Kowt, 
Afghanistan, 28 October 2013.
15  A public version of the report on this study has been released: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 
Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole of Government Mission, ACMC, Queanbeyan, 2016.
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Finally, a word about a subject that comes up so often in discussion about 
conflicts of this kind: exit strategies. We have seen how the approaches of 
successive governments to the implementation of their policy objectives 
evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq during our missions there. At the outset 
in both cases, government asserted its determination not to be there for 
the long haul and not to become involved in occupation or reconstruction 
roles. But in time, in both cases, the elected government of the day 
decided, for what it considered good and sufficient policy reasons related 
as much to the company we were in as to circumstances on the ground, to 
do those things, and more. Government would have so decided even if it 
had had the most rigidly defined exit strategy or end state from day one.
Circumstances changed, and national policy implementation changed 
with it, even if the strategic objectives did not. As ever, when we become 
involved in conflicts in which the national interest is defined more in 
terms  of policy benefits than national survival, and in which we are 
a member of a wider coalition, we will—as the Chinese would say—be 
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.
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In my four-year term of office as the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), 
there are three major operational commitments that stand out.
The first, and perhaps most important, commitment from a strategic and 
national point of view was the UN-mandated operation to provide security 
in East Timor carried out from 20 September 1999 until 28 February 
2000. The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) mission stands 
as a watershed moment in Australian military history and for our nation; 
it was for the first time that Australia had to put together and lead an 
internationally sanctioned coalition operation in our neighbourhood 
using military forces from many nations. As a result, Australian military 
doctrine had to be changed rapidly for our leadership role and the resulting 
requirements for interoperability—that is, to be able to work effectively 
with counterpart forces from coalition partners.
The second major operational commitment was the provision of security 
for the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. This operation involved 
a substantial force of about 4,500 full-time and part-time ADF members 
who had to learn to work effectively with a variety of domestic law 
enforcement agencies and Olympic organisers before and throughout 
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the Games. The ADF also had significant training responsibilities for the 
provision of specialist security forces, including forces able to respond to 
a terrorist incident.
The third major operational commitment had its genesis in the 9/11 
attacks in the United States.
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the ADF was already engaged in two 
significant operational commitments. The first commitment was a 
follow-up to the security operation in East Timor: Operation TANAGER, 
involving about 1,600 personnel supporting the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The second 
commitment was mounting Operation RELEX from 3 September 2001 
until 1 July 2002 to deter people-smugglers selling one-way overland bus 
trips and boat passages intended to bring people into Australia without 
proper authority.
With this as background, I will examine the main events in the post-9/11 
military world until I retired from command of the Defence Force. I will 
add some observations about unfolding operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq after July 2002. I will then finish this chapter with my assessment of 
the implications of these events for the ADF and the nation.
The attacks of 9/11 in context
On 26 February 1993, terrorists detonated a truck bomb in the basement 
of the World Trade Center. It killed six people and injured more than 
1,000 people. The intention of these terrorists was to send the North 
Tower crashing into the South Tower, thus bringing both towers down 
and killing tens of thousands of people.
Investigations now show that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of this 
operation, had spent time in al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan 
before 1991 when he began the planning of a bombing attack inside 
the United States. He later said that the 1993 attack was in vengeance 
for US support for Israel. Letters sent to media outlets in the United 
States just before the attack demanded that America end all aid to Israel, 
terminate diplomatic relations with Israel and end interference in Middle 
East countries’ interior affairs. If these demands were not met, the letters 
threatened, further attacks would take place.
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Yousef ’s uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, later considered to be the 
principal architect of the 9/11 attacks,1 gave tips and advice to Yousef on 
the telephone. He also supported financially a co-conspirator, Mohammed 
Salameh, with a small wire transfer to him of US$660.2 The records now 
show that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was a skilful terrorist committed to 
the cause of attacking the West.
In 1996, Tom Clancy’s new bestselling Jack Ryan book, Executive Orders, 
was released in the United States.3 The back cover of the book had the 
following synopsis:
A runaway Jumbo Jet has crashed into the Capitol Building in 
Washington, leaving the President dead, along with most of 
the Cabinet and Congress. Dazed and confused, the man who 
only minutes beforehand was confirmed as the new caretaker 
Vice-President is told that he is now President of the United States.
The full story is in the opening pages of the book. Therefore it is possible 
that the breathtaking conception of using US technology to attack the 
symbols of US global leadership, such as the Pentagon and the World 
Trade Center, might have had its genesis in Clancy’s work of fiction. 
Indeed, in 1996 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed presented Osama bin Laden 
with an outline of an idea along these lines.4
It was on my watch that the tragic 9/11 attacks occurred. I was dining 
with a friend in Perth when ADF Operations alerted me to an unfolding 
event in New York City. I turned on the television in time to see live 
coverage of the second aircraft fly into the South Tower. However, what 
became quite clear within hours of the collapse of both towers from the 
television coverage, supplemented by upgraded intelligence reporting, was 
the imperative for the United States to take immediate action in response 
in Afghanistan. Additional measures to safeguard communities who were 
in fear of what might happen next would also be necessary.
By midnight Perth time, I had decided I needed to return to Canberra as 
quickly as I could as I knew the Prime Minister, accompanied by a strong 
team from Australia, was in Washington, DC, for an official visit. We took 
the first available flight to return to Russell Offices and my headquarters.
1  Included in the 9/11 Commission Report.
2  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, globalsecurity.org, from an original on 21 October 2008.
3  T. Clancy, Executive Orders, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1996.
4  BBC News, ‘Suspect reveals 9/11 planning’, 22 September 2003.
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In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, there was a lot of uncertainty, 
including when our national leadership team would return from the 
United States. We tried to obtain more detail about exactly what had 
happened, as well as engaging with US military authorities on likely 
response options.
The timing, coordination, imagination and audacity of these attacks 
took the world by surprise. This was in spite of knowledge that al-Qaeda 
was a  force to be reckoned. It had mounted successful attacks on USS 
Cole on 12 October 2000 and other attacks on US interests, such as 
the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998. 
The intelligence agencies had been doing their best to anticipate al-Qaeda’s 
next moves, but this was one they missed.
After the tragedy that befell New York, the Pentagon and the passengers 
and crew members of all four large-body aircraft used in the attacks, the 
world watched and waited for the next big event. For some time after 
9/11, it was thought that other ‘spectacular’ events had been planned. 
People watched and waited, while we were doing our best to try to 
outsmart al-Qaeda.
The British historian Niall Ferguson has summed up the position well, 
as follows:
The defining event of this century’s first years was an attack on 
the financial and transport networks of the United States by an 
Islamist gang that is best understood as an anti-social network. 
Although acting in the name of al-Qaeda, the 9/11 plotters were 
only weakly connected to the wider network of political Islam, 
which helps explain why they were able to escape detection.
There was an evil genius to what the attacks of 11 September 
2001 did. In essence, they targeted the main hubs of America’s 
increasingly networked society, exploiting security vulnerabilities 
that allowed them to smuggle primitive weapons (box cutters) 
onto four passenger planes bound for New York and Washington, 
respectively the central nodes of the US financial and political 
systems … the al-Qaeda operatives achieved the greatest coup in 
the history of terrorism. Not only did they generate an atmosphere 
of fear in the United States that persisted for many months; more 
importantly, they precipitated an asymmetrical response by the 
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administration of President George W. Bush that almost certainly 
did more over the succeeding years to strengthen than to weaken 
the cause of Salafist Islam.5
Post 9/11
The Bush administration, with the support of Congress, responded 
quickly to these attacks with a statement of intent. During a televised 
address to the nation from the White House in the evening of 9/11, 
President Bush said, ‘[W]e will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbor them.’
From an Australian perspective, my recollection is that an urgent meeting 
of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) took place in 
Parliament House on Wednesday afternoon following my return from 
Perth. This meeting was chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, John 
Anderson MP, and it included a hook-up with Prime Minister Howard 
in Washington, DC. The meeting canvassed a range of possibilities that 
might affect Australian security interests in the forthcoming weeks and 
the implications of a commitment to invoke the ANZUS Treaty as 
a  framework within which to conduct consultations with the United 
States. The matter of the return to Australia of the Prime Minister’s party 
was also discussed.
The government announced the activation of the ANZUS Treaty on 
14 September after Howard’s return to Australia. This was followed in 
Parliament on 17 September by a resolution that ‘fully endorses the 
commitment of the Australian Government to support within Australia’s 
capabilities United States-led action against those responsible for these 
tragic attacks’.6 Clearly, the government had set a high priority on the 
ADF doing as much as was prudent to assist the United States in its efforts 
to combat terrorism.
Within the Australian Defence Organisation, the Secretary, Dr Alan 
Hawke AO, and I discussed implications for our own security. We were 
anxious about further attacks on targets of opportunity, certainly within 
the United States, and possibly with close allies like Australia. As a matter 
5  N. Ferguson, The Square and the Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power, 
Allen Lane, London, 2017, pp. 333–4.
6  House of Representatives, Debates, 17 September 2001, p. 30739.
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of urgency, we lifted the security watch at all ADF bases in Australia. I was 
also concerned that small groups of ‘sleeper’ terrorists in our community 
might decide to attack ADF members, and possibly their families, as 
a  means of demonstrating al-Qaeda’s reach and the seriousness of its 
agenda. Consequently, I decided to write a personally signed letter to 
families of ADF members in Australia emphasising the need to consider 
personal security measures, including the use of different travel routes to 
and from work, and schools where appropriate, as well as being watchful 
about their homes and within their communities.
Given the nature of our close relationship with the United States, it did 
not take long before the phones and the emails were running hot between 
US Pacific Command in Hawaii and, less frequently, the chairman of 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC. Our Defence staff 
in Washington, DC, and our consul-general in Hawaii were also busy 
discussing options for the conduct of immediate response operations 
in defence of our interests and to support the United States in the 
prosecution of al-Qaeda terrorist training camps, certainly in Afghanistan, 
and possibly in other places of interest.
Another proposal being pursued vigorously by the United States was the 
patrolling by naval ships of the Malacca Strait and the management of 
appropriate interception operations there. Early on it was evident that 
finding sufficient naval ships from reliable allies and partners of the 
United States would be troublesome. Australia was unable to participate 
in this activity owing to other operational priorities.
I was also conscious, particularly in the context of Malacca Strait operations, 
that there might be sensitivities in Jakarta to any US requests for support. 
Accordingly, I visited Jakarta to explain to colleagues there that any 
US requests for help should be taken seriously. I also pointed out that US 
officials might become tense if they encountered inexplicable obstacles. 
I had the impression at the time that my trip was worth the effort.
Providing air defence assets to protect the US naval support facility, 
US Marine Corps pre-positioned ships and US Air Force (USAF) bases 
in the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia was another US 
priority. From an Australian perspective, the request to mount this 
operation with RAAF resources could be undertaken quite easily within 
the constraints of ADF priorities. The government readily accepted 
arguments for participation in these operations by RAAF Hornet aircraft 
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from the Air Combat Group. This deployment began on 9 November 
2001 and lasted until 7 May 2002. The air defence of Diego Garcia was 
the first time since the Korean War the RAAF had been tasked to conduct 
potentially hostile air operations using our fighter aircraft.
Concurrent tasks, as pointed out already, severely limited Australia’s ability 
to carry out substantial additional operations to support the US military 
effort. The ADF was still involved in Timor Leste as a priority, providing 
training to the new country and managing security operations under the 
leadership of UNTAET. For the Navy, and with some army support, 
Operation RELEX began on 3 September following the MV Tampa 
incident. Several fleet units were deployed in northern Australian waters 
to carry out patrols and conduct interception operations to frustrate the 
activities of people-smugglers.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the US-led international effort to 
oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and destroy Osama bin Laden’s 
terrorist network based in Afghanistan, began on 7 October 2001. 
For the ADF, major operations in support of ENDURING FREEDOM 
demanded the highest attention during October and November 2001. 
Australia’s parallel Operation SLIPPER, beginning on 22 October 2001, 
was marked by the political leadership farewelling in Perth our first 
contingent of special forces troops bound for Afghanistan.
The land operation was to deploy a highly mobile special operations force 
into Afghanistan to neutralise and, if necessary, destroy the al-Qaeda 
terrorists sheltered by the Taliban government. The naval operation in the 
Indian Ocean operation and sea areas adjacent to Middle East coastlines 
was to support our deployed ground forces and, if necessary, interdict 
unwelcome forces elsewhere. Both these operations formed the mainstay 
of the Australian Government’s commitment to the United States under 
the ANZUS Treaty. The focus of these operations was a significant move 
away from our traditional area of operations in the Pacific and our 
relationship with Pacific Command. Quickly we had to build up a new 
relationship with US Central Command (CENTCOM) that would 
soon take priority over the long-standing relationship we enjoyed with 
Pacific Command.
How did we select these forces and not others? I was particularly 
concerned that we should include an amphibious ship (Landing Platforms 
Amphibious or LPA) in the force to ensure the presence of an Australian 
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medical capability nearby if needed by our special forces in Afghanistan. 
The inclusion of Australian special forces in a US operation would involve 
acquiring some new skill sets and equipment, but we were confident that 
operations on the ground would be relatively easy to conduct.
What was not going to be so easy was how we might provide support to 
other deployed forces, especially if things started to go wrong. We also 
needed to consider the resources for the rotation of deployed forces if 
these operations were needed for an extended period. For example, in the 
context of support to other deployed forces, we needed special diplomatic 
arrangements to operate RAAF Boeing 707 air-to-air refuelling aircraft 
from airfields close to Afghanistan, yet far enough away to offer a measure 
of security. Accordingly, we dispatched our Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal 
Angus Houston AO, to the region with a brief to find us an airfield and 
a government that would be useful for our needs. He was able to arrange 
for Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan to be used.
I had visited Washington on 30 September for the change of command 
ceremony when General Myers became chairman of the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on 1 October 2001. While in Washington, I also had the privilege 
of a brief in the National Military Command and Control Center in 
which thinking about the range of operations being considered by the US 
military was outlined. I can say, from my perspective, that there were no 
surprises in anything I heard. At the end of the brief, I spoke about our 
base defence security enhancements and the letter I had written to ADF 
families about the need to look to their personal security.
The day following the change of command ceremony, exactly three weeks 
after the 9/11 attacks, my team and I flew on American Airlines flight 77 
(the Pentagon crash flight) from Washington to Los Angeles. At Dulles 
Airport, near Washington, most of the terminal was deserted.
To complicate matters further, the writs for a federal election in Australia 
were issued on Monday 8 October for an election to be held on Saturday 
10 November 2001. This meant that most of our response operations 
would commence during the caretaker period. Consequently, with the 
approval of the government, a considerable effort was made to keep 
the  federal Opposition, and particularly the Leader, Kim Beazley MP, 
fully apprised of the government’s intentions and the implications for our 
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alliance relationship. I spent several hours with Beazley and his leadership 
team going over the key issues for our deployments. He seemed interested 
to ensure the best possible support for our deployed special forces group.
Once operations began in Afghanistan in October 2001, our ADF 
planners became closely involved with US Central Command, something 
quite new and different from working with our customary friends at 
US Pacific Command. In a sense, the dice were being loaded towards 
Australian involvement in all further operations that could be connected 
to the outcomes of 9/11.
Interoperability issues: Prisoner handling
In January 2002 during a trip to the region with our Defence Minister, 
Senator Robert Hill, I visited various ADF units deployed on Operation 
SLIPPER. Everywhere, I found that our forces had integrated well with 
US counterparts at sea and in Afghanistan. All operational issues were 
being carried out in the professional manner we have come to expect 
from the ADF. Of particular note was our visit to Bagram air base in 
Afghanistan where our special forces people were working closely with 
their US counterparts in headquarters and in the field. But, while our 
interoperability was as good as we might expect and the practice consistent 
with doctrine of its day, there was an important gap in interoperability 
that had to be sorted out: prisoner handling.
For my own part, this oversight was a surprise. I recall that during the 
Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) talks on 
3 November 1999 in Washington, DC, I had introduced a discussion 
item into the agenda on interoperability. The intention was to show 
that interoperability was based on more than shared equipment and 
communications, extending to shared values and doctrine. This point was 
picked up in paragraph 13 of the AUSMIN communiqué, which stated:
Australia and the United States noted that interoperability remains 
a priority goal of the alliance. Rapid technological changes require 
both governments to maintain an open dialogue and continue to 
explore exchanges focused on interoperability.7
7  Archived in Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations, 1999 Joint Communiqué, 
3 November 1999, para 13, dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-
states-ministerial-consultations-1999-joint-communiqu.aspx (retrieved 31 March 2020).
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Prime Minister John Howard meets soldiers of the Australian 
Special Forces Task Group deployed on Operation SLIPPER in 
Afghanistan, 2005.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
In field operations by our special forces in Afghanistan it did not take 
long to appreciate that on some occasions al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters 
would offer their surrender rather than becoming casualties of combat 
action. For Australia, as a signatory state of all the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols, this presented a serious problem if the number of deployed 
personnel was to be kept low.
Unlike Australia, the United States is not a signatory of all the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols, and for prisoner-handling this presented 
a  problem as we could not simply hand our prisoners over to US 
forces without breaking the Conventions. The Geneva Conventions 
require that the state accepts responsibility for the treatment of any prisoners 
that  surrender to its forces, including under Article 3 in circumstances 
where the conflict does not involve one state fighting another.8
For the initial deployment to Afghanistan, the effect of the Conventions 
would have meant the deployment to Afghanistan of a considerable 
number of additional personnel to set up and manage a ‘prison’ in which 
8  The Third Geneva Convention is about the treatment of the prisoners of war. Article 3 of this 
convention applies in non-international conflicts; that is, when the combatant parties are not states.
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Australia would bear full responsibility for the treatment of its prisoners. 
But, in the context of the early commitment to Afghanistan, it was highly 
desirable to find a solution for this problem. After briefing ministers 
about the problem and a possible solution, I wrote a letter to my opposite 
number in Washington suggesting that the creation of an Australian 
prison in Afghanistan would not be sensible if another solution could 
be found.
The letter resulted in a written assurance from the Chairman, US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff that all prisoners taken by US military forces in 
Afghanistan would be treated in accordance with the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols. This letter was taken as the basis for 
the Australian Government to agree that it would not be necessary for the 
deployment of a ‘prison’ to Afghanistan if arrangements could be made in 
the field for a US military officer to accept the surrender of any captives 
taken during Australian operations. This turned out to be a neat solution 
to an important interoperability issue.
Iraq
In the lead-up to the Iraq invasion I was retired, working in Oxford, 
watching carefully how things were unfolding from a UK perspective 
(now the subject of the Chilcott Report), and paying little attention to 
Australian events. I did, however, check the ABC News website to gauge 
community responses to the government’s decision to commit Australian 
military forces to the invasion force, under US leadership, on 18 March 
2003.9 I was surprised, and a little pleased, to see on that website ADF 
personnel responding to some people in the community who wanted to 
label ADF members as ‘war-mongers’ by reminding them that the ADF 
was a ‘force for good’!
I spent some time trying to work out what knowledge might have brought 
Bush, Blair and Howard together on such a joint venture. At that time 
my presumption was that highly classified intelligence assessments about 
Iraqi WMD capabilities were such that the three leaders became united 
in their intent, despite their differences in politics. No other scenario is 
credible.
9  See ‘Howard commits troops to war’, 1 March 2003, www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/ 18/ 
1047749732511.html (retrieved 31 March 2020).
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The invasion of Iraq took place nearly nine months after I handed 
command of the ADF over to General Peter Cosgrove. I cannot know 
what took place in classified conversations from the time of my retirement 
until the invasion of Iraq. But, at the time of my departure in early July 
2002, it was my opinion that no special evidence existed to make an 
invasion of Iraq essential, which became one topic of conversation during 
my final call with the Prime Minister.
Australian information available to me at the time seemed to focus on the 
simple decision by Prime Minister John Howard that Australia should 
join its alliance partners to invade Iraq, even though the contrast between 
Australia and the United Kingdom, in terms of community responses, 
could not have been more different. I remember well the UK campaign 
‘Not in Our Name’, which sought to undermine Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s willingness to go along with President Bush’s plans for toppling 
Saddam Hussein. I did not find much reporting of similar community 
opposition to the invasion of Iraq in Australia. But, in my view, the 
wisdom of crowds as witnessed by the opposition campaign in the United 
Kingdom has now been sustained through the exposure of systemic 
failings outlined in the Chilcott Report, which shows how misguided the 
invasion turned out to be.
In Australia, it seemed, the executive power of the government was 
sufficient to begin what we would now describe as the ‘long campaign 
of war’, which grew to include Afghanistan as well as Iraq. This revealed 
once again, as in Vietnam, fundamental weaknesses in conceptions of 
the usefulness of strategic military power in circumstances short of total 
war. Reporting from the press after the government’s announcement of 
our contribution to the invasion of Iraq showed that voters were strongly 
against a war in Iraq without UN support, even though 61 per cent of 
the same voters would have supported the invasion if it had been backed 
by the United Nations.
The unconscionable cost for our all-volunteer forces—some members of 
which have now served in conflict overseas for longer than anyone did in 
either of the two world wars—is incalculable. Many of the consequences, 
in terms of casualties, destroyed family relationships, mental illnesses and 
disabled veterans, will be a burden on our society for decades to come. 
Yet the only people who really noticed were surviving members themselves 
and the families of those who are suffering, wounded or have been killed.
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Once committed, of course, successive Australian governments of both 
political persuasions have not been able to do much other than follow 
the US grand strategy. Hence, it is possible to argue that the only 
superpower that existed in 1945, having triumphed in the European and 
Pacific theatres of war, has learned that short of total war, a determined 
and intractable enemy can succeed despite all the trappings of power—
in Vietnam, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. What is even more curious is 
that we have failed to learn from the lessons to be drawn from these 
expeditionary fights.
Afghanistan after the invasion of Iraq
At the turn of the century, well before I handed command of the ADF 
over to General Cosgrove, two books were published under my signature 
by the Australian Defence Organisation. The first of these books is 
titled The Australian Approach to Warfare, and the second is titled Force 
2020. I  commend them both not because of the wisdom in them but 
because they are a useful summary of our thinking in the early part of 
the 21st century. I note that, on page 33 of The Australian Approach to 
Warfare, we show a war on terrorism from 2001 to the present being listed 
as ‘Participation in US-led campaign against international terrorism’.10 
None of us at that time—even though there was strong recognition that 
the post–Vietnam War era had passed—could have predicted that more 
than 15 years later Australia would still be involved in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan combating terrorism.
Final thoughts
It involves a great deal of complexity to assess fully the outcomes of our 
involvement in the ‘long war’ (as operations in Afghanistan have become 
known). More likely, it is far too early to make such a call. In making an 
interim assessment, however, we must take into account the important 
assumption that Australia would not have been involved in military 
operations in Iraq or Afghanistan—or indeed anywhere else in the Middle 
East—in the absence of significant pressure from the United States to 




support its agenda in the region. It also follows that Australian forces will 
not be operating anywhere in the Middle East after a withdrawal by the 
United States.
To place the ‘long war’ in context, there are two points that I think would 
be important to assessments of success or failure.
The first perspective relates to the 13 years of campaigning involving the 
ADF as an all-volunteer force. In effect, ADF personnel at the centrepiece 
of our consideration have undertaken combat operations in the full 
knowledge that people in Australia, apart from their own families, would 
barely notice. I am aware that some ADF personnel have participated 
in more than 10 deployments to Iraq and/or Afghanistan. This raises 
a question about the serious limitations of undertaking extended duration 
and extensive operations without the benefit of national service.
The second perspective relates to Australia’s ability to conduct its own 
campaigning. As a relatively small contributing nation, Australia was 
involved in two significant coalition operations (Afghanistan and Iraq) in 
which the United States asserted its primacy as the lead nation. This has 
meant a return to the pre–East Timor doctrine in which Australia would 
always be operating as a small component of a much larger multinational 
coalition. Presumably, although we continued the practice of deploying 
an Australian national command headquarters into the combat zone, 
there have been implications for our ability to be fully in charge of our 
own operational imperative in both conflicts.
On reflection, I think the 9/11 attacks fundamentally changed the 
dynamics of the Australian approach to war. Just as Operation RELEX 
was launched to counter people-smuggling, the responses to these attacks 
were not deliberate. We learned as we went. In the three months after 
9/11, these responses were cobbled together as the world held its collective 
breath awaiting news of the next attacks. We simply had no idea of the 
possible nature and scale of what might follow. But what we did know 
was that the basis of our security was under serious threat from experts in 
asymmetric warfare; this has been a common characteristic of all groups 
intent on using terror to achieve their objectives.
As with INTERFET, the initial insertion of our special forces into 
Afghanistan was accompanied by a clear exit strategy. Success was defined 
as the destruction of al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and 
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significantly reducing its presence in country. This success we achieved 
quite quickly, but then the priorities and complications presented by the 
invasion of Iraq meant that we took our eyes off this ball too early.
Now, it seems evident that the search for WMD was an artifice to cover the 
real intent of the invasion of Iraq, which was to topple Saddam Hussein. 
In May 2002, at a meeting with senior administration officials in the US 
Department of Defense, we were told that planning for a campaign in 
Iraq was for contingency purposes only. It is now rather revealing from 
the books written by Bob Woodward that US intentions over Iraq had 
firmed in December 2001, beginning with a high-level meeting of the 
administration at President Bush’s Crawford ranch just before Christmas.
In my tour as CDF, we transitioned from a focus on our region and 
relative peace into the post-9/11 age when, having been caught short 
over Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, we suddenly woke up to the fact 
that the world had been undergoing changes that entailed significant new 
challenges to the established order. Whereas in the previous four years 
we had been the lead nation in the UN-mandated coalition operation 
to restore security to East Timor involving 26 other countries, we now 
returned to an operational environment in which the United States called 
the shots.
Notably, at the time of mounting INTERFET in East Timor, I do not 
think that Australia would ever have contemplated invading Indonesia to 
set East Timor free. If we had invaded Indonesia to set East Timor free, 
the dynamics of our region would have been reshaped quickly in ways 
that would not have been good for Australia as it is hard to believe that 
war with Indonesia would not have resulted. By 2003, it seemed we were 
more circumspect in 1999. In today’s world it seems it is much easier to 
invade a country that is not your neighbour.
Finally, I cannot help but observe that while Parliament has held a full 
inquiry into the circumstances of ‘Children Overboard’ and other matters 
resultant from certain events of political interest during Operation RELEX 
in October 2001, it has not yet held an inquiry into the circumstances 
leading up to and during the ‘long war’ from 2001 until the present.11 
Given the cost of the long war to the nation, this failure to examine 




fully all these issues beggars belief about our priorities and the impact 
of political expediency. This failure also lends support to those who call 
for a change to the processes we use in Australia to decide on war.
If national service of some kind had been required in the United States 
and in Australia before embarking on the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the decisions for war would have been a lot more difficult to make.







Australia’s intervention in 
Afghanistan, 2001–02
Dan McDaniel
I met the former US Senator Charlie Wilson at midnight in Kandahar 
when it was 30 degrees Celsius. Standing outside in the dark with three 
US officers, Charlie said to us, ‘[Y]ou boys are finishing off what we 
started, but you’re doing it a whole lot better than we ever did.’ Privately, 
I disagreed. It was now 2009, I was on my third tour and the coalition 
did not seem to be winning a counter-insurgency that was quite different 
from the counter-terrorism mission I was sent to fight in 2001–02.
Back in Charlie Wilson’s day, in response to the Soviet Union invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1981, the United States supported the Afghan mujahideen 
to fight the Soviet forces efficiently and effectively, famously providing 
them with a Stinger missile to shoot down Soviet helicopters. US support 
for the mujahideen largely ceased once the Soviet Union withdrew from 
Afghanistan and the United States judged that it had achieved what was 
in its primary national interest.
Twenty years later, the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 
operations immediately following were similarly well focused and fairly 
well executed under the circumstances. Al-Qaeda was the enemy, the 
Taliban its support. While some contributing nations had broader national 
agenda, the primary objective of removing the terrorist group al-Qaeda 




Then a major, I led the first SAS Squadron, under an Australian Special 
Operations Task Force Headquarters.1 We entered Afghanistan in early 
December 2001, through Forward Operating Base Rhino, a former drug-
smuggling hub located in the desert south of Kandahar. Following the fall 
of Kandahar in late December, during which Australian forces supported 
the combined US special operations forces and Northern Alliance efforts, 
the Task Force’s base of operations moved to Kandahar airfield. Although 
the base was home, much of the squadron’s time was spent outside it 
on long-range and long-duration patrols and shorter direct-action tasks. 
In March 2002, the Task Force temporarily relocated to Bagram Airfield 
to support Operation ANACONDA in attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda 
forces in eastern Afghanistan. My squadron was rotated out and replaced 
by a second squadron in March–April 2002, at which time Bagram 
Airfield became the permanent base for the Task Force headquarters. 
The final squadron rotation occurred in September 2002, and Australian 
special forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan in December 2002.
This chapter reflects on the first year of the commitment of Australian 
special forces to combat operations in Afghanistan, from the invasion in 
2001 through to withdrawal at the end of 2002. It is intentionally focused 
at a level higher than specific tactical actions, most of which remain 
classified. Instead, its focus is on Australia’s national strategy, the missions 
and the broad lessons. It will also briefly reflect on Australia’s exit strategy.
These reflections are deliberately limited to those of the tactical troops 
and commanders of 2001–02; it captures the rough, blunt perspectives 
of then junior troops rather than the analytical and polished evaluations of 
now senior soldiers and officers. This account and any inaccuracies are my 
own; however, in preparation I interviewed many of the SAS commanders 
of the 2001–02 deployments and others who were senior officers at the 
strategic level in Australia at the time.
1  This chapter numbers the SAS squadrons by the order in which they were deployed to 
Afghanistan, not by their formal subunit titles; i.e. ‘the first squadron deployed’ rather than ‘1 SAS 
Squadron’.
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National strategy—ANZUS, entry and the 
Australian reputation
At the time of the September 11 attacks, I and elements of the squadron 
were on a separate deployment and did not learn of the attacks until some 
days afterwards. We were swiftly recalled to Australia and, in November 
2001, the squadron was sent to the Middle East.
Prime Minister John Howard’s swift decision to stand alongside the 
United States and commit troops to combat operations in Afghanistan 
demonstrated the level of Australian national intent. Although the Special 
Forces Task Force was issued a mission to defeat al-Qaeda and deny 
Afghanistan as a terrorist safe haven, we had no real relationship with 
Middle Eastern nations. Furthermore, each of our traditional coalition 
partners was focused on their own national agenda, and the United States 
was focused on its own plan rather than on forming and supporting 
a broader coalition. This left us with the problem of securing a  base 
in the Middle East, entry to Afghanistan, US command and control 
‘sponsorship’ (i.e. the US host formation to which Australians could 
attach) and logistics support necessary to achieve the national will. There 
were no favours—nothing was offered and nothing was simple.
The Task Force faced some active resistance from other coalition partners 
who were positioning themselves within their own national agenda, and 
there were some follow-up discussions between the Australian Prime 
Minister and US President to finally secure support. The Task Force 
Commanding Officer, supported by the deployed national commander, 
Brigadier Ken Gillespie, had to work hard to secure a base in the Middle 
East. He had to work hard for US command and control sponsorship. 
This eventually came in the form of a US Marine commander by the name 
of Brigadier General James Mattis, who would go on to become the US 
Secretary of Defense under President Trump, and then Gillespie had to 
work harder to actually get the force into Afghanistan. There was a lot 
of work to be done before the real work began.
Once the Task Force was deployed to Afghanistan, all ranks of the 
squadron felt keenly a responsibility to reinforce Australia’s military 
reputation on this world stage. The soldiers understood that the Task Force 
was representing not only the Australian military but also the Australian 
nation, including its commitment to the global rules-based order and the 
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US alliance. At the tactical level, the soldiers knew that actions in this 
war zone would shape the coalition’s judgement of the professionalism 
of Australian soldiers.
Early on, my boss, the SAS Commanding Officer, made a tactical 
decision that had strategic impact: the decision to deploy with our own 
ground transport in the form of the SAS’s modified Land Rover Perenties. 
Australia’s was one of the few coalition special forces that brought its 
own vehicles. This provided autonomy and flexibility, and the ability 
to conduct a wider range of missions, thereby allowing a modest-sized 
squadron to make a disproportionately large contribution to the US-led 
effort. For a period in the midst of winter of 2001–02, Australia was 
one of the few nations conducting long-duration special reconnaissance 
patrols, reporting on the presence of al-Qaeda and the broader mood 
and perceptions of the Afghan people across the east and south of the 
country. Each individual Australian patrol was tracked at the US Central 
Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in the mainland United States, 
and its reporting was being briefed at the highest levels of the US military 
and administration. The information provided was highly regarded, and 
the Australian patrol flags on the map at CENTCOM Headquarters were 
a powerful demonstration of Australian commitment. However, it was 
Operation ANACONDA that showcased Australian professionalism and 
influenced the course of the commitment of Australian special forces for 
the remainder of 2002.
Operation ANACONDA’s objective was to destroy a large al-Qaeda–
Taliban force located in the Shahi Kot valley, in Ghazni Province in central 
eastern Afghanistan. Unlike earlier Afghan-led operations in the Tora Bora 
region of Nangarhar Province, north of Khost, Operation ANACONDA 
was to be a coalition-led combat operation that would commit more 
than 6,000 conventional and special operations forces. During the course 
of this operation, Australian patrols directed air power on to al-Qaeda 
targets all day and night for more than a week, killing significant numbers 
of enemy fighters, destroying enemy equipment and on more than one 
occasion protecting the lives of coalition soldiers fighting in the valley. 
The action resulted in the awarding of a Distinguished Service Cross to 
an SAS sergeant patrol commander and a US Silver Star, the US military’s 
third-highest personal decoration for valour in combat, to a United States 
Air Force member attached to one of the SAS patrols.
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About the time of Operation ANACONDA, the Australian Government 
was considering that there would only be a single squadron commitment 
with no rotations. The Task Force performance on Operation 
ANACONDA persuaded senior US commanders that the Australian 
force was one worth lobbying for. The Australian Government agreed 
to remain committed and deployed a second squadron to Afghanistan to 
take over from the first.
Not surprisingly, the squadron rotations were the subject of deliberate 
government consideration and decision. No rotation was assured and, 
in both cases, the decision to continue the deployment was not made 
until four to six weeks before departure. This process was apparent to the 
deployed force, with the tempo of operations reducing around the times 
of Australian Government consideration.
As the deployment progressed into mid-2002, it became clear that most 
al-Qaeda forces had departed Afghanistan. At this point, the national 
intent seemed less clear. There was still work to be done to ensure that 
pockets of al-Qaeda were dealt with, but the focus of the deployed forces 
shifted a little, which is probably best understood through the missions 
assigned to each SAS squadron.
Missions
The first SAS Squadron’s mission was clear and without restriction—it 
was essentially to deny Afghanistan as a firm base for al-Qaeda’s global 
terrorism campaign in order to reinforce Australian national interests. 
The ruling Taliban regime was of interest and clearly important in terms 
of Afghanistan as a safe haven for al-Qaeda; however, the focus was 
very much on hunting al-Qaeda forces. The mission was simple, clear, 
executable and aligned from the tactical to the national level.
There might have been some surprise at the wide range of the mission at 
the time of Australia’s deployment. The US and UK special forces had 
made early gains before we departed Australia, and indeed the tactical 
situation did evolve from September to early December 2001. The 
Australian Government probably could have reduced the breadth of the 




While throughout 2002 the mission remained focused on al-Qaeda 
and denying Afghanistan as their base, by the second squadron rotation 
the Taliban started to feature more prominently in tasking. Following 
Operation ANACONDA, it was increasingly clear that the bulk of the 
remaining al-Qaeda forces had departed Afghanistan and moved largely 
into Pakistan. As a result, the second and third SAS Squadrons’ tasking 
shifted from directly targeting al-Qaeda forces to a more traditional 
reconnaissance role, focusing on remaining pockets of al-Qaeda forces, 
their support networks and their movement routes along the various 
‘rat lines’ between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Australian forces were now 
also tasked with stemming the flow of Taliban figures along the same 
movement routes. A particular focus became protecting Kabul from 
attack to facilitate the conduct of the strategically important national 
Loya Jirga to select a future President and Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan.2
The mission assigned to the first Task Group deployed to Afghanistan 
provided the freedom to exploit fleeting opportunities. The Task Group 
commander had the flexibility to move his forces wherever necessary 
within Afghanistan to achieve the national intent and the tactical direction 
of his coalition commander, Brigadier General Mattis. As I said earlier, 
the first assigned mission was simple, clear, executable and aligned from 
the tactical to the national level. It remains the finest example of mission 
command I have experienced,3 and was one of the many useful tactical 
lessons of this deployment.
Lessons
From its first rotation, the first squadron documented more than 200 
lessons and recommendations. They ranged from a lack of modern anti-tank 
capability to 5.56mm weapons being outranged, a lack of a mature joint 
tactical air control capability, the advantage of a varied fleet of helicopters 
and of course experiences in cold weather warfare. The following strategic, 
operational and tactical lessons are worthy of note.
2  Pashto for ‘grand council’, a Loya Jirga is a mass national gathering that brings together 
representatives from the various ethnic, religious and tribal communities in Afghanistan. See www.rferl.
org/a/ afghanistan-loya-jirga-explainer/25174483.html (retrieved 31 March 2020).
3  Mission command involves the trusted delegation of authority to undertake a mission within the 
parameters of a commander’s guidance.
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Strategic lessons
The first lesson concerns the issue of the reasons for intervention in 
a  nation’s external affairs versus its internal affairs and the associated 
national strategic decisions, preparation and level of national commitment 
in time, resources and casualties.
The 2001 invasion was about intervention in Afghanistan’s external 
affairs; that is, al-Qaeda and the safe haven it had in Afghanistan from 
which it was planning and carrying out global terrorist operations. While 
Taliban regime change was a predictable (and potentially US-planned) 
consequence, it was not the primary aim, certainly not of Australian 
forces, and might not have happened had the Taliban eventually given 
up al-Qaeda forces early during the invasion, as the United States had 
requested. To succeed in this mission, the Task Force needed only 
a  fairly basic understanding of Afghanistan: its strategic relationships 
and influencers, its history, its people, its first and second level of tribal 
affiliations and its geographic environment.
Contrast this with intervention in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, which 
might include installing and maintaining a pro-Western government, 
imposing Western-style values, systems and processes, nation-
building, protecting human rights and reversing the oppression of 
women and minority groups in a complex tribal environment where 
subtribes and their associated dynamics extend eight, nine, even 10 
levels. This involves a far deeper and greater level of planning, cultural 
understanding and  immersion, risk, inter-agency commitment in time 
and resources, and a deeper assessment of Australia’s national interest. I do 
not believe that any one nation demonstrated an appreciation of this until 
much later in the occupation and, as a result, I do not believe that any 
contributing nation, including Australia, prepared well with a strategy 




Australian personnel on guard in an Australian light armoured vehicle 
as a US Army Blackhawk helicopter takes off in Baghdad, 2006.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
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Second, and a lesson that is topical given current geostrategic 
circumstances, the Australian military needs to work at understanding 
the alliance with the United States and not take it for granted. Despite the 
many activities and interactions with the United States at many levels, the 
initial problems we had with securing basing, sponsorship and entry to 
Afghanistan taught us that we were not as ‘tight’ with the Americans as we 
thought. Despite shared history over many of the world’s major conflicts 
in the last century, it was apparent at the tactical level that at that time the 
United States really did not know us, understand us or necessarily trust us.
The fact that this relationship was not automatic was a surprise but clear 
to those deployed. It did not seem as clear to the Defence organisation 
in Australia, which appeared critical of the Task Force’s early inability 
to gain the tactical traction necessary to meet the national intent. There 
seemed to be in Australia an assumption that trust automatically came 
with Australia’s decision to commit ground forces, which was not the 
experience of those deployed. The military outcomes of Australia’s alliance 
with the United States require constant work at many levels and ongoing 
and realistic assessment.
Operational lessons
Beyond the strategic-level lessons observed during this phase, three lessons 
stand out at the operational level. First, the Australian military overseas 
exchange program reaps dividends and must be continued. In 1998, 
I spent a year posted to the United States serving with different units of 
the US special operations fraternity. Fast forward to Afghanistan in 2001. 
Following our occupation of Kandahar airfield, we had identified some 
areas of interest in the Helmand region but were being denied the safe 
passage through Kandahar city necessary to travel to the Helmand area. 
The US Special Forces unit that, with Hamid Karzai and his Northern 
Alliance soldiers, had secured Kandahar city had either not received our 
formal requests or ignored them. My commanding officer and I travelled 
into Kandahar city to try to negotiate passage with the US Special 
Forces commander. Upon arriving at the makeshift US Special Forces 
Headquarters, I met a senior US warrant officer with whom I had worked 
closely while on exchange in the United States and who was now a senior 
member of this US Special Forces group. After recounting old times, he 
organised an immediate meeting with the US Special Forces commanding 
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officer who, as it happens, I had met at a social function while on the same 
US exchange. The US commander promptly offered us passage through 
Kandahar city whenever we required it.
Admiral Bill McRaven, a former commander of US Special Operations 
Command, was fond of what he termed the Special Operations Force 
truth that ‘you can’t surge trust’. Notwithstanding my earlier comments 
regarding our broader military relationship and alliance with the United 
States, the one-on-one trust that is built through the exchange program 
has paid off at the tactical level time and again. It is important to note that 
the Australian Special Operations Commander in 2001, Major General 
Duncan Lewis, had attended the US Army War College. Additionally, one 
of the Australian deployed commanding officers in 2002 had attended the 
US Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
The second lesson concerns Australian national command. It would not 
be an Afghanistan discussion without mentioning command and control 
and, most particularly, what the term ‘national command’ actually 
means  and how Australia applies it. Australia established a national 
commander and headquarters from 2001; the first national command 
headquarters was lean and comprised a commander, a handful of staff 
officers, some logistics personnel and a signals detachment.
Before deploying the first squadron, the then Chief of Defence Force, 
Admiral Chris Barrie, made it clear to my commanding officer that the 
‘national command’ function had two purposes: first, a backstop and 
support should he face tasking that was outside the national interest, 
and second for Australia to exert influence at senior levels in the coalition. 
The national command function was not designed to command or 
control the commanding officer; rather its mandate was to allow him the 
freedom to make rapid decisions within Australia’s strategic intent and, 
in so doing, exploit fleeting opportunities without reference to higher 
mission command.
Throughout 2002, and probably specifically after Operation 
ANACONDA, there was anxiety at senior levels within Defence that the 
Special Operations Task Force would draw itself further into whatever 
fight presented, regardless of national intent, and wedge the Australian 
Government into remaining committed to Afghanistan. This suspicion led 
to pressure on the national commander and his staff to be more involved 
in managing priorities and directing the Task Force and its actions.
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Over the years, Australia’s national command headquarters grew and on 
occasions seemed to assume a greater level of almost operational command 
of Australian task groups, parallel to and sometimes in competition with 
the coalition operational command and control arrangements. The 
Australian national command headquarters often provided outstanding 
support for deployed task groups; however, its status and responsibilities 
were inconsistent and seemed to depend on the intent of the appointed 
national commander rather than on the need or indeed direction from 
Canberra. The national command function started with a clear role and 
mandate that grew hazier. Certainly, each time I deployed I felt the need 
to test what it thought it was doing against what I had been briefed before 
departing Australia.4
The point is that the ADF needs to better define and implement the 
mandate, tasks and responsibilities of a national commander. Further, 
it needs to be clear on its national command and operational command 
and control models to ensure the most efficient employment of finite 
staff resources. One alternative model used by other nations was to 
add national command responsibilities as a function of its most senior 
deployed headquarters or staff, which in our case would have rested with 
the Task Force commander.
The third lesson concerns Army and ADF policy on a war footing. 
Despite the then ongoing operations in Timor Leste, Australia had not 
been engaged in many of the policy challenges that we faced since the 
Vietnam War. Rules of engagement for war, a lack of detention policy and 
a lack of detainee interrogation policy were a few of the operational issues 
that I had to work through. However, the most troubling issue was that of 
managing wounded soldiers back in Australia with what seemed primarily 
peacetime personnel policies. Quite different from today’s practice, back 
in 2002 wounded soldiers had to comply with medical and fitness policies 
that did not seem to appreciate the impact of their war service.
In one case a soldier had lost a portion of his foot and significant leg 
function to an anti-personnel mine but was penalised for not being able 
to complete portions of the Army basic fitness assessment. While he 
ultimately and probably correctly discharged on medical grounds, upon 
return from that first tour it felt as if ADF policies were too slow to adapt 
4  I served under its national command three times in eight years.
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to the commitment of its people to war. Defence needs to ensure that its 
policies remain combat focused and do not lazily drift into those policy 
settings best for managing an ADF at peace.
Tactical lessons
Beyond the operational level, there are three tactical lessons that stand out 
from that first year of service in Afghanistan.
First, this was the first real dawning of the necessity of a new suite of 
enablers to which we were exposed, such as long endurance, armed 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. There was a growing awareness that Australian 
special forces needed to lift its modernisation game but without becoming 
over-reliant on technology. We had observed this over-reliance in the 
lead-up to Operation ANACONDA. Our Special Forces Task Force had 
independently discovered the significant al-Qaeda presence within the 
Shahi Kot valley a few months before Operation ANACONDA and was 
reporting from manned observation posts. The US command, however, 
ordered the Australian patrols to leave the area for fear of compromise, 
and instead manned and unmanned reconnaissance flights were flown 
to establish enemy dispositions. These flights failed to identify all 
of the enemy strong points that did much of the damage to coalition 
forces during the first hours and days of Operation ANACONDA. 
It was our view that the coalition was too reliant on technology for its 
reconnaissance and that reporting from manned SAS observation posts, 
combined with the overhead imagery, would have provided planners with 
a more complete picture of enemy dispositions. We believed that Australia 
needed to embrace new technology and ways of operating but that the 
soldier remained the critical piece. The answer was better enabled soldiers, 
not soldiers enabling technology.
Second, our tactical self-sufficiency was a key factor in our early success 
and overall reputation. While other coalition Special Operations Forces 
elements were competing for limited US vehicles and helicopters, the 
squadron’s fleet of Long Range Patrol Vehicles, communications suite 
and fairly rough but workable logistics chain provided an agility that 
was attractive to the Americans, who needed to service the demands of 
a growing number of less robust coalition partners. The Australian force 
was light, agile, self-sufficient and therefore attractive to our US allies.
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Third, the deployment validated the SAS maintaining a broad suite of 
equipment and capabilities. There had been much discussion in the 
1990s about the SAS’s focus, and at one stage the organisation debated 
disbanding the vehicle-mounted capability and disposing of the fleet of 
Long Range Patrol Vehicles. The first rotation validated the breadth 
of unit capabilities. The SAS squadron’s ability to conduct a wide array of 
missions, from pinpoint direct-action attacks to reconnaissance across 
thousands of kilometres; the diverse skill sets, ability to plan and execute 
missions rapidly and such tactical skills as sniping and cold weather 
warfare were but some examples. The Special Forces Task Force delivered 
a high level of versatility, agility and adaptability that was attractive to the 
coalition command.
Exit strategy—mission accomplished 
or Iraq looming?
Beyond these strategic, operational and tactical lessons, I cannot comment 
on whether there was a formal exit strategy as its existence was never clear 
to me at the tactical level. Only those in the senior political and military 
machine at the time would be able to verify the existence of a formal 
exit strategy and whether such a strategy was used to guide key decisions 
throughout 2002. What I do know is that while the national intent and 
mission was clear, the strategy for exit was less so.
Some thought that there might be only one deployment of troops and 
that withdrawal would follow. Indeed, when the first commanding officer 
was rotated, it was widely communicated that his replacement was there 
to pack up and return the Task Force to Australia at the conclusion of 
Operation ANACONDA.
Around each rotation decision there were high-level teleconferences 
between Australia and the United States during which the United States 
pressured Australia to remain. Following Operation ANACONDA, 
Australia decided that it was so engaged in the fight and relied upon by 
the coalition that its forces should remain. So, in my view, the Australian 
Government decided to continue to commit ground forces not just for the 
sake of the US alliance but also because militarily Australia was delivering 
tactical effects upon which the coalition relied.
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At the tactical level, the fairly blunt and unsophisticated view was that 
a  one-year commitment would suitably demonstrate national will. 
A  year also  suited the SAS as it could be broken up into three four-
month rotations, which would effectively manage the high intensity of 
the deployment and expose most soldiers to this combat environment. 
I  doubt that anyone assessed at that point that the Australian special 
forces community would have more than enough exposure over the next 
15 years.
Iraq was looming towards the end of 2002, and many at the tactical level 
felt that the evident geographic shift of US assets and the shift of US staff 
focus started to distract from the job in Afghanistan. The mission that 
underpinned the invasion of Afghanistan was, in my view, achieved by 
the end of 2002, so the force withdrawal in December of that year was 
prudent from an Australian national perspective. While I say this, one 
wonders what would have happened had it not been for the planning for 
the invasion of Iraq. I suspect that it was potential future operations that 
ultimately determined the timing of the withdrawal of Australian special 
forces from Afghanistan.
In terms of the decision to commence another operation in Iraq, my 
personal view in 2002–03 was that quite aside from the justification for 
invading Iraq, opening a second front in the Middle East at that time 
seemed militarily unwise. I viewed such a rapid pivot to Iraq as a military 
and strategic mistake, simply because it would stretch resources too thin, 
and that if the job in Afghanistan was to shift from countering terrorism 
to nation-building, then it was nowhere near done to the extent necessary 
for assets and staff to be reassigned to another invasion and major conflict.
Even in April 2002, my view was that the Taliban would return and behave 
in much the same way as the mujahideen of the 1980s. I did not share the 
view that even a massive military coalition had the resources to win, then 
hold Afghanistan and concurrently win in Iraq. My expectation was that 
in 2003, significant counter-attacks would be launched from countries 
bordering Afghanistan. In the end I was wrong, and the coalition faced 
only a limited insurgency in 2003. The Taliban could have made it more 
difficult in that first year of operations in Iraq; however, that was to come.
79
4 . AuSTRALIA’S INTERvENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001–02
Conclusion
This first year and, indeed, the first rotation were wild times when 
boundaries were set only by where the enemy were. I had the view that 
rather than making history, our squadron was dropped in the middle of it. 
One day while on patrol I met a former Afghan mujahideen fighter from 
the Soviet era who handed me a photo of Ronald Reagan. On the back 
was written the name ‘Mike’ and a phone number. The Afghan told me 
that he had been ‘working with Mike some time ago‘ but that his radio 
batteries had gone dead and he needed new batteries so they could get 
back in contact. ‘Mike’ was clearly of the US Central Intelligence Agency 
and had likely dumped this Afghan contact back in the 1980s when the 
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. I suspect that ‘Mike’s’ CIA colleagues 
were probably as keen to speak to the Afghan contact now as he was to 
take their money. It struck me then that the game was back on and that, in 
an Afghan sense of time, the break between the Soviets and our invading 
force was merely a half time.
The missions and freedoms assigned to us in that 2001–02 period were an 
example of what right looks like, and Australia managed it well. Our task 
of removing a terrorist force and the conditions that allowed it to grow 
was clear, was aligned from the national through to tactical levels, and 
represented the essence of mission command. Its ultimate test was that it 
allowed deployed forces the necessary freedoms to best achieve Australia’s 
national objectives, which the Task Force did. Although we did not find 
Bin Laden, the invasion was a success, the strategy and mission were 
clear and our exit roughly aligned with achieving that mission; denying 




Air Operations Control 
and Reporting Centre
Chris Westwood
Much had happened in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the 
Special Forces Task Group in 2002. Australian land forces returned in 
2005. Thereafter calls were being made for additional niche contributions, 
including critical capabilities in relatively short supply. This included calls 
for capabilities to manage the increasingly busy airspace over Afghanistan, 
such as the RAAF’s Control and Reporting Centre (CRC), a field 
deployable unit designed to manage the use of airspace in a war zone.
The 2007–09 deployment of the RAAF’s CRC was drawn from No. 41 
Wing, Surveillance and Response Group (SRG). The CRC was responsible 
for deconflicting civilian and military air traffic over Afghanistan as well as 
ensuring that all military aircraft, both manned and remotely piloted, were 
properly marshalled within the area of operations. The CRC deployment 
represented only one small but important part of a significant RAAF 
contribution to operations during this period. This contribution included 
the following elements:
• Air Mobility—86 Wing (C-130 Hercules air transport and air-to-air 
refuelling aircraft)
• Heron unattended aerial vehicles—5 Flight (used for reconnaissance 
and surveillance)
• APC3 Orion surveillance aircraft—92 Wing (used for maritime as 
well as land surveillance over Iraq from 2005 onwards)
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• Air Traffic Control—44 Wing (personnel deployed at various airfields 
alongside US and coalition counterparts)
• An Air Task Group, consisting of the following two components:
1. Air Combat—81 Wing (F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft deployed 
particularly for Operation FALCONER in 2003 over Iraq)
2. Air-to-Air Refuelling—33 Squadron (operating Boeing 707 and 
later KC-30 refuelling aircraft throughout the Persian Gulf region)
• Intelligence—87 Squadron (collection, analysis and reporting for 
deployed force elements)
• Medical—Aeromedical Evacuation, Role 2 (deployed with the land 
forces in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan)
• Joint Terminal Attack Controller—4 Squadron (providing precision 
targeting assistance to deployed forces)
• Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC; RAAF contribution 
comprising personnel assigned to various command, operations, 
intelligence and logistics appointments alongside US Air Force and 
other coalition personnel managing coalition air operations across 
the Middle East)
• Various units delivering communications, combat support and 
supplementing joint staff appointments
• Control and Reporting Centre (CRC)—41 Wing.
In short, for the period 2001–14, lots of great Air Force people were doing 
great things. The forthcoming official histories will provide coverage of 
the breadth and depth of the RAAF’s operations in the Middle East.1 So I 
will simply acknowledge the great achievements of the RAAF in general, 
and individual members in particular, and move on to the CRC.
A niche deployment such as the CRC is generally overshadowed in 
discussions regarding air power by fast jets and bombs. Perhaps not 
surprisingly given my background, I believe there is much to be learned 
from examination of these smaller capabilities such as the CRC. And 
lessons drawn from such examination are relevant not just to CRC or even 
broader command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations, but also for all small, 
high-end niche capabilities.
1  See Australian War Memorial, ‘Historians: Official History of Australian operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and East Timor’ at  www.awm.gov.au/learn/understanding-military-history/official-
histories/ iraq-afghanistan-timor/oh (retrieved 21 October 2020).
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RAAF Control and Reporting Centre, Kandahar, 2007–09.
Source: Courtesy of Air Commodore Chris Westwood.
Australian soldeirs check vehicles on a main supply route in Southern 
Iraq, 2008.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
The CRC by definition includes sensors—in this case our own Lockheed 
Martin TPS-77 radar, plus access to all other deployed radars; an operations 
facility—contained within a series of ISO containers inside a large tent; and 
some link (military tactical data exchange networked communications) 
capabilities and facilities both at the CRC site and scattered around the 
theatre. The CRC compiled an air picture characterising the Afghanistan 
airspace from this facility and provided that to various agencies, primarily 
the CAOC. The CRC also used their air picture to provide 24/7 air battle 
management throughout the Afghanistan airspace.
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The role of the CRC is simple: to ensure we have the right aircraft with the 
right weapons and fuel load in the right place at the right time to support 
the joint (interservice) fight—our priority was to support the troops in 
contact with adversaries.
This was the first RAAF CRC offshore operational deployment in 50 years. 
It was fair to say that at the time, while we were good at moving capabilities 
around Australia, we had little offshore deployment experience or culture, 
and operating inside a deployed Joint Task Force (JTF) was reasonably 
foreign. So we had a steep learning curve. However, there was no better 
operational or technical CRC capability of its type at the time on the 
planet—including the operators and technicians (and support staff) who 
were, and still are, highly trained.
In terms of operational statistics, there were 196,000 sorties that came 
through the CRC in the 23-month deployment, more than any operator 
would see in a full career. The CRC supported 7,000 troops in contact 
during that time—something we are particularly proud of. This was a busy 
operational deployment in the busiest airspace in the world at the time.
In addition to these key operational achievements, there were some 
impressive technical statistics as well. In the 23 months of operations, 
the capability operated 24/7, achieving close to 100 per cent availability. 
This was a big ask for this type of sensitive electronic equipment, which 
included many single points of failure, operating in such a harsh climatic 
zone and under considerable operational pressure. Credit needs to go to 
our outstanding technical teams who took these challenges in their stride.
Figure 1 shows the airspace divisions in Afghanistan at the time of the 
RAAF CRC deployment. There were three Air Battle Management 
agencies  controlling three Afghanistan Battle Management Areas 
(BMAs):  an RAF CRC (‘Crowbar’), a US AWACS (‘Wizard’) and 
our RAAF CRC (‘Taipan’). The RAAF CRC was the primary agency 
and had Operational Control (OPCON) of the RAF CRC and US 
AWACS. Effectively, the RAAF CRC ‘controlled’ the Afghanistan skies 
for 23 months. In the context of the ADF, this represents a historically 
significant achievement.
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Figure 1: Afghanistan airspace.
Source: Courtesy of Air Commodore Chris Westwood.
Lessons
There were myriad lessons at all levels and from many perspectives 
concerning this deployment. In compiling these lessons, I spent a  bit 
of time with many of the key players involved in the deployment. 
In  particular, I would like to acknowledge Group Captain Richard 
Pizzuto. Richard was one of the deployment commanders and maintains 
a keen interest in capturing the history of the CRC deployment. I have 
collated these lessons into strategic, operational and tactical categories and 
listed the top ones of each.
Figure 2 shows a simplified command and control (C2) diagram. 
Operationally, the CRC worked for the CAOC. Everything was real time, 
which challenged those well-intentioned staff officers who were used to 
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• Air worthiness
Figure 2: Control and Reporting Centre command and 
control arrangements.
Source: Courtesy of Air Commodore Chris Westwood.
Strategic lessons
The value of high-end niche capabilities such as this to Australia’s alliance 
relationship with the United States cannot be overstated. US CRC 
capabilities were very tired, technically and personally. US Marines and 
USAF personnel had many rotations since 2001. Even in major forces, 
the pool of personnel and equipment available to service deployments 
of this type is limited and can be overused. Frankly, the US people and 
equipment were looking for an opportunity to reconstitute the force. 
Deploying the RAAF CRC into Kandahar for two years was a great way 
to give our US counterparts a well-earned and much-needed break—and 
they were extremely grateful.
Being offered a significant C2 role in a combined force, such as the Air 
Battle Management OPCON role of the CRC, with so much direct 
operational interaction with allied forces, demonstrated the trust the 
United States had in our CRC. Our operators and commanders had 
to be known and trusted by our allies, with compatible if not common 
doctrine and procedures. Things such as Air Battle Management, tanking 
(refuelling) procedures, ‘Link 16’ data communications doctrine and 
protocols and so on cannot be learnt on the fly. This underscores the 
importance of investment in high-end exercises to continually prepare 
and develop forces, and expose personnel to partners. Exercises such as 
Red Flag, where high-end capabilities can be tested and integrated with 
allies and put on show, are critical. Australian exercises need to be complex 
and attractive to the full range of partners, and need to include genuine, 
demanding, warlike scenarios. Trust is critical.
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There is also a need to invest in education. Broad education among the 
key stakeholders can make or break a deployment. Very few people in 
the ADF, at all levels, understood the nuances of the CRC capability—
which is perfectly understandable. The same, no doubt, is true for many 
current high-end niche capabilities such as electronic warfare, cyber and 
information operations for instance. More time spent demonstrating the 
CRC capability, and explaining where the ‘one sizes fits all’ mentality 
might not work, would have been useful. Niche technical capabilities of 
this type tend to be locked up and somewhat hidden behind secure doors. 
This is not always helpful. Everyone we depend on to make operational 
deployments successful needs to understand what these niche capabilities 
do and what their unique requirements might be.
Most important of all is relationships, of course. Knowing and trusting 
each other at all levels fixes most problems. Having RAAF officers as 
Deputy Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and 
CAOC directors, as well as valuing long-standing relationships between 
senior officers throughout the RAAF, the Australian Army and Navy, 
US forces and RAF, was a great aid in working through local issues—
including getting the local C2 squared away. Likewise, relationships in 
Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) at all levels helped 
work through many teething issues. Relationships always have been and 
always will be the key to success. Knowing each other through courses, 
exchanges and exercises can create the rapport and trust necessary to 
overcome problems at all levels.
Operational lessons
As I have mentioned, Afghanistan was the first deployment of the RAAF 
for 50 years. We, of course, had moved the CRC capability around 
Australia on many occasions, which did develop some reasonable technical 
deployment skills, but it was clear that some of the more JTF-level skills 
needed to be developed. The CRC team learnt quickly, but there were 
tears along the way.
For example, the CRC did not engage the JTF staff effectively in the 
pre-deployment phase. Hence JTF personnel did not understand 
the CRC’s deployment needs, and CRC personnel did not understand 
their processes. The result was that pre-deployment reconnaissance 
was somewhat underdone. What should have been a dedicated activity was 
instead tagged on to a special forces reconnaissance, which clearly had 
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different priorities. The CRC Recon Team was subsequently slashed—
even losing the logistics officer. Deployment planning therefore became 
that much harder, and the advance party ultimately had a more difficult 
task as a result.
The CRC also had an unusual in-theatre training and assessment 
requirement for operators, which the JTF personnel staff never did 
quite get to grips with. This was the busiest operational airspace in the 
world. There was no way to simulate the intensity. None of the team 
had experienced the sheer volume of aircraft and the absolute urgency of 
operations. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) that was developed by 
41 Wing was as good as it could be, based on in-theatre Air Task Orders 
and Airspace Control Orders, and using a representative simulation 
capability. It was good enough for the USAF to adopt, but it still 
could not replicate the intensity or tempo of real operations. As such, 
operators were put through a 2–3-week training program on arrival in 
theatre before facing an assessment that, if passed, certified them for live 
operations. Unfortunately, a handful of operators (about eight over the 
23 months of the deployment) could not make the jump from MRE to 
live operations, and they were tagged for compulsory return to Australia. 
This invariably invoked lengthy engagements with the JTF personnel and 
legal staff, who did not appreciate the due process and rigour that had 
already been applied; sometimes they insisted on adding their own review. 
Such reviews might take a week, during which time the CRC would be 
short an operator.
Being something of an unknown capability to many in the JTF and 
HQJOC, the CRC always forced an uphill battle to justify its existence or, 
more precisely, its workforce. This was a particular issue in Afghanistan, 
where the government imposed a hard limit on the number of ‘boots 
on the ground’. The CRC had a 75-person footprint that replaced a US 
footprint approximately twice the size. That is not unusual. The ADF 
has long prided itself on multiskilling and doing more with less. This 
reflects the demands of operating a mid-size force with best of breed 
equipment. It seems fine on paper until illness strikes or when someone 
does not come up to speed and needs to be replaced. There were unique 
challenges in this regard, yet the operational personnel allocation table 
was considered sacrosanct. The concept of ‘one size fits all’ is outdated and 
largely irrelevant in a modern force.
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Finally, at the operational level, I must mention the redeployment. 
41 Wing (under the TECHCON umbrella) had planned the extrication 
of the CRC in detail to ensure the protection of millions of dollars’ 
worth  of equipment from packing and handling mistakes. The wing’s 
concerns were not shared by the JTF staff, however, who insisted yet 
again on applying the standard model, a model that did not include the 
deployment of a specialist pack-up team as planned by the wing. The 
resulting damage to the $20 million radar when it struck the boom gate 
as it was driven off the site by a contractor easily accounted for any savings 
garnered by the decision not to deploy the specialist 41 Wing team.
Tactical lessons
One lesson at the tactical level concerned workforce sustainment. The CRC 
initially deployed for two rotations and one 12-month deployment. Once 
the deployment of the wing was extended (no real surprise), there were 
numerous workforce sustainment and concurrency issues, many unique to 
small, highly specialised capabilities of this type. My message is twofold: 
first, there is a clear need to be flexible and innovative as a whole force 
with workforce sustainment (medical, rotation durations and so on), and 
second, there is a need to listen to those who understand the specific 
workforce pressures of these capabilities. One size does not always fit all.
Summary
Overwhelmingly, this was a great deployment that achieved great results, 
and one of which those involved can be proud. That is important. The 
commitment and professionalism shown by the 400 or so ADF members 
who deployed with the CRC was yet another example of the remarkable 
people who serve in the ADF. And finally, there is plenty to learn about 
deploying niche capabilities. These will become more and more crucial to 
the joint and integrated force as fifth-generation technology takes hold. 
The lessons drawn from the CRC deployment are relevant for future high-
end niche capabilities, be they cyber, electronic warfare or whatever comes 





operations at the battle 
group level in Iraq
Anthony Rawlins
While Australia’s military presence in Afghanistan ebbed and flowed, 
pressure was also on Australia to deploy land combat forces to support the 
coalition facing massive challenges in Iraq. On 16 July 2003, Operation 
FALCONER ceased and Operation CATALYST commenced, heralding 
a transition from a focus on combat operations towards the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of Iraq.
In 2005 Australia committed the first of six conventional battle groups 
to security and stability operations in Iraq. This deployment was in direct 
response to broader US requests for increased coalition contributions to 
counter-insurgency operations. Australia’s response focused on training 
indigenous Iraqi Security Forces to assume the lead for security under 
a new and democratically elected national government.
The decision to continue military operations remained a sensitive 
political issue. From the outset the decision to commit to the war in 
Iraq had never won bipartisan political or mainstream electoral support.1 
The government’s decision to remain committed was carefully considered, 
1  The Opposition Leader at the time, Simon Crean, stated: ‘Labor opposes your commitment to 
war. We will argue against it and we will call for the troops to be returned.’ House of Representatives 
debates, 18 March 2003, p. 12512, www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/
Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/ParliamentaryInvolvement (retrieved 31 March 2020).
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finely calibrated and specifically messaged: this was to be a transition from 
combat-focused operations reflecting ongoing coalition progress in Iraq.2 
Previously the government had sought to justify military commitments 
on the basis of Iraq’s breaches of UN resolutions, catalogued in United 
Nations Resolution 1441. As counter-insurgency operations deepened, 
coalition casualties mounted, and the likelihood of discovering a WMD 
‘smoking gun’ diminished, debate about the value and legitimacy of 
continued military participation escalated.
With the announcement of an imminent withdrawal of Dutch forces 
from Iraq’s southern provinces, the government now contemplated a US 
request for an Australian force element to replace them. On 22 February 
2005, Prime Minister John Howard announced the deployment of 
a conventional battalion-sized group to Al Muthanna Province, designated 
the Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG). Its mission was to provide a stable 
and secure environment for the Japanese Reconstruction and Support 
Group undertaking humanitarian, engineering and reconstruction tasks 
in the area, and to assist in the training of Iraqi army units in the province.3 
Working in support of the Interim Iraqi Government, AMTG-1 would 
provide a visible and tangible Australian contribution to multinational 
efforts to develop a more secure and stable Iraqi nation-state.
Over five subsequent evolutions, this task group, later redesignated the 
Overwatch Battle Group (West) (OBG(W)), undertook a variety of activities 
to expedite the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces and local government to 
buttress local security, support civic control and deliver good government. 
Australian forces oversaw the inaugural and largely successful transition of 
Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces from coalition to Provincial Iraqi 
Control, the first two provinces in Iraq to achieve this milestone. Australian 
forces then transitioned into a loosely defined but ostensibly supportive 
‘operational overwatch’ configuration until the last Australian battle 
group withdrew in 2008. Despite numerous engagements with adversary 
groups—particularly the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia (a group that emerged in 
2003 led by firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr)—no Australian soldier 
from any contingent was killed in action. This combination of progressive 
Iraqi success, zero fatalities and American political praise for Australia’s 
contribution has since facilitated generally positive mainstream analyses of 
Australian efforts on Operation CATALYST.4
2  Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 218.
3  Department of Defence, Annual Report 2004–05, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005, p. 161, 
www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/04-05/downloads/0405_dar_10_full.pdf (retrieved 31 March 2020).
4  See for instance Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 244.
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Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornets prepare to depart on a 
mission to strike a Deash headquarters compound in Mosul, Iraq, from 
Australia’s main air operating base in the Middle East region, 2016.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
In contrast, the academic commentary has been more probing and the 
praise less effusive.5 Analysis and critique has focused more on the motives 
and means by which this carefully nuanced military contribution achieved 
its professed political and strategic objectives. Although the general 
consensus suggests that Australia adroitly managed its participation 
and achieved its desired strategic outcomes at very little cost, some have 
contended that at the tactical level, Australia’s reputation as a ‘heavy lifter’ 
in the coalition community actually suffered. Within the Australian Army 
itself, a parallel and equally critical dialogue appraising the means by 
which senior leadership chose to manage the political–strategic military 
requirement for government has also been evident.
This academic dialogue formed the touchstone for my presentation to 
the ‘War in the Sandpit’ seminar at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera, on 
12 May 2017. Invited to speak as a former Commanding Officer of 
Overwatch Battle Group (West)-2 (OBG(W)-2), I chose to recount 
my experience of the deleterious impact of strategic–tactical dissonance 
during this deployment; that is, the subtle but visceral impact on 
the practice of mission command emanating from uncertainty as to the 
strategic objective of the mission. I settled on this approach following 
near-unanimous concurrence among six the AMTG and OBG(W) 
5  Ibid., pp. 244–5.
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commanders that higher-order strategic imperatives—specifically, a clear 
national intent—had not been adequately or accurately communicated 
to the tactical level of command. The consequences, certainly in my own 
personal experience, manifested in some strategically counter-intuitive 
and tactically debilitating outcomes unlikely to have been evident at the 
highest levels of command, but which I now recognise as needing to be 
highlighted as containing important lessons for the future.
My observations, assessments and deductions on this issue, presented 
to many academic, military and political leaders at the seminar, proved 
polarising. Not surprisingly, in the post-seminar wash-up, my observations 
seemed to resonate favourably with those who operated at the tactical 
level but attracted scepticism amounting to outright rejection the more 
senior the stakeholder involved was in the chain of command, particularly 
so the more personal their involvement in the planning or execution of 
Operation CATALYST. Some media personalities saw my assessments as 
a potential smoking gun, seemingly confirming their long-held suspicions 
of duplicity between the government’s declared and unstated motives 
for engagement in Iraq and its commitment to coalition efforts. Despite 
what some might have thought, my motives were neither to denigrate 
my military superiors, criticise government capacity or commitment to 
furthering Australia’s national interests, nor the means chosen to achieve 
them. Nor was it to suggest that Australia should have committed more 
heavily to combat operations during Operation CATALYST.
Rather, my intent—which can be more fully outlined in this chapter—
was to examine in greater detail the means by which our military elected 
to exercise command and control, and apply the concept of mission 
command in the conduct of security and stability operations in Iraq. Not 
surprisingly, in light of my own and most of my counterpart commanding 
officer experiences, this examination has precipitated a reasonably critical 
view of our command and control architecture, emanating from what 
I do believe to have been the highly politically charged and nationally 
sensitive nature of this operation.
In attempting to understand why a restrictive and directive means of 
national command and control was employed, undermining the practice 
of mission command at the tactical level, I have relied upon third-party 
assessments. I must emphasise that I was not privy to the discussions 
and debate at the strategic and operational levels that would no doubt 
have informed the development of this command and control system. 
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Very few at the most senior levels of command would have been party to 
these discussions. Nevertheless, in my own mind, the search for reasons 
is important, given that the tenets of mission command were both 
doctrinally prescribed and professionally accepted in the Australian Army 
at that time, yet were seemingly either consciously or subconsciously 
discarded during many of the task or battle group deployments.
In the final analysis, much (I now suspect) revolves around the question 
of whether there was an express or implied direction for Australian 
battle groups to limit operational activity to avoid casualties. To this 
day I can neither unequivocally confirm nor deny whether this was the 
case; although it was certainly a topic of hot discussion within most 
contingents, no such direction (to my knowledge) has been confirmed as 
either an express or implied requirement. At best my personal experience 
and discussion with other tactical commanders confirms that remained 
a metaphoric ‘elephant in the room’ for most contingents deployed on 
Operation CATALYST.
This chapter therefore allows me to amplify the position put forward in 
my verbal presentation to the ‘War in the Sandpit’ seminar. It outlines 
my personal understanding of the background, objectives and nature 
of tactical operations in Iraq during Operation CATALYST. It leverages 
third-party accounts of the strategic and operational decision-making 
processes to discover what the national strategic intent might have been, 
which would have informed force design and development of a command 
and control architecture to give best effect to the political objective. It is 
my personal view, and that of most of my counterpart commanders 
on Operation CATALYST, that the command and control architecture 
chosen and employed was non-doctrinal and suboptimal for prosecuting 
contemporary operations. Our recounted experiences suggest the exercise 
of mission command at the strategic through to tactical levels was 
frequently undermined by an unfamiliar national command framework. 
This chapter seeks to discover the reason for this and in so doing highlights 
a potential lesson for Army: the importance of communicating strategic 
intent down to the tactical level as an essential prerequisite for the practice 




Essential reading for anyone interested in Australia’s military activities 
in Iraq is the abridged history and analytical study of the war in Iraq 
by Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010. 
The Australian Army directed Professor Palazzo to undertake this study 
in order to critically review Australia’s involvement in this contemporary 
campaign for future learning. His work, heavily redacted for release at 
the unclassified level, still provides a comprehensive history and—
for many—a broad-ranging insight into the operational and strategic 
considerations at play at the time.
His study highlights that the commitment of Australian forces to Iraq, 
from the commencement of combat operations through to stability 
and security operations, remained a politically sensitive issue for 
government. The conduct of this seminar confirms that many in the 
policy and academic community are comfortable with recognising that 
a principal determinant in Australia’s decision to commit to the war in 
Iraq was a calculated intent to enhance the strategic relationship between 
Australia and the United States. The seminar served to further confirm the 
strategic intent and outcome suggested by Palazzo in the Lowy Institute’s 
blog, Interpreter:
Australia joined the war to advance its own policy objective: to 
improve its relationship with its great power protector. It achieved 
this goal with great skill and at very little cost, and showed that 
it is possible for a junior partner to advance its strategic interests 
within a coalition dominated by a great power. For Australia, 
what mattered most was not what was happening in Baghdad but 
in Washington.6
6  A. Palazzo, ‘The making of strategy and the junior coalition partner: Australia and the 2003 
Iraq War’, Infinity Journal, art. 6, vol. 2, no. 4, 2012, pp. 27–30, quoted in Palazzo, ‘We went to Iraq 
for ANZUS’, Interpreter, 25 March 2013, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/we-went-iraq-anzus 
(retrieved 31 March 2020).
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A trooper from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment provides security to Japanese 
Iraq Reconstruction Group convoy vehicles in As Samawah, 2005.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
This policy objective, coupled with the political landscape, would have 
heavily influenced military planning, force design and the selection 
of operational areas for Australian forces. It would also have informed 
mission specification, pre-deployment training and the overarching 
national command and control architecture. In contrast to the more 
combat-oriented counter-insurgency operations being undertaken by US 
and British forces, the Australian mission set was carefully calibrated to 
enliven the strategic focus on provincial reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
Nevertheless, given the potential sensitivity of the electorate to Australian 
casualties, design and provisioning of the force ensured that it would be 
capable of defending itself in combat operations against any conceivable 
adversary in its area of operations.
The prescribed area of operations and mission set for the inaugural AMTG 
deployment clearly reflected these strategic considerations. In the largely 
peaceful province of Al Muthanna, AMTG-1 was to provide a stable and 
secure environment for the Japanese Reconstruction and Support Group 
undertaking humanitarian, engineering and reconstruction tasks in 
southern Iraq, and to assist in the training of Iraqi army units. The force, 
a ‘square’ battle group comprising a light armoured (cavalry) squadron 
and a protected motorised infantry company, along with combat support 
and combat service support company-sized subunits, was deemed more 
than capable of overmatching expected levels of opposition in the area.
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However, during the third AMTG rotation, the Japanese force withdrew 
from theatre as Al Muthanna transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control. This 
transition in July 2006 marked the formal handover of primary security 
duties for the province from coalition forces to the Iraqi Government 
and its indigenous security forces. With this change, the ostensible and 
predominant function of Australian military forces in Al Muthanna had 
been removed. AMTG-3 therefore relocated to Ali Air Base, Tallil, in the 
neighbouring province of Dhi Qar. By way of new function, the task group 
was now assigned the rather ill-defined task of operational overwatch 
of Al Muthanna Province, which still entailed continued training and 
development of Iraqi Security Forces under the capstone program known 
as Mentor, Monitor and Train (M2T).
Dhi Qar was the next province to transition to Provincial Iraqi Control 
on 21 September 2006, as the Italian contribution previously overseeing 
provincial security withdrew in the following month. In response to 
coalition (predominantly US) representations to replace them, Australia 
agreed additionally to assume operational overwatch of Dhi Qar Province, 
and with this expansion and consolidation of duties the AMTG was then 
retitled the Overwatch Battle Group West (OBG(W)), with AMTG-3 
becoming the inaugural OBG(W)-1.
This change in title reflected a fundamental change in the mission and 
objectives of the Australian force, with the battle group being more heavily 
focused on training and developing the capacity of the Iraqi Security 
Forces while maintaining a preparedness posture to provide support if the 
security situation degenerated beyond their capacity. However, the simple 
reality is that this ‘intervention’ posture was more illusory than real, 
crafted more to bolster the confidence of the local Iraqi Security Forces 
than to backstop them militarily. Operational overwatch was also cleverly 
conceived to present a positive strategic picture of Australia as a coalition 
partner engaged in ‘heavy lifting’, particularly as the insurgency in Iraq 
grew increasingly virulent, although the scale and intensity of counter-
insurgent activities in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces remained well 
below the national average.
I describe the mission set of ‘overwatch’ as something of a facade on the 
basis that the provision of combat support to the Iraqi Security Forces 
was really nothing more than a fictional construct, and the provision of 
combat support resided well outside the decision authority of the local 
battle group commander. Activation required a complex, lengthy and 
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largely ill-defined series of approvals from local to national Iraqi, coalition 
and then Australian governmental approval chains. It was made clear 
to successive tactical commanders that Australia would approve such 
a request only on formal application from the government of Iraq to 
the Australian Government, requiring that government prove that the 
situation outstripped the capacity and capability of national security 
resources. Iraqi Government inability or unwillingness to commit 
national  resources would not constitute sufficient reason for the battle 
group to engage in supportive combat operations. In a hypothetical crisis, 
this high threshold for action meant that any Australian intervention 
would have come late, following the commitment and overmatch of 
all national and other regional coalition forces in order to stabilise the 
situation before it spiralled out of control and generated a public affairs 
disaster for the coalition.
This arrangement meant that there was never any conceivable likelihood 
of the battle group being able to support local Iraqi forces constructively 
and decisively in combat operations to maintain stability in the province, 
at least not before it had escalated out of control, requiring a larger and 
more immediate coalition intervention to stabilise the situation.
This significant practical impediment was certainly not reflected in the 
Multi-National Division – South East (MND-SE) mission orders for 
the Australian force. In order to manage British (and potentially also 
US) expectations, it meant that the bulk of OBG(W) activity focused 
on supporting activities to maintain stability in the provinces, rather 
than actively pursuing destabilising elements. This translated into daily 
activity sets including Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) with local 
leaders, collective and individual training of provincial leaders and Iraqi 
army elements, force protection of coalition forces and installations, and 
intermittent support to various local Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs). These efforts have been accurately characterised as ‘preventing 
the insurgent’s cause from gaining purchase in the prevailing society’ 
rather than on combat operations against the enemy.7 It proved—in large 
measure—to be a successful approach, although it was periodically upset 
by events occurring in other parts of Iraq, which served also to destabilise 
the local security situation.
7  Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 242.
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It is a matter for historical record that, over time, the insurgency in Iraq 
grew ever more emboldened, increasingly contesting the authority and 
control of national and provincial governments and the capabilities 
of the Iraqi Security Forces. This national trend periodically affected 
southern Iraq, most notably during coalition counter-insurgent surge 
periods in central and northern Iraq. It translated into more dangerous 
operating conditions for several OBG(W) rotations, particularly in the 
conduct of movement, patrols and KLE in Dhi Qar Province. It was 
frequently asserted that the former Italian contingent had negotiated an 
agreement or ‘detente’ of sorts with the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in Dhi Qar 
Province. In exchange for some measure of financial assistance, the Italian 
contingent could operate without the militia contesting their presence. 
This arrangement was never confirmed, but it goes without saying that 
a ‘contract’ of this nature would never have been contemplated by—let 
alone authorised for—Australian forces operating in Iraq. In accordance 
with the operational mission specified in orders from Headquarters 
MND-SE, OBG(W)-2 thus began to expand its capstone overwatch and 
training activities into Dhi Qar Province, bringing it into closer contact 
with insurgent forces frequently using Dhi Qar as a ‘rest and recreation’ 
locale from insurgency activity in other parts of Iraq.
This seems to have been the catalyst for increased scrutiny and directive 
control from the national command chain, as OBG(W)-2 began to 
orient towards the operational overwatch and friendly force protection 
components of the mission in response to local assessments of security 
conditions. This reorientation inevitably brought the battle groups into 
closer contact with the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, the stakeholder most 
likely to contest their presence. Attacks on coalition logistic convoys and 
indirect fire attacks against the Tallil Air Base also began to increase at this 
time. This deterioration in provincial security conditions and the greater 
level of insurgent activity in Dhi Qar Province might have tripped risk 
sensitivities in the Australian national chain of command. This in turn 
gave rise to a perception of increased scrutiny and intervention in tactical 
decision-making by the Australian headquarters of Joint Task Force 633 
(JTF 633), ostensibly to assess and regulate tactical activities in Dhi Qar 
in accordance with Australian national intent.
Certainly, during the OBG(W)-2 deployment, the Australian national 
commander in JTF 633 now specified a requirement for advance 
notification of all tactical activities through provision of plans and orders 
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to the national headquarters in Baghdad. This gave rise to frequent 
episodes of Commander JTF 633 reserving (and frequently exercising) 
the right to veto tactical activities, including patrols aimed to counter 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), interdicting the main coalition 
supply route from Kuwait to Baghdad, and clearing patrols to known 
rocket launch sites. This veto frequently took the form of directing the 
commanding officer to canvas other coalition forces on Tallil Air Base to 
execute these activities, all well understood to be within the Australian 
mission remit according to operational orders from Headquarters 
MND-SE. This approach generated significant tension between myself 
and the commander of JTF 633, as I continually asserted that these tasks 
were well within our mission set. It also generated tension between the 
OBG(W) and local coalition force elements, given their loss of confidence 
in Australian capability and resolve, which also gravely wounded morale 
within the Australian contingent. The question of just why we were 
frequently precluded from executing approved mission sets for which 
we had been trained and assessed as mission capable during our final 
Mission Rehearsal Exercise was the source of great confusion among 
the contingent.
This dissonance between implied strategic intent and tactical freedom 
of action during my deployment suggested a critical omission in the 
national  command architecture—a failure effectively to communicate 
national intent or strategic objectives from which we could purposefully 
orient our tactical actions. We understood our tactical mission and tasks 
articulated in the operations order from Headquarters MND-SE, which 
was provided in the traditional, well-understood coalition mission orders 
format. These orders expressly contemplated combat action against 
the insurgency in support of provincial stability and security, support 
to friendly forces in contact, and integral force protection activity. To 
my recollection, each and every task and battle group before ours had 
extensively trained to this mission set during its Mission Specific Training 
and Mission Rehearsal Exercise before deployment. These were enduring 
tasks, and while they were articulated in the UK-led Headquarters 
MND-SE operations order, they had been ratified by previous Australian 
national command chains so as to inform Mission Specific Training and 
Mission Rehearsal Exercise training and certification.
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The Australian national command also intervened in the tactical activities 
of other task and battle group contingents. This was presumably to ensure 
that tasks allocated in mission orders from Headquarters MND-SE did not 
breach or contravene Australian national interests. This in theory should 
not have presented a problem, as this is the express role and function for a 
national command entity in Australian operational doctrine. The problem 
was manifest in its execution rather than the theory.
Herein lay the essential problem for myself and many other tactical 
commanders attempting to execute operational orders from Headquarters 
MND-SE: what were Australia’s national interests in southern Iraq? 
Without this clear articulation at the tactical level of command, the only 
means by which Australian national interests could be properly interpreted, 
preserved and/or protected was through incessant intervention by the 
national command chain to authorise, modify or veto tactical activities 
based upon an isolated and segregated assessment of strategic intent. This 
translated into a highly variable level and poor understanding of the risk 
management frameworks of each national commander.
The criticality of communicating 
national intent
Australian military doctrine itself highlights that without clear articulation 
of intent, the foundational basis for the application of mission command 
will be absent. ADF doctrine directs commanders to make sure that 
subordinate commanders understand the higher commander’s intent, 
their own missions and the operational context before planning tactical 
activity. Articulation of intent forms the conceptual basis for mission 
command, as subordinates can then be told what effect they are to 
achieve and the reason it is necessary. Their superior commander will tell 
them what to achieve, but should not tell them how to achieve it—the 
‘how’ is the preserve of the tactical commander, who is acknowledged as 
being in the best position to read and understand local conditions and 
situational variables.8
8  Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0, ‘Command, Leadership and Management’, chapter 2, section 2-2, 
10 June 2008, para 12.
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An F/A-18 waits its turn to refuel over Iraq during Operation 
Falconer, 2003.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
The experiences of Australia’s tactical commanders on Operation 
CATALYST suggest that this most basic of doctrinal stipulations was 
at best only partially enacted, often in an ad hoc and informal manner. 
The commanding officer of the first Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG-1), 
then Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble, recalls that the strategic intent 
for the mission was verbally communicated to him by both the Chief of 
Defence Force (CDF) and Chief of Army (CA) before his deployment. 
However, written versions of Australian strategic and operational orders 
were neither drafted nor made available until well into the AMTG-1 
deployment. Given that he recalls writing his own mission orders in the 
absence of anything other than verbal context, it is likely that national 
orders were retrospectively drafted to conform to the tactical orders he 
had written. By way of comparison, Noble recalls the operational orders 
provided by the higher coalition headquarters (MND-SE) to be both precise 
and well articulated, with clear intent provided in both written and verbal 
media. Somewhat incongruously, he recalls a lack of interaction with the 
Australian theatre commander, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), until 
such time as his first visit during the deployment. This suggests either an 
implicit acceptance that coalition orders were compatible with Australia’s 
strategic intent or, alternatively, that either the tactical commander 
or Australian national commander would be required to manage and 
ameliorate any inconsistency on the ground.
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AMTG-1 was the inaugural deployment and at short notice, and therefore 
an element of ‘catch-up’ could be countenanced. Subsequent commanders 
did not receive a similar level of pre-deployment interaction with either 
CDF, CA or CJOPS, thereby precluding this personal conveyance of 
strategic intent. In the absence of this personal interaction and clear 
written articulation of national intent, most tactical commanders have 
expressed different levels of confidence that the strategic intent was 
sufficiently discoverable or could be properly implied. Of those most 
confident that the strategic context and command intent was implicitly 
discernible, the commanding officer of AMTG-3/OBG(W)-1 recalls:
[R]eviewing the intent that I drafted as part of our in-theatre 
review (completed at the end of the first month in theatre) it was 
pretty clear that I understood the strategic aim … In terms of 
Australian interests it was clear to me that we had an ‘enabling 
role’ and that the confluence between tactical mission and 
Australian interests lay in us providing an ‘overt demonstration 
of relevance and the continual delivery of positive outcomes or 
effects’. The  Task Group had ‘to provide a balanced, agile and 
highly relevant military response’. The mission was on the nose 
politically and the US was in the midst of the ‘cut and run’ debate 
so it was clear that at the political–strategic level our masters were 
searching for answers and leaning very heavily on the military to 
come up with a solution. This was clear across the board within 
the coalition chain of command. I knew I wasn’t going to get any 
coherent guidance and decided to embark on our own approach[,] 
building on the conceptual work done by AMTG-2.9
Other commanders, however, cite lower levels of confidence in attempting 
to discern the strategic intent in light of the evolving political context. This 
was my own personal experience. Despite the extensive mission specific 
training and Mission Rehearsal Exercise regime, I remained unsure as to 
what express or implied strategic caveats or limitations would circumscribe 
my tactical freedom of action. I therefore undertook a self-funded trip 
to Canberra during my pre-deployment leave in order to gain a better 
understanding of the strategic context and any national caveats from our 
strategic headquarters in Canberra. I particularly wanted to confirm the 
veracity of rumours circulating in our mounting base that we were to 
avoid casualties at all costs.
9  Discussions with author.
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I therefore organised an impromptu visit to Military Strategic 
Commitments at Russell Offices in Canberra. None of the senior 
appointments were available for me at the time I visited. In speaking to 
the relevant desk officer for Operation CATALYST, asking for advice as 
to what I needed to do to meet the strategic intent and what I needed 
to avoid, the response was disappointingly blithe and vague. The advice 
was simply ‘Just don’t f*#k it up’ [sic]. When I asked what this actually 
meant, I was told that I would very quickly discover what I was doing 
wrong if I ‘skied off-piste’. At his level of authority and understanding, 
the desk officer simply could not cogently articulate what sort of things 
were ‘on’ and what was ‘off-piste’. It was not very reassuring, but by the 
same token I was relatively comfortable that the pre-deployment training 
had provided me with an operative understanding of what we were there 
to do, and what tools and tactics were available to me as a commander 
in seeking to execute this amorphous ‘national intent’ in the absence of 
specific national orders.
Other tactical commanders recount a similar personal requirement to 
determine implied strategic intent through their mission analysis process. 
The provision of coalition operational orders during pre-deployment 
training provided a solid understanding of coalition operational intent. 
However, Australia’s military orders tended to focus almost exclusively on 
the administrative or procedural aspects of constituting, concentrating 
and deploying the force into theatre. Reassurance was derived from the 
assertion that operational orders from Headquarters MND-SE had been 
vetted at the Australian theatre command level, and it was assumed that 
instructions to overcome any incongruence would be articulated in 
individual directives, national orders from Headquarters JTF 633 or in 
the CJOPS campaign plans. As a matter of doctrine, they would also be 
addressed ‘on occurrence’ by the national command chain in theatre—the 
raison d’être for a national commander in theatre. But the lack of a clear, 
cogent statement of national intent through the doctrinally accepted 
orders process clearly complicated the pre-deployment preparation 
of respective force elements. A heavy focus on the administrative and 
governance aspects of deployment served more to distract rather than 




The hierarchy of military orders didn’t flow naturally within 
the coalition but, as mentioned before, I was conscious of the 
dissonance within the coalition and also of the governance focused 
(and therefore limited utility) of national directives. By way of 
example, the mounting order out of Headquarters 1st Division 
came too late to make any difference and the deployment order 
arrived a day after our advance party had left.10
This diffuse process also resulted in a lack of discernible communication as 
to any national caveats or ‘red cards’ to the tactical commanders through 
Australia’s operational chain of command, at least not before interaction 
with the national commander in theatre.
However, if the national intent or caveats took time to discern for Australia’s 
tactical commanders, there was little doubt that—over time—they came 
to be well understood by the higher coalition headquarters. In the short 
period in the transition between the first and second AMTGs, it appears 
that Headquarters MND-SE had already determined that national 
strategic intent was curtailing the Australian tactical commander’s freedom 
of action. This interpretation was not complimentary, but it was generally 
understanding of the circumstances in which the Australian force element 
had to operate. The Commanding Officer AMTG-2 lamented:
I never received orders. I just took Roger’s orders and typed 
a ‘2’ over the ‘1’ and no-one noticed. By the time I arrived in 
theatre, the Brits had given up on us as far as contributing to 
their plan. The British Brigade Commander in Basra gave me his 
Brigade operational orders and asked me to fill in the blanks for 
AMTG-2—this is true! As there was no formal direction from 
Australia, I therefore made it up. No one ever took me aside and 
told me what the actual (not for public consumption) reason for 
us was for us being in Iraq. It certainly wasn’t to defeat anti-Iraqi 
Government forces and it was also evident that the Japanese weren’t 
totally incapable of looking after themselves. I had a conversation 
with Chief of Army just before we left and confirmed the real 
reason, but it wasn’t until day 3 on the ground in theatre when 
I think when I realised that all we could do was stuff things up … 
As-Samawah was as good as it was ever going to get!11
10  Discussions with author.
11  Discussions with author.
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As foreshadowed earlier, this absence or informality in the articulation 
of strategic intent was accompanied by a bureaucratic and forensic 
involvement in the administrative aspects of the deployment by 
various headquarters in the national command chain. According to the 
commanding officer of AMTG-3/OBG(W)-1:
the operational concepts were developed by us and briefed to all of 
the supporting commanders and also those in our tactical chain, 
and they were agreed without too much fuss. Fortunately, no one 
else was doing it at the time and, although some train-spotting 
[i.e. higher-level engagement with the details of our planning] 
occurred, it was inconsequential. Orders were largely written by 
us for insertion into the relevant orders (mainly divisional orders). 
HQ JTF 633 orders were largely administrative.12
The commanding officer of AMTG-2 similarly recalls an absence of 
articulation of national strategic intent, coupled with an overbearing and 
unhelpful focus on administrative control driven by internal military 
politicking:
In the early days, AMTG was to be a 12-month commitment 
with two six-month tours, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment being first. 
I was involved in much of the early discussions and planning as 
it was obvious to us in 1 Brigade that the follow-on force would 
have to be 5/7 RAR. What I didn’t factor on was a senior officer 
in Headquarters 1 Division wanting a 3 Brigade unit to go next. 
It meant that for the next four months, I had no authority to 
spend money or do anything really to prepare the force (training, 
equipment and even my reconnaissance) and everything I did 
was through begging, borrowing, stealing and bluffing. I had to 
fight constant little ‘pissant’ battles to get simple requests filled 
like automatic sniper rifles, and if it wasn’t for Chief of Army 
showing such an interest in us and thus being available for me 
to speak directly to when he visited, I wouldn’t have got the very 
little I asked for. In the end, I was described by a colonel in Army 
Headquarters as a ‘typical whinging CO’. I also had to deal with 
personnel and families who wanted to know what was going on, 
plans, career courses, postings, and the like. I rolled the dice and 
bluffed through it, telling everyone it was up to us to do.13
12  Discussions with author.
13  Discussions with author.
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These experiences suggest that there were significant deficiencies in 
the articulation of intent at the operational level in Australia’s chain 
of command, potentially owing to a more incumbent focus on 
the administrative aspects of preparing and deploying operational 
contingents. Nonetheless, it seems clear from a subsequent reading of 
Palazzo’s study that Australia’s strategic leaders had actually developed 
and were maintaining a high level of strategic unity. This seemed to have 
been well in place during the inaugural Australian deployment, with the 
commanding officer of the first AMTG recalling:
[The Chief of the Defence Force] articulating his intent and then 
reinforcing this during his visits meant that it worked—without 
that we would have deployed with no orders. Actually, both the 
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence were also very clear on 
their intent when they visited us.14
Although in Palazzo’s estimation politico-military unity might have 
endured throughout Operation CATALYST, the articulation of national 
intent and military strategic objectives down through the operational to 
tactical levels clearly seems to have fallen away in subsequent rotations. 
This might have been because the political and military strategic 
leadership remained confident that the initial parameters had been set by 
the first AMTG deployment; therefore only minimal ongoing dialogue 
was required to maintain a steady state. Alternatively, it might have been 
that as the tactical situation on the ground became more dangerous, 
particularly with the assumption of responsibilities in Dhi Qar Province, 
the risk of Australian casualties demanded closer scrutiny and control of 
tactical activities by the Australian national command. Irrespective of 
either possible motivation, what resonates most strongly is a definitive 
procedural failure to convey the strategic intent—the fundamental 
strategic context—down to the tactical level as the tenets of mission 
command suggest is essential for unity of effort.
14  Discussions with author.
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Intent and the practice of mission 
command
Articulation of command intent, from strategic down to tactical levels, 
forms a bedrock principle of the philosophy of mission command. 
Without this clear articulation, unity and synchronisation of effort suffer:
Mission command and control relies on the use of mission tactics 
in which seniors assign missions and explain the underlying intent 
but leave subordinates as free as possible to choose the manner of 
accomplishment. Commanders seek to exercise a sort of command 
by influence, issuing broad guidance rather than detailed 
directions or directives. The higher the level of command, the 
more general should be the supervision and the less the burden of 
detail. Commanders reserve the use of close personal supervision 
to intervene in subordinates’ actions only in exceptional cases. 
Thus, all commanders in their own spheres are accustomed to 
the full exercise of authority and the free application of judgment 
and imagination. Mission command and control thus seeks 
to maximize low-level initiative while achieving a high level of 
cooperation in order to obtain better battlefield results.15
Australian Defence Doctrinal Publication 0.01 (ADDP 0.01) and Land 
Warfare Doctrine 0-0 (LWD 0-0) are typical of the genre in that they 
restate most of the universally accepted prerequisites for the successful 
application of mission command. These include the concepts and precepts 
of doctrine, reliability, trust, understanding and risk.16 Western military 
doctrine specifies that for mission command to be effective, each tenet 
must be well understood and accepted at all levels of command, and then 
vigorously enacted in practice.
However, during Operation CATALYST, the philosophy of mission 
command was not formally entrenched as the joint command philosophy 
for the conduct of operations by deployed forces. The ADF’s capstone 
command and control publication in effect at the time was Australian 
15  United States Marine Corps, Command and Control, Doctrine Publication 6, Department of the 
Navy, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 109–10, www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%206.
pdf?ver=2019-07-18-093633-990 (retrieved 31 March 2020).
16  Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0, ‘Command, Leadership and Management’, chapter 2, section 2-2, 
10 June 2008, para 13.
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Defence Force Joint Operational Command and Control,17 issued on 
14 December 2001, operative as interim command and control doctrine 
until formally superseded by Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 
00.1 (ADDP 00.1), Command and Control, on 27 May 2009.18
Nevertheless, at this time subscription to the philosophy of mission 
command as an operational command and control construct was well 
established within the Australian Army. At the time Land Warfare 
Doctrine  0.0 (LWD 0.0) Command, Leadership and Management 
prescribed mission command as the Army’s extant philosophy of command 
and control system for the conduct of operations. In advocating the well-
established tenets of mission command, it specified that subordinates 
were to be given a clear indication of their commander’s intent—the 
result required, the task, resources and any applicable constraints—but 
the subordinate commander was to be afforded freedom to decide how to 
achieve the required result.19
Equivalent doctrine and practice was also operative among the various 
nations commanding and controlling operations in Iraq, most notably the 
US and British contingents. The Australian concept of mission command 
had been closely modelled on equivalent US and UK doctrine, and was 
therefore consistent with Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and 
Multi-National Division – South East command and control systems. 
MNF-I and MND-SE mission orders were developed and executed on 
the basis of the tenets of mission command familiar to Australian military 
forces. All the Australian commanders throughout this period readily 
acknowledge that the philosophy of mission command was applied as the 
capstone command philosophy in the development of their operational 
and tactical mission orders.
17  Australian Defence Force Joint Operational Command and Control, Provisional Edition, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 14 December 2001.
18  Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 (ADDP 00.1), Command and Control, formally 
introduced mission command as applicable to the ADF, stating: ‘[T]he ADF has adopted a command 
philosophy known as “mission command” that promotes flexibility by rewarding initiative, ingenuity, 
innovation, resourcefulness, and devolution of authority in achieving the commander’s intent. 
Understanding the strategic and operational context within the joint operational framework allows 
tactical commanders to react quickly and appropriately to demanding situations.’ ADDP 0.01, 
Command and Control, para 2.18, p. 2-8.
19  Land Warfare Doctrine 0.0, ‘Command, Leadership and Management’, Department of Defence 
(Australian Army), Canberra, 17 November 2003.
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Similarly, Australian commanders unanimously confirm that during the 
conduct of pre-deployment training, mission command was empowered 
and employed, including the development and execution of operational 
orders. Following the original AMTG-1 deployment, extant operational 
orders from higher coalition headquarters in Iraq were always made 
available, allowing the deploying force to develop its derivative operational 
orders. These coalition mission orders had all been ‘vetted’ and approved 
by Australian national commanders at the theatre command level. While 
some specific caveats on such issues as national rules of engagement and 
compliance with specific international and domestic legal considerations 
were widely acknowledged and accepted by coalition commanders, no 
task or battle group commander could recall any specific operational 
caveats placed upon any missions or tactical objectives assigned to them 
by Headquarters MND-SE.
These factors suggest that all the essential precursors for the effective 
application of mission command were functionally in place for Australian 
forces, particularly given that the campaign in Iraq was predominantly 
a land component operation with army commanders in command 
at coalition and Australian strategic, operational and tactical levels of 
command. Accordingly, it is clear that the underpinning philosophy 
for command and control in Iraq was in fact mission command; that is, 
the superior commander would direct what was to be achieved while 
leaving the subordinate commander free to decide how to achieve the 
assigned tasks.20
The experiences of many task and battle group commanders was that this 
was variably practised, with different levels of application depending upon 
the command style and approach of respective national commanders. Given 
Palazzo’s assertion of strong politico-military unity, leading to potentially 
invasive strategic control at the tactical level, I therefore sought the views 
and experiences of Australia’s task and battle group commanders in terms 
of understanding how three essential elements of mission command 
were applied in practice during their deployments. My enquiry centred 
on three broad questions: first, whether the national strategic intent was 
clearly conveyed to them; second, whether this allowed them to reconcile 
potentially divergent Australian and coalition tactical requirements; and 
20  ADDP 0.01, Command and Control, para 2.19, p. 2-8.
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third, whether the exercise of Australian national command affected their 
ability to apply mission command in seeking to achieve both coalition 
and national objectives.
What follows are select snapshots of the experiences of several of 
Australia’s tactical commanders in an attempt to reconcile Palazzo’s 
assertion of strategic success with the suboptimal conditions experienced 
in the application of mission command on the ground. I have sought to 
understand whether the Australian philosophy of mission command was 
actually applied, and, if it were effectively applied under these conditions, 
whether it might have contributed to the successful strategic outcome 
described in Palazzo’s study.
In correlating their experiences, it appears that the unreliable transmission 
of national or strategic intent through the layers of command might also 
have affected the ability of the Australian national commander in theatre 
to exercise cogent national command. This observation is based mostly 
on my personal observations, where wide variations in the interpretation 
of national intent between commanders at strategic, operational and 
tactical levels were frequently encountered. By way of example, in one 
illuminating personal exchange between myself, commander JTF 633 
and CJOPS during the latter’s visit to OBG(W)-2 in theatre, glaring 
differences in the interpretation of my authority to intervene to support 
coalition forces in contact illuminated an embarrassing level of confusion 
as to my command authority.
COMD JTF 633 had previously instructed me that I was not authorised 
to intervene on behalf of coalition forces in contact without his express 
authorisation. It remained a point of contention between us throughout 
my deployment, as I constantly contested his interpretation of my 
authorities based upon my pre-deployment training and understanding 
of previous task and battle group standard operating procedures. Given 
this dispute, I took the opportunity to confirm this with Australia’s theatre 
commander during his visit. In confirming that this was—in fact—within 
my authority (the fact that I had even asked greatly aggravated COMD 
JTF 633), CJOPS stated that my authority to intervene in support of 
coalition forces in contact extended to combat operations in support 
of British elements in the adjoining and highly dangerous MND-SE 
provinces of Basra and Maysaan. This revelation stunned COMD JTF 
633 and myself, as this was never considered within the authority of either 
of us, and seemed contrary to the implied national intent to focus on 
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reconstruction and training tasks and avoid combat. Our interpretation 
had been that a request of this nature (crossing provincial boundaries) 
would require express governmental authorisation.21 Irrespective of the 
correct interpretation, to my mind the dissonance between we three 
commanders at respective levels of command (strategic, operational and 
tactical) was a seminal example of prevalent deficiencies in the articulation 
of command intent through the Australian chain of command during 
Operation CATALYST.
This, and the previously recounted experiences of other tactical 
commanders, suggest that the articulation of intent—the doctrinally 
essential precursor for the effective application of mission command—
was frequently absent or at best episodic. In seeking to understand 
the reasons for this during our discussions, given the relatively mature 
understanding and subscription to the tenets of mission command within 
the Army at the time, most tactical commanders put forward a variety of 
speculative explanations. These included either operational immaturity 
in the Australian operational command chain, individual failings by 
particular national commanders, or a relatively laissez-faire sense that 
articulation of Australian intent could be achieved through vetting of 
coalition operational orders.
The most concerning explanation put forward by several commanders and 
some of their battle staff was a sense that Australia’s most senior strategic 
and operational commanders simply did not want to articulate Australia’s 
calculated strategic intent formally, as described by Palazzo, because of its 
political sensitivity:
[Of ] second importance to Howard was the opinion of the 
Australian domestic audience and he recognised the necessity 
of minimising casualties. In this the Prime Minister successfully 
managed a potentially divisive issue. Events in Iraq, by comparison, 
were considerably less important to the achievement of Australia’s 
policy goal.22
21  The rationale for this was that an arrangement existed between Australian and British forces 
whereby mutual support would be provided between provinces where the respective nation’s forces 
were in danger of defeat. In order for the task group or battle group to be able to rely upon support 
from the British, it would need to be responsive to requests from British forces in Basra and Maysaan 
provinces. This determination that a decision to deploy to another province to support British forces 
in heavy contact was within the battle group commander’s authority was dubious, given the implied 
caveats on battle group operations in so many other respects.
22  A. Palazzo, ‘Assessing the war in Iraq’, Address to the Royal United Services Institute of New South 
Wales, 31 July 2012, p. 15, www.rusinsw.org.au/Papers/20120731.pdf (retrieved 31 March 2020).
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To have overtly communicated this type of political consideration to 
the tactical level would risk its public disclosure, resulting in political 
embarrassment and undermining efforts to buttress the alliance. While 
limited combat exposure by Australian forces might have been widely 
suspected within the coalition, in the absence of formal orders to this 
effect, it remained plausibly deniable. Confirmation of any belief that 
Australian military forces were only there to ‘put a flag in the sand’, 
and nothing more, in order to shore up the alliance would likely prove 
an embarrassing revelation for the government and Australia’s military 
leadership and soldiers. Formal correspondence illuminating the 
calculated nature of Australia’s military involvement could also wound 
the strategic enterprise. Some commanders and staff suggest that given 
the experience and professionalism of Australia’s senior leaders, it might 
also have been that they were embarrassed in being privy to a mission in 
which Australian troops were committed to a dangerous and complex 
operation where their freedom of action to achieve the coalition intent 
was so heavily and deliberately constrained.
If this more calculated approach to preserving the sanctity and secrecy of 
the national strategic intent is taken to be credible, or even possible, then 
it would strike at the heart of one of the most essential tenets of mission 
command: the clear articulation and understanding of higher intent at 
the tactical level. If it was not possible to bring tactical commanders ‘into 
the tent’ in terms of the true strategic intent and sensitivity to casualties, 
it would therefore be necessary to constrain tactical activity in order to 
ensure that pursuit of coalition tactical outcomes would not threaten 
the sanctity and integrity of the national political intent to demonstrate 
commitment without suffering casualties.
The impact of constraining tactical 
freedom of action
Australian Army doctrine operative at the time highlights two essential 
components of the operative philosophy of mission command: 
(1)  commanders using a minimum of control so as not to limit the 
subordinates’ freedom of action unnecessarily; and (2) subordinates 
deciding for themselves how best to achieve their missions.23 Given the 
23  Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0, ‘Command, Leadership and Management’, chapter 2, section 2-2, 
10 June 2008, para 15.
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limited and episodic articulation of strategic intent previously outlined, 
and the lack of any real and express limitations on a tactical commander’s 
freedom of action through formal national orders, what remains untested 
are assertions that tactical freedom of action was deliberately constrained 
through the national command chain, in particular by the Australian 
national commander located at HQ JTF 633 in theatre.
In seeking to determine whether the Australian national command 
element in theatre enabled or undermined mission command, the task 
and battle group commanders cited a variety of different experiences. The 
commanding officer of AMTG-1 recalls that the Australian embedded 
staff officer at Headquarters MND-SE was excellent for advice, and that 
the commander of JTF 633 was also generally very helpful. His experience 
with other Australian headquarters at the operational level outside theatre 
was generally less positive. In stark contrast, the commanding officer of 
the second AMTG was scathing of the interference of the Commander 
JTF 633 in unnecessarily constraining his tactical freedom of action to 
achieve designated and endorsed mission outcomes:
When we did receive [national command] guidance it was ad 
hoc and always centred on stopping us from doing something. 
First example—the Brits had responsibility for providing security 
assistance to the Iraqis for the December 2006 elections. It was in 
all our interests to coordinate and assist in this regard. We were 
told via [national command] we had no role and were to stay 
out of it. I attended the British lead planning meetings and 
contributed what we could by just advising how we would conduct 
our normal security roles, which would assist ‘naturally’, but it 
was a professionally humiliating time for us. Another example—
we received what was assessed by the intelligence agencies to 
be credible intelligence that we would be hit by an improvised 
explosive device on one of the routes within the tactical area we 
were responsible for. We planned an operation to interdict it. 
The Land Commander found out and denied us this action and 
insisted the British execute it, despite the threat fitting within our 
remit and emanating from our area. I was mortified … it was so 
embarrassing in that it was professionally humiliating and a part 
of my respect for our organisation died that day.24
24  Discussions with author.
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I recall numerous and similarly invasive interventions by the Australian 
JTF 633 commander during the deployment of the OBG(W)-2. After 
a period, these interventions caused me to question not only the basis 
of the authority of the national commander to intervene in my tactical 
decision-making, but also his tactical competence in seeking alternatives 
to the courses of action being proposed.
By way of example, within a week of the OBG(W)-2 arriving in the 
province, Jaysh al-Mahdi launched a coordinated and heavy attack on the 
Police Headquarters in As-Samawah when the police refused to accede to 
demands for prisoner release. Surprisingly, and reassuringly, for the first 
time the local Iraqi police and army elements combined and cooperated 
to defeat this attack. The militia returned in numbers, bolstered by 
insurgent fighters from other provinces, and laid siege to the provincial 
headquarters. The situation in the city became dire; the Iraqi Security 
Forces were both outgunned and outnumbered, so the local commanders 
called us for combat support and an urgent resupply of ammunition. I was 
fully aware of our restrictions on intervention—at best we could arrange 
for an aerial resupply of ammunition. But I resolved to move the battle 
group tactically to a secure location in the desert just outside the capital. 
This was not to intervene in the fight but to create a ruse to deceive the 
insurgents that we were in fact about to commit in support of the Iraqi 
Security Forces, to unsettle the militia and bolster the confidence of the 
local Iraqi commander. Whether the ruse was successful or not remains 
unknown. Either way, the Iraqi Security Forces remained steadfast and 
the militia eventually withdrew without achieving their objective.
When I informed the JTF commander later that night that I had done this, 
he was apoplectic, insisting that I had intervened in express contravention 
of both national and coalition orders. His assertion was—and I recall 
this precisely—that I did not have the authority to ‘step up’ the battle 
group, which required his express permission as national commander. 
This flabbergasted me. If I could not even manouevre my force without 
his permission, what tactical authority did I possess as battle group 
commander? In seeking to clarify command options available to me in 
future, I recounted an exhaustive list of actions we had been instructed 
on and trained for on the Mission Rehearsal Exercise, including actions 
that previous task and battle groups had frequently undertaken in theatre. 
Each was serially rejected as being outside my remit, including even the 
option of aerial overpasses by coalition aircraft or authority to observe 
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engagements via our unmanned aerial vehicle. With command caveats of 
this nature, mission command had clearly given way to directive control 
of tactical activity.
The commanding officer of the second AMTG recalls similar invasive 
episodes with HQ JTF 633 during his deployment, leading him 
to conclude:
[HQ] JTF 633 was just a conduit for getting reports out and 
acting as the scout for Big Brother. I realised very early to play it 
‘grey’ and stay under their radar or invite the 10,000-kilometre 
screwdriver. I was lucky to have great individuals as respective 
national commanders during my time as they understood and 
applied mission command and gave me freedom of action. They 
were cut from the same cloth, and I was fortunate in this respect. 
Both applied mission command and both were very supportive. 
So, I was free to plan and conduct tactical level operations so long 
as I kept things low profile. To this day, I can only shudder at the 
thought of the meddling and obstacles I would have experienced 
if the operation had been more kinetic.25
This inconsistency in variable involvement of the national commander 
in tactical decision-making proved puzzling to many commanders, as 
did the roles and remit of other embedded national officers in coalition 
headquarters. The commanding officer of AMTG-2 recalls:
We also had a colonel senior national representative (SNR) 
embedded with the British Division based at Basra. I had no 
formal instructions as to how this individual featured within 
our command and control chain. On national command issues 
I worked directly to [Commander] JTF 633. I was more of the 
understanding the embedded SNR was [Commander] JTF 633’s 
representative in Basra with no direct authority in my chain of 
command. I had little contact with the SNR because I didn’t feel 
a need to engage them and to their credit, they didn’t try and 
impose themselves upon them. But in knowing them personally, 
I also knew they were available to me if I wanted to engage 
them informally.26
25  Discussions with author.
26  Discussions with author.
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Given the variable nature of experiences with the Australian national 
commander in theatre, it would seem that much came down to the 
personality of the individual and their corresponding interpretation of 
the role of the national commander and their role in preserving Australia’s 
strategic intent. While many acted in what was described as an impediment 
to mission command, through an expressed requirement to ‘approve’ task 
and battle group operational orders and activities, others maintained 
more of a mentoring and enabling role for the tactical commander. 
Different tactical commanders also recount varied tolerances for risk with 
their respective national commanders, giving rise to markedly different 
stipulations on reporting tactical plans on an ongoing basis.
These variable experiences recounted by tactical commanders in terms of 
the freedom of action granted does not necessarily support the assertion 
of strategic micromanagement of tactical activities as suggested by 
Palazzo. Most tellingly, no task or battle group commanders recall any 
explicit intervention by the Chief of Defence Force acting as personally 
as a  ‘strategic corporal’ in their tactical decision-making. The most 
deleterious interventions in tactical decision-making recalled by all tactical 
commanders were always exercised at the operational level through the 
national command element, usually by the Commander JTF 633 himself.
However, the varied experiences certainly tend to suggest either a lack of 
clear articulation or strategic intent and/or national caveats down through 
the national command chain, or alternatively a willingness by some national 
commanders to loosen the reins and allow tactical commanders freedom 
to manoeuvre. Clearly, one of the key bases driving the approach of the 
national commander towards allowing or constraining the freedom  of 
action of the task or battle group commander was the relationship of trust 
between them.
Trust
Australian and Western military doctrine also posits that for the tactical 
commander to be able to exercise judgement and freedom of action in 
achieving this higher intent, an essential enabler is trust. That is, once the 
senior commander has articulated the results to be achieved and assigned 
the appropriate resources, he/she must have trust in both the professional 
understanding and ability of the subordinate commander to be able to 
achieve the outcome desired. Again, in light of Palazzo’s assertions of 
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close strategic supervision bordering on tactical micromanagement, I also 
sought to determine whether the prerequisite level of trust was afforded to 
task and battle group commanders to properly enable mission command 
at the tactical level.
It is important to note that trust between military commanders engaged 
in operational activity is always a two-way relationship. Western military 
doctrine insists that mission command requires a high level of mutual 
trust at all levels of command. Subordinates are trusted in the allocation 
of sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders 
are trusted to keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their 
subordinates’ freedom of action to achieve their intent. The inverse is that 
commanders will rely upon subordinates to provide accurate and timely 
information to achieve operational success. Hence, doctrine highlights 
that high demands are made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, 
on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out 
assigned tasks.27
Once again, great variability in the experiences of respective task and battle 
group commanders is registered in relation to the sense of trust afforded 
them and their trust in their senior command chain. The commanding 
officer of AMTG-3/OBG(W)-1 recalls:
Both Commander 1 Division and Commander 3 Brigade 
were clear in their discussion with me prior to deploying about 
the political sensitivities but neither were prescriptive in their 
guidance, showing great faith and trust. The Brigade Commander 
completed a reconnaissance concurrent to mine (covering off on 
the strategic and theatre issues) and we debriefed him on our 
appreciation while heading home out of Kuwait. He gave guidance 
but knew from his previous experience at US Central Command 
Forward and also with INTERFET that guidance would remain 
fluid and that if we didn’t stay a bound ahead in our thinking then 
we would be caught flat-footed.28
27  ADDP 0.01 stipulates that ‘The ADF’s mission command philosophy is realised in the 
commander’s confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge 
of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to 
fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific 
direction has been given to the subordinate.’ ADDP 0.01, Command and Control, para 2.31, p. 2-12.
28  Discussions with author.
NICHE WARS
120
Conversely, the relationship between myself and the Commander 
JTF 633 in theatre was marked by an absence of mutual trust. Given the 
earlier exchanges on differences in perceived authorities, based upon the 
expressed stipulation that all battle group operational orders were to be 
vetted by the national commander, by late in the deployment we were 
selectively providing redacted operational concepts of operations and 
operational orders to HQ JTF 633. From discussions with his staff, it was 
also evident that his relationship with his own staff was similarly affected 
by a lack of trust and regard. I had determined some protocols with the 
Chief Operations Staff Officer (J3) at HQ JTF 633 by which sufficient 
information could be provided to inform the national commander of 
our tactical activities without invoking his suspicion or tripping his risk 
sensitivities. I had lost confidence in his tactical acumen, and was failing 
on most occasions to articulate tactical ideas, concepts or options without 
attracting his ire. Instead I chose to seek counsel, advice and mentoring 
on the merits and appropriateness of proposed tactical operations with my 
parent brigade commander back in Australia. I felt very strongly that our 
relationship and the constraints being imposed on my tactical authority 
were jeopardising the lives of OBG(W) soldiers. This was confirmed in 
my own mind during one particular incident late in the deployment.
During an indirect fire (rocket) attack on the base, the insurgents fired 
a second salvo from the exact same point of origin at the 30-minute mark, 
which was instructive that (1) they knew our protocols (i.e. all clear after 
30 minutes), and (2) they were confident that there was going to be no 
response from us to clear or contest the firing site or point of origin after 
the first salvo. I believed the latter had come to pass because we had had 
several previous exchanges with the Commander JTF 633, who insisted 
that our job was not to seek engagement with the enemy nor was it to 
protect the base. If a response to indirect fire attacks was required, his view 
was that the Americans or another contingent should do it—even though 
one of our approved mission tasks was to patrol suspected indirect fire 
sites within our designated security area outside the base.
This incident emphasised that his risk aversion was proving highly 
detrimental  to our own force protection, and having to vet immediate 
tactical  action through the national chain of command was untenable. 
In this case I was unable to convince Commander JTF 633 that aggressive 
patrolling and/or clearance of launch sites was actually a self-defensive 
measure, an action to protect ourselves, and I was not—as he suggested—
’under the spell of the Americans’. I clearly remember at this point convening 
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a ‘war counsel’ with my senior staff officers and combat team commanders 
on this issue, at which point we resolved deliberately to withhold future 
patrolling plans from him on the basis that to do otherwise might cost 
Australian lives and continue to adversely affect Australian morale and 
reputation on the base. This exchange conclusively demonstrated that there 
was simply no vestige of mutual trust and that I had lost all respect for his 
tactical judgement of our situation from afar. I required another mentor, 
with whom I had professional trust and respect, to discuss tactical options 
and to ensure that I was acting in accordance with what I perceived to be 
the ‘national interest’ and derivative mission orders.
The commanding officer of AMTG-3/OBG(W)-1 had what could only 
be described as a diametrically opposite experience, with both national 
command chains forward and rear:
[National Command] worked as well as it could, and worked 
because they supported us and didn’t interfere. The national 
commander was an excellent mentor and supporter. As I have said 
before, I put this down to his operational command experience.29
Every tactical commander remains adamant that the doctrinal philosophy 
of mission command was entirely appropriate for the complex operating 
environment in which we operated, including the complexities 
concomitant to coalition operations. None recall any suggestion or 
discussion within the Australian chain of command that the philosophy 
of mission command would be relevant only to a high-end war-fighting 
environment and inappropriate for security and stability operations. 
In  fact, its pointed relevance to the current operation inspired the 
commander of the first AMTG to publish an article on the application 
of mission command on his return to Australia, in which he emphasised 
the centrality and applicability of mission command to Operation 
CATALYST. A central observation was that the effective application 
of mission command demanded more than rhetorical subscription to 
the doctrine:
The key to effective, focused action is mission command. The 
philosophy of mission command must be believed and nurtured. 
To be effective, it must be built on the intellectual components 
of clear intent, trust and accountability. The central moral 
29  Discussions with author.
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component is trust. A physical framework must also be established 
to support decision-makers at every level, especially those in the 
midst of chaos and in close contact with the adversary.30
Yet despite this seemingly universal subscription to the relevance and 
utility of mission command, dissonance appears evident in its application 
within the Australian national command in Iraq. The personal experiences 
of respective Australian tactical commanders reveal common dynamics at 
play in seeking to apply mission command in operational practice. Their 
recollections and observations give rise to familiar revelations about the 
relevance, effective application and ultimate utility of mission command 
in modern, complex operations. Most peculiarly, the Australian experience 
on Operation CATALYST highlights contemporary challenges in fully 
enabling mission command as a theatre framework providing connectivity 
and between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. This 
experience is reflective of the issues faced by Western military forces on 
modern operations, which might be highly politicised and conducted by 
individual nations within a complex coalition architecture.
Counter-intuitive outcomes
In another article, ‘The making of strategy and the junior coalition partner: 
Australia and the 2003 Iraq War’, Palazzo argues that the Iraq campaign 
was a masterstroke of Australian policy-making.31 His previous assertion 
that it had little to do with events in Iraq is an intriguing observation for 
those who deployed, seemingly inimical to the traditional military view 
that in war, strategic success emanates from successful actions or military 
‘victories’ at the tactical and operational levels of war.
Palazzo’s hypothesis is antithetical in contending that achievement of 
coalition military objectives was neither the principal aim nor ultimate 
determinant of Australian strategic success:
Unusually, strategic calculation was at the forefront of the Australian 
Government’s senior political leaders and their military advisers. 
The Australian Government of Prime Minister John Howard saw 
30  R. Noble, ‘The essential thing: Mission command and its practical application’, Australian Army 
Journal, vol. 3, no. 3, 2006, p. 124, researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/aaj_2006_3.pdf 
(retrieved 31 March 2020).
31  Palazzo, ‘The making of strategy and the junior coalition partner’, pp. 27–30.
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the War in Iraq as an opportunity to advance a long-held security 
objective, one that had little to do with events in the Middle East. 
For Australia, the policy goal for its participation in the Iraq War 
was the opportunity to enhance its relationship with the United 
States. In achieving this objective Australia identified factors 
by which a junior coalition partner can set and attain its own 
policy goals, and, importantly, avoid creating a conflict with the 
objectives of the coalition-leader.32
Palazzo suggests that tactical ‘victories’ were neither necessary nor 
encouraged by Australia’s strategic leaders. The mere presence of Australian 
forces would be sufficient to achieve the desired strategic objectives, 
provided that tactical involvement was carefully orchestrated and 
controlled to prevent any semblance of tactical ‘defeat’. Task and battle 
group actions would need to be carefully controlled to ensure strategic 
visibility while minimising the force protection risk. This complex formula 
necessitated clear unity of purpose between government and the military 
in order to achieve the desired strategic outcome:
Australian political–military divisiveness was not evident in the 
Iraq War. Howard and his senior general, the Chief of Defence 
Force General Peter Cosgrove (and later Air Chief Marshal Angus 
Houston), acted as one in regard to Iraq. Cosgrove understood 
the government’s purpose and worked towards that goal. To keep 
the ADF on target the CDF tightly controlled the mission and 
kept the Prime Minister informed of its progress. Contemporary 
military theory contains numerous references to the effect of 
the ‘strategic corporal’. In Iraq the influence of the junior ranks 
was minimal as Cosgrove aspired to be the ‘tactical general’. 
Throughout the Iraq War no issue was too unimportant for the 
CDF’s strategic-level oversight. The commander of Australia’s 
headquarters in the Middle East also served as Cosgrove’s strategic-
level theatre representative. He had direct access to the CDF—
outside the formal chain of command—and kept Cosgrove alert 
to all activities across the Coalition that might have an effect upon 
Australia’s ability to secure its goals.33
This strategic scrutiny and control of tactical freedom of action often had 
debilitating effects on morale at the task and battle group level. The policy 
of constraining tactical activity at the strategic and operational levels 
32  Palazzo, ‘Assessing the war in Iraq’, p. 13.
33  Ibid., p. 14.
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without national context confused Australian soldiers as well as their 
higher coalition headquarters in theatre. Without a cogent explanation 
for curtailment of tactical activity, coalition forces frequently interpreted 
these inexplicable constraints as a lack of courage and resolve. Irrespective 
of strategic interpretation, this also generated a highly counter-intuitive 
but easily foreseeable result: the Australian Army’s professional credibility 
and standing as a trusted, capable and committed alliance partner often 
suffered at the tactical level. Perceptions of risk aversion to casualties had 
a gravely deleterious impact on the reputation of Australian forces on 
the ground.
This trend was visible even before assumption of operational overwatch 
activities in the more dangerous province of Dhi Qar. During the AMTG 
period, Professor John Blaxland registered and reported a growing sense 
of disquiet developing among Australian soldiers and coalition partners in 
Al Muthanna Province, most particularly within the British contingent. 
This disquiet morphed into open hostility in later evolutions where 
tactical freedom of action to intervene in support of coalition forces in 
contact was constrained, becoming the root cause of verbal disdain for 
Australian forces:
As one Australian officer observed, British senior officers 
‘understood’ the constraints of the Australian rules of engagement. 
But the British soldiers, ‘the squaddies, called the diggers cowards 
to their faces. At least some of the diggers agreed.’ The net effect 
of this government-driven tactical approach was the absolute 
minimisation of Australian casualties. But this approach came at 
a price in terms of credibility with Australia’s allies and coalition 
partners and soldier’s morale.34
Final thoughts
Ironically, Operation CATALYST has proven true to its operational 
nomenclature (title), although it is far more likely in buttressing the 
Australian–US alliance at minimal political and human cost (battlefield 
casualties) rather than a catalysing impact on the Iraqi nation-state 
and regional geopolitical landscape. Whether it had this latter effect 
is a separate question not addressed by this chapter. Of greater importance, 
34  Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 242.
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as evidenced by discussion and debate during the ‘War in the Sandpit’ 
seminar, is that it seems to have polarised opinion among political, 
academic and military commentators as to the most appropriate measure 
of appraising success.
There is, however, an alternative perspective: at the tactical level, many 
officers and soldiers viewed this operation as a confusing, disappointing, 
deeply embarrassing and professionally disheartening experience. For 
many, our ability to put our hands on our hearts and declare unequivocal 
mission success remains an elusive and deeply soul-searching endeavour. 
To the casual observer, this might sound odd, given that many 
contemporary measures of operational success were present, no soldier 
was killed in action, and our casualties were often minor despite some 
intense engagements with opposition forces. Surely this would tend to 
connote that strategic success was built upon highly professional efforts 
and outcomes at the tactical level.
The observations outlined in this chapter suggest the means by which 
Australia’s strategic leaders chose to achieve the desired strategic outcomes 
actually mortgaged professional pride and military reputation at the 
tactical level. Australia’s national command and control architecture 
contributed to debilitating strategic–tactical dissonance, through 
either a  conscious or an unconscious failure cogently and reliably to 
communicate strategic (national) intent down to the tactical level of 
command in a  complex coalition operating environment. This did our 
soldiers a massive disservice in that it returned counter-intuitive results 
in giving justifiable cause to a cadre of coalition officers and soldiers, and 
likely also Iraqis, to appraise Australian contingents as ‘talking the talk 
but failing to walk the walk’. I have no doubt that we could have done 
better in this regard while still achieving the strategic objectives desired 
by government. We simply needed to be true to our capstone operational 
doctrine of mission command.
In suggesting this, I remain aware of the dangers of binary thinking. That 
is, with the benefit of hindsight it is easy to identify the disadvantages 
of a  particular approach, leading to the trite assertion that a different 
approach would generate a better outcome. My peculiar advantage in this 
respect is being able to look back with the benefit of the great contextual 
analytical work by Professor Palazzo and others. Having now also occupied 
a number of different positions at tactical, operational and strategic levels 
NICHE WARS
126
of command, I have a more informed perspective of the difficult and 
competing interests and issues at play and therefore the strategic context 
within which the various task and battle groups operated.
Even so, I would still strongly contend that this manifestation of national 
command control cannot be considered an optimal means by which to 
wage war, enforce the peace or deliver humanitarian assistance or disaster 
relief. To prevent strategic–tactical dissonance, and the accompanying 
deleterious impact upon the morale and well-being of a deployed force, 
our strategic leaders must strive to get the national command and 
control architecture right, both in form and in substance. This demands 
an honest, considered and principled approach to the application of 
mission command to ensure that those at the most risk on the battlefield 
understand precisely what it is that they are being asked to do and what 
they are risking their lives to achieve. This starts with a clear and honest 
articulation of national intent being cogently communicated down to, 
and understood by, tactical commanders.
My personal belief is that the means by which we as a military chose to 
deliver the political outcomes demanded by government on Operation 
CATALYST did not keep faith with our history, traditions, doctrine or 
national character. The arguably duplicitous approach we took as a nation 
to committing our troops to stability operations in Iraq, ostensibly to put 
an Australian flag in the sand in support of our major ally, generated mixed 
and equivocal results—some very good (mostly at the strategic level) but 
many very bad (at the tactical level). This chapter should not be interpreted 
as suggesting that we should be a reflexive slave to any particular operating 
methodology, but my view is that we should always understand the reason 
for taking a different line or treading a different path. We should also 
understand the potential second- and third-order consequences inherent 
in any departure from proven doctrinal approaches. To my mind, this is 
what the ‘War in the Sandpit’ seminar has allowed me to do: articulate 
some hitherto unseen or vaguely perceived negative consequences of 
suboptimal national command and control on a contemporary coalition 
security and stability operation.
If we do in fact wish to achieve articulated strategic intent, as in this case 
to buttress and enhance our strategic alliances, and be seen to deliver on 
our commitment to a rules-based global order, we must ensure that our 
actions truly reinforce that intent at every level. As a professional military 
we owe that to ourselves, to our government and—most importantly—to 





Australia’s maritime military operations are unique among those of the 
broader Australian Defence Force (ADF) because the Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) has had ships more or less continually deployed to the 
Persian Gulf or the Red Sea since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990.1
During both the 1990 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
RAN’s contribution was a three-ship task group and a clearance diving 
team, with an embarked task group staff and logistic support element 
(LSE) ashore. However, for most of those long years the contribution was 
a single frigate integrated into the multinational Maritime Interception 
Force (MIF). In the period between the 9/11 attacks and the immediate 
aftermath of the 2003 hostilities, the Navy bolstered its contribution to 
two or three ships with a task group commander and staff.
During the 1990 Gulf War, while the RAN provided three ships to the 
large multinational armada and a mine-clearance diving team, its task 
group commander did not have a command role in the multinational 
organisation.
1  For further information and sources consulted, please see P. Jones, ‘The maritime campaign 
in Iraq’, in Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval 
Warfare, ed. B.A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, Routledge, New York, 2011, pp. 167–81.
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A generation of officers and sailors had therefore become increasingly 
familiar with the Persian Gulf, the inshore waters of Iraq, their allies, 
the at times aggressive neutrals in the case of the Iranians, the myriad of 
shipping and not least their prospective enemy, the Iraqis.
The other benefit of this exposure was the growing confidence of the US 
Navy in Australia’s ships and, from 2001, in its task group commanders. 
This meant that often the Australian naval task group commander was 
dual-hatted and had, in addition to command of the RAN task group, 
alternating command of the MIF with a US Navy captain.2 This was very 
much a conscious decision on the part of the US Navy. For example, 
in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, my superior, Rear Admiral Barry 
Costello, USN, told me that because of my time in theatre, I, supported 
by my staff, would fill the role of Maritime Interception Operations 
Screen Commander, and not a US Navy captain, as originally conceived.
Overview of operations, 1990–2003
The enduring thread from 1990 to 2003 was therefore maritime 
interception operations with their asset-intensive surveillance and 
boarding operations. This was first to enforce sanctions imposed under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 and then, 
after the Iraq War, under UNSCR 687, to maintain security, prevent 
smuggling by non-state actors or promote freedom of navigation.3
Such surveillance and boarding operations date back to the age of sail. 
They can be conducted for many years and require endurance, patience 
and a sea-going temperament. They also needed a sophisticated naval 
organisation to meet the unremitting tempo. History records that such 
operations, if well conceived, are effective. The blockade of Napoleonic 
France in the first decade of the 19th century and the Kaiser’s Germany 
in the second decade of the 20th are two such examples, and, I would 
contend, that of Iraq up to 2003 was also effective.
2  The US Navy captain was the Commander Destroyer Squadron 50, normally based at Fifth Fleet 
Headquarters at Bahrain.
3  UNSCR 661 was adopted in August 1990 to sanction Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. 
UNSCR 687 of 1991 outlines the terms imposed on Iraq after the expulsion of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait. See en.wikisource.org/wiki/Portal:United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolutions (retrieved 
31 March 2020).
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The nature of such operations is not something all governments and 
policy-makers understand. In respect of the sanction enforcement 
on Iraq,  while the first Bush and then the Clinton administration 
largely understood the purpose of these operations, the second Bush 
administration did not.
The command arrangements for operations in the Gulf were complex. The 
Commander US Fifth Fleet was the operational-level commander based 
ashore in Bahrain. He was also the Maritime Component Commander 
to Commander United States Central Command (CENTCOM) based 
in Tampa, Florida. The commander of the on-station carrier battle group 
provided the operational-level command of naval forces. The command 
of the MIF was typically exercised from a US Navy cruiser or destroyer.
During the period from 1990 to 2001, there had been occasions when 
land- and sea-based air strikes and Tomahawk land attack missile 
launchings had been conducted against Iraq. These were generally in 
support of the efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) or in response to breaches of the Iraqi no-fly zone. Targets struck 
included military command and control and civil telecommunications 
facilities. The cumulative degradation of command and control capacity 
had an important impact on the ability of the Iraqis to respond to the 
2003 invasion.
During that same period, however, the effectiveness of the MIF was less 
than optimum. Smugglers of oil and other goods seeking to circumvent 
the embargo would often use the presence of Iraqi shore-based missile 
batteries on the Al-Faw Peninsula and a passage through Iranian territorial 
waters to avoid interception. On occasion, the MIF would conduct night 
surge operations near the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah and Shatt al-Arab 
waterways to increase their chances of intercepting smugglers, clearing the 
coast before sunrise. These operations had little strategic effect on sanction 
enforcement. The strategically vital offshore oil terminals near the mouth 
of the Khawr Abd Allah and Shatt Al-Arab would remain of enduring 
significance and a high priority to be secured in the event of the outbreak 




The most significant development in this protracted sanction enforcement 
campaign was the attacks of 11 September 2001. In their wake, not only 
were the naval forces infused with a significant increase in ships from 
the long-standing contributors but also other navies contributed forces 
to assist in the Global War on Terror. This blurring of mission between 
UNSCR enforcement against Iraq and the anti–al-Qaeda Global War on 
Terror differed between nations. Some nations would deploy forces only 
in and around the north Persian Sea and Gulf of Oman as well as the Gulf 
of Aden to cut al-Qaeda lines of communication, while other nations 
such as Australia grouped the two missions together.
Like the conduct of many naval operations of the past, the post-9/11 
phase of operations shifted in response to a confluence of strategic-, 
operational- and tactical-level developments. The increase in naval forces 
in the Persian Sea and Persian Gulf enabled the Commander Fifth Fleet 
to deploy separate coalition task groups in the north Persian Sea/Gulf of 
Oman and the Gulf of Aden. These forces not only provided a capability 
for the Global War on Terror but also, as events unfolded, would by their 
presence provide enhanced security for the 2002–03 force build-up before 
commencement of the US Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The MIF was also to enjoy a substantial increase in force levels. But 
before additional forces arrived, a significant tactical shift took place. The 
immediate response to the 9/11 attacks made it necessary temporarily 
to detach US Navy Tomahawk fitted ships from the MIF. This left the 
depleted MIF under the command of Captain Nigel Coates in HMAS 
Anzac. Coates, in response to the drastic reduction in force numbers, used 
his ship’s shallow draft and national rules of engagement to move into 
Iraqi territorial waters at the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway. 
This shift to a close blockade had an immediate effect on smugglers.
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HMAS Adelaide patrols the waters around the oil terminals in the 
North Arabian Gulf during Operation Catalyst, 2004.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
The initial success was limited by few warships having sufficiently shallow 
draughts to allow them to operate close inshore. For the close blockade 
to be effective, continuous inshore frigate presence was required. This 
capability was provided by an increased number of British Royal Navy 
and RAN warships. From 2001 to 2003, the crews of these ships built up 
considerable knowledge of the shallow waters, thus allowing incrementally 
greater freedom of manoeuvre. This would prove invaluable during OIF.
For their part, the smugglers responded to the new challenge posed by 
the MIF. A move and counter-move ensued until 2003 with smugglers 
welding doors and hatches, electrifying guardrails and attempting mass 
breakouts to swamp the MIF. The MIF replied with acetylene cutters, 
greater coordination and training. By mid-2002 the larger merchant ships 
were effectively submitting to being searched and trying to hide modest 
quantities of oil in hidden tanks. In the last six months of the sanction 
enforcement, only two merchant ships escaped the interception force’s 
net, and even then the MIF successfully encouraged the Islamic Republic 
of Iran Navy to apprehend them in their territorial waters.
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Members of the Afghan National Army, 3RAR Battle Group and 
Mentoring Task Force 4 step off on their first handover/takeover patrol 
from Forward Operating Base Mirwais in Chora, Afghanistan, 2012.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
The main focus became smuggling in much smaller dhows. Night 
mass breakout attempts of 40–60 dhows were not uncommon. The 
MIF responded with improved tactical cohesion between the boarding 
parties of the RAN, US Coast Guard, Royal Marines and US Navy. 
These conventional forces were augmented at night on a regular basis by 
Polish special forces (Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego or 
GROM)4 and US Navy Seals, who were based in Kuwait. In addition to 
the boarding parties, helicopters were used to vector boarding parties 
to breakouts. 
Over the years the boarding parties benefited from design improvements 
in the Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), which resulted in boats of 
greater endurance, reliability and comfort. Having said that, in the early 
months of the year boarding parties could risk hypothermia if not well 
equipped and their on-water time closely managed.
4  In English, Group [for] Operational Manoeuvring Response.
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In the air, US Navy Seahawk helicopters fitted with the Hawklink 
tactical data link allowed video streaming of the dhow breakouts to the 
MIF commander’s command ship. This visual perspective was invaluable 
in coordinating modest MIF resources.
The two other actors in this complex and shifting maritime scene were 
the naval forces of Iran and Iraq. Iran had units of both the Iranian navy 
and the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy. The latter was the most 
active in the northern Persian Gulf and at times unpredictable. Its small 
craft irregularly swept through waters at the mouth of the Khawr Abd 
Allah and boarded vessels and harassed crews. In contrast, the Iranian 
naval presence was weighted more in the central and southern Gulf. The 
Iranian navy proved helpful when cued through interlocutors to intercept 
smugglers transiting through Iranian territorial waters or responding to 
search and rescue incidents.
The Iraqi Navy largely confined itself to its two bases of Umm Qasr and 
Basra. However, in mid-2002 their PB-90-class patrol boats initiated 
solitary daytime patrols in the Khawr Abd Allah approaches. There was 
concern in US Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters that the close proximity of 
the Iraqi PB-90 to MIF warships might allow the patrol boats to inflict 
damage to the larger ships in a surprise attack. To ward against that 
possibility, the MIF invariably had a missile-armed helicopter airborne 
and would warn the Iraqi PB-90 not to interfere with interception force 
operations. Once again, the Hawklink-transmitted video stream allowed 
the MIF commander to monitor deck movements on the PB-90 in this 
situation, although the PB-90 was significantly less capable than the units 
of the MIF. The naval forces were in a unique position whereby they saw 
their prospective foes on a regular basis and had an opportunity where 
possible to intimidate them.
Preparations for Plan 1003V: The invasion 
of Iraq
The operational plan to invade Iraq and disarm the regime of WMD was 
developed by CENTCOM under the command of General Tommy R. 
Franks. It was designated Plan 1003V. Work commenced in 2002 and 
was refined in numerous iterations. The maritime elements of this plan 
were developed by the Commander of the US Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral 
Timothy Keating, and his staff both in Tampa and in Bahrain.
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The central characteristic of the maritime campaign was the diverse nature 
of the tasks assigned to the navies and marines. These tasks included:
• Protecting of focal points from the Suez Canal to Kuwait to ensure 
the massive logistical build-up of supplies for land, air and sea forces. 
As with Operation DESERT STORM, the overwhelming bulk 
of material was shipped by sea.
• Facilitating the entry into Iraq of special forces and other covert 
elements before hostilities.
• Providing a sizeable proportion of the air power for the operation. 
This requirement was significantly increased when sorties could not be 
flown from air bases in Turkey, nor over-fly rights obtained from that 
country. A significant element of this air power would be sea-based 
Tomahawk strike missiles in the initial ‘shock and awe’ wave of attacks 
on Iraqi infrastructure and leadership.
• US Marines and the Royal Marines providing a significant element of 
the land force. The marines would be involved in securing southern Iraq, 
including the ports. Some elements would move north to Baghdad.
• Securing the Mīnā’ al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya offshore oil terminals 
to prevent a catastrophic oil spill into the Gulf and ensure their 
preservation for the benefit of post-war Iraq.
• Countering Iraqi naval operations, including any mining.
• Ensuring the merchant ships and dhows (potentially more than 400 
vessels) holed up in the Khawr Abd Allah (estuary) and the Shatt 
Al-Arab (river) did not interfere with coalition operations along the 
length of the Gulf.
• Forcing entry to the Khawr Abd Allah and facilitating the port of 
Umm Qasr into a hub for humanitarian aid. This would inevitably 
involve a significant mine counter-measures effort.
• Deterring any attempt by the Iranian naval forces or al-Qaeda seaborne 
elements from interfering with coalition operations.
The campaign had to factor in the possibility of Iraqi use of biological and 
chemical agents. This threat, despite subsequent absence of WMD, was 
deemed to be a major risk to coalition forces.
The missions and tasks required a significant force build from about 50 
warships to 150. This build-up began in November 2002. The coalition 
force was centred on the newly arrived USS Constellation carrier battle 
135
7 . MARITIME OPERATIONS
group (Rear Admiral Barry M. Costello) and the USS Abraham Lincoln 
battle group (Rear Admiral John M. Kelly), which returned following 
a  short break in Australia. In assigning responsibilities, Vice Admiral 
Keating gave Rear Admiral Kelly the role of commanding the strike 
elements and Rear Admiral Costello the multifaceted sea control missions. 
There were other subordinate command arrangements, which reflected 
the shift of Fifth Fleet missions from one of UNSCR enforcement and 
sea control to combat operations in the littoral. Like many operations, 
the command arrangements were a compromise between clear lines 
of accountability, national sensitivities and assessments of likely rates of 
effort of US and supporting coalition naval vessels.
A central feature of Plan 1003V was the significant application of naval 
air power. This was achieved with the deployment of four carrier battle 
groups to augment those two already in theatre. USS Kitty Hawk and 
later USS Nimitz joined the two carriers in the Gulf while the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt and USS Harry S. Truman carrier battle groups would 
operate from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. To facilitate the integration 
of naval and air force assets, Rear Admiral David C. Nicholls became the 
Deputy Joint Force Air Component Commander at the Prince Sultan 
Air Base in Saudi Arabia. US Navy personnel also integrated into the air 
planning staff.
The United States also deployed the specialist forces that Plan 1003V 
needed for success. These included:
• mine counter-measures vessels US Ships Ardent, Cardinal, Dextrous 
and Raven
• mine-clearance diving teams employing remotely operated underwater 
vehicles as well as dolphins to detect bottom mines
• MH-53E Sea Dragon minesweeping helicopters
• the heavily armed patrol boats USS Firebolt and USS Chinook as well 
as the US Coast Guard cutter Boutwell and the US Coast Guard patrol 
craft Adak, Aquidneck, Baranof and Wrangle for the envisaged inshore 
operations
• the high-speed catamaran USS Joint Venture deployed to support 
special forces
• additional replenishment ships and the hospital ship USNS Comfort 
pre-positioned in the Gulf.
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Britain’s Royal Navy deployed the UK Amphibious Task Group (UKATG), 
centred on aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, into the Gulf. This was under 
the command of Commodore A.J.G. Miller. The Ark Royal was configured 
as a helicopter carrier and had not embarked Harrier strike aircraft. The 
other major UKATG ships were the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, the 
aviation support ship RFA Argus (fitted as a hospital ship) and the landing 
ships RFA Sir Tristram, RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Percivale. These ships 
were escorted by the destroyers HM Ships Liverpool, Edinburgh and York, 
frigates Marlborough, Chatham and Richmond, minehunters Grimsby and 
Ledbury. They were supported by the tankers RFA Fort Rosalie and RFA 
Orangeleaf. In addition, the survey ship HMS Roebuck would undertake 
surveys of the north Persian Gulf. The Tomahawk-fitted submarines 
Splendid and Turbulent would be multitasked in the operation.
The RAN deployed the amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla to bring to the 
Gulf stores for the Australian joint force. While originally intended to join 
the logistic forces in the Gulf, as Australian Naval Task Group Commander, 
I had her reassigned to the MIF where her amphibious, command and 
communications capabilities proved invaluable. Indeed, once Kanimbla 
offloaded her stores, my staff and I shifted the MIF command function 
from the Arleigh Burke destroyer USS Milius to Kanimbla. Her planning 
spaces were extremely useful in the lead-up to the conflict. To compensate 
for this reassignment, Kanimbla’s Sea King helicopter joined the US 
‘Desert Duck’ logistic helicopter effort one day a week. Kanimbla joined 
the frigates HMAS Anzac and HMAS Darwin, which had their time in 
theatre extended. The Navy also deployed Clearance Diver Team 3 to 
work with other coalition diving teams under the command of US Navy 
Commodore Michael P. Tillotson.
The Polish Government deployed GROM, and a fresh crew was flown 
into theatre for its support ship ORP Kontra Admiral Xavier Czernicki, 
which was assigned to the MIF. Her ability to embark additional boarding 
teams and boats would prove very useful.
Contribution of the Marines
The US Marines and the Royal Marines made a substantial contribution 
in size and combat power. The campaign represented the largest marine 
deployment since the Gulf War of 1990. The US contribution included 
elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, commanded by 
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Lieutenant General James T. Conway. The force would number 65,000 
personnel supported by 142 MIAI tanks, 606 amphibious assault vehicles, 
279 light amphibious vehicles, 105 howitzers, 7,000 trucks and 454 
Marine Air Wing aircraft. The vast majority of these forces would be pre-
positioned in Kuwait.
The British provided the 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, under 
the command of Brigadier James Dutton. The force would also pre-
position ashore in Kuwait from the UKATG. The initial requirement 
was to secure the ports of Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr from land. This 
was undertaken by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) 
while the Royal Marines combined with the British Army’s 1st Armoured 
Division to secure Basra following an air assault on the Al-Faw Peninsula.
Information and communications 
technology
For the first time in a major naval conflict, satellite communications 
would play a pivotal role not only in long-haul strategic communications 
but also between ships and formations. Commercial software tools such 
as email, chat and web surfing became critical command and control aids 
and proved vital to the success of the mission. The allocation of satellite 
bandwidth became a matter of close attention for commanders.
Chat was of particular significance in passing orders and disseminating 
information. It allowed ships to join in a ‘meeting room’ with their task 
group commanders where reports would be made and orders given. Chat 
proved excellent for providing shared situational awareness and fostering 
task group cohesion. For example, one-on-one ‘whisper boxes’ between 
task group commanders and individual ships allowed details to be sorted 
out before posting orders in open meeting rooms. Innumerable task-
specific chat rooms proliferated throughout the theatre for such functions 
as logistics, air warfare or shore bombardment. There were, however, 
challenges with this novel tool. Information overload was a risk, as was 
providing too much transparency to higher commands who became 
tempted to micromanage issues. In addition, chat could distract the eyes 
of operations crews from radar screens and charts.
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Lead-up to the Iraq War
Critical to the operation’s success was the massive build-up of materiel for 
the land, air and sea forces. As in 1990, the vast bulk of equipment and 
stores came by sea. From January until the end of April, the US Military 
Sealift Command moved about 21 million square feet of materiel and 
more than 261 million gallons of fuel. The commander of the Military 
Sealift Command, Vice Admiral David L. Brewer III, attributed this 
achievement to the adoption of lessons from the Gulf War. The large, 
medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships were such an example and became 
the prime movers with a carrying capacity of 300,000 square feet per ship. 
The surge of the Military Sealift Command was assisted by Ready Reserve 
Force roll-on/roll-off ships from the US Maritime Administration and 
commercial charter. The protection of these ships from interference from 
al-Qaeda, Iran or Iraq was of critical importance. Ships were provided not 
only naval escorts (often by the MIF) as required but also on-board US 
Navy and US Marine Corps security teams.
From January 2003, ships stationed in the Gulf began to receive additional 
training and had defects repaired. An example of this training was naval 
gunfire support drills for the Australian and British frigates designated for 
this mission. In preparing for the likely conflict, the MIF identified four 
worst-case scenarios: Iraqi mining, short-range Iraqi missile strikes from 
the Al-Faw, a blue-on-blue incident, and a collision involving helicopters 
unfamiliar with the confines of the north Persian Gulf. The MIF 
developed enhanced procedures to mitigate these risks. They included 
improved reporting and tracking procedures for merchant ships, aircraft 
and boats, and a range of visual and procedural tools to confirm identity. 
The MIF Commander became the North Arabian Gulf Local Surface 
Warfare Commander and Local Air Warfare Commander. These small 
but important steps were to ensure not only that the MIF could operate in 
a broader warfare context but also that when the inevitable force build-up 
occurred, the much-enlarged coalition force could operate safely in this 
relatively confined area.
A key to the cohesion between not only the on-station ships but also newly 
joined forces was the long-standing ties between most of the naval forces. 
In particular, American, British and Australian sailors had long association 
and familiarity. Extensive use of embedded liaison officers in the different 
levels of command helped to resolve issues and promote cohesion. 
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The new joiners also had the benefit of chat rooms to immerse themselves 
as they steamed in theatre. The Royal Navy frigates were visitors to MIF 
chat rooms from the point when they commenced steaming down the 
English Channel. This accelerated their eventual integration into the MIF.
While the coalition forces prepared for war, the Iraqis began to rebase their 
warships from Umm Qasr to Basra. This unprecedented redeployment of 
all major ships included Saddam Hussein’s presidential yacht, Al-Mansur. 
It was assessed that Iraqis thought Basra offered more protection for these 
ships, as well as allowing a short passage across the Shatt Al-Arab to Iran if 
considered expedient to do so and should Iran prove to be accommodating.
As part of revised command and control arrangements, Commodore John 
W. Peterson in the cruiser USS Valley Forge was made the North Arabian 
Gulf Commander. He had extensive north Persian Gulf experience 
and had been heavily involved in developing the maritime plan. His 
new purview was operations off both the Khawr Abd Allah and Shatt 
Al-Arab, and supporting special forces operations. He also had to align 
the activities of the coalition with the Kuwaiti–Bahraini–Emirati Defence 
of Kuwait Task Group now at sea. Major General Ahmed Yousef al-Mulla, 
Commander of the Kuwait Naval Force, in the United Arab Emirates 
frigate Al Emirat commanded this task group as it operated in the western 
sector of the north Persian Gulf.
From mid-February to early March, the planning tempo increased 
significantly. An important issue was aligning the different components 
of the plan to reduce the possibility of fratricide.
On 1 March 2003, we scrutinised the plans for the clearance of merchant 
and dhow traffic from the Khawr Abd Allah. We desired clearance of the 
channel to ensure that delivery of humanitarian relief to Umm Qasr could 
occur within 72 hours of the adjacent land sector being secured. The plan 
involved Kanimbla being used as a command platform with the MIF to 
oversee a force of 38 RHIBs inspecting, clearing and directing dhows and 
merchant vessels to designated holding areas. All vessels would be searched 
for explosives, mines, weapons and contraband material before being 
allowed down a defined route into the central Persian Gulf. US Navy 
and US Coast Guard patrol boats, as well as Kuwaiti patrol vessels and 
maritime interception operations helicopters, would support operations. 
In addition to the organic RHIBs, Kanimbla and Czernicki would host 
additional boats and associated personnel from other non-MIF warships 
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operating further down the Gulf. Later, part of the MIF would deploy 
forward to protect the mine counter-measures effort and patrol the river 
once cleared.
The proposed use of naval gunfire support in the assault on the Al-Faw 
Peninsula became a contentious issue. Four frigates in two fire support 
areas planned to provide fire across the whole of the Royal Marines’ 40 
Commando area of operations and on to 42 Commando’s insertion point. 
Despite US concern about deconfliction with air assets and an initial lack 
of Royal Marine support, it was agreed that naval gunfire support would 
become a feature of the plan. The planning work and assiduous advocacy 
by the commanding officer of HMS Marlborough, Captain Mark 
Anderson, was instrumental in this outcome. As events were to unfold, 
naval gunfire support was to prove invaluable to the assault.
On 11 March 2003, Rear Admiral Costello convened a final planning 
conference on board USS Constellation in which all plans were outlined. 
Elaborate anti-fratricide measures for the small boats were also briefed. 
Such was the concern about fratricide that Costello directed that 
a weapons safe posture was to be adopted, with engagement of the enemy 
to be directed by him unless in self-defence. This approach reflected the 
preponderance of coalition military power and the confined nature of the 
battle space. More challenging was the deconfliction between maritime 
and land operations in the littoral. Despite the sharing of plans, albeit 
often later than desirable, and the exchange of liaison officers, there 
remained doubt as to whether all risks had been retired.
Rear Admiral Kelly’s remit was complex and required the integration of 
the naval air and strike assets into the coalition air and targeting plans. 
In addition to striking Iraqi targets, the naval forces had to complement 
operations to ensure air superiority over both Iraq and Kuwait. A particular 
challenge was to protect Kuwait city from a possible short-range missile 
attack from Iraq. The US Army deployed Patriot anti-air missile batteries 
around the city, and the destroyer USS Higgins was fitted with additional 
equipment to provide early warning and tracking for these forces.
The Iraqis had developed defensive plans that were being incrementally 
implemented. In the first instance, the Iraqi navy moved the last of its 
larger ships from Umm Qasr to Basra. Some tugs, small patrol craft and 
a  barge were fitted with disguised mining rails to enable them to lay 
defensive minefields at the mouth of and along the Khawr Abd Allah. 
Plans were also put in place to destroy navigational markers along the 
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waterways. Small inflatable boats were also rigged as suicide boats from 
components of Iraqi-built LUGM-145 naval moored contact mines. These 
boats were to be deployed from the Al-Faw, enabling coalition warships 
to be attacked from the Khawr Abd Allah and Shatt Al-Arab waterways.
The MIF, through its contact with merchant ship and dhow crews, had 
learnt of some of these plans, including the threat to navigation marks 
and the Mīnā’ al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya offshore oil terminals. As a 
result, all Iraqi government vessels were trailed by MIF RHIBs while at 
the entrance to the Khawr Abd Allah to monitor their actions.
During the evenings, there had been a noticeable increase in smuggler 
movement with increased desperation to exit the Khawr Abd Allah. 
On the evening of 15 March 2003, a Kuwaiti patrol boat fired warning 
shots at an exiting dhow that had not responded to its order to stop. The 
ill-directed fire hit an Indian crew member. A medical team from HMAS 
Anzac was unable to save his life, and the dhow was directed back up the 
Khawr Abd Allah. Perhaps, as a result of this event, there was a marked 
reduction in dhow activity.
On the arrival of the UKATG in the north Persian Gulf, pre-positioning 
of the Royal Marine force in Kuwait commenced with US and Australian 
assistance. Reconnaissance of the peninsula, commenced by Royal Navy 
airborne Sea King Mk 7 helicopters fitted with early warning radar, 
provided synthetic aperture radar images of the terrain and installations. 
HMAS Kanimbla was used as a forward operating base for crew swaps and 
refuelling. Tragically, on 22 March 2003, two of these helicopters collided 
with the loss of seven lives.
On the afternoon of 17 March, 38 dhows attempted an unusual daytime 
escape of the Khawr Abd Allah. Their crews had heard erroneous news 
reports of the impending start of the war. In their desperation they started 
to jettison cargo. Vice Admiral Keating approved the recommendation of 
the MIF to clear the Khawr Abd Allah rather than turn the dhows around 
in accordance with the UN sanctions. It was a historic moment because it 
was the effective end of the 12-year embargo. The well-developed plan of 
the MIF was activated. All dhows were anchored and searched for arms, 
explosives, mines and deserting Iraqi leadership before being physically 
marked, cleared and directed south along the designated track called Red 




For their part, once the dhows’ crews understood what was happening, 
they were compliant. For some boarding teams and dhow crews, it was 
a poignant moment. After months, if not years, of being boarded and 
being turned back, this was to be their last meeting. Among those vessels 
cleared was the Indian dhow that lost her crew member two nights earlier.
As expected, the word of the clearance quickly spread up the Khawr Abd 
Allah, and the following day the merchant ships made their outbound 
passage. Fifty-six dhows and 47 merchant ships were inspected and 
cleared in about three days. This early clearance emptied the waterway in 
preparation for combat operations.
In the early morning of 19 March, UN officials on the Mīnā’ al-Bakr and 
Khor al-Amaya oil terminals were detained and taken to Basra in an Iraqi 
government tug. There were fears that they would find themselves used 
as ‘human shields’ just as such people had been used during the earlier 
Gulf War. To prevent this, CH-47 Chinook helicopters intercepted the 
tug, removed the UN workers, and allowed the vessel to proceed on its 
way. The UN workers reported that Iraqi military were present on the two 
offshore oil terminals with some suspicious equipment. This corroborated 
earlier reports from merchantmen that Iraq might detonate explosives on 
the terminals.
Hostilities
On the evening of 19 March 2003, US Navy Seals and Polish GROM, 
under the overall command of US Navy Commodore Robert S. Harward, 
conducted a sea and airborne assault on Mīnā’ al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya 
oil terminals. HMAS Anzac stood by to extract these forces if the assault 
was repulsed. However, the attack proceeded to plan, and both platforms 
were quickly secured. Iraqi explosives were present on the platforms but 
had not been fitted. At the same time as the oil terminal operation, US 
Navy Seals secured the two related oil manifolds on the Al-Faw Peninsula.
This operation was soon followed by the first wave of Tomahawk land 
attack cruise missile launches from US Navy cruisers, destroyers and 
submarines as well as British submarines. In all more than 800 Tomahawks 
were fired from 35 coalition ships from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, 
the Persian Sea and the Persian Gulf, with almost half of those being 
fired in the first 24 hours. A third of the missiles were launched from 
submarines, including from the British submarines.
143
7 . MARITIME OPERATIONS
The Al-Faw coalition aircraft commenced strikes on Iraqi army positions, 
augmented by 148 Battery Royal Artillery firing from Bubyan Island, the 
largest island in the Kuwaiti coastal island chain in the north-western 
corner of the Persian Gulf. On completion of this bombardment, Royal 
Marines conducted an airborne insertion on the Al-Faw Peninsula.
Soon after the commencement of hostilities, an Iraqi navy PB-90 patrol 
boat proceeded down the Khawr Abd Allah to attack coalition warships. 
En route it was detected by a AP-3C Orion from Patrol Squadron 46, 
which relayed its location to an AC-130 gunship then supporting the 
Al-Faw operation. In a brief exchange of fire, the PB-90 blew up under 
the hail of fire from the aircraft’s 76mm gun. Three survivors, suffering 
from hypothermia, were picked up at daylight by Adak. They were 
expeditiously recovered to HMAS Kanimbla where they told their tale 
of survival.
At around 0200 on 20 March 2003, HMS Marlborough, HMAS 
Anzac, HMS Chatham and HMS Richmond were detached for shore 
bombardment duties. The passage to assigned fire support areas was 
challenging with a  strong tidal stream, poor visibility and shallow 
waters. The Royal Marines encountered stubborn resistance from Iraqi 
forces and called for naval gunfire support at 0604. The ships engaged 
command posts, bunkers and artillery positions. In one action, HMAS 
Anzac destroyed a T59 artillery piece in a fire mission of three rounds. 
Such was the unprecedented accuracy of the frigates that spotters used 
single rounds to direct Iraqi troops up the peninsula. Very accurate fire 
was provided by frigates at near maximum ranges with Royal Marines 
in close proximity waiting to exploit the effects. Naval gunfire was used 
to encourage capitulation by Iraqi forces with success on a number of 
occasions. The battery commander reported: ‘Success on the Al-Faw 
was due to the aggressive use of indirect fire support, especially the swift 
response from naval gunfire support ships which had a huge impact on 
the ground and shattered the enemy’s will to fight.’ A total of 17 fire 
missions were executed with just 155 rounds of 5-inch and 4.5-inch 
ammunition expended.
During the night another aspect of the operation was executed. This was 
the protection of an amphibious transit lane for the fast landing craft 
air cushion (LCAC) hovercraft to take equipment from Bubyan Island 
across the Khawr Abd Allah to the Al-Faw Peninsula. USS Chinook, USS 
Firebolt, USCGC Adak and USCGC Aquidneck reported three Iraqi tugs 
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and a barge coming down the Khawr Abd Allah. It was discovered that the 
tug Jumariya had a barge with 20 Manta and 48 LUGM contact mines 
concealed in its hull, while the tug Al Raya contained 18 LUGM mines. 
The mines on the upper deck of the Al Raya were concealed by hollowed-
out 50-gallon barrels. The barrels were lined in rows, simulating a cargo 
barge and tug. An Australian Army LCM-8 landing craft ferried the 38 
Iraqi crewmen to a US Navy designated prisoner-holding amphibious 
ship. SEALs from USS Joint Venture, which had come up the channel 
west of Bubiyan Island, then confirmed that there were no additional 
Iraqi mine barges further up the Khawr Abd Allah.
Later in the day, four small Iraqi suicide boats proceeded down the 
Shatt Al-Arab. They were pursued by Iranian naval forces and beached 
themselves. In response to this threat, I detatched HMS Chatham and 
HMAS Darwin as a Surface Action Group to the mouth of the Shatt 
Al-Arab. The ships possessed a good combination of weapon systems to 
deal with small inshore contacts. The ships remained off the mouth of the 
Shatt Al-Arab until the danger of these boats had passed.
The anticipated short-range Iraqi missile attacks from the Al-Faw did 
materialise on 20 March, but the target was Kuwait city, not coalition 
warships. At least six SCUD missiles were fired with limited damage 
sustained. The Patriot missile defence batteries, with cueing from USS 
Higgins, intercepted at least two SCUDS, destroying them in mid-flight.
While this activity was occurring at the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah, 
the US, British and Australian clearance diving teams had driven across 
the desert from Kuwait behind the leading 15th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit elements into Umm Qasr. Once the port had been secured, they 
commenced mine clearance of the port precinct. Australian, British and 
US Navy diving teams were complemented by dolphins trained by the US 
Navy to locate bottomed mines. The mine clearance forces were supported 
from the amphibious ship USS Gunston Hall.
On 20 March, US Marine Corps Task Force Grizzly advanced to South 
Rumaylah to prevent Iraqi efforts to destroy the oilfields. However, 
the main effort of the US Marines was to push into Iraq and approach 
Baghdad from the south-east, securing vital points en route. Meanwhile, 
the Royal Marines and British Army units focused on securing the 
south and took Basra on 6 April. By 10 April 2003, the US Marines had 
established themselves in Baghdad. The focus then shifted to stabilisation 
and security operations.
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Meanwhile, the aircraft carriers maintained continuous air missions to 
support the air campaign, while the Tomahawk armed cruisers, destroyers 
and submarines also contributed to operations. More than 400 navy 
aircraft from six fighter wings flew more than 7,000 sorties in support of 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM between 20 March and 14 April. Among 
the many Iraqi targets struck were the remnants of the Iraqi navy tied up 
alongside in Basra, including Al-Mansur.
The US Marine Air Wing flew some 9,800 sorties and expended nearly 
6.25  million pounds of ordnance during the operation. Owing to the 
shortage of airfields and other considerations, their AV-8B Harriers 
operated from their amphibious ships. This demonstrated the US Marines’ 
‘Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea’ concept, which is premised on 
a largely self-contained force being able to project force and sustain 
operations from its offshore support ships, integrating all joint, combined 
and organic assets.
During the next couple of days events moved quickly. Once the Al-Faw was 
secured, the coalition mine counter-measures vessels HM Ships Bangor, 
Blyth, Brocklesby and Sandown, as well as US Ships Dextrous, Cardinal and 
Ardent, complemented by the two Sea Dragon helicopters with towed 
sidescan sonars, commenced counter-mine operations. MIF patrol boats 
and RHIBs protected these forces through ever-lengthening riverine 
patrols. On one such patrol, USS Chinook observed suspicious activity on 
the Al-Faw shoreline. On landing a team ashore, they chased away Iraqis 
who left a semi-inflated boat and a cache of rockets and other weapons. 
The MIF continued riverine patrols until the Al-Faw was secured.
The campaign plan called for clearing of mines in the Khawr Abd Allah 
up to Umm Qasr within 72 hours. But this goal proved unrealistic owing 
to the large number of mine-like objects littering the riverbed. This was 
hardly surprising as the Khawr Abd Allah has been a battle zone on several 
occasions in the 20th century. To speed up the clearance, the normal mine 
counter-measures process of detect, identify and destroy was modified 
to detect and destroy mine-like objects. In the end, the coalition mine 
counter-measures forces cleared the equivalent of 913 nautical miles of 
water in the Khawr Abd Allah and Umm Qasr port area. Eventually, 
21 berths for ships were opened in Umm Qasr, and this cleared the way 
to allow the first coalition humanitarian aid shipments into Iraq on board 
RFA Sir Galahad on 28 March.
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The maritime component of operations to dislodge the Saddam Hussein 
regime was long in the build-up but short in duration. On 12 April 2003, 
Baghdad fell to coalition forces. Even before that day, once the land forces 
had secured Umm Qasr and Basra, the primary role of maritime forces fell 
to contributing to the air campaign.
At this phase of the campaign there was a strong desire to rapidly draw 
down on forces. This was not only because of their attendant logistic 
and fiscal burden but also because they could become a target for local 
insurgents, al-Qaeda or misadventure. In consultation with the overall 
campaign commander, General Franks, the naval footprint was therefore 
rapidly decreased.
In coming months, however, there was much work to be done by coalition 
naval forces in stabilising the post-Saddam Iraq. This included opening up 
ports and waterways and, most importantly, protecting the vital offshore 
oil terminals through which more than 90 per cent of Iraq’s foreign 
earnings flow.
Summation
The maritime campaign to oust the Saddam Hussein regime was 
noteworthy for the diverse range of missions undertaken by an integrated 
multinational force. The Deputy Maritime Component Commander, 
Rear Admiral Snelson, on reflection stated: ‘Overall, the campaign was 
a  classic use of maritime power in support of initial diplomatic and 
coercive objectives and then in support of a joint war-fighting campaign.’5
The success of the maritime element was based on a number of factors. 
Key among them was 12 years of experience operating and sustaining 
naval forces in the narrow confines of the northern Gulf. Related to this 
experience was the high level of interoperability among participants. This 
was a testament not only to the experience of working together but also 
to the widespread use of liaison officers and the development of mission-
specific procedures and doctrine for the operation. An example was the 
elaborate identification procedures to prevent friendly fire on RHIBs. 
Rear Admiral Snelson stated:
5  D. Snelson, ‘Liberating Iraq—The UK’s maritime contribution’, Naval Review, vol. 91, no. 4, 
2003, p. 328.
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This very close integration of forces practised by the Australian 
Navy as well as the US [Navy] and [Royal Navy], resulted in 
unparalleled unity of effort that paid dividends in preventing 
friction, blue-on-blue engagements and forcing the sharing of 
intelligence and C2 connectivity.6
This integration extended to the higher levels of command and planning. 
Vice Admiral Keating remarked:
This was a different war, perhaps obviously, but for not-so-apparent 
reasons. It was joint war-fighting at the highest form of the art I’ve 
ever seen. The component commanders (air, land, sea) working 
for General Tommy Franks had spent about a year formulating 
this plan.7
Despite the complexity of the operation, the relatively sophisticated 
command and control tools allowed large amounts of information 
to be disseminated. This allowed units to be multitasked or retasked. 
Vice Admiral Keating remarked, ‘We were able to keep up with the 
rapidly dynamic and changing war in ways that were, in my experience, 
unprecedented.’8
The most decisive strategic effect created by the maritime component was 
the generation of air power from six carrier air groups in an operation 
where constraints were placed on land-based air power. The second crucial 
effect was sea control that enabled the build-up and sustainment of all 
land, air and sea forces. This sea control also enabled the strategically vital 
offshore oil terminals to be secured before oil could be released into the 
Gulf by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The consequences of such a release 
could have been catastrophic. The coalition’s sea control also prevented 
sea mining of the Gulf, which could have had serious implications on the 
coalition’s conduct of operations. Finally, deployment of significant marine 
forces made a notable contribution to the success of the land campaign.
6  Ibid., p. 326.
7  T.J. Keating, ‘This was a different war: Interview with Vice Admiral Timothy J. Keating’, US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, vol. 129, no. 6, 2003, p. 30.




Following the Iraq War, the thread of maritime interception operations 
and the provision of good order at sea was once again picked up. Initially, 
the environment was benign, but then Iraqi insurgents and later al-Qaeda 
and Islamic State terrorists posed a threat in the northern and southern 
Gulf. Seaborne forces had the opportunity to disrupt the drug trade 
between the subcontinent and Africa. These and the earlier operations 
showed the utility of naval forces that are capable of both sustained 





I saw three Iraq wars: the first Iraq War in 1991, otherwise known as the 
Gulf War; the second Iraq War from 2003 to 2011, being the invasion 
and stabilisation of Iraq by counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency; 
and the third Iraq War, being 2014 to perhaps 2017–18, against ISIS. 
There is a popular view that there was just one war and that it was all the 
fault of the United States, President Bush, or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
But in fact—and I acknowledge that this is a contentious view—the only 
thing common across the three wars was the geography of Iraq.
From 2004 to 2005, I was an embedded member, an ‘embed’, of the 
Headquarters Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), and probably 
the most senior Australian soldier deployed. During that time, I was chief 
of operations in Iraq. My experience was an American experience of what 
our US comrades considered to be a war of necessity. For the US Army 
at least, this was a war of necessity, and the achievement of the mission 
was more important than the lives of soldiers, so greater risks and more 
casualties were accepted by the United States. For the allies, this was a war 
of choice, and most allies chose to prioritise the lives of their soldiers over 
the achievement of almost any mission.
I discussed the various views of my task as chief of operations in my 
book, Running the War in Iraq. I made the point that my experience 
was an American experience as I worked as a lone Australian (except for 
my brilliant executive officers and my extraordinary bodyguard) in the 
headquarters and throughout Iraq with almost no contact with other 
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Australians. I was told by the Australian Chief of Defence Force to ensure 
that the commanding general was aware that I was working for him alone. 
Suffice to say that since 2004, as the ADF and the government’s exposure 
to war increased, Australia has become much more competent in giving 
direction to its deployed soldiers through military directives.
The war in which I was involved as an embed was big. Most Australians 
are unaware how big it was or how vicious the fighting was. When I was 
there, there were 150,000 to 175,000 coalition troops, and we built the 
Iraqi army up to 125,000 troops and police over a year. The United States 
had 20 combat brigades deployed but, strangely, only had 413 hospital 
beds over the entire theatre because of the capability to evacuate casualties. 
Out of the 10 combat divisions that the full-time US Army possessed, 
the equivalent of three and a half were deployed at any one time in Iraq. 
Given the US world responsibility, this illustrates how desperately short 
the United States is in terms of land combat forces and how much the 
United States needs its allies. But in Iraq, the allies were not there.
To illustrate the level of combat in this counter-insurgency fight, I spoke 
briefly about the second battle of Fallujah, in November 2004. This 
was a conventional ‘divisional’ attack on a city that had 3,000 to 6,000 
dug-in insurgents defending it. That this should occur within a counter-
insurgency, which most Australians seem to associate with jungles and 
communist terrorists, was somewhat counter-intuitive. To show how one 
type of traditional but complex conflict has merged into other types of 
complex conflict, I described Fallujah as ‘a conventional operation as part 
of a stabilization campaign to achieve an integrated political effect against 
an insurgent and terrorist force that stayed and fought’.
I commend to you Dr Albert Palazzo’s 572-page report on Australia’s 
participation in the Iraq War,1 which has recently been made available 
through a Freedom of Information request by the Sydney Morning Herald—
but with 500 redactions by Defence.2 The SMH quoted Defence as referring 
to the report as an ‘unofficial history that reflect the author’s own views’, the 
author being referred to as an ‘Army official’. In that report, I was referred 
to as ‘the ADF member most directly involved in fighting the insurgents’, 
and I consider this report to be a good summary of our participation in the 
Iraqi war up to 2010. The author of the report considered that Australia’s 
1  Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010.
2  See www.smh.com.au/interactive/2017/pdfview/ViewerJS/#../The_Australian_Army_in_Iraq.pdf 
(retrieved 3 April 2020).
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participation in the war was ‘inconsequential and confused, timid even’, 
and observed: ‘It would be interesting to know the reaction of US personnel 
who served in Iraq to Australia’s timidity.’ Well, as someone who lived within 
the beast for a long time, and became familiar with the US personnel at the 
top, let me tell you that whenever they thought of it, which was not often 
because they were running serious operations and battles, they were not 
impressed, and we were just another ally.
This issue goes to the importance of military credibility in an alliance. 
Because the centre point of our defence policy is an expectation that 
the United States will come to our aid in an extreme military situation, 
it is important that the United States feels that Australia will share the 
burden not just of military expenditure but also of combat. This was not 
a view that seemed to be accepted by Australian defence civilians in the 
room, the flippant comment being made that ‘we do not go to war to 
impress the US military’. My view is that Australia’s credibility as an ally is 
crucial to our defence policy if we base that policy on US assistance in an 
emergency. This does not mean that we accept US policy always or that 
we follow the United States like a deputy sheriff.
If we consider that a war should be fought, and we are prepared to put 
troops into that war, then we should realise that it is against our interests 
for us to be popularly considered the ‘new French’, as the British called us 
in Al Muthanna Province because we would not fight. The alternative is to 
not rely on the United States and to put our minds to defending ourselves, 
which we are unlikely to do. Regardless of what the United States says to 
us or to our allies, the United States understands which nations are truly 
prepared to carry the burden of world security with them. Many defence 
civilians seem to think that ‘showing the flag’ is clever when we send 
troops to Iraq at a time when the United States is desperate for assistance, 
and we decide that we will support the war rhetorically, so that we will 
send our troops there but not fight. Then of course many of the same 
people point out how we are ‘punching above our weight’ in an appalling 
show of insensitivity.
Ignorant people think that the United States does not need its allies and 
that it has infinite military strength. It did not then, and after 16 years 
of one or two wars, eight years of President Obama and congressional 
sequestration, the United States needs its allies like it has never needed 
them before. And Australia needs to have a clear-eyed view of what it 
contributes to the alliance.
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My favourite lesson from Iraq was about allies, and it was that it took 
the coalition eight years to win a war that in my judgement (and in 
retrospect) we should have won in two years. Why? Because the allies, like 
Australia, refused to help effectively. Twenty-eight countries were present 
in Iraq when I was there, yet one, or maybe two at times, were doing all 
the fighting.
By way of conclusion, I came up with a number of generalised lessons put 
as simply as possible, as follows:
• Counterinsurgencies are not quick, cheap or easy. But they are winnable.
• Get serious or get out.
• Security forces are not the only answer, but they are normally the first 
answer.
• The amount of strategic benefit derived from a ‘niche’ or ‘token’ 
deployment is in direct proportion to its value to an ally.
• You will never ‘do strategy’ if you cannot balance the objective with the 
costs (mainly time and casualties).
• Close combat is so ugly that everyone is looking for alternatives—
except the modern insurgent.
• A comprehensive inter-agency approach is not just a set of words; it is 
real resources (time, money, lives, reputation).
• ‘End-states’ (i.e. the conditions to be achieved at conclusion of 
the operation) specified before the start of a war are an interesting 
academic exercise.
• It is much harder to get out of a war than to decide to get into a war 
in the first place.
• Avoid simple solutions—they are likely to be wrong.
• Avoid the four standard errors:
1. allocating insufficient troops initially
2. insisting that reconstruction start before there is security
3. failing to provide even the non-military resources necessary
4. stretching the involvement beyond the limits of your home nation’s 
resolve.
These are the lessons about winning wars that embeds can provide.









Command and control, or C2, is an issue of keen interest to both students 
and practitioners of the military art because the C2 arrangements go 
a long way to establishing the tenor of any operation. As General David 
Petraeus used to say when I worked for him at US Central Command 
(CENTCOM), if you get the C2 right the rest will follow. At the other 
end of the spectrum, poor command and control arrangements create 
ambiguities and frictions that distract the attention and energy of 
commanders. After all, C2 structures are about power relationships: who 
gets to give orders and who has to take them. An examination of command 
and control arrangements is therefore very important to understanding 
Australia’s recent operations in the Middle East.
I present here a personal perspective, and my observations should be 
seen in that light. I served twice as Commander Joint Task Force 633, 
so my assessments are developed primarily through the lens of national 
command. But in the period under consideration I also served as 
Chief of Staff at Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), 
Head Military Strategic Commitments (HMSC) and Deputy Director 
Operations at CENTCOM, so what follows also reflects some flavour of 
those appointments.
I do not propose to dwell at any length on why national command is 
so sensitive to Australians; our experience in two world wars is widely 
known and understood. Neither will I trace the detailed development of 
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higher ADF command structures from Federation; such an exposition is 
not necessary for this discussion, and in any case others have done that 
very elegantly elsewhere.1
Instead, I want to focus on the Australian command and control 
arrangements that I experienced in the Middle East Area of Operations 
(MEAO) in 2006 and 2012. I begin by describing the original structures 
and how they evolved over time to the points at which I found 
them. I  then canvass some of the critiques of the model and offer my 
perspectives. Finally, I turn briefly to select other issues that I grappled 
with on a day-to-day basis during my tenure in command.
Australian Middle East Area of Operations 
command and control, 2001–14, in outline
As we have seen in earlier chapters, Australia’s most substantial recent 
involvement in the Middle East had its origins in the terrorist attacks in 
the United States in September 2001. In response to those attacks, the 
ADF deployed ships to support the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) 
in the Persian Gulf, a special operations task group to Afghanistan, and 
aircraft to different locations in the region. Operation SLIPPER, as it was 
known, was commanded by Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), 
Rear Admiral Chris Ritchie. ‘Australian Theatre’, or AST, is the precursor 
title of HQJOC. Ritchie’s concept for the operation was endorsed by the 
Chief of Defence Force and the Strategic Command Group, and he was 
then left to run it.
We did not deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters for Operation 
SLIPPER in 2001, but we did deploy an Australian national commander, 
Brigadier Ken Gillespie. He was based in Kuwait, where he was co-located 
with the US Land Component Commander and handy to the other 
US component commanders. Gillespie reported to COMAST, but did 
not himself exercise much control over the deployed Australian forces. 
Instead, on national matters, the commanders of the tactical elements 
reported directly to their respective Australian Theatre component 
1  See in particular D. Horner, ‘The higher command structure for joint ADF operations’, in 
History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, ed. R. Huisken and 
M. Thatcher, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2007, pp. 143–61. Much of my description of the early years 
in the Middle East Area of Operations is drawn from this rich source.
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commanders—that is, to the maritime, special forces and air component 
commanders. Gillespie was kept informed so that he could veto Australian 
participation if required, but on operational matters, the tactical 
commanders worked under the operational control of their respective US 
component commanders.
The command arrangements for the 2003 Iraq War, Operation 
FALCONER, had some similarities. The Australian national commander, 
Brigadier Maurie McNarn, was co-located in Qatar with the US 
commander General Tommy Franks. As in Operation SLIPPER, McNarn 
reported to COMAST, who by then was Rear Admiral Mark Bonser. 
As  before, the several deployed task group commanders were placed 
under operational control of the coalition component commanders. But 
this time they reported through McNarn on operational matters and to 
COMAST on technical and administrative matters. The big differences, 
though, were at the strategic level. First, for reasons of secrecy, Operation 
FALCONER was planned in Canberra by Strategic Operations Division 
in Defence Headquarters, and Bonser was brought in only later. And 
second, in addition to reporting to Bonser, McNarn also reported directly 
to the Chief of Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, who wanted 
a more direct connection with his commander in the field because of the 
rapid pace of operations.
After the successful invasion of Iraq, Operation FALCONER came to an 
end and a new operation, CATALYST, began. While several units returned 
to Australia, the remaining force still contained a variety of naval, land and 
air elements, and at this point a joint task force was established: Joint Task 
Force 633 (JTF 633). The first Commander JTF 633, Air Commodore 
Graham Bentley, was given operational control of all Australian elements, 
which he in turn delegated to coalition commanders. He reported to 
COMAST but retained a direct link to the Chief of Defence Force.
In the period following the establishment of JTF 633, there were some 
seismic changes in arrangements at the strategic and operational levels.
• In 2004, Headquarters AST became HQJOC; COMAST (a two-star 
appointment) became the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCJOPS); 
and the three-star appointment, Vice Chief of the Defence Force 
(VCDF), was double-hatted as Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).
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• At the same time, Strategic Operations Division was disestablished, 
and a smaller Military Strategic Commitments (MSC) Branch was 
established at one-star (brigadier or equivalent) level to support the 
Chief of Defence Force (four-star ranked appointment) and VCDF in 
their operational roles.
• In 2007, the roles of CJOPS and VCDF were separated, so that for the 
first time we had a three-star officer (lieutenant general or equivalent) 
focused entirely on commanding operations on behalf of the Chief of 
Defence Force.
• At the same time, HQJOC (the rebadged Headquarters Australian 
Theatre) expanded considerably as it moved from Potts Point in Sydney 
to Bungendore in rural New South Wales, not far from Canberra, and 
absorbed the component headquarters.
• Finally, the MSC Branch was expanded to a small division, headed 
by a  two-star officer (major general or equivalent) as Head MSC 
(HMSC).
At the JTF 633 level, though, the basic command and control construct 
remained remarkably stable for more than a decade. Commander JTF 633 
exercised operational control over a number of task groups dispersed across 
the MEAO, most of which were then delegated under the operational 
control of coalition commanders. Commander JTF 633 also commanded 
a significant national logistic element, which was designed to reduce our 
impost on US resources.
There were, of course, a number of changes in the JTF over time.
• In 2006, in response to our renewed and growing commitment in 
Afghanistan, a deputy national commander was established in Kabul, 
Colonel Dick Stanhope being the first incumbent.
• In 2007, the rank of the Commander of JTF 633 was upgraded from 
one-star to two-star level, and the rank of the deputy in Afghanistan 
was later upgraded from O6 (colonel or equivalent) to one star.
• Having moved to Baghdad in 2003 soon after the end of the Iraq 
War, in late 2008 the JTF headquarters moved to the United Arab 
Emirates. A move was necessary because the UN mandate in Iraq was 
coming to an end, but it also reflected the realisation that the weight 
of Australian operations was by then in Afghanistan.
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• At about the same time, the various air elements of the JTF were 
assigned to an Air Task Group under a group captain, rather than 
reporting directly to the commander of the JTF as they had done 
previously.
• And in 2011, the new CJOPS, Lieutenant General Ash Power, 
assigned units under operational command of Commander JTF 633 
rather than operational control. By so doing, the Commander JTF 
633 could exercise the further delegation of authority, rather than that 
function being mandated directly from HQJOC.
By the time I arrived in the United Arab Emirates to assume command 
in September 2012, the JTF command and control arrangements were 
largely  well settled, although, as Figure 3 illustrates, it was somewhat 
complex. The blue lines show the basic national command arrangements. 
CJOPS exercised theatre command,2 with national command3 and 
operational command4 being delegated to me as Commander JTF 633. 
In turn, I exercised national command of those units based in Afghanistan 
through my deputy in Kabul, Brigadier Peter Short, while those outside 
Afghanistan worked directly to me. Also in the national space were 
multiple chains of technical control, shown in Figure 3 in green, running 
from a range of agencies in Australia to units based in the Middle East. 
These chains dealt with matters ranging from airworthiness and special 
forces operations to finance and other administration. In  fact, some 
detachments were not strictly even working for me at all—for example, 
the Diggerworks team at Tarin Kowt was an army unit focused entirely on 
learning lessons about our land materiel, and I had no responsibility for it 
other than to provide it with protection and logistic support.
2  Theatre Command is the authority given by CDF to CJOPS to command assigned forces to 
prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises) and other 
activities as directed.
3  National Command is a command that is organised by and functions under the authority of 
a specific nation.
4  Operational Command is the authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks 
to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON, 
TACOMD (Tactical Command) and/or TACON as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself 

























Figure 3: Middle Eastern Area of Operations command and control 
arrangements.
Source: Courtesy of Major General Michael Crane.
Authority to employ Australian units for the conduct of operations was 
delegated to coalition commanders (the linkages are illustrated in Figure 3 
in brown). Australian units were generally allotted under Operational 
Control (OPCON)5 or Tactical Control (TACON)6 of the supported 
coalition headquarters, depending on the requirement. The picture 
is greatly simplified, of course, because there were multiple coalition 
headquarters, and some of them had multiple linkages to Australian 
units. For example, our ship in the MEAO worked for Combined Task 
Force (CTF) 150 on maritime security, CTF 151 on counter-piracy and 
CTF 152 on Gulf security, with the command and control arrangements 
switching at any given moment to suit the immediate requirement.
It is interesting to note that Peter Short exercised more than just national 
command on my behalf. When the Dutch left Uruzgan in 2010, Australia 
began holding and interrogating detainees in its own right for the first time. 
5  Operational Control is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that 
the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time 
or location; deploy units concerned; and retain or delegate TACON of those units. It does not include 
authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, 
of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
6  Tactical Control is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or 
manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
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Given the obvious sensitivities, the deputy commander in Afghanistan was 
made responsible for oversight of detention and interrogation operations, 
and the respective units were allotted OPCON to him.
Finally, another critical element of the C2 architecture was the liaison 
network that Peter Short and I operated, shown in Figure 4 in red. Peter 
worked all his contacts in Afghanistan assiduously and did a great job on 
my behalf in keeping his finger on the pulse from day to day. That meant 
I did not have to visit Afghanistan as frequently as I might have done 
otherwise, and it freed me to focus on relationships in the Gulf.
For example, I called on the US naval, land and air component commanders 
several times during my tour to get their assessment of their operations, 
to check whether there were any issues for Australia and, of course, to 
touch base with the Australians working in their respective headquarters. 
Working also with the Australian ambassadors in the region, I routinely 
called on representatives of the host governments on whose support we 
relied so heavily.
The critiques
Despite their longevity, the command and control arrangements 
described above have been critiqued routinely. Most of the main concerns 
are summarised in a scoping study for a review of strategic C2 lessons, 
conducted by Noetic Solutions in July 2013.7 The study claims that 
there are ‘very few JTF 633 “fans” in the ADF’, and found ‘near-uniform 
questioning of [the JTF’s] role, size, location and function’. JTF 633 was 
generally perceived, the study said, to be ‘at best marginally contributory 
to the work people did, and was described variously as “a self-licking 
ice-cream”, overly controlling, risk averse, disruptive and interfering’.
The study found that those consulted had several concerns. First, they felt 
that the appointment of a discrete national commander, rather than the 
role being assigned to a senior embedded officer, confused senior coalition 
officers and other coalition members. Second, they felt that this separation 
of functions rendered the Australian national commander just another 
7  Noetic Solutions, ‘Strategic Command and Control Lessons—Scoping Study’, Noetic Solutions, 




visitor to the headquarters who merely added to the staff workload. 
They felt that any perception of special influence or access was probably 
largely illusory. Finally, they felt that the connection between the various 
activities being conducted did not support the need for a JTF—in other 
words, that the various task groups were essentially conducting discrete 
tasks through different coalition chains of command. They argued that, 
with the introduction of the various environmental directors general, 
HQJOC had evolved beyond an integrated model. Under these changed 
circumstances, the task groups could have been commanded directly 
through these ‘components’, with the logistic and force support elements 
being made direct command units—presumably through the Chief Staff 
Officer for Joint Logistics (or J4) at HQJOC.
At the other end of the spectrum, another former JTF 633 commander, 
Major General Craig Orme, makes a quite different criticism.8 Orme 
assesses that the command and control arrangements were not sufficiently 
strategic and that JTF 633 could have had an even wider role. He argues 
that we only ever had a tactical vision for each operation, and came to 
understand the need for an MEAO theatre architecture only after some 
15 years of operations. He makes the point that, had we had such an 
architecture to tie the theatre together from the outset, the transition to 
new operations as conditions changed would have been much smoother. 
He also argues that such an architecture could have included the minor 
operations, including in South Sudan, the Sinai and Palestine.
Finally, Brigadier Anthony Rawlins in Chapter 6 of this book raises another 
critique based on his experience as commanding officer of Overwatch 
Battle Group (West)-2 (OBG(W)-2) in Iraq’s Al Muthanna Province 
in 2006–07. If I understand it correctly, it is that the national chain of 
command failed to articulate a clear intent for OBG(W) operations, then 
leave the commanding officer to get on with implementing that intent in 
accordance with the principles of mission command.9
8  Major General C.A. Orme, DSC, AM (Retd), private communication, April 2017.
9  ADF doctrine does not define mission command, but describes its effects. Perhaps the most 
precise description (in a somewhat unsatisfactory section of the doctrine) is ‘Under Mission 
Command … the superior commander directs WHAT is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate 
commander free to decide HOW to achieve assigned tasks’. See ADDP 0.01, Command and Control, 
pp. 2–8.
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Now, the data for the Noetic study was developed via an email 
questionnaire sent to just 14 senior ADF and Department of Defence 
officers. The authors are quick to point out that their study makes no 
claim to being comprehensive. Accordingly, we should take care in 
deciding what weight to give expressions such as ‘few fans in the ADF’ 
and ‘near-uniform questioning’.
That said, the people canvassed represent an impressive body of experience. 
The group included two former JTF 633 commanders and two others who 
would go on to command it. It also included former senior embedded 
officers, a former CJOPS and a former Commander Special Operations, 
as well as senior Defence headquarters and staff from HQJOC. Further, 
Craig Orme’s and Anthony Rawlins’s experiences speak for themselves.
So each of these critiques deserves to be examined in detail, and no doubt, 
as historians mull over the evidence in years to come, a clearer picture will 
emerge. Let me offer a few observations that the historians might include 
in their considerations.
First, I agree that the idea of a discrete national commander did bemuse 
some coalition officers, but I never thought they were confused, and 
I never found it an insurmountable issue. Actually, some senior Americans 
rather liked our system, because it was quite clear which officers were 
doing national tasking and which ones were engaged in coalition work.
For my own part, I have always thought there were good reasons not to 
have an embedded officer as the senior national representative. Underlining 
that distinction between dedication to national tasks and coalition effort 
is one. Another is that, presumably, an embedded officer’s embed duties 
are sufficient to fill his or her days in their own right without loading 
national responsibilities on top. I certainly found that was the case when 
I was an embedded officer at CENTCOM. If it is not, somebody should 
probably be reviewing whether that embed position is really necessary. 
Finally, I am not sure that embedded officers can bring a sufficiently 
hard-headed national focus to the national command role. My experience 
throughout more than a decade suggests that embedded officers are 
quickly institutionally captured by their coalition headquarters. And that 
is as it should be—we want them to be the best coalition staff officer they 
can be because it is in Australia’s interest for them to be seen to be a loyal 
team member. But that does make it difficult for them to judge priority 
between coalition and national interests.
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I also agree that my visits to coalition headquarters did make some work for 
coalition staffs, but it was minimal. I was being reminded of the sensitivity 
to my visits, particularly by our embeds and national staff in Afghanistan. 
I do not know how my predecessors or successors did it, but I tried to 
time my visits appropriately, and I always made them low key. I was not 
interested in getting detailed briefs from the coalition staff. I was focused 
on engaging the commanders themselves, and those who were worth their 
salt were always willing to give me their time. Of course, I also wanted to 
hear the views of our embedded staff on how the operation was going and 
whether their individual roles were useful, and to talk to them about how 
they were going personally. If that took up some of their time, I make no 
apology for that.
As to whether we received any special access or influence by virtue of 
having a discrete national commander, I am not sure we ever made that 
claim. I believe that such special access and influence as we had has come 
from the US experience of Australia as an ally and partner: we came to 
the party when they asked us; we then tried not to ask too much of them 
in terms of support; and we always said which part of the job we would 
do, then did it.
A more interesting question is whether we had it right in having 
our national support infrastructure, including our headquarters and 
commander, based in the United Arab Emirates from 2008 rather than, 
say, in Kabul. To me, the argument for the United Arab Emirates was 
reasonably compelling. From a security point of view, it was far superior 
to anywhere in Afghanistan, and not having it in Afghanistan reduced the 
load on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Also, having 
been based in Baghdad in my first tour, I found the United Arab Emirates 
much more convenient for visiting the dispersed elements of the JTF and 
our coalition and host nation partners.
Perhaps another variation would have been to appoint Peter Short as 
national commander in Afghanistan, working either to me as the regional 
national commander or directly for the CJOPS. I think Short would 
argue that he could have done that and that, in many ways, it was the de 
facto situation anyway. I will simply say that I think it is easier to make the 
case for that kind of arrangement than it is for double-hatting an embed, 
which would be my least preferred option.
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A member of Mobility Support fires a 84mm Carl Gustaf Rocket 
Launcher at the heavy weapons range in Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan, 2012.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
The ‘no need for a JTF’ critique is also interesting: could we have done 
away with Headquarters JTF 633 altogether and run the entire operation 
through the HQJOC components and Joint staff? Well, of course 
anything is possible, and in fact we do run some minor operations that 
way—Operation SOLANIA in the Pacific, for example.
But I believe it would have been difficult to do it through HQJOC and 
the components of the headquarters in the early days in the MEAO 
because of the limited capacity of HQJOC before the 2007 expansion. 
Perhaps the components could have run the operational task groups, but 
the J4 at HQJOC certainly could not have run the national support side 
with the staffing levels it then had. And of course, the doctrine we were 
moving towards at the time was the creation of an integrated HQJOC 
with no components, so such an approach would have swum against the 
prevailing philosophical tide.
Beyond matters of capacity, there is also the question of whether we 
should have run the operations in the MEAO directly through HQJOC, 
even if we could have. Perhaps one could make the case that this would 
have eliminated overlap and shortened lines of command and control, 
but in my view these are marginal benefits. HQJOC is, after all, designed 
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to run all operations worldwide at the operational level, and running task 
groups directly would inevitably draw it down into the tactical to the 
detriment of its higher command functions. So, for me, the answer to this 
question is no.
Craig Orme’s concern that we did not take JTF 633 far enough has 
greater merit. I was in Baghdad in late 2008 trying to negotiate a new 
Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq, so I saw firsthand the disruption 
to Headquarters JTF 633 as it moved down the Gulf to the United Arab 
Emirates. I have heard service chiefs lament the way we walked away from 
some Gulf countries when we no longer needed them after the successful 
invasion of Iraq, only to have to rebuild our bridges when we needed 
them again. So there is definite appeal in the idea of a solid foot on the 
ground with an enduring remit to manage Australia’s military footprint in 
the MEAO on behalf of HQJOC.
I believe, however, that such an idea quickly founders on the rocks of 
reality. Wish it otherwise as we may, all our operational commitments in 
the Middle East from 2001 to 2014 were developed incrementally and 
were therefore tactical in their focus. There was no sense of being engaged 
in a campaign, at least not in the early years. Winning resources was 
difficult, as successive governments prescribed numbers for task elements 
almost to the individual soldier level. In such an environment, winning 
support for a JTF headquarters with a more expansive mandate would 
simply not have been possible. That said, we should certainly note the 
potential of this idea for future operations, even when they start small 
and tactical.
As to Anthony Rawlins’s concerns, let me just say that, in my view, the 
OBG(W) task and the constraints around it were clear. We were, at that 
stage, in our province, past any free-flowing manoeuvre warfare, with its 
inherent ambiguity, where there is a need for subordinate commanders 
to have freedom of action and room for them to express themselves with 
flair and élan. The task the Australian Government had taken on just 
had to be ground out, and there was not anything pretty about it. That 
OBG(W) soldiers did not like the task, or that there might have been 
more professionally interesting jobs elsewhere, is of little account.
As an aside, when Ken Gillespie was VCDF and dual-hatted as CJOPS, 
I  accompanied him on a call on the British two-star commander of 
Multi-National Division – South East (MND-SE), who made a strong 
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play for OBG(W) to be allowed to reinforce in what was by then 
a difficult situation in Basra. Gillespie had little patience for this request. 
He reminded our host that the difficult situation was of British making. 
He pointed out that we had a long history of being asked by the British to 
do things that were not in our interests, and said we would not be so easily 
drawn again. He noted that we had already undertaken to do the job in 
Al Muthanna, and declared his intention that we would see it through. 
Perhaps we failed to communicate this intent adequately to OBG(W), 
but there was certainly no doubt in our commander’s mind about what 
he wanted to do—and what he did not.
Where I could agree with Rawlins is that perhaps Australia missed an 
opportunity to leave Al Muthanna when the Japanese did, which would 
have saved our soldiers from what was apparently an unpopular mission. 
Of course, that would have meant that somebody else had to do it. In any 
case, for its own reasons the government decided that we would not leave 
with the Japanese, so the job just had to be done, like it or not.
Selected other issues
I want to leave the critiques there and touch briefly on some other issues. 
There are many we could consider, but I will focus here on just a few.
First, let me touch on national caveats and the so-called red card. In any 
coalition, national caveats are a sensitive issue. They are a significant factor 
for the coalition commander because they constrain the employment of 
his force. General John Allen used to track them personally when he was 
Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan, and I recall that during one of my 
visits to Kabul he produced a matrix that showed the various caveats—
and it was a very complicated chart indeed.
But from a contributing country’s point of view, national caveats are 
critical to sustaining national will for the contribution. They are usually 
finely calculated, balancing the need to make the force useful with a clear 
assessment of national appetite for risk.
Australia’s history is replete with examples in which those we have fought 
alongside have asked us to do things that were not necessarily in our 
interests, and since we first invoked the idea of a national commander, 
standing up for those interests has been a key part of the role.
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As a general statement, our caveats in the MEAO in 2006–07 and 
2012–13 were reasonably modest. The Australian forces assigned for 
tasking in Al Muthanna in Iraq and Uruzgan in Afghanistan were not to 
operate outside those areas without explicit national approval; the ship 
could work with some task forces but not others; and things of that ilk. 
Of  course, Anthony Rawlins has drawn to our attention his concerns 
about the constraints around OBG(W) operations (see Chapter 6), but 
even those caveats were modest compared to those imposed by some 
other nations.
I only ever really came close to pulling the national ‘red card’ once. It was 
right at the beginning of my second tour, in early October 2012, and, 
oddly enough, it arose out of an ISAF requirement, not an Australian 
one. It was not long after we had suffered the tragedy of losing three 
soldiers to an attack by the treacherous Afghan, Sergeant Hekmatullah. 
That attack precipitated a significant review of ISAF force protection 
protocols. One of the outcomes was a requirement that 11 specified 
criteria had to be satisfied before a combined ISAF–Afghan National 
Army patrol could be sent outside the wire, although an ISAF Forward 
Operating Base commander could give a waiver on up to three of those 
criteria if he was satisfied that the risk had been adequately mitigated. 
At that point, the Americans were still leading in Uruzgan, and two nights 
in a row the evening report from our deputy, Colonel (now Brigadier) Ben 
James, advised that the US commander proposed to send out a combined 
Australian–Afghan patrol the following day, on the basis that he had 
waived three of the 11 criteria.
On the first night, I called James and asked which of the criteria had 
been waived and on what basis the Combined Team – Uruzgan 
commander felt that the associated risks had been adequately mitigated. 
An explanation followed, and I thanked James and let it go, but when 
the same thing happened the following night—again initially without 
explanation—I called James again to express my concern. I do not recall 
exactly what I said, but it was to the effect that as the Australian national 
commander, I was becoming uneasy about what appeared to be a routine 
acceptance of additional risk for Australian soldiers that seemed to 
circumvent Commander ISAF’s intent.
James accepted my concerns, and from then on a thorough justification 
accompanied advice of planned combined patrols. As things turned out, 
it was not long before ISAF set aside the requirement to satisfy those 
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criteria explicitly and the risk was managed in different ways. But from 
a perception point of view, the damage had been done. When I went to 
visit Uruzgan a few weeks later, there was still an undercurrent of concern 
about my ‘meddling’ in operational matters, and Commander Regional 
Command (South) made an oblique reference to the issue during a later 
visit by the CJOPS.
This incident serves to illustrate just how important but also how 
sensitive the role of a national commander can be. These were not even 
Australian rules—they were ISAF’s—yet what I thought were quite 
reasonable questions provoked a minor storm. But I cannot agree with 
Anthony Rawlins that mission command says I should have just stepped 
back. We must never forget what has been done to us by others in their 
own interest, and national commanders must continue to advocate for 
Australian interests when they see them threatened.
It is worth mentioning briefly that the command and control 
arrangements  concerning embedded officers is not straightforward. 
Certainly, controlling them is not easy, principally because most of 
them work deep within a coalition chain, there is rarely direct Australian 
supervision, and they are, after all, Australians—they are outcome focused 
and they have a ‘can-do’ attitude. So, for example, when the one-star 
Australian director of the Combined Air Operations Centre in Qatar 
boarded a US aircraft and went on a bombing mission over Afghanistan 
one day in 2007, it caused me some concerns. To this day, I do not know 
whether he was within his personal directive and rules of engagement to 
do so, but the point I made to him was that I would have minded less if he 
had told me about it before he went on the mission rather than after. That 
way I could have at least been prepared to manage the fallout if anything 
went wrong.
Graham Bentley first began the task of crafting directives to embeds in 
2003, and they have grown like Topsy since. The early ones were a bit 
light, and if anything, the current versions are probably too prescriptive. 
But it is important that embeds do have clear guidance because laissez-
faire is simply not a workable approach to managing them.
Another interesting dimension of our command and control 
arrangements in the MEAO was the relationship between the JTF and 
Australia’s diplomatic missions in the region. Our ambassadors in the 
various countries up and down the Gulf were, of course, important in 
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helping to assure ongoing support for our basing presence. But the two 
key diplomats, to my eyes at least, were the ambassadors in Baghdad and 
Kabul, and of those I met and worked with, two merit mention here.
I first met His Excellency Marc Innes-Brown in Baghdad in late 2006, 
when my predecessor, Brigadier Mick Moon, took me for an introductory 
call during our handover. Innes-Brown had been ambassador since August 
that year. I do not recall what we talked about in that introduction, but 
I do remember that he had red hair and a reputation of being pretty fiery 
to go with it.
Just a couple of weeks later, my senior operations officer walked into my 
office to advise that His Excellency had requested that we send over some 
staff to brief him on current operations. That seemed a little odd—after all, 
he had an attaché resident in the embassy. I asked whether we had given 
such briefs before and found we had not. Then I consulted our operations 
order and my directive from the CJOPS, and, as I recall, I found that both 
were silent on any formal command and control relationship between 
the JTF and the embassy beyond a requirement for us to provide force 
protection and some enabling logistic support.
Yet clearly it was imperative that there be a relationship that ran deeper 
than  just force protection and logistics. While I was not required to 
consult or report through the ambassador on operational matters, the JTF 
was a big focus for him in its own right and, beyond that, our activities 
obviously had the potential to affect his broader work. Reciprocally, 
he had access to a range of information that lent context to what I saw 
happening in the coalition, and he could work to shape things in the 
diplomatic arena if I felt I needed such help.
In the end, I declined to provide staff to give Innes-Brown his brief—I felt 
that our headquarters was busy enough doing its core tasks without adding 
jobs that we were not resourced to do. But I did offer to go across to the 
embassy to give him a personal update, and he accepted with alacrity. That 
approach seemed to work well in terms of both meeting his information 
need and deepening our personal relationship. So I made the journey 
across to the Red Zone every fortnight or so for the remainder of my tour, 
combining the brief to the ambassador with visits to our embedded staff 
and calls on senior coalition officers.
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Major General Michael Crane, Commander Joint Task Force 633, with 
Afghan National Army artillerymen, Camp Alamo, Kabul, 2013.
Source: Department of Defence.
In 2012, my relationship with the ambassador to Afghanistan began 
differently. In May that year, I attended the force preparation course in 
Sydney, only to find that the then ambassador-designate, Jon Philp, was 
also enrolled. This extraordinary step on Philp’s part had two important 
outcomes: it gave him some insight into the way the ADF perceived 
Afghanistan and its operations there, and, perhaps more importantly, it 
allowed us to begin to develop our personal relationship before becoming 
immersed in our respective responsibilities. Over dinner one night that 
week we agreed that, while we would likely have different perspectives on 
many issues, nothing would be important enough to allow it to disrupt 
our personal relationship. We settled on a protocol under which, if we 
could not agree, we would refer a matter to our superiors and each abide 
by their decision. This approach served us well, and I am delighted to say 
that we never needed to ask for adjudication from Canberra.
Successful as our personal relationship was, I should close by observing 
that the formal arrangements between the JTF and the embassy in 
Kabul (or lack thereof ) were broadly similar to those I had experienced 
in Baghdad in 2007—although in Kabul there was not yet a resident 




As I have said, there are many other issues relating to command and control 
I could have discussed. Should we revisit the idea of a standing deployable 
JTF headquarters? How did Headquarters JTF 633 perform technically, 
and should we rethink our individual trickle flow reinforcement system? 
Why did Australia come to have its own campaign plan for Afghanistan 
and how was that managed? How did we get to be leading in Uruzgan 
Province when we had fought for so long not to be in charge there? At the 
strategic level, how far have the services really come in ceding control of 
assigned forces to the CJOPS? And so on.
There is obviously still a lot of work to be done by historians in sorting 
through these issues. One factor that will complicate their task is that 
everybody’s experience is different. If you are Major General Paul Symon, 
who commanded in the early days, your concern is whether we should 
have had a properly organised standing national headquarters to get us 
started. If you are Major General John Cantwell in 2010, you are worried 
about HQJOC reaching past you into Afghanistan, and the extent to 
which you yourself have to lean into Afghanistan to feed the Canberra 
beast. If you are Major General Craig Orme in 2014, you are concerned 
about how you ramp up again in Iraq when Australia has only just 
removed the last remnants of its military presence there. And, of course, 
Anthony Rawlins has set out his concerns earlier. So, where you stand on 
our command and control arrangements very much depends upon where 





The role of intelligence in war tends to be unclear, at least until enough 
time passes to allow the declassification of records necessary for historians 
to ply their trade. In the Second World War, for instance, revelations of 
the Ultra secret almost three decades after the end of the war substantially 
altered judgements on what transpired.1 However, intelligence on the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been subject to a significant amount 
of public reporting thanks to a number of unauthorised disclosures. 
This reporting, together with personal experience, makes it possible to 
sketch a picture of the role intelligence played in supporting Australian 
operations in Afghanistan.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a personal perspective of intelligence 
support to land operations in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2014. In doing 
so, the chapter will touch on three main areas: organisation and structure, 
strategic support, and intelligence effectiveness.
When reading this chapter, a number of caveats should be borne in mind. 
The first is that intelligence remains sub rosa—subject to secrecy—and 
this is a fundamental constraint on what can be said by the author. The 
second is that much of the intelligence story in Iraq and Afghanistan—
particularly in the air and at sea—is not mine to tell. Finally, this chapter 
is based on my experience of four and a half years of direct involvement in 
operations in Afghanistan, more than two of which were deployed.
1  See for instance F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1974.
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In regard to wisdom, this chapter is dedicated to the memory of Graeme 
Clarke, a man who shaped the majority of today’s Australian Army 
Intelligence Corps personnel through his experience, knowledge and 
peerless passion for one of the oldest of professions.
In writing this chapter, I have been mindful of the words of General Peter 
Cosgrove, who wrote in his biography that intelligence officers should 
‘bring you the facts, their careful deductions, [and] from time to time 
a courageous conclusion’.2 I hope I have done justice to the General, 
Graeme Clarke, and the men and women I served with.
Context
There is, of course, history to this history. For army intelligence, the 
period leading into 2001 had not positioned it well for operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
Following Australia’s military commitment to East Timor (1999 to 
2005), the Australian Army Intelligence Corps was heavily committed 
and understaffed. Additionally, many of the Army’s core intelligence 
collection capabilities, such as electronic warfare and human intelligence, 
were the victims of benign neglect. The deployment to East Timor in 
1999 had also seen an ugly public brawl erupt between Cosgrove’s chief 
intelligence staff officer (J2), Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins, and the 
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). This dispute revolved around 
Collins’s reported concerns about pro-Indonesian bias in DIO and the 
alleged switching off of a strategic intelligence pipeline from Canberra to 
the field.3 Relationships were not what they should have been.
The organisational consequences of these issues played out during 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, forcing the Army’s intelligence 
efforts into a decade of improvised and ad hoc arrangements, practices, 
technological innovations and tactical support structures.
With this context in mind, and to the extent that it is possible to describe 
an organisation across two theatres and over 10 years, what did intelligence 
in Afghanistan look like?
2  P. Cosgrove, My Story, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2007.
3  P. Flood, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, Canberra, 2004, Chapter 3.
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10. INTELLIGENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
The organisation and structure 
of intelligence support to operations 
in Afghanistan
While intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan changed in 
structure and functional capability, there were three generic constants 





































Figure 4: Australian intelligence collection and analysis arrangements 
in Afghanistan.
The first constant was coalition intelligence support. Australian intelligence 
efforts did not, of course, occur in a vacuum. Integral to intelligence, from 
the strategic to the tactical level, was the network of international resources 
from which the Army, Navy and Air Force could draw, be they Five Eyes, 
Nine Eyes (Five Eyes plus four close European partners),4 Fourteen Eyes 
(the extended network of NATO-linked international military partners 
operating in Afghanistan) or wider coalition. Indigenous intelligence 
reporting, with its own strengths and weaknesses, was also available. 
Of  these, in my experience, I would contend that Australia benefited 
4  See E. MacAskill and J. Ball, ‘Portrait of the NSA’, Guardian, 3 November 2013, www.the guardian. 
com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance (retrieved 26 April 2020).
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most from the Five Eyes relationships, thanks to the level of coverage, 
the resources available in support, and the depth of often complementary 
analysis undertaken by the various components of the coalition.
The second constant was Australian-based support. Forces in the area of 
operations (AO) were supported by strategic and operational intelligence 
efforts based in Australia. These efforts served four main functions: 
feeding the needs of their respective Canberra audiences (including 
Defence and wider national security intelligence, operations and policy 
circles); managing the intelligence resources provided to the AO; 
providing direction and oversight for intelligence operations in the AO; 
and providing support of varying degrees of usefulness to those within 
the AO.
Finally, there were the deployed ADF intelligence assets. Each of the 
services deployed elements to meet their own intelligence needs and to 
contribute to the joint picture. For example, there were specialist Air 
Force and Navy intelligence elements protecting platforms and providing 
intelligence support to their respective tasks, including counter-piracy, 
counter-smuggling and counter-terrorism. Then there were the deployed 
land intelligence elements, contributing to planning, force protection and 
situational awareness through sensors on such platforms as the Heron 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and through such functions as human 
intelligence, electronic warfare and signals intelligence, and geographic 
intelligence. Ultimately, this information was, through the science of 
analysis and the art of fusion, turned into intelligence by analytical staff. 
While driven by the needs of commanders, this intelligence was basically 
focused on fighting the insurgency and understanding the muddled 
tapestry of Uruzgan’s population and its power structures.
At this point, it is proper to recognise the contributions made by deployed 
civilians. Across all three of these constraints, civilians provided specialist 
expertise otherwise unavailable to the Army, which was particularly 
valuable in allowing our forces to leverage the capabilities of national 
agencies. This included the deployment of Defence civilians to Afghanistan 
to provide trusted and close intelligence support. These deployed civilians 
fully deserve the Operational Service Medal, and I am proud to have 
served with them.
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Strategic support to intelligence 
operations in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, the majority of my experience was with operational and 
strategic intelligence support, including direct support to deployed forces.
Drawing on the incomparable capabilities of allied partners, the scale 
of strategic intelligence support provided to deployed forces was considerable. 
In keeping with their acknowledged roles of supporting military operations 
and protecting Australian troops, Defence’s three intelligence agencies: the 
Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate and 
the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, all had deployed staff. 
These deployed elements provided, at least, liaison officers who were able to 
task their agencies in what was known as reach-back support. Each agency 
provided a unique service, which grew in utility over time. This utility was 
a product of both the significant resources committed and a developing 
understanding of how to support the deployed chief intelligence officer, 
J2  or S2 (at the lower echelon), of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and its 
respective subordinate units.
However, I do recall multiple conversations when ADF colleagues would 
criticise strategic support to deployed forces. Barbs might include that 
the agencies deployed people to be seen to be relevant, that the agencies 
did not trust ADF personnel with their capabilities, or that agencies 
wanted to prevent their capabilities from diffusing down into the Army. 
I also remember hearing several times that agency liaison officers would 
run single-source reports to commanding officers, without telling the 
Intelligence Staff Officer (S2), in a form of intelligence one-upmanship. 
I personally never saw failings of this nature, and the vast majority of 
agency staff I encountered were professional and dedicated.
So why mention what might be nothing more than rumours? Well, what 
I can say with certainty is that the central role of the S2 was assisted 
immensely by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)
regularly evaluating the effectiveness of the supporting intelligence efforts. 
This held everyone, including agencies, accountable.
In my observation, there was a mostly healthy rivalry between the agencies, 
although there were times, often associated with particular personalities, 
when this was tested. I do recall seeing a poster in Tarin Kowt on the 
differences between the agencies. This poster expounded the virtues of 
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signals intelligence, and contrasted it with another intelligence function, 
represented by a stick figure holding what might have been a weapon, and 
the assessment: ‘There are bad men in Afghanistan.’
To my mind, one of the most important contributions made by strategic 
agencies was the provision of ‘actionable’ intelligence for targeting 
purposes.  This type of intelligence is precisely what it sounds like. 
It involves a cycle of identifying individuals as insurgents, presenting this 
intelligence as part of a command decision to target, or not, and  then 
providing accurate information to allow duly authorised action to 
be taken.
It is a matter of public record that intercepted phone calls informed 
decisions on who should be targeted by special forces. Media reports 
claim that mobile telephones can be located when an emitter is used to 
mimic a mobile telephone tower, convincing a target phone to connect 
through it.5 If the emitter is itself mobile, then triangulation can occur 
as the platform moves around and measures the target phone’s signal 
strength. It is a covert but deadly game of ‘Marco Polo’.
In 2011, an article in the Australian Army Journal titled ‘Australian special 
forces in Afghanistan: Supporting Australia in the “long war”’ stated that 
special forces, specifically Task Force 66, had the capabilities and role to 
‘incapacitate’ the Taliban’s leadership. The author went on to conclude 
that ‘the effectiveness of these operations has … been significant’.6
The ABC television program Four Corners later reported that Australian 
special forces had killed ‘dozens’ of Taliban commanders. It quoted an 
unnamed lieutenant colonel as saying that special forces missions to target 
insurgent leaders were provided with ‘very good’ intelligence, drawn from 
national agencies and ADF sources, on which decisions were based. It was 
claimed that the intelligence available to Task Force 66 often allowed it to 
‘find’ and ‘fix’ a specific insurgent at a specific location, regardless of their 
physical appearance, clothing or efforts to avoid detection.
5  See for instance V.J. Appelbaum, J. Horchert and C. Stöcker, ‘Catalog advertises NSA toolbox’, 
Der Spiegel, 29 December 2013, www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-
doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html (retrieved 14 March 2020).
6  I. Langford, ‘Australian special forces in Afghanistan: Supporting Australia in the “long war”’, 
Australian Army Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, 2010, pp. 21–32.
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The Taliban were reportedly aware of the coalition’s ability to track 
their mobile phones, at least as early as 2008. This was thought to have 
been behind their threat to attack cellular towers that were not turned 
off at night—when special forces often staged their counter-leadership 
operations.
The experience of Major General Jim Molan in Iraq was that US Special 
Forces, supported by their unique intelligence feeds, played a ‘key part’ 
in targeting the insurgency. In talking about the operational and legal 
considerations of actioning a target, he records himself thinking: ‘God, let 
there be special intelligence so that the decision will be straightforward.’7
My experience was that intelligence support to Australian special forces in 
Afghanistan was as important as that described by General Molan. One 
of my most treasured mementos is a letter I received in mid-2013 from 
an officer in the Special Air Service Regiment in which he talked of the 
‘lasting impression’ left by this support, while noting that ‘few appreciate 
[its] impact’.
Overall, I am comfortable in asserting that, in the history of Australian 
military operations, there has not been a better resourced or more 
sustained targeting of an adversary’s operational and tactical leadership.
Additionally, I am strongly convinced that intelligence support to 
targeting in Afghanistan was tactically and, at times, operationally 
effective. But—in terms of influence on strategic decision-making—
there is clearly room for debate. The former Director of the US signals 
intelligence organisation, the National Security Agency, General Michael 
Hayden, has acknowledged this, saying: ‘If you radiated on an American 
battlefield, you were likely to die. Less certain, though, was our ability to 
inform broad questions of policy.’8
However, it is important to note that strategic support was about more than 
targeting. It played a key role in many force protection operations. One 
example is in the December 2011 seizure of 3.55 tonnes of ammonium 
nitrate in Zabul. This stockpile was enough to make more than 250 
improvised explosive devices, the majority of which were probably bound 
for Uruzgan.
7  See Molan, Running the War in Iraq.




In his fascinating but frustrating book, Intelligence in War, John Keegan 
wrote that all history of the Second World War written before 1974 was 
‘flawed’ simply because the story of Enigma and Magic, the breaking of 
German and Japanese wartime codes, was unknown before then.9 There 
is a lesser but still enthralling history waiting to be told about the people 
and impact of technical intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The dusk of a ‘golden age’ for intelligence?
Afghanistan might very well be a high-water mark for intelligence support 
to military operations. Afghanistan had a relatively unsophisticated 
communications network, and the distance between Uruzgan’s 
insurgents  and their leadership in Pakistan forced them to use these 
networks at least part of the time.
A very considerable intelligence enterprise exploited technological and 
practical factors, particularly as the balance between operations in Iraq 
and  Afghanistan changed. I believe this coincidence of technology, 
geography and resources is unlikely to be seen again.
Second, despite the strain it caused on the limited numbers of intelligence 
personnel, the scale of strategic support was mirrored by deployed tactical 
capabilities, which at one time included intelligence specialists embedded 
at the company level.
It did not, however, begin this way. For example, in 2001, there were 
six Australian Army Intelligence Corps specialists and liaison support 
from two agencies supporting special forces in Afghanistan. At one 
stage, the S2 for our special forces was an SAS officer rather than an 
intelligence specialist. By 2010, in the words of an intelligence colleague, 
the intelligence support available to the Special Operations Task Group 
(SOTG) was ‘a massive evolution by any measure’. Analyst numbers had 
greatly increased; sensitive collection capabilities had been added; there 
were more agencies with more staff and more embedded capabilities; 
and there were Australian specialists in two coalition intelligence cells in 
Kandahar. I am aware that these capabilities continued to grow through 
to 2013, creating a truly robust presence.
9  J. Keegan, Intelligence in War, Pimlico, London, 2004, p. 370.
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Overall, I would liken the level of intelligence support received in 
Afghanistan by our brigade minus-sized forces to have been roughly 
equivalent to what a reinforced division might have hoped to receive in 
the field in other contingencies. This was a laudable focus of Defence 
intelligence resources on the mission, but I doubt that this level of resources 
could be expected in future.
My concern is that the experience in Afghanistan has created a generation 
of commanders, particularly special forces patrol leaders, who might 
regard the intelligence support they received in Afghanistan as the norm. 
As long as Australia has the strategic luxury of choosing the extent of 
our involvement in conflicts, this is likely to be the case. But if a future 
enemy removes this choice from us, I see a strong possibility of unmet 
expectations and, consequently, accusations of intelligence failure.
Iraq, weapons of mass destruction 
and the role of intelligence
In regard to failures in this period, the 800-pound elephant in the room 
would have to be the presence, or not, of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) in Iraq leading into 2003. General Hayden recalls that there was 
a genuine consensus that ‘there was a case’ for WMD but that ultimately 
the intelligence community ‘just got it wrong’.10 In the Australian context, 
Dr Albert Palazzo’s previously classified work concluded that WMD 
judgements were based on ‘faulty’ assessments and therefore that Iraq was 
an intelligence failure.11 I do not propose to go into this further; however, 
those who want a more detailed account of Australian intelligence 
assessments of the WMD threat posed by Iraq might start with Phillip 
Flood’s 2004 inquiry into the Australian intelligence community.12
Ultimately, this begs the broader question of the relationship between 
intelligence and decision-making, and the fine balance that needs to be 
struck so that the first informs the second without being suborned by it. 
In my opinion, this balance, extrapolating slightly from a recommendation 
of the Flood Inquiry, is best served when the leadership of intelligence 
10  Hayden, Playing to the Edge, p. 50.
11  Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010, pp. 27–8.
12  Flood, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies.
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assessment organisations comes from those whose professional life has 
been spent mastering its nuances, complexities, limitations, relationships 
and legalities.
Intelligence effectiveness in Afghanistan: 
Kicking goals in a game of cricket?
Looking at the operational and tactical levels, to what extent did they 
also suffer from intelligence failures? Or, as I have pondered since I left 
Afghanistan in late January 2016, was intelligence kicking goals but 
playing a game of cricket? In other words, were the achievements by one 
measure largely irrelevant in terms of the measure that counts the most: 
the final outcome?
For me, one of the most striking public critiques of the effectiveness 
of intelligence was in the report Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making 
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.13 This public report was scathing 
of the efforts of US intelligence in Afghanistan, describing them as 
‘only marginally relevant’, obsessed with the insurgency, and ‘unable 
to answer fundamental questions’ that would leverage popular support 
and thereby delegitimise the insurgency. It is not just the content of this 
document that is striking; it is the fact that it was written by the senior 
US military intelligence officer in Afghanistan at the time, Major General 
Michael T. Flynn.
The solutions proposed by Flynn are grassroots, community-based 
intelligence collection, focusing on governance, development and 
stability. Of course, like all things, there is a context, and a debate 
had  raged in 2009 over the relative merits of a counter-insurgency or 
counter-terrorism-based strategy in Afghanistan. It is clear whose side 
Flynn was on. However, even if one accepts that counter-insurgency was 
a valid approach in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan, I am not 
aware of any evidence that this report substantially changed the way the 
United States approached intelligence there.
13  M.T. Flynn, M. Pottinger and P. Batchelor, Fixing intel: A blueprint for making intelligence 
relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 2010.
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Returning to kicking goals in a game of cricket, I have quoted General 
Cosgrove’s view on intelligence officers. The general also said that a key 
attribute of intelligence officers was experience, and opined that this 
usually had ‘scars attached’. Personally, as I look back over my time 
involved with operations in Afghanistan, there are ‘scars’ that I bear and 
that I will now recount. I leave it to others to judge whether these were 
failures, but they certainly were not successes.
The first ‘scar’ came from the two occasions when my team was unable 
to support operations. One occasion followed the conclusion of 
Operation  ATHENA and the Canadian withdrawal from Kandahar. 
This left portions of Route Bear to the south of Tarin Kowt (connecting 
Tarin Kowt with Kandahar) potentially vulnerable and—quite rightly—
generated a desire to exert influence there. The second occasion was 
similar. It followed the withdrawal of our Dutch partners from Uruzgan 
and the subsequent Australian decision to penetrate into the Tangi Valley 
to the west of Tarin Kowt.
In both cases, my collectors and analysts had no baseline to work from. 
Australian troops were to be committed into what was effectively a black 
hole for my teams’ intelligence function. While we worked to fill that 
void, all we could do was inform commanders, so that this gap could be 
taken into account in their planning. Intelligence training stamps into 
you the absolute necessity to say ‘I don’t know’ when that is the case. That 
does not make it any easier when lives are at stake.
The second ‘scar’ was also operational, and it was our lack of success in 
being able to provide actionable intelligence on arguably the most effective 
of the senior Taliban field commanders for Uruzgan—Objective Katana. 
Although he was the enemy, I came to regard Katana with a grudging 
respect. He was a competent and committed leader, who was not afraid to 
leave his Pakistani sanctuary and venture into Uruzgan. The fact that he 
was able to do so was a testimony to his operational security practices, as 
well as to the respect he commanded from the Taliban, who knew of his 
travels. Regardless, an Afghanistan with men like Katana in charge will 
be poorer by any Western measurement—except, possibly, stability.
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Finally, there was the period between 2009 and 2012 when the number 
of attacks by Afghan security personnel on coalition soldiers—that is, 
the so-called green-on-blue attacks—skyrocketed. There were significant 
losses to coalition forces as the result of such attacks, including seven 
Australians who were killed and 12 who were wounded.
Consequently, there was an unrelenting focus on combatting green-on-
blue attacks. However, technical intelligence proved to be unsuitable for 
the task. Essentially, unless the potential attacker associated himself with 
known insurgents or was brought to our attention by other reporting—
counter-intelligence, human intelligence or reports of suspicious 
behaviour from the field—then technical means were likely to be useful 
only after an attack.
This turned out to be the case. Australian intelligence played the key role 
in bringing justice to all three rogue Afghans who fled after their attacks: 
Objectives Morningstar, Jungle Effect and Shady Igloo.
There is scant detail publicly available about the hunt for Lance Corporal 
Jones’s killer, Shafidullah, although the then Defence Minister Stephen 
Smith acknowledged that intelligence tracked him to his home where he 
was shot when he pulled a pistol on special forces troops.
In August 2013, Prime Minister Rudd announced that Mohammad 
Rozi, an Afghan soldier who attacked and wounded Australian and 
fellow Afghan soldiers almost two years before, had been killed. Using 
‘focused intelligence’ (drawing on a range of sources in a concentrated 
effort to weave together the strands and make sense of the situation and 
deliver timely and actionable intelligence), Australian forces had tracked 
Mohammad Rozi from Uruzgan to Pakistan and then to Takar Province 
in northern Afghanistan.
Later that year, the direct role of intelligence in the capture of the Patrol 
Base Wahab attacker, Hekmatullah, was clear in the description of the 
operation as a ‘hi-tech spy hunt’ using ‘a combination of electronic 
eavesdropping, human intelligence and detailed satellite imagery’.14
14  C. Stewart, ‘How they found the Diggers’ killer Hekmatullah’, Weekend Australian, 3 October 
2013, www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/how-they-found-the-diggers-killer/news-
story/ 6883aa8eee237dcac676c67f259073d2 (retrieved 14 March 2020).
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Perhaps illustrating the difficulty of predicting individual behaviour, 
the Queensland Coroner’s report on the August 2012 attack at Patrol 
Base Wahab concluded that there were no indications that Hekmatullah 
was a threat and that it was not possible to draw a conclusion on his 
true motivation for the attack. Almost exactly the same findings about 
indications and motivation were made about the earlier green-on-blue 
attack that killed Lance Corporal Jones in May 2011.
As I have said, the techniques that were successful in providing 
actionable intelligence against Taliban leaders in Uruzgan were unsuited 
to pre-emptively combatting green-on-blue attacks. This inability to 
contribute to the prevention of green-on-blue attacks weighs heavily on 
me. It is my greatest professional regret.
Finally, I do not think that any discussion on the ‘scars’ left by this war 
would be complete without acknowledgement of the enduring and terrible 
psychological legacy it has left some with. In the context of my experiences, 
I want to take this opportunity to touch on a facet of psychological risk 
that I encountered during this time: vicarious trauma. Vicarious trauma 
is what can happen when a person is exposed to something in which they 
did not personally participate. For example, it could result from seeing 
graphic images or listening to potentially distressing material.
The danger of this sort of exposure was first brought home to me in the 
aftermath of a successful strike against a target. Immediately following 
the  strike, we were looking to assess the longer-term impact on the 
insurgent network. The information collected was graphic, detailing 
the physical effects of the strike and the emotional toll it had on certain 
key figures. As the direct result of exposure to this material, a young 
analyst working for me starting showing signs of distress. Over some 
days, it became clear that it was having an effect both at work and at 
home, including significant loss of sleep and nightmares. Ultimately, this 
exposure to the brutality of war meant that this analyst—who was very 
good at their job—had to move to another area.
As a footnote, this episode also carried a warning, although a different 
one, for me. When I was exposed to the same material that had caused the 
young analyst psychological distress, my reaction was laughter. Beyond 
any degree of reasonable professional satisfaction, I felt something 
bordering on euphoria at the results of the strike. It was only when my 




While psychological stress affects individuals in different ways, this legacy 
of operations in the Middle East will be with us for decades, and the 
care and treatment that we offer our people who suffer must continue to 
be a priority for government and Defence.
Conclusion
What I have described in this chapter is my perspective on intelligence 
support to land operations in Afghanistan, from 2007 to 2014. This 
story begins poorly. Its opening features an Australian Army Intelligence 
Corps tired and under-resourced from its years in Timor, as well as an 
intelligence system whose relationships were not as harmonious as they 
could have been. However, over time, the story becomes one of success, 
although this success is far from unqualified and is not synonymous with 
a satisfactory ending.
Ultimately, however, this is the story of men and women, military and 
civilian, making a clear difference to Australian operations in Afghanistan 
and to the soldiers who conducted them. It is the story of men and women 
who did precisely what their country asked of them and who did it very 
well indeed. In the fullness of time it is a story that deserves to be told in 
its entirety.
I am very proud to have been a part of this intelligence effort, as we did 
our best to pierce Clausewitz’s fog of war and to ensure that the Australian 
Army was forewarned and forearmed in Afghanistan.
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Civil and humanitarian 
assistance
Alan Ryan
If I were to fault the process … [of planning the effort in 
Afghanistan] … I would say that vastly more attention was 
focused on every aspect of the military effort than on the broad 
challenge of getting the political and civilian part of the equation 
right. Too little attention was paid to the shortage of civilian 
advisers and experts: to determining how many people with the 
right skills were needed, to finding such people, and to addressing 
the imbalance between the number of US civilians in Kabul and 
elsewhere in the country.
– Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense, 2014
My brief in writing this chapter is to provide an Australian Civil-Military 
Centre (ACMC) view on the contribution of civil society organisations 
(CSOs), non-government organisations (NGOs) and other government 
agencies (OGAs) in Iraq and Afghanistan 2001–14. I have already failed 
because to arrive at a holistic view that makes sense is impossible. Iraq and 
Afghanistan were two distinct conflicts—the cultural, political, social and 
economic circumstances were fundamentally different. So too were the 
array of different humanitarian, development, advocacy and private sector 
actors. Over 13 years the story changed considerably as the relationship 
between humanitarian actors and the military shifted. Finally, CSOs, 
NGOs, OGAs and, yes, humanitarian relief organisations are not the 
same thing at all. Even within government the tendency to sum up 
the full array of ‘other government agencies’ with an easily dispensable 
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acronym misses the point that all government departments and agencies 
possess their own mission and mandate. With respect to national and 
international civil society aid, advocacy and development organisations, 
it can be deeply offensive to be lumped together as an amorphous ‘other’. 
Nonetheless, in too many historical accounts of conflict the greater weight 
of attention is given to war-fighting and security operations, and the rest, 
the odds and sods, find themselves in a single chapter.
This is not that chapter. As it is impossible in single short essay to capture 
the scale of the non-military enterprise in two separate wars, I propose to 
make a few corrective observations.
First, as long as the history of contemporary conflict in the Middle 
East focuses on combat operations rather than peacebuilding, it is only 
a discussion about treating the symptoms, not the causes of violence. 
The next time members of the international community mount an 
intervention on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq, greater attention must be 
given to the critical nature of civil–military interaction in planning and 
executing stabilisation and reconstruction. Because if we do not, we had 
better resign ourselves to winning wars quickly on our own terms and 
then rapidly losing the peace because we missed the point of what conflict 
is all about.
Second, the history of conflict is only in part the story of combat 
operations. I have heard too many veterans of both of these conflicts rail at 
the insult to their professionalism at not being able to fight the insurgent 
war on their terms. The next generation of war-fighters must understand 
that there is a never-ending supply of people to kill. As one special forces 
operator put it, there are tactical achievements more important than 
‘killing farmers and two dollars-a-day Taliban conscripts’.1 All wars end, 
and the military will play a constructive role only if they have established 
a close and constructive relationship with the peace builders. Very few of 
those peace builders wear a uniform, so the effective military officer had 
better develop an idea of who they are and learn how to work with them.
Third, these conflicts resulted in a blurring of the lines of international 
humanitarian action. The emergence of something termed the 
‘new  humanitarianism’ created challenges to the way that civilian 
1  C. Masters, No Front Line: Australia’s Special Forces in Afghanistan, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2017, 
p. 425.
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aid, development and advocacy groups operate in persistent warfare. 
Militaries and governments used aid and stabilisation packages to support 
their own national and political objectives in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
While meeting short-term requirements, the lack of coordination 
between themselves and with host nation authorities too often meant 
that these efforts did more harm than good. Too often if the military was 
providing assistance to build hearts and minds, it meant that other, more 
expert and/or appropriate agencies were prevented from doing their jobs. 
As Nick Guttmann and Sean Lowrie, the chair and director respectively 
of the Start Network (the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies), 
wrote: ‘Civil society delivers some 70 per cent of the last mile of 
international humanitarian assistance. A crisis for NGOs would mean 
a crisis for the entire humanitarian system.’
In this chapter, I briefly identify the types of civilian actors that were active 
in these conflicts, consider the challenges that these conflicts represented 
to the humanitarian response system, and outline some of the lessons 
from Afghanistan and Iraq that will continue to apply in the future.
The search for common ground in  
civil–military–police interaction
In an introduction to a recent book on civil–military interaction, 
Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe at NATO 
(2009–13), wrote that we need effective civil–military interaction as 
there are countless operational issues ‘that the military are not necessarily 
willing or able to address themselves’:
[T]here may be issues of neutrality, impartiality and independence 
that the military find difficult to meet, as in medical support, 
humanitarian operations and disaster relief. Without resolving this 
myriad of challenges, the modern multifaceted mission will not 
fulfil its mandate … It takes non-military partners, governmental 
and non-governmental, to achieve that.2
2  G. Lucius and S. Rietjens (eds), Effective Civil–Military Interactions in Peace Operations: Theory 
and Practice, Springer, Berlin, 2016, p. vi.
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This issue of ‘partnership’ is a fraught one. The then US Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, talking to a group of NGO leaders in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, famously stated:
I have made it clear to my staff here and to all of our ambassadors 
around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the 
best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier 
for us, such an important part of our combat team.3
The speech prompted outrage from the international humanitarian 
community. In the years that followed, his comments might even have 
operated to frustrate their intended effect. Secretary Powell might have 
meant to suggest that the military and humanitarian organisations 
worked in common cause to make the world a better place. But civilian 
organisations operating by the principles of humanity, independence, 
neutrality and impartiality were never going to subscribe to their 
enlistment into the US military ‘combat team’.
Western militaries have had to overcome the notion, often inculcated 
in the past at remote combat training centres, that fighting would occur 
in a  ‘people-free zone’. The experience of both Afghanistan and Iraq was 
not only that there were large civilian populations present, but also that 
a large number of other national and international professionals had a stake 
in achieving peace, security and economic sustainability. It is one of the 
major lessons of these conflicts that force preparation training in Australia 
now involves exposure to a range of non-military actors and scenarios.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition military forces faced considerable 
challenges reconciling their combat mission with the desire of the 
international political coalition to make meaningful change in politics, 
the economy, the legal system, health and dealing with the grinding 
effects of poverty.
There is a reason for that. As the US Joint Chiefs of Staff own counter-
insurgency doctrine states:
Long-term security cannot be imposed by military force alone; 
it requires an integrated, balanced application of effort by all 
participants with the goal of supporting the local populace and 
3  C. Powell, ‘Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental 
Organizations’, Washington, DC, 26 October 2001, avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/powell_brief31.asp 
(retrieved 1 April 2020).
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achieving legitimacy for the HN [host nation] government. 
Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as 
civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military 
forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks. 
Diversion from those tasks should be temporary and only taken to 
address urgent circumstances … Military forces should be aware 
that putting a military face on economics, politics, rule of law etc, 
may do more harm than good in certain situations.4
For their own part, many members of the international humanitarian 
community now question the degree to which they can afford to be 
impartial and apolitical if they are to have any chance of achieving 
their objectives.
The complexity of the environment that emerged from Iraq, Afghanistan 
and subsequently Syria was captured by Claudia McGoldrick, Special 
Adviser to the Presidency of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). Questioning the very existence of an international humanitarian 
system, she wrote:
At best there may be multiple ‘systems’—working on local, national 
and international levels—with varying degrees of organization, 
different approaches and different goals. This broad humanitarian 
landscape and all of its features are evolving constantly, shaped by 
the increasing complexities of the causes and consequences of war, 
violence and disasters, and will inevitably assume quite a different 
shape in the years to come.5
Complexity, multinational operations 
and the art of the possible
You will have noticed that there is not much reference to Australian 
actors here. There will not be. That is not because there were not many 
Australians working for NGOs, UN agencies, private sector organisations, 
diaspora and civil society groups. There were, and there still are. However, 
when considering Australia’s participation in the multination coalitions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, we need to appreciate the subnational, multinational 
4  Department of Defense, US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 
2007, p. 2.42.
5  C. McGoldrick, ‘The state of conflicts today: Can humanitarian action adapt?’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 97, no. 900, 2015, p. 1180.
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and supra-national character of the many civilian actors with which 
Australia interacted. The other harsh reality is to accept the fact that in the 
many histories of both conflicts that are emerging, Australia rarely, if ever, 
makes it into the index. If Australia expects to make a more significant 
contribution to future international interventions, it will not be because 
of the ADF’s war-fighting prowess, no matter how good it is, or how 
many bitter sacrifices it accepts. It will be because Australia has figured 
out how to work with the non-military elements of local, regional and 
international elements of power. It will be because the country recognises 
and has adapted to the demands of complexity.
That said, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq represented a steep learning 
curve for all Australian government agencies that found themselves in 
these theatres of operations. While operations in the Middle East have 
realised the predictions that it would be a long war, it is easy to forget how 
novel these commitments were in the first years of the 21st century. Both 
Afghanistan and Iraq saw an initial military-only, war-fighting phase. 
The ADF’s involvement in Afghanistan was drawn down in December 
2002 to only two officers until the second phase of Operation SLIPPER 
commenced in August 2005. Combat forces committed to the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 for Operation FALCONER were withdrawn at the end 
of the invasion, and it was not until April 2005 that troops redeployed 
for Operation CATALYST to Al Muthanna Province. In both countries, 
the initial focus was on participating in the Global War on Terror and 
ensuring the disarmament of Iraq. In November 2001, Foreign Minister 
Downer made it clear in a media interview that ‘nation-building’ was no 
part of Australia’s mission in Afghanistan:
We don’t want to get … bogged down in Afghanistan. We don’t 
want Australian troops to be part of managing and running 
Afghanistan for the next five or six years … we want to help with 
the war on terrorism, to destroy al-Qaeda and its network and 
so on. But we don’t really have a great desire … to get into the 
long-term management of Afghanistan.6
6  A. Downer, interview transcript, ‘Meet the Press’, 18 November 2001.
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Announcing the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, 
Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard stated:
Our military deployment will be limited given current 
commitments in our own region. Many other nations have 
indicated a willingness to provide peacekeeping assistance in 
Iraq. The government has made clear all along that Australia 
would not be in a position to provide peacekeeping forces in 
Iraq. Our coalition partners clearly understood and accepted 
our position … Australia takes its rehabilitation responsibilities 
very seriously. Our contribution—as in the conflict phase—will 
focus our limited resources in niche areas where we have expertise 
and where a concentrated effort can make a difference. We have 
committed some $100 million in aid. We have provided highly 
skilled personnel to contribute to key humanitarian planning 
and reconstruction efforts.7
The emphasis in both cases was to make a clean break with military 
operations but not to become embroiled in the ‘messy’ business of 
civil–military interaction in what Australia hoped were post-conflict 
societies. Of course, the reality that emerged was very different, 
particularly when Australia re-engaged in both countries with provincial 
reconstruction efforts.
From 2005 onwards, it became increasingly obvious that Australian 
government agencies—not just the ADF but also DFAT, AusAID, the 
AFP and subject matter experts drawn from a variety of other agencies 
and departments—needed to develop expertise in dealing with the civil 
society sector in all areas of operations. This should not have been such 
a surprise. The principle was well accepted at the time in the operations that 
Australia led in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Even as a junior partner 
in a large and diverse international coalition, we needed to understand 
the governance and humanitarian context. This understanding cannot 
be achieved by departments and agencies planning in stove-pipes. Nor 
are inter-agency committee meetings sufficient to develop the level of 
environmental expertise necessary for effective integrated national policy. 
It is difficult to criticise voluntary civilian agencies for not getting aid and 
assistance right when state actors were incapable of it too.
7  J. Howard, Ministerial statement to Parliament on Iraq, 14 May 2003.
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The ACMC report Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-
Government Mission8 found that the evolutionary and changing nature of 
operations in Afghanistan meant that both the international community’s 
and Australia’s approach to aid delivery at national and provincial level was 
uncoordinated. The report concluded that a lesson for the future was that 
‘whenever a whole-of-government mission is considered, all departments 
and agencies involved should participate in an inter-agency planning 
team to plan the mission’.9 The importance of a deliberate approach to 
the delivery of aid and development assistance and the coordination 
of national contributions with host nation and civil society efforts was 
underscored by twin recommendations. Where aid delivery is funded or 
delivered by government agencies and is a requirement of the mission,
I. Aid objectives should be defined clearly from the outset and 
advice provided to government on whether the aid is most 
appropriately delivered by DFAT or the ADF, or a combination 
of both, and in the case of DFAT aid, which agencies (including 
the AFP) would be best placed to deliver it.
II. Whichever agencies are responsible for delivering the aid 
program, it should be regarded as a whole-of-government 
program from its outset and be planned and coordinated by 
an inter-agency group, supported where possible by a parallel 
group in the field, which includes representation from the 
resident diplomatic mission.10
Providing humanitarian and development 
assistance in a political minefield
Drawing on the experience of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 
as knowledge derived from regional operations in Timor and Solomon 
Islands, the ACMC describes the civil society environment in these terms:
In addition to national authorities, international military, police 
and the aid community are likely to encounter a range of other 
important and influential stakeholders in the host country. 
Stakeholders include local civil society and NGOs, tribal and 
factional leaders, religious organisations and the private sector. 
8  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government 
Mission, ACMC, Queanbeyan, 2016.
9  Ibid., p. 8.
10  Ibid., p. 10.
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These entities range from credible, professional organisations with 
strong popular support to ineffective organisations or groups with 
criminal ties. It is important to remember that not only is the 
affected population always the first responder, but that, when 
possible, local capacities should be an option of first resort in 
facilitating a comprehensive response.11
Among themselves, the realities of providing humanitarian assistance in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan drove a deep rift through the many organisations 
providing assistance. Two issues predominated: (1) protection, and 
(2) the source and influence of donor funding for reconstruction 
and development projects.
As the security system in both countries deteriorated, humanitarian relief 
organisations were often faced with a stark choice: whether to work within 
the security umbrella provided by the coalition or to remain neutral 
and independent. Accepting a degree of coalition protection did not 
necessarily increase security—it risked being identified as being aligned to 
one or more parties in the conflict. But even that was rendered irrelevant 
as terrorist groups actively targeted humanitarian groups as a means of 
enhancing their own profile.
In particular, the politicisation of aid delivery in Afghanistan posed 
enormous challenges to the United Nations, to the major humanitarian 
relief organisations, and to international organisations such as the ICRC. 
NGOs were receiving large sums from state donors, but this money rarely 
came without strings attached. In the aftermath of the overthrow of 
the Taliban, Paul O’Brien, now Vice President for Policy and Advocacy 
at Oxfam America, wrote while still an adviser on aid coordination, 
development planning and policy reform to the Afghan Government:
The global importance of what was going on in Afghanistan was 
hard to miss. The new rules for international engagement were 
being written here, and they posed interesting challenges for 
NGOs. In other post-conflict reconstruction contexts, NGOs had 
been strengthening governments for years. But this was different. 
An internationally orchestrated regime change had taken place, 
and state-building was clearly part of a larger plan to promote 
one type of regime over another. By accepting donor funds to 
11  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Same Space—Different Mandates: A Civil–Military–Police Guide 
to Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response, ACMC, Queanbeyan, 2015, p. 12.
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strengthen the new government, NGOs would implicitly support 
this strategy and would jettison their pretensions at political 
independence from explicit donor agendas.12
The tendency of more naive military and political actors from many 
countries to describe all non-military actors as ‘NGOs’ exacerbated 
these problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Across Afghanistan, at 
the provincial level, local military commanders and government aid 
officials focused on the need to complete projects that would demonstrate 
results during their deployment and in their area of operations. In both 
countries the division of security responsibility among different coalition 
members resulted in inconsistent approaches being applied at a national 
level. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) came to be seen as the 
best way for states to reconcile their security and stabilisation objectives, 
but the composition of these teams was very much a national preference. 
By 2008, there were 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, led by 13 different nations.
In an excellent analysis of the use of PRTs in Afghanistan, completed 
for the British Humanitarian Policy Group, Ashley Jackson and Simone 
Haysom argued:
Many aid actors strongly objected to the presence of PRTs on the 
grounds that they, and the broader stabilisation approaches of 
which they were a part, militarised and politicised assistance. They 
often lacked the skills and tools required to ensure that their work 
was appropriate, effective and sustainable, and that it supported 
(rather than undermined) Afghan institutions. There were also 
significant problems with coordination, both among PRTs and 
in their interactions with aid agencies. While ISAF (International 
Security Assistance Force) assumed command of all the PRTs in 
Afghanistan in 2006, in practice they were controlled by lead 
nations with seemingly little uniformity or coordination with 
ISAF HQ or the Afghan Government. The structure and activities 
of individual PRTs varied widely, as did the financial resources 
each PRT lead nation spent.13
Coalition members’ desire to demonstrate progress often resulted in 
questionable alliances with local warlords and investment of both military 
and aid resources in unsustainable or unnecessary projects. Countries were 
12  Letters to author.
13  A. Jackson and S. Haysom, The Search for Common Ground: Civil–Military Relations in Afghanistan, 
2002–13, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, 2013, p. 3.
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also often confused by the fact that different humanitarian actors behaved 
very differently, and this led to a perception that some, or all, civil society 
actors were unreliable. For example, there was a clear division between 
larger international humanitarian agencies who were able to sustain 
principled neutrality and local NGOs who were more likely to pursue 
pragmatic accommodation with government representatives. The Dutch 
scholar Georg Frerks wrote:
This does not support the conclusion, however, that international 
agencies represented the moral high ground, while local NGOs are 
unprincipled and money-driven. Firstly, the INGO [international 
non-governmental organisation] position is not just a principled 
one, but also a material one: they can afford to keep their distance 
from the military and function in relative autonomy. Secondly, 
many local agencies are not unprincipled, but differently 
principled as they feel that humanitarianism is primarily about 
helping people as much as you can.14
Conclusions and recommendations
There remains a perception in some areas and some countries that the 
national interest of donor countries should take priority over mission 
results. This perspective is extremely short-sighted. States may achieve 
short-term operational gains in terms of government ‘announceables’, 
local security or tactical battlefield success, but if the overall strategic 
objective of reconstruction and stabilisation at the national level is not 
achieved, all the effort is for nought. The unstructured approach to the 
delivery of reconstruction assistance in both Iraq and Afghanistan resulted 
in enormous duplication of effort and the waste of scarce resources. 
The  former Chief of Army, now Professor, Peter Leahy summed it up 
succinctly when he suggested that aiming for a Western-style liberal 
democracy was unrealistic, ‘But, gee whiz, with the amount of effort 
going in there and the number of troops, I’d be looking for black-and-
white cows and people yodelling.’15
14  G. Frerks, ‘Who are they?—Encountering international and local civilians in civil-military 
interaction’, in Effective Civil–Military Interaction in Peace Operations, ed. Lucius and Rietjens, p. 41.
15  Middleton, An Unwinnable War, p. 316.
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Civilian, military and police participants on conflict, stabilisation, 
reconstruction and peacebuilding need to be pragmatic. Sometimes it is 
impossible to reconcile all their efforts or to achieve more than partial 
cross-sectoral understanding. Nonetheless, being aware of the limitations 
on civil–military engagement does not mean that we should not make 
best efforts to promote coordination in a complex emergency. We  can 
draw a number of recommendations from our experience in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
First, network analysis of all major humanitarian, host nation and 
civil society actors needs to be incorporated in a structured way from 
the very beginning of operational planning. It needs to be continually 
revisited and updated. It needs to take into account the fact that different 
organisations need to be dealt with differently and that at the same time 
the humanitarian landscape is constantly changing. To fail to invest in 
a  rigorous assessment of who is doing what is to accept the likelihood 
of duplication of effort and waste.
Second, within government a strong policy basis requires structured 
engagement with policy experts resident outside government; in 
universities, civil society groups, international organisations, the private 
sector, diaspora movements and host nation institutions. Nothing will 
replace this engagement. If it is not resourced appropriately, sustained and 
integrated at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, then missions 
are operating blind.
Third, partnerships between military and civilian organisations need 
to be founded on formal understandings wherever possible. These 
understandings should spell out the terms on which they will engage, 
including the terms on which parties do not want to engage. In both 
Iraq and Afghanistan there were many examples of excellent temporary or 
personal understandings that did not survive posting cycles and personality 
changes. Leaders need greater visibility of counter-part relationships, 
and those organisational relationships need to be given some degree of 
protection from the depredations of the ‘new broom’.
Fourth, we need to stop believing our own propaganda. All organisations 
inevitably report that their activities are successful. We all like to believe 
that our inter-agency and counterpart relationships are as good as can be 
achieved. Investment in real-time and concurrent operational evaluations 
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generally produce more mixed messages, but equally provide civilian and 
military leaders and policy-makers with the information that is essential 
to enable them to adjust their approach.
Fifth, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts should be 
devolved to the local level wherever possible.
Sixth, consistency matters. When an intervention is managed by a coalition, 
every effort needs to be made to ensure that post-conflict operations 
are conducted with the integration of national effects in mind. The 
uncoordinated delivery of support at the provincial level by multinational 
teams with different budgets, operating procedures and policies is a recipe 
for disaster. Rather than seek out operational autonomy for provincially 
based teams, countries contributing to a coalition should seek to be better 
integrated in the joint, inter-agency and multinational effort.
Finally, preparedness is essential. To achieve the necessary level of 
preparedness for complex operations comprising rapidly assembled civilian, 
police and military elements, contributing nations need to have invested 
in building common military doctrine and training, and established 
a firm appreciation of the principles of civil–military engagement between 
national elements, NGOs and international organisations. They need to 
have conducted exercises to hone all participants’ awareness of the need 
for the application of the integrated approach.
All of these recommendations are likely to be dismissed as requiring too 
high an overhead in terms of more assessment, and leading to more civilians 
sticking their noses into the business of the military. But building peace in 
post-conflict societies is not blitzkrieg—it is a long, slow, careful process, 
and it needs to be based on evidence, not a sense that an enhanced body-
count will somehow ‘break’ the enemy. The people who will determine 
the conditions of the post-conflict settlement are rarely the people we are 
fighting. The next time Australia considers a commitment to an offshore 
intervention, better that we overinvest in achieving a sustainable solution 
than underinvest. All wars end, and it is the investment that we make in 




The military and the media
Karen Middleton
In the first line of his autobiographical novel Blood Makes the Grass 
Grow Green, American soldier Johnny Rico makes a disclaimer of sorts: 
he wrote it under orders. At the funeral of one of their colleagues, he 
says his sergeant major told him and other members of C Company, 
2nd Battalion, 5th Infantry of the 25th Infantry (Light) Division that it 
was their duty to tell their own stories.
‘[He said] that there was a lot of negative publicity circulating out there 
about the Army and that each one of us has an Army story, and it was our 
responsibility to have it told,’ Rico explains, before presenting the reader 
with a raw, darkly funny glimpse into his time in Afghanistan—as he 
terms it, ‘a year in the desert with Team America’.1
Rico concedes that his tale might not be quite what the sergeant major 
had in mind but jokes that absent more specific instructions, this was 
what he produced. ‘I write’, he says, ‘because I want to be a good soldier.’ 
Fictionalised in parts—he does not say which parts—Johnny Rico’s story 
rolls from expositions on loyalty, honour and authority into reflections 
on grinding disillusionment, sometimes from a vantage point that feels 
like the outer edges of sanity. The book is well and truly unvarnished. 
Even published as it was after Rico left the Army, it is hard to imagine 
1  J. Rico, Prologue, Blood Makes the Grass Grow Green, Presidio Press, New York, 2007, p. xiii.
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this kind of thing being written by an Australian soldier and certainly 
not at the urging of a superior. Here in Australia, the prevailing culture is 
the opposite.
The Australian Defence Force prefers a more polished presentation and, 
with its supporting department, has historically invested so much in 
varnish that it almost deserves its own budget line item. The instruction 
from Johnny Rico’s sergeant major implies that the publicity around the 
US Army was negative because it was not the whole truth; not the real 
truth, the soldier’s truth. In Australia, Defence’s complaint historically 
seems to have been that any negative publicity via the nation’s media 
stemmed from their failure to present its official version of the truth—
the airbrushed, cheerleader version written in a world where nothing 
ever goes wrong and nobody should be either embarrassed or to blame. 
Defence would likely respond that the media only look for trouble, and 
when they do not find it, they make it.
Maybe in some cases that is true. But what is also true is that hostility 
and suspicion seek each other out, and if that is what greets journalists—
if obfuscation and obstruction are the starting points for media–military 
relations—then it is likely to be what is returned. The relationship between 
Australia’s defence apparatus and its media has improved considerably 
in recent years, thanks largely to the high tempo of operations and 
a commitment to embedding reporters with the ADF in the field. But 
there is still a way to go. Wherever the relationship falls short, some fault 
lies on both sides.
Chasing ‘clicks’ online to attract dispersed and flagging advertising 
revenue, media organisations are increasingly impatient with the nuances 
of policy and particularly of conflict. Some organisations look less for the 
whole story than for the most dramatic version of it to be produced in 
the shortest possible time. The daily newspaper deadline is giving way to 
minute-by-minute coverage, with stories updated and published as they 
develop. There is a new unofficial (and unflattering) motto in the online 
news world: you’re never wrong for long. Each item, whether for print or 
broadcast, is less and less part of a curated whole news presentation than 
a stand-alone attracter of readers and viewers. This does not always help 
to build trusting relationships, including with Defence.
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Another significant contributor to the mutual suspicion is the political 
culture that pays lip service to openness and the role of the ‘Fourth Estate’ 
in a democracy while working hard to keep as much as possible secret. 
As senior military officers themselves are increasingly concluding, using 
that method to try to win hearts and minds often has the opposite effect. 
Whenever Defence’s objective is seen to be controlling the message and 
avoiding scrutiny, the media will instinctively want to sidestep the control 
and amp up the scrutiny. If ADF personnel and Defence officials refuse 
to answer questions, journalists will fall back on that old rhetorical one: 
what do they have to hide?
In his book Don’t Mention the War on Australian media–military relations 
during the Afghan conflict, Monash University historian Kevin Foster 
observes, correctly, that the Australian media have depended heavily on 
the ADF for news from Afghanistan, mostly through journalists being 
embedded in their ranks. The public has relied on the media for the same. 
Foster describes what he asserts has been the public’s ‘apparent ignorance’ 
of what was actually going on over there, calling it ‘a critical failure of 
coverage’. ‘The media have to bear their share of the responsibility for 
this failure,’ Foster says. ‘But one must also acknowledge that journalists 
cannot report on events that they cannot access.’2
This culture of secrecy comes from high up, beyond the top of Defence 
to the senior ranks of government—regardless of which side is in power. 
It is a shut-them-out culture that infects the military–media relationship 
and the quality of what Australians are told. Australia’s political system is 
much less steeped in accepting the public’s right to know than those of 
our biggest allies, especially the United States.
Australian military public affairs officer Colonel Jason Logue canvassed 
the process and history of embedding media with the Australian Defence 
Force on operations in his paper Herding Cats. Logue, then a lieutenant 
colonel, compared the Australian experience with those of counterparts 
from the United States and Britain, explaining how embedding had been 
part of the US military’s media strategy in previous conflicts. But in the 
opening stages of the war in Afghanistan after the attacks on US soil on 
11 September 2001, the US Defense Department had deemed it too risky 
to take journalists to the battlefield. Journalistic integration was such 
2  K. Foster, Don’t Mention the War—The Australian Defence Force, the Media and the Afghan 
Conflict, Monash University Publishing, Clayton, Vic, 2013, pp. xiv–xv.
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an accepted part of US operations that a Defense official had publicly 
apologised to members of the Pentagon press pool for their lack of access 
during the conflict’s first phases.3
In Australia, the notion that a Defence Department official—or anyone 
from government—would offer a public apology to the media for locking 
it out is so beyond comprehension as to be laughable. Within government 
in Australia, there often seems little more than a theoretical respect for what 
media are there to do: hold the elected representatives and institutions 
accountable and be the eyes and ears of the Australian people. Where this 
generates tension on the ground, it is generally not the fault of military 
practitioners down the chain—for example, the good men and women 
assigned as liaison officers for media teams during operational embeds. 
They are, to borrow a phrase, just following orders. As it translates in 
the military arena, this culture means that access to information is not 
treated as an assumed right; it is considered a privilege. The lines between 
maintaining operational security—the standard reason given for refusing 
media access—and avoiding embarrassment and reputational damage are 
still too often blurred.
Where Australians are involved in combat controversies, the investigation 
process is slow, public disclosure seemingly reluctant, and redaction 
often extensive. Journalists’ efforts to conduct their own investigations 
and publish or broadcast the results are met by obfuscation, objection 
and ultimately a phalanx of lawyers. This is especially the case where 
journalistic endeavours might contradict the official version of events or 
challenge the hero status of anyone whose image has been co-opted to tell 
a shinier story. Logue’s study focused on the media embeds conducted in 
Afghanistan in 2011, when the system of offering journalistic access to 
that conflict was at peak effectiveness for both the military and the media.
Undertaking a media embed role is a compromise and sometimes an 
uncomfortable one. Journalists enter a theatre of operations completely 
reliant on the ADF for transport, security, food and accommodation, and 
access to the conflict and its personnel. For the military, the PR risk lies 
in welcoming scrutineers who are not part of the family and who will be 
focused on what the public does not already know; who are programmed 
to look first—although not only—for what might not be quite as described 
3  Lieutenant Colonel J. Logue, Herding Cats: The Evolution of the ADF’s Embedding Program 
in Operational Areas, Working Paper 141, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2013, p. 5.
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back at headquarters and what might be going wrong. Everything that 
journalists publish and broadcast during media embed trips should be 
seen in that overall context. Few would jeopardise their situation by 
running a mid-level gotcha story while they were still away. But they do 
have to file something to justify the investment in time and money and the 
risk to personal safety of sending them there. That does not—and should 
not—preclude them from filing non-time-sensitive stories of greater 
import when they get home. But it can make for some less exciting and 
sometimes overblown on-the-spot reportage when circumstances do not 
provide the fire fights and other action that viewers, readers and bosses 
are expecting.
Difficult choices sometimes must also be made. As a correspondent for 
SBS Television, I undertook three media embed trips to Afghanistan in 
2007, 2011 and 2012. The first time was as part of a highly managed 
group visit involving several media organisations, colloquially known as a 
‘bus tour’. In the subsequent tours, we embedded separately. In those early 
days, the ADF leadership—or at least those running its communications 
strategy—appeared little interested in an intelligent or thoughtful media-
led discussion about what Australia was doing in Afghanistan. It just 
wanted to show us its helicopters at Kandahar—replete with pilots who 
were not allowed to say anything about anything other than what they 
could do—and the trades training school it was operating on the base at 
Tarin Kowt. That school quickly became a running joke among embedded 
reporters in the years that followed, so regularly was it peddled as potential 
story fodder. Returning to the multinational base on each new visit, we 
were offered the same school tour and interviews with trainees. It was like 
Groundhog Day in camouflage.
That became symbolic of the ADF’s failure to understand its own 
communications responsibilities, not only to the journalists it was hosting 
but also to the people of Australia. Why did they need to be shown the 
same pictures and told the same story over and over? The answer is that 
they did not. The ADF was just serving up something designed to occupy 
reporters on the spot and stop them from looking for and finding some 
actual news. Treating journalists as propagandists only serves to generate 
the very hostility the ADF seeks to guard against.
While concluding that a more sophisticated and less guarded (some might 
say paranoid) approach is more successful, Logue’s study revealed an 
official benchmark that should be queried. He detailed a commissioned 
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analysis of the coverage embedded journalists produced during 2011 that 
showed ‘a strong correlation with the identified favourable messages of 
the ADF supporting its personnel, the military/personal conduct of ADF 
personnel as “beyond reproach” and that ADF operations were making 
progress towards strategic goals’.4
To define success as being the adoption of the ADF’s talking points 
suggests that the exercise is not about letting Australians know what is 
actually going on but what the ADF wants to be known and the image 
it seeks to project. In those circumstances, it is very easy for the line 
between restricting journalists’ activities for reasons of operational security 
and restricting them to limit embarrassment to become indistinct. 
The problem is that the tighter the hold the ADF seeks to exercise over the 
content of coverage, the more likely we journalists are to try to break free. 
If the objective is to avoid hostile coverage, what is the value in generating 
a hostile relationship?
Logue’s interviews with senior ADF officers overseeing Australia’s Afghan 
deployment from the Middle East Area of Operations in 2011 indicate 
that they appreciated the value of openness along with the risks. The 
Dubai-based joint task force commander at the time, then Major General 
and now Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell, recognised 
both the obligation to inform and the operational value in doing so. 
‘As Australians, we live in a democracy and in that democracy, media 
agencies play a key role that has been acknowledged by the government 
and population we serve,’ Campbell observed, noting the media coverage 
was often ‘underwhelming’ but would be worse if the ADF chose not 
to engage.
There is an expectation, a reasonable one in our society, to engage 
with media. We have no choice but to do so … What Army 
and the defence force really does, within the agreed bounds of 
operations security constraints, is ‘media enabling’ to assist media 
access to report independent perspectives on military operations 
in a contested and dangerous environment. Put simply, war is 
sustained through public support which, in turn, is enabled 
through regular and consistent contact with the media. It is simply 
unreasonable to not engage because to not do so will damage 
the campaign.5
4  Ibid., p. 27.
5  Ibid., p. 44.
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The commanding officer of Mentoring Task Force 2, the then Lieutenant 
Colonel Darren Huxley, described a ‘balancing game’ of inviting strangers 
into the house. ‘Obviously, in a liberal democracy it is absolutely correct 
for us to be open to scrutiny,’ Huxley said. ‘But it will never be easy to 
depart from a view that media embeds are generally looking for failure on 
which to report.’6 The commanding officer of the task force that followed, 
the then Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith, summarised succinctly the 
obligations of both the military and the media, and the implications of 
working side by side in a war zone:
Military professionals ought to seek the truth no matter how 
awkward or uncomfortable it is and support the media in 
reporting that truth. If the truth is unfavourable then we should 
not be surprised by the unfavourable response of the public to 
such reports. Quite simply, if you want the media to report on 
success, be successful. If you are losing a war, then the media will 
try to identify why things are going wrong and report on the 
possibility of losing … If your soldiers are poorly disciplined, 
racist or misogynistic then this truth will be revealed sooner or 
later. It’s all fairly simple. Work on getting real things right, invite 
the media in to see it and let them report what they see.7
Smith was the commanding officer at the time I undertook my 2011 
embed. I reported some of what I saw but not all. In the final days of 
our visit, we stayed at Combat Outpost Mashal, in Uruzgan Province’s 
Baluchi Valley. I had asked to visit Mashal as it had been the scene of 
a fatal attack on an Australian soldier—the base’s cook, Lance Corporal 
Andrew Jones—by an Afghan colleague earlier that year. It would become 
the first of many such incidents.
I wanted to gauge the impact on the Australians who had been deployed 
soon after the attack and were living there alongside Afghan army personnel. 
On arrival something caught my eye—and raised an eyebrow—in the 
soldiers’ mess. The dining tables were laminated with pictures of naked 
women. There were no women living at the base and few passing through. 
I was tempted to highlight this in a news report as it did not seem to align 
with Defence’s policies on equality and respect. But I knew that if I did, 
the story I had gone to Mashal to report—about how young Australian 
soldiers were managing the stress of working with Afghan trainees who 
6  Ibid., p. 45.
7  Ibid., p. 47.
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might turn on them—could not be written. If I called them out on their 
sexist pictures, nobody would speak to me. Not then and possibly not 
in future. When I sat down to speak to a soldier at one of the tables, 
he apologised unprompted for the images, despite having had no role in 
putting them there.
Perhaps Chris Smith did not know about the pictures. More likely, he 
took a decision that there were bigger battles to fight. And so did I. 
Although the images were clearly visible in what we put to air, I chose 
not to draw particular attention to them. It is perhaps an example of what 
Logue describes as ‘self-censorship’.8 It is not a term that sits comfortably 
with any journalist, and others might criticise the decision I took. Some 
other feminists certainly would. But it was a choice I made with a longer-
term investment in mind: the investment in relationships that would 
build trust and enable bigger, better and arguably more important stories 
to be told in future.
In his interview with Logue, Campbell singled out those same trust 
relationships as the by-product of embedding that had greatest value 
for all concerned. ‘From my perspective, the opportunity to inform and 
educate on our military operations is a key benefit of the media embed 
program,’ Campbell said. ‘In fact, it is this enhancement of the journalist’s 
understanding which endures well after the journalist has left the theatre 
that I believe is the most important aspect of the program.’9
In his book, Foster interprets Campbell’s comments more cynically, 
suggesting that they reveal an ‘unwanted propinquity with the fourth 
estate’.10 Foster correctly notes some failings in the embed system and the 
influence of restrictions on the standard of coverage.
The system remains vulnerable to individual whims in the field, as 
demonstrated in 2012 when my cameraman colleague Jeff Kehl and 
I  were subjected to repeated sets of unnecessarily intensive vetting of 
images. This degree of vetting, undertaken by young officers seeking to 
exert their authority, had not been deemed necessary on previous, higher-
tempo visits. We had filmed nothing out of bounds—by our third visit, 
we knew what was and was not allowed and had no interest in jeopardising 
anyone’s security, including our own—and these young officers were 
8  Ibid., p. 33.
9  Ibid., p. 43.
10  Foster, Don’t Mention the War, p. 33.
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acting beyond their remit. But I would argue that Foster’s analysis is 
missing some context that affected the nature and quality of reportage, 
including the implications for embedded journalists as Australia’s role 
in the conflict changed.
Singling out some of my own in-country reports from 2012 for criticism, 
Foster observed that they included a descriptive feature story on bomb 
detection dogs and a piece on the use of blast-proof underwear. He did 
not ask why. The answer goes to the heart of the challenges embedding 
presents to both dispatcher and dispatched. For a television news journalist 
on a military embed at war, two imperatives come into direct conflict: the 
logistically heavy broadcast medium’s requirement for anticipation and—
wherever possible—advance planning and the situational requirement for 
spontaneity and maximum ability to change course at short notice.
Arriving in 2012, it became clear that the activities we had hoped to 
conduct were not going to be possible. It was not like the previous year, 
when we had stayed among Australian soldiers at Forward Operating Base 
Mirwais and Combat Outpost Mashal and been properly embedded in 
their routines. Then, we had joined them on foot patrols through the 
town of Chora and the valleys beyond.11 In the shared compounds, 
we had access to Afghan soldiers and their commanders—albeit using 
ADF and ISAF interpreters—who were then working under coalition 
leadership. But by late 2012, the Afghan National Army was taking the 
lead on the ground. The Afghans decided who did what, who went where 
and whether anyone went anywhere at all. That had a material influence 
on what was possible as an embedded Australian journalist. At Forward 
Operating Base Hadrian, near Deh Rawood, the patrols we were to join 
were cancelled without explanation.
The Australians were preparing to pull back to the main base within 
a  fortnight, before ending their mission in Uruzgan altogether, so 
operations were winding down. The so-called green-on-blue attacks had 
become so prolific that the forward bases had been segregated and relations 
were strained by suspicion, resentment and grief. Beyond reporting that 
situation—which we did—there were only two choices. We could be the 
network’s chief political correspondent and cameraman who spent three 
11  K. Middleton, ‘Shadow of the Towers’, Part II, Dateline, SBS, 11 September 2011, www.youtube.
com/watch?v=VW12K3cFGcU&t=3s (retrieved 1 April 2020).
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weeks away and produced next to nothing until we got home, or I could 
generate some ideas for fall-back, fill-in pieces that were not what we had 
hoped for but were also not entirely irrelevant. I chose the latter course.
I was not going to inspect the trades training school again, so we produced 
stories that might at least be interesting to viewers, if not exactly herald 
the unconditional surrender of the Taliban and cessation of international 
hostilities for all time. This is one of the risks of agreeing to embed: no 
control over what might happen outside the wire and little more over 
what the ADF—or Afghan National Army—will allow. In cases like this, 
the downside for media embeds is obvious, the longer-term upside less so.
What is harder to quantify is the impact on the depth and quality of reporting 
and analysis produced upon returning home and into the future. I am 
convinced that among non-specialist and specialist journalists alike, and 
despite those compromises, the media embed experience fosters a more 
sophisticated understanding of a conflict than does reporting from afar 
without it. It is in the interests of the ADF, journalists and the public to 
continue to foster those trust relationships. Thus far, the ADF has made 
an effort to do so. But, again, more could be done.
While fair criticism of media coverage is to be encouraged, Defence 
might contemplate the implications of discrediting the traditional news 
media generally. With the advent of the concept of ‘fake news’, the role 
of professional, credible media is more important than ever. Propaganda 
is no longer the sole purview of the security apparatus and all kinds of 
players—including whole states—are weaponising information in the 
non-military arena. The emergence of information-sharing social media 
platforms that empower individuals as ‘influencers’ and spawn ‘citizen 
journalists’ has meant that news consumers disillusioned with superficial 
trash from traditional sources or suspicious of commercial motives—or 
both—now feel like they have alternatives. They can bypass the regular 
news media and access information—if often echo-chamber opinion 
masquerading as fact—from other apparently independent sources. 
The eagerness to look to those alternatives and willingness to trust them, 
in some cases in preference to professional media, has created the perfect 
climate for disrupters-with-intent. Clever propagandists have been 
able to co-opt the credibility of some traditional media by mimicking 
their presentation.
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Suddenly, it is harder to know what is real online and what is invented. 
The  explosion in the use of social media means stories that look as if 
they come from reputable sources can have instantaneous, widespread 
distribution. As allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US 
presidential election demonstrate, this is a potentially dangerous 
development that threatens the operations of democracy and the 
institutions within it, including the military. While diversity of news 
sources is essential, so is credibility. Above all, so is fact.
Strengthening engagement and trust between the military and the media 
and ensuring that the truth is told should further the credibility of both 
parties in the eyes of a disillusioned public. Contrary to its PR mission as 
explained by Logue, the ADF should not strive to be described as beyond 
reproach. As Chris Smith suggested, it should strive to operate in ways 




The Australian Federal Police 
in Afghanistan, 2007–14
Col Speedie and Steve Mullins
The humanitarian work undertaken in support of civil society and non-
government organisations described earlier was complemented by the 
work of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), notably in Afghanistan. This 
chapter examines this police dimension to Australia’s war in Afghanistan.
The AFP commitment to Afghanistan commenced in October 2007 with 
four officers deployed to Kabul and Jalalabad, growing to 28 officers per 
deployment by the time it finished in 2014. These officers were deployed to 
Kabul, Kandahar and Tarin Kowt. This effort is not widely known outside 
those government agencies and foreign partners involved in Afghanistan, 
and in general prompts the question of why they were there and what 
were they doing in a high-risk, warlike environment. The answer is that 
Australian civilian police have been engaged in expeditionary policing1 
since 1964 with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), which saw the deployment of 40 police officers from several 
Australian police services. The term ‘expeditionary policing’ is used to 
define the role of civilian police who are increasingly deployed abroad 
to support peace operations.
1  ‘Expeditionary policing’, a term defined by the author, best describes the activities of civilian 
police deploying to an international foreign jurisdiction, to conduct domestic policing activities 
as they would in their home jurisdiction. This usually includes the application of executive police 
powers of that foreign jurisdiction, as generally happens on Chapter 7–mandated UN peacekeeping 
operations. ‘International policing’ differs in the application of effort.
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Since that first deployment to UNFICYP, the AFP has deployed officers 
in an expeditionary role to Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, 
Haiti, Timor Leste, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and 
Afghanistan. The Solomon Islands deployment, also known as the Regional 
Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI), is distinctive for two reasons. 
First, it was as an Australian-led regional mission rather than United Nations 
one, and second, that, within the umbrella of overall civilian leadership, it 
was police-led with a robust military component in support, rather than 
the reverse, which was historically the case in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Each peacekeeping or police capacity development mission is different, 
and Australia’s international policing experience has shown that the 
dangers posed to police are very real and quite varied. The deployment of 
AFP members to Afghanistan certainly presented unique challenges that 
had not been present in other missions. The majority of the Afghan battle 
space was dominated by an insurgency that was actively involved at the 
epicentre of the global opium trade. The capital, Kabul, was under regular 
complex attacks,2 which included the use of vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs). So, with this in mind, the AFP Commissioner 
at the time declined requests that AFP members be employed in ‘outside 
the wire’ mentoring duties in Uruzgan Province until such time as the 
environment permitted civilian police to do so.
The first deployment
The first contingent of four AFP officers deployed to Afghanistan in 
October 2007. Two members were embedded3 within the Combined 
Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) at Camp 
Eggers as mentors; one as Senior Mentor to the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) Chief of Criminal Investigations Department and the second as 
a police adviser to the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General for Police 
Development. The remaining two members were deployed to Jalalabad 
to focus on counter-narcotics intelligence. This city, to the east of Kabul, 
straddled the significantly strategic road to Peshawar. The police also 
2  ‘Complex attack’ is a military term for a multiple, simultaneous and multi-locational attack, 
although, in the case of Afghanistan, this usually involved use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIEDs), placed IEDs and/or suicide bomb attack by armed fighters who attack the target 
post blast and as a final act detonate a suicide vest they are wearing.
3  An embed in this context was the deployment of a military, police or civilian officer into a foreign 
military unit; in this case, an Australian police officer into a US Army unit.
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mentored the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) in that location. 
This is the only time when AFP members were working and mentoring 
ANP ‘outside the wire’.
This first deployment was under the auspices of a government-to-
government agreement separate from the same status of forces agreement 
covering the ADF or NATO. Hence, each year, a new agreement for the 
deployment of Australian police to Afghanistan had to be negotiated 
and signed before a new contingent could be deployed. This agreement 
approved the carriage of firearms, movement into and out of the country, 
specific armed and armoured private security, and life support services for 
the AFP in Kabul and Jalalabad.
Midway through this first deployment, the two AFP members deployed 
to Jalalabad had to depart that city owing to specific significant 
threats against them. Their increasing success in the mentoring of the 
CNPA there, culminating in the public destruction of a few thousand 
kilograms of illicit narcotics, upset some significant players in the illicit 
narcotics industry. Those in Kabul were equally successful, with the AFP 
Commander Afghanistan Mission responsible for writing the highly 
significant ANP Criminal Investigations Department development and 
training program, which was eventually adopted by the European Union 
Police Mission in Afghanistan as the foundation development and training 
program for criminal investigations in Afghanistan. The second member 
was appointed as a senior police adviser, working within the staff of the 
Commanding General of CSTC-A.
Operation CONTEGO
In 2008, the Australian Government National Security Committee 
of Cabinet (NSC)4 approved a new AFP Concept of Operations for 
the mission. The strategic guidance of the mission was defined thus:
The Government of Australia intends to enhance support for 
international stabilization operations in Afghanistan through 
the deployment of policing expertise to Australian whole 
of government activities in southern Afghanistan and other 
international efforts based in Kabul. The AFP contingent will 
focus on counter-narcotics and criminal intelligence.




On 15 October 2008, the Prime Minister of Australia further outlined 
government policy as it related to the strategic engagement with 
Afghanistan as follows:
To get a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s internal tension 
(both in Uruzgan Province and nationwide), there will need to 
be a carefully integrated civilian, political and military strategy. 
Our Afghanistan policy is a comprehensive one. We have a strong 
military commitment—one that includes training and mentoring 
as key roles. We have a broad development assistance program—one 
that helps to build skills and soft and hard infrastructure. We will 
subject our commitment to annual review against the mission we 
have set for ourselves, against the integrated civilian and military 
strategy agreed with NATO and against the application of those 
strategic objectives to our particular charge in Uruzgan Province.5
Also supporting the intent of this concept of operations General Stanley 
McChrystal, the new Commander of the International Security Assistance 
Force (COMISAF), stated in 2009:
The insurgency is fuelled by a number of enabling factors, including 
a thriving narcotics industry, illicit finance, corruption at all 
levels of government, and a variety of other criminal enterprises. 
The narcotic industry dominates Afghanistan’s economy 
and has a  chokehold on the country’s other major industry, 
agriculture. Narcotics are a significant source of funding for the 
insurgency of an estimated 3 to 4 billion dollars a year in drug 
revenue. These factors form a nexus that undercuts population 
security, legitimate governance, rule of law, licit agriculture, and 
sustainable development.6
However, as the war against the insurgency in Afghanistan was still within 
the armed conflict phase of operations, the mission could not be defined 
as a traditional peacekeeping mission as the parties had not yet ceased 
military operations. Nor could the mission be defined as a traditional 
or contemporary police capacity-building mission at that stage for the 
same reason.
5  K. Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Australian Policy in Afghanistan: Address to the C.E.W 
Bean Foundation Dinner’, speech, 15 October 2008, Australian War Memorial, www.pm.gov.au/
node/5517 (retrieved 1 May 2010).
6  S. McChrystal (COMISAF 2009), United States Government Integrated Civilian and Military 
Campaign for Support to Afghanistan, Commonwealth Institute, www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/ 0908 
eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf (retrieved 5 May 2010).
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During October and November 2008, the new mission, called Operation 
CONTEGO, deployed personnel to intelligence and strategic advisory 
roles, to shape counter-narcotics and law enforcement activities that 
would contribute to whole-of-government and international efforts 
to debilitate illicit narcotics activities in Afghanistan. The deployment 
for Operation CONTEGO involved the new AFP Commander of the 
Afghanistan Mission deployed to Kabul as an embed in the Combined 
Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. The appointment was for 
him to continue as Senior Mentor to the Chief of the ANP Criminal 
Investigations Department while also responsible to further leverage 
stakeholder and partner agency influence from a whole-of-country 
perspective in respect of the narcotics industry. These stakeholders and 
partners included the country managers of the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency, the UK Serious and Organized Crime Office (now called the 
UK Crime Commission), senior ISAF members, the Australian defence 
attaché in Kabul, the Australian ambassador to Afghanistan and the head 
of the European Union Police Mission.
Three AFP members deployed to Kandahar airfield to leverage military 
intelligence resources located at ISAF Regional Command South 
Headquarters. Three members deployed to Tarin Kowt to support 
ADF assets who shared joint responsibility with Dutch forces for ISAF 
security within Uruzgan. A criminal intelligence officer deployed to the 
joint US–UK Interagency Operations Coordination Centre (IOCC)7 
in Kabul to support the ISAF criminal intelligence collection effort 
undertaken to combat the Afghan narcotics trade.
All life support and protection for the AFP mission members deployed to 
Kandahar and Tarin Kowt were provided by the ADF. Members in Kabul 
were provided with life support and personal security via a commercial 
contract arrangement with Armour Group, who were eventually taken 
over by the security firm G4S.
7  The AFP had a strategic partnership with the IOCC and its parent organisation, the Joint 
Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC). The IOCC, the tactical arm of the JNAC, provided criminal 
intelligence and law enforcement fusion in Afghanistan. The IOCC fuses the strategic intelligence 
capabilities of the US and UK military and law enforcement agencies—the DEA and SOCA 
respectively—which had the lead role in narcotics interdiction within Afghanistan.
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Afghan artillery soldiers fire their D-30 Howitzer as the Australian 
mentors watch on at the heavy weapons range in Tarin Kowt, 
Afghanistan, 2010.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
Apart from the continuing international engagement stakeholder tasks 
in Kabul, three important projects emerged early in the deployment that 
would set the scene for significant strategic impacts on the rule-of-law 
environment.
First, Col Speedie, who was AFP Commander of the Afghanistan 
Mission, was deeply involved in the initial establishment of the Senior 
Police Advisers Group in Kabul. Attending a meeting at the United 
Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) in October, the 
AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission noted that the lack 
of coordinated effort in the law and justice space directly affected 
the development of the ANP. Despite the many projects underway 
by various NGOs, no one was coordinating the projects to ensure 
that there was no duplication of effort or any negative impact from 
competing groups. Discussing the problem with the International 
Police Liaison Officer assigned to the CSTC-A (a full colonel from 
the US Army Military Police), the AFP Commander suggested 
a  coordination group of the heads of the many police missions in 
Afghanistan to deconflict and synergise police development projects. 
This body would also act as a strategic police development think tank 
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for the International Police Coordination Board. The board was chaired 
by the Minister of the Interior and attended by the ambassadors of 
countries contributing financially to police development, as well as the 
Commanding General of the CSTC-A and the head of the European 
Police Mission in Afghanistan.
The main purpose of the Senior Police Advisers Group was to have the 
most senior foreign police officers in Afghanistan feed organisational 
development advice to the Minister of the Interior and to the International 
Police Coordination Board, in a coordinated manner, and coordinate 
police development projects across all the regions. Importantly, it also 
had as a member a senior police officer from the Office of the Minister 
of the Interior. In order to bring the Senior Police Adviser (SPA) of 
UNAMA into the project, it was decided to offer the chair of the Senior 
Police Advisers Group to the SPA for the first three months, and after 
that it would rotate between the members. Meetings were hosted at the 
European Police Mission camp in Kabul.
The second project the AFP Commander led in Kabul was the establishment 
of the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force. This was a joint task force of 
the ANP and the National Directorate of Security designed to combat 
kidnapping, organised crime and corruption. Crimes of these types 
were strongly linked across the country and had a nexus with the illicit 
narcotics industry. The project commenced with the development of the 
Kidnapping Investigation Unit. Kidnapping of Afghan nationals was on 
the increase in Kabul, along with the alarmingly high rate of kidnapping 
of foreign journalists and aid workers. Owing to concerns that certain 
members of the ANP might have been behind some of the kidnappings,8 
a US Army colonel tasked as mentor to the Afghan Counter Terrorism 
Police ensured that a highly vetted police unit was established within the 
ANP that could be trusted to combat kidnapping. His plan was to have 
the unit mentored by anti-kidnapping experts from the FBI and to have 
all members polygraphed to ensure that they were not involved in crime, 
nor linked to it through family members.
8  Intelligence was being received at that time that a small cadre of senior and highly placed Afghan 
police officers were engaging their own officers to carry out the kidnappings of the foreign nationals 
and then both negotiating and delivering the ransom money in cash for their release.
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Unfortunately, the colonel was in the final stages of his deployment and 
asked that the AFP Commander take over the project as the new Senior 
Mentor of the Kidnapping Investigation Unit. AFP management back 
in Australia granted permission and, as part of the process, the AFP 
Commander was also able to hand over his duties as Senior Mentor to 
the Chief of the Criminal Investigations Department to the Chief of 
the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). EUPOL was 
eager to take on this role and could provide up to seven more members 
as the new development team to the Chief of the Criminal Investigations 
Department. This handover was considered a win for both the European 
Police Mission and CSTC-A. Just before the departure of the colonel, the 
first of the FBI Kidnapping Investigation Unit mentors arrived in country 
to commence work on first recruiting and vetting the new members, then 
training them, all while commencing actual operations as the kidnappings 
continued to occur. This unit had a direct line of communication to the 
Minister of the Interior, HE Mr Hanif Atmar, who was exceptionally 
supportive. As Senior Mentor for the Kidnapping Investigation Unit, the 
AFP Commander was responsible for its development at the political and 
organisational levels.
In harvesting more intelligence on kidnappings from various foreign 
sources in Kabul, the AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission 
confirmed the suspected nexus between kidnapping, organised crime 
groups and corruption within the police, justice sector and Afghan 
government. Combined with the problem of the lack of coordinated 
effort within these sectors, the AFP Commander of the Afghanistan 
Mission moved to overcome these issues by expanding the Kidnapping 
Investigation Unit into a major national law enforcement task force 
to combat kidnapping, corruption and organised crime. With its own 
intelligence and prosecutions teams, it would be able to develop in secret 
criminal target packs with information provided by foreign and local 
intelligence sources, then investigate, arrest and finally prosecute those 
arrested in court, in front of a vetted judge.
The Afghan Major Crimes Task Force would be an Afghan-led, joint ANP 
and National Directorate of Security unit being (initially) mentored and 
trained by a multinational law enforcement mentoring team from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. As the scope 
of the project involved a great deal of financing and the deployment of 
more FBI agents, the full support of the US Government was required. 
The AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission negotiated the project 
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through both the CSTC-A and US Embassy law enforcement contacts 
in order to gain that commitment before briefing the Minister of the 
Interior. During the following months, the Kidnapping Investigations 
Unit was very successful, with some 40 national and foreign kidnap victims 
safely recovered and more than 140 persons involved in the kidnappings 
arrested. By July 2009, the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force project was 
fully operational with US$30 million in funding from CSTC-A and the 
further deployment of FBI members who assumed control of the project on 
their arrival. The AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission remained 
the Senior Mentor to the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force (AMCTF), 
representing the interests of the Commanding General of CSTC-A.
The third project of the AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission 
was to have three AFP members embedded within the Kandahar 
Intelligence Fusion Cell situated at Kandahar airfield to gather and 
process counter-narcotic intelligence that could then be used as 
evidence. Before deployment, the ADF asserted that it would take 
the lead for securing the engagement of the ‘Four Eyes’ (i.e. the Five 
Eyes, less New Zealand, which was not involved) military intelligence 
community within Regional Command – South (RC-South). From 
October 2008 until late February 2009, the ADF was unable to 
secure that support and subsequently advised that the AFP would 
have to engage each individual country’s intelligence community on 
a bilateral basis to gain access to the facility and the material within. 
This surprising roadblock was eventually overcome in no small way 
thanks to an AFP officer embedded within the ISAF headquarters 
of the IOCC in Kabul. The general work of this officer involved 
developing law enforcement and prosecutorial target packages for 
those involved in the illicit narcotics industry, with the great spin-
off that the AFP would be exposed to the best daily intelligence on 
the Afghan illicit narcotics industry. Another advantage was that this 
presence strengthened the relationship between the AFP Commander 
of the Afghanistan Mission and the head of the IOCC. As good fortune 
would have it, this head of the IOCC reported directly to Commander 
of ISAF, who was then General David D. McKiernan, and had an 
excellent working relationship with him. It was this relationship that 
was positively exploited in February 2009 by the AFP Commander of 
the Afghanistan Mission in order to place three AFP members in the 
Kandahar Intelligence Fusion Cell.
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In March 2009, the new US administration changed its counter-narcotics 
strategy from one of large-scale poppy eradication to a more targeted policy 
that combined a more cohesive military–civilian plan to attack the nexus 
of the insurgency, narcotics and government corruption. To implement 
this new policy, the US administration, through ISAF Command, 
directed that a new joint military–civilian task force be established at 
RC-South, known as the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Nexus 
(CJIATF-Nexus). It was tasked to develop a counter-narcotics intelligence 
collection, counter-narcotics campaign planning, assessment, targeting 
and fusion capability, and support the London-based Joint Narcotics 
Analysis Centre to conduct strategic-level analysis, studies on effects of 
the narcotics trade on security and governance, and provide reach-back 
support to the IOCC situated at ISAF headquarters in Kabul.
Fortuitously, the AFP team had just been accepted into the Kandahar 
Intelligence Fusion Cell and was now in the best position to be part of 
this new unit. Very quickly after the announcement of the creation of 
the CJIATF-Nexus, as the IOCC representatives in RC-S, the AFP was 
quickly invited to join it as a senior partner, and was tasked with a leading 
role in its development.
The AFP mission was now placed at the centre of the implementation of the 
new ISAF Civilian–Military Plan as it related to counter-narcotics within 
the country. In the weeks that followed, the CJIATF-Nexus undertook 
a comprehensive harvest of all known military and criminal intelligence 
from within the Afghan battle space. This intelligence environment scan 
identified most, if not all, of the criminal syndicates that were operating in 
and out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, none of this intelligence reporting 
could be disseminated to Afghan law enforcement as all of the military 
intelligence was highly classified. Also, Afghan law enforcement, in 
particular the ANP and the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, had 
serious allegations of corruption to confront, as it appeared that a number 
of the criminal syndicates identified in the intelligence scan had strong 
links to serving senior executive officers of the Counter-Narcotics Police 
of Afghanistan.
This new cell was able eventually to deliver criminal intelligence 
solutions  to the ISAF battle space managers in direct support to non-
lethal military counter-narcotic operations. What this means is that the 
AFP, through its involvement with the CJIATF-Nexus, was now able to 
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provide a non-kinetic means of removing significant players from the 
battlefield, through a rule of law path that, when done, had a positive 
impact on the general population and on the government of Afghanistan.
Proof of the success of this joint police–military initiative came in July 
2009. The Aghan Major Crimes Task Force enabled with sanitised 
CJIATF-Nexus criminal intelligence and supported by US Drug 
Enforcement Agency and mentors from the UK Serious and Organized 
Crime Office arrested the Argestan Provincial Border Police Chief, 
Colonel Shar Shahin, with 4,300 kilograms of hashish and 90 kilograms 
of pure Afghan brown heroin. While Shahin was subsequently sentenced 
to 20 years imprisonment, this operation caused significant anxiety with 
certain members of the government of Afghanistan and police as it was 
the first time some felt truly exposed to the coming tide of high-profile 
arrests and criminal prosecutions that would be the inevitable result of 
such a successful multinational–Afghan military–police partnership.
In May 2009, when the sterile corridor concept (for evidentiary integrity) 
was being cemented within the operations, the CJIATF-Nexus team, 
as well as its executive team (including AFP), briefed the US Defence 
Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates. They outlined the capabilities being 
realised through the fusion of military intelligence and international 
law enforcement criminal intelligence inside the CJIATF—-Nexus. 
These were in direct support of both ISAF battle-space owners and the 
potential positive outcomes utilising Afghan rule of law outcomes. Gates 
checked out the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities—
which he pushed to increase in both Afghanistan and Iraq, at a classified 
intelligence fusion centre. He emphasised the importance of this effort to 
operations underway in Afghanistan, with the ‘fusion of  intelligence and 
operations in a way that has never been done before in warfare’.9
Operation SYNERGY
Moving on through this very busy period, in August 2009, the AFP 
deployed a further contingent of police to Tarin Kowt under the banner of 
Operation SYNERGY. These members were to work in partnership with 
9  D. Miles, ‘Gates wraps up Afghanistan visit with new insights’, 8 May 2009, United States 
Department of Defense, waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2009/05/gates-optimistic-on-
afghanistan.html (retrieved 3 May 2010).
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the Dutch police from the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan; 
however, not long after their arrival, the Dutch police withdrew, allowing 
the AFP essentially to take over full management of the police training 
facility. Their main focus was to train all ANP recruits who were deployed 
to Uruzgan. They were also able to develop new training programs for 
leadership and specialist operations, which was a hugely successful project 
that eventually provided training for more than 2,500 police officers 
in basic police patrol officer courses and other police specialist and 
leadership programs.
Operation ILLUMINATE
In 2010, Operation CONTEGO and Operation SYNERGY were 
combined into Operation ILLUMINATE. From this point on until its 
withdrawal in 2014, the AFP continued to be engaged mostly in the 
training of ANP, but in a broader sense that also included training members 
of the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force, and conducting other police 
specialist training programs in Kabul. Further development of the AFP 
contribution to Afghanistan from that point witnessed senior members 
of the AFP deployed to significant positions within ISAF headquarters 
as advisers.
Conclusion
This historical study has highlighted one of the more distinctive roles 
of the AFP in undertaking capacity-building efforts in support of 
both  indigenous law enforcement and international stabilisation efforts 
in Afghanistan.
The mission provided tangible solutions to ISAF senior officials who 
continue to enable and support international stabilisation operations in 
Afghanistan. The mission, via its direct involvement in establishing both 
the AMCTF and the CJIATF-Nexus, further delivered law enforcement 
solutions that enabled the movement of sanitised classified military 
intelligence to the Afghan law enforcement criminal intelligence domain. 
This then allowed vetted and credible Afghan law enforcement teams 
(specifically the AMCTF) to target, disrupt and dismantle those criminals 
operating in the nexus between insurgency, narcotics and corrupt 
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operations within the Afghan Government. Through its involvement 
in the initial establishment of the Senior Police Advisors Group in Kabul, 
the AFP supported the strategic development of the ANP in both policy 
and training.
In the initial stages of the AFP contribution, three key developments 
were successfully undertaken by the AFP that aligned to support the 
international stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. These were, first, 
to develop an operational national law enforcement unit of integrity 
to combat kidnapping, corruption and organised crime (the Afghan 
Major Crimes Task Force); second, to develop a robust, internationally 
supported national criminal intelligence unit (CJIATF-Nexus) to support 
the Major Crimes Task Force; and last, to assist in developing a Strategic 
Police Advisory Group to shape and influence ANP policy and training 
development. Following on from this, the AFP then expanded its mission 
fully and successfully to conduct and manage the training of Afghan 
police who were involved in many varied policing disciplines.
The Concept of Operations was developed to support the deployment of 
the mission in a way that was broad enough to allow for the realignment of 
the mission towards capacity building of the government of Afghanistan 
and Afghan law enforcement, should the opportunity arise. This flexibility 
was crucial to the mission outcomes and ensured that opportunities could 
be harnessed in support of wider strategic objectives, such as in 2009 and 
later in regard to the training effort from 2009 to 2014.
The AFP withdrew its mission in 2014 after maintaining a presence in 
Afghanistan for seven years, successfully deploying some 103 members 
in various roles in four locations. Over those seven years, the significant 
outcomes included:
• The writing of the complete training and development package for the 
ANP Criminal Investigations Department.
• The initial establishment of the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force, 
which saw great success initially in the rescue of 40 kidnap victims 
in Kabul, and the arrest of some 140 persons involved in those 
kidnappings.
• The initial establishment of the Senior Police Advisers Group in Kabul, 
a strategic police development think tank hosted by the European Union 
Police Mission in Afghanistan and led initially by the UNAMA Senior 
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Police Adviser, which included representation from the ANP. Its purpose 
was to feed organisational development advice to the Minister of the 
Interior and the International Police Coordination Board.
• The establishment of the CJIATF-Nexus in Kandahar, which designed 
and implemented the first sterile corridor intelligence pathways that 
allowed information gathered by the military to be used for police 
intelligence on the narcotics industry and high-level corruption by 
public officials. This type of information was later fed to the Afghan 
Major Crimes Task Force and resulted in the first, very public arrest 
of a senior Afghan Police Colonel, Shar Shahin, for the possession and 
transport of more than 1,000 kilograms of illegal narcotics.
Within five years from late 2009 until 2014, the AFP trained:
• 2,194 ANP patrolmen
• 259 non-commissioned officers
• 98 evidence collection officers
• 570 investigators for the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force
• 65 surveillance officers
• 13 police trainers
• 96 police officers on leadership and development programs.
The AFP also held significant police advisory positions on the International 
Police Coordination Board, in the Office of the Commander ISAF, and 
as Senior Mentor to the Deputy Minister for Security. Members were also 
deployed to the European Union Police Mission.
The seven-year AFP Afghanistan Mission was a highly risky and expensive 
endeavour that saw 103 AFP members deployed to harsh and dangerous 
conditions. Numerous rocket and mortar attacks at Tarin Kowt and 
Kandahar airfield took the lives of soldiers and civilians alike. In Kabul, 
numerous complex and VBIED attacks were carried out against ISAF 
camps and convoys. Camp Eggers, which was the headquarters of 
CSTC-A, where the AFP Commander of the Afghanistan Mission worked, 
and the front gates of ISAF headquarters, where the AFP IOCC member 
worked, were both subject to a VBIED attack that resulted in the deaths 
and injuries of ISAF personnel. In addition, a convoy of civilian staff from 
the IOCC was attacked by a VBIED at the military entrance of Kabul 
International Airport, resulting in a loss of life and severe wounding of 
civilians in armoured vehicles, the same type as used by the AFP.
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There was the constant threat and fear of green-on-blue attacks whereby 
rogue ANP officers or soldiers would target their ISAF mentors and 
trainers, at times preventing AFP members from attending ANP buildings 
or the headquarters in Kabul. The Ministry of Justice was the subject 
of a complex attack while a member of the UK prosecutions mentoring 
team was there, luckily escaping thanks to the excellent quick extraction 
reactions of his Close Personal Protection Team supplied by Armour 
Group, the very same company that provided protection for the AFP in 
Kabul. The back road to the military airport that was used as an alternative 
route for AFP members in Kabul came under sustained sniper attack, 
preventing its further use and thereby forcing the AFP to use Jalalabad 
Road, nicknamed ‘Bomb Alley’, as the only route they could take to get to 
and from work each day. All of this and more happened just in 2008–09, 
with no reduction in the threat at any time throughout the entire seven 
years the AFP was deployed to Afghanistan.
With this as the working environment for AFP members, special 
recognition is given to all of them for achieving so much in such a short 
period, in such conditions that civilian police are neither conditioned, 
trained nor fully mentally prepared to work in. It takes personal 
resilience and boldness to achieve anything in this environment, and 
all participating AFP members should be rightfully recognised for their 
excellent and dedicated contribution. Not all returned to Australia 
without scars. Not  all returned the same as when they left. While this 
narrative contributes in some small way to tell the story of the AFP’s 
highly successful contribution to Afghanistan, it certainly fails to tell the 
human story, which only those who served there can tell in their own 
words and perhaps in their own time. I hope, however, that in some small 
way, this chapter can at least describe in general terms just how successful 
the seven-year AFP contribution to Afghanistan was, and that there were 
103 AFP officers who, with immense dedication and at great personal risk 






When thinking about Australia’s role in Afghanistan, most automatically 
gravitate towards the work of the Army in particular, and the Air Force 
and Navy in support. The last few chapters have made clear that Australia’s 
engagement, while constrained, was multifaceted. Yet another facet of 
that engagement concerned the provision of support to the local people 
through aid and development projects.
This chapter presents a snapshot of the role that officials from the Australian 
Agency for International Development (AusAID) undertook in Uruzgan 
Province, Afghanistan, as part of Australia’s whole-of-government effort.
The chapter focuses largely on my personal experiences as a stabilisation 
adviser (STABAD), and on impressions of Australia’s response, including 
the challenges faced, what worked and what did not, and why. The details 
and achievements hereafter are those up to the withdrawal of Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and AusAID personnel in late 2013.
Background
Australia’s mission in Afghanistan was one of foreign policy, and the DFAT 
is the department primarily responsible for setting Australia’s foreign 
policy. The then Australian Agency for International Development1 had 
responsibility for Australia’s aid budget globally, and of course this included 
in Afghanistan.
1  In November 2013, AusAID formally became part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
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Australia has been committed to international operations in Afghanistan 
since 2001 in the areas of military operations, diplomacy and development. 
Since 2006, Australia has been operating a diplomatic mission in Kabul 
with a small DFAT staff and representatives from other government 
agencies. With the return of the ADF, and Australian operations focusing 
on Uruzgan in 2009, we identified that it was necessary to have the relevant 
civilian arms of the government also operating in Uruzgan. The United 
States already had a joint civilian–military approach in Afghanistan, and 
the Dutch, who had primacy in Uruzgan at that time, also had a combined 
civilian–military team.
Australia had previous experience in civilian–military operations in the 
non-warlike operations undertaken in Bougainville2 and in Solomon 
Islands.3 However, in the high-risk conflict zone of Afghanistan, Australia 
was presented with a new challenge, and one that had not been envisaged.
The ADF force elements that deployed were well trained, well equipped, 
focused and highly effective in fighting the insurgency and building 
the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However, as 
we know, winning wars in the 21st century requires more than a purely 
military approach. The military alone cannot ensure the defeat of the 
insurgency; it is a complex political, ethnic and tribal issue requiring an 
equally complex, measured and wide-ranging response to it.
To be fully effective in nation-building and strengthening fundamental 
elements of the fabric of society required a holistic approach, with diplomats 
working alongside, mentoring and supporting their Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) counterparts in all aspects 
of governance, accountability and human rights. It required AusAID 
working in partnership with the Afghan government line directors and 
implementing partners on development and capacity-building of Afghan 
government employees and institutions. The view was taken that only by 
adopting this approach could military gains be made enduring and the 
reach of GIRoA in the province and with the people be strengthened.
The road to transforming Afghanistan from a fractured, war-ravaged country, 
where institutions were either broken or non-existent, to a functioning self-
governing democracy, is strewn with many obstacles. To have any hope of 
2  The Truce Monitoring Groups and subsequent Peace Monitoring Groups after the cessation 
of hostilities in the civil war.
3  International Peace Monitoring Team and then Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI).
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effective and sustainable development, several key ingredients had to be 
present. This was especially critical in a multi-donor and multi-mission 
environment.4 These key factors included early intervention, long-term 
government commitment,5 and donor coordination. However, all three of 
these factors were absent in whole or in part from all contributing nations.
Diplomacy and overseas development assistance is difficult even in the 
most permissive of environments; however, operating in the warlike 
setting of Afghanistan was undoubtedly the most difficult environment 
faced by the Australian Government in recent memory.
With the ADF focused on its area of operation, most ADF reporting 
and analysis was based on supporting their activities. Australia needed 
to have an overall vision of what was happening, especially politically, 
economically and in terms of the rule of law. We needed an understanding 
of the complex tribal dynamics that affected everything occurring within 
the province and beyond, including nationally and internationally. With 
the right tone and vision, this would enable Australia to form a strategic 
view for short-, medium- and long-term goals.
DFAT was and remains the most appropriate source of that reporting, 
as this is their ‘bread and butter’. AusAID played a crucial role in support, 
identifying how to assist the community and overseeing project delivery, 
ensuring that Australia’s and GIRoA’s best interests were served.
A report of the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) stated that 
other coalition partners such as Canada and the Netherlands have long 
since used this combined team approach ‘in together-out together’:
Civilian and military personnel participated in mission preparation 
activities together, including security and safety training, as 
well as headquarters-level exercises and simulations designed to 
strengthen relationships and understanding between participating 
agencies.6
4  Donors included the United States, European Union and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development as well as local and international non-government organisations. 
Missions covered included the work of the NATO, the UNAMA and the ISAF.
5  Commitment needs to be in tranches of five to 10 years, not the frequent maximum of one to 
three years. As we have seen, it takes generations to repair decades of war, corruption and neglect.
6  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole of Government Mission, 
ACMC, Queanbeyan, 2016, p. 40.
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As the ADF and government agencies have distinctive cultures and can be 
somewhat insular, training and preparation together breaks down these 
internal constraints so that they can work together for the same goal. 
I hope that this will be the approach adopted for future missions.
The rest of this chapter sets out to examine how this approach was 
implemented.
Mission
DFAT’s policy advisers, or POLADs, were responsible for offering advice 
to their military counterparts on matters ranging from governance, 
detainee visits, human rights and the rule of law. In Afghanistan, AusAID’s 
mission statement for the development advisers was building resilience 
and supporting at-risk populations, empowering women and girls by 
addressing barriers to their social, political and economic participation, 
and supporting the Afghan Government to maintain economic growth 
and institute more effective and accountable governance.
Often enough, the provision of aid is the easiest part. The real challenge 
is ensuring that the aid is what is really required, is compatible with 
the mission, is not supporting the insurgency, and is both viable and 
sustainable over time. Indeed, aid that is poorly delivered can often be 
worse than no aid at all, as it can create or exacerbate tribal or community 
conflicts and power imbalances and even ruin economies.
Before going further, it is important to note that AusAID itself does not 
implement aid. Instead, AusAID focuses on institutional strengthening, 
so that development is sustainable and enduring. In Afghanistan, AusAID 
identified community needs in concert with GIRoA and communities. 
It identified the implementing partners required to construct infrastructure 
and to deliver and fund projects either independently or in partnerships. 
These partner organisations ranged from UN agencies, international 
non-government organisations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), and non-government organisations (NGOs) such as 
Red Crescent, Save the Children, World Vision and other national NGOs.
In line with the mission, the projects in Afghanistan ranged from 
vaccinating children against preventable diseases, water, sanitation and 
health (WASH) training and distribution of sanitation packs, construction 
of schools and health facilities, the training of nurses and midwives, 
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agriculture, rural development, governance and capacity-building, to 
name a few. These projects were designed to support the coalition’s counter-
insurgency focus, by extending the reach of GIRoA into the community 
and encouraging the community to support GIRoA  and  distance of 
themselves from the insurgents.
Challenges
It will not surprise the reader to know that implementing these projects 
had their challenges. International interventions and support requirements 
do not end when the conflict ends; they need to continue to strengthen 
government and institutions, building capacity to make it resilient to 
challenges, and to prevent it reverting to its previous state. In the post-
conflict environment, there are several schools of thought that seek to 
benchmark when a country can operate largely independently, although 
with a level of continuing support from the international community. 
Often the benchmark is successful free and fair democratic elections. 
However, the assessment of what constitutes ‘free and fair’ can be rather 
subjective, and of course can be used as a convenient metric for donors 
seeking justification to withdraw. Another approach is suspicious of the 
electoral benchmark and focuses more on economic factors as being 
indicative of community confidence and stability. These factors include 
economic growth, flow of currency into or out of the country, good 
governance, transparency, anti-corruption strategies and adherence to the 
rule of law. Going by these realistic measures, progress becomes more 
difficult to discern.
The reality
The reality faced was that Afghanistan was a country that was still at war, 
had a highly dubious electoral process, and was performing poorly against 
other benchmarks. Out of 180 countries on the Transparency International 
scale of corruption, it rated 179th.7 This made it clear that a resolution to 
any of the governance or development challenges was never going to be 
quick or easy. Afghanistan required a long-term, scalable commitment.
7  Civil-Military Fusion Centre, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan, Civil-Military 
Fusion Centre, Norfolk, VA, 2012, p. 6.
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For more than 30 years Afghanistan has barely been able to draw breath 
between conflicts, and an estimated 9 million of its people are illiterate. 
In the largely Pashtun, highly conservative and less progressive province 
of Uruzgan, the literacy rates were estimated to be as low as 2 per cent. 
Illiteracy and lack of formal education fed into the insurgency and made 
the community vulnerable to misinformation and recruitment; hence 
the Taliban opposed education except in places where they could control 
the content. When the coalition moved into the province, few schools 
existed, and almost no female students were able to attend those schools 
that did exist. Infant and maternal mortality was high, medical facilities, 
midwives, clinics and so on were either not available or not operating. 
Knowledge and understanding of basic principles of WASH were largely 
absent. Agriculture was primitive and undertaken in the same manner 
as it had for centuries, and opium production was the major cash-crop. 
The continuing war, complicated by political, tribal and ethnic conflicts, 
made the delivery of aid risky.
Just as with a doctor, the first principle of delivery of overseas 
development  assistance is ‘Do no harm’. It is easy to trigger jealousies, 
increase divisions between communities, inflame conflict, encourage 
corruption and create unrealistic community expectations. This not only 
affects the community and aid deliverers but can also undermine the 
coalition and GIRoA. The risk and impact in Australia of poor overseas 
development assistance can be about both loss of reputation and loss of 
trust, which in turn can affect funding.
The situation on the ground was all the more complicated as the insurgents 
were operating a parallel government in order to legitimise their standing 
and to undermine GIRoA and the coalition. They created doubt in the 
mind of the community as to the legitimacy of the central government 
and the long-term commitment of the coalition, resulting in a reduction 
of community support for the ANSF.
We strove to counter this by mentoring and encouraging GIRoA officials 
to leave the security of their blast walls and razor-wired office compounds 
and go out into the community to extend the reach of GIRoA, not just 
from outside Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital, but also to the district 
centres and beyond into villages. We encouraged district government 
representatives to interact with the community and improve their standing 
by having aid delivered through the prism of GIRoA, rather than through 
the donors.
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Just as it was critical for security, counterinsurgency and development 
to spread out from Kabul into the countryside and into the provinces, 
it was just as critical that it spread out from provincial capitals into 
the districts and smaller villages. These were the areas that were either 
supporting insurgents or were vulnerable to joining their support base 
if they doubted the capacity of GIRoA to support them. In short, 
development and security goals sat side by side in Uruzgan, and they were 
not incompatible.8
Effective aid delivery needs to be coordinated at both the national and 
provincial levels. Cooperation between donors is necessary to prevent 
duplication, competition and gaps. However, even in Afghanistan the 
aid world is crowded, often with various donors working to their own 
agendas and mission statements to the detriment of the overall objective; 
in this case, the provision of assistance to the Afghan people. The lack 
of coordination at national and provincial levels severely hampered aid 
delivery and effectiveness, with duplicate, overlapping and inefficient 
application of uncoordinated efforts often leaving little in terms of a long-
standing legacy.
In 2008 there was still some hope that such coordination could be 
put into effect. That was when the Afghan Government approved the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy for security, governance, 
economic growth and poverty reduction.9 It expressed a strong preference 
for aid to be channelled through the central government. While it was 
understandable for a sovereign nation to want ownership of development 
and to coordinate development assistance to its people, the reality is that 
GIRoA did not possess the necessary capacity to do so. Nor were effective 
systems in place to enable funding from a national level to reach projects, 
or even line ministries. In addition, there was a distinct shortage of the 
experience needed to understand the basic principles of aid delivery.
Whether unintended or by design, this level of dysfunction promoted 
and enabled large-scale corruption and diversion of critical funds from 
projects and the people of Afghanistan into the hands of individuals. 
Doubtless, some of those funds would have found their way into the very 
hands of the insurgents our forces were fighting.
8  ACMC, Afghanistan, Chapter 3.




Notwithstanding these concerns, considerable effort was made in an 
attempt to pursue the government’s national development strategy. The 
civilian contribution was based within the PRT in the Multi-National Base 
— Tarin Kowt. Effective overseas development aid and diplomacy cannot 
be conducted behind the wire. Face-to-face meetings between provincial 
government line directors were critical to build relationships, engender 
trust and identify common goals. Consultation with communities was 
necessary to determine what kind of assistance was required, along 
with requirements for due diligence and the mentoring of partners for 
the implementation of this program. To achieve this level of interaction 
with the provincial government, the coalition military had to support all 
civilian movements. The ADF formed the Other Government Agency 
(OGA) Platoon to provide security for ‘outside the wire’ missions in and 
around Tarin Kowt. In other districts where either AusAID or Australian 
Civilian Corps members were working, security was undertaken by US 
members of the PRT.
Regular meetings took place in Tarin Kowt at either the governor’s office 
or PRT House between DFAT and AusAID officials and their Afghan 
counterparts. This ensured the development of relatively strong working 
relationships and productive partnerships. This also made certain that 
provincial officials knew that they were getting the necessary support, 
and allowed us to have a good view of what was occurring within the 
government in order to structure our responses accordingly.
During the next few years, the civilian contingent grew in number as the 
aid projects increased. This formed a key component of the PRT, in both 
the provision of their projects and in supporting military reconstruction 
projects with technical and other advice.
In early 2011, the Australian Civilian Corps was created as a branch 
within AusAID by the then prime minister Kevin Rudd. I was selected 
for the first Australian Civilian Corps deployment to Afghanistan as 
a  stabilisation adviser. There were six stability advisers deployed in two 
rotations. One deployed to Tarin Kowt, another to nearby Deh Rawud, 
and I was based in Forward Operating Base Mirwais, in the neighbouring 
Chora District. My colleagues and I arrived in early September 2011, and 
we were due to finish our deployment at the end of October 2012.
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Unfortunately, the decision to deploy stability advisers to Uruzgan 
coincided with the announcement by US President Obama of the 
drawdown or end date of the US mission in Afghanistan.10 Without the 
military to provide security, there were questions as to how civilians could 
undertake institutional strengthening, development and anti-corruption 
roles.11 Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard also announced that 
Australia would be withdrawing from Uruzgan between 2012 and 2014.
The announcement of the coalition forces’ withdrawal from Uruzgan 
(and Afghanistan) worked directly against our goals, one of which was to 
persuade the community to support the Afghan Government instead of 
the insurgents. The community, especially in contested areas, were going 
to support whoever they believed would be in control of their village, 
district and province when the coalition forces withdrew and, at best, 
were understandably going to have a bet each way.
As stabilisation advisers, our new role was largely undefined, and 
identifying how we worked with the PRT was not clear. We came from the 
Australian Civilian Corps roster. The Australian Civilian Corps members 
came from a wide range of backgrounds, which included NGOs, the 
United Nations, consultants, contractors, police and military. I was the 
only civilian who came from either DFAT or AusAID, although most of 
my career had been with the United Nations, NGOs and the AFP. The 
stabilisation adviser role had a multitude of responsibilities: part diplomat, 
part development and mentoring, and an advising, training and trouble-
shooting role within the Afghan communities. Although civilians had 
been at forward operating bases previously, it was the first time that they 
were permanently based there.
After a brief induction at Al-Minhad Air Base in Dubai on the way to 
Afghanistan, my colleagues and I arrived in Multi-National Base — Tarin 
Kowt. My concerns, first raised in Dubai, that the ADF did not quite 
understand that civilians were really being deployed outside the base at 
Tarin Kowt to forward operating bases and all that this entailed, were 
confirmed in Tarin Kowt. After only a day and a half in Tarin Kowt, 
10  CNN Wire Staff, ‘Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan’, CNN Politics, 
23 June 2011.
11  J. Dougherty, ‘What happens to “civilian surge” as military surge ends’, CNN, 22 June 2011.
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I was deployed to Forward Operating Base Mirwais in the Chora Valley. 
It was clear that civilians were tolerated, but war-fighting was what it was 
all about, and assets for civilians were pretty much last on the priority list.
I was set down at the flight line unaccompanied by security, awaiting my 
flight on a Chinook helicopter. When it arrived, I struggled across to it 
with my (excess) luggage and managed to climb aboard. The flight was 
soon full of soldiers, and as no one else was heading to Forward Operating 
Base Mirwais, I asked the loadmaster to let me know when I arrived, so 
that I could know when to get out. We soon lifted off and began flying 
from base to base. The soldiers alighted at the various bases, until I was 
the last passenger left on the flight. The loadmaster then came up to me 
and yelled in my ear: ‘We are just pulling up now. The base is uphill. 
When we stop, get out and run like hell.’ He then emphasised: ‘This is 
Injun country!’
As instructed, this unarmed civilian jumped out and grabbed all of his 
gear for the next year. The loadmaster pointed up a steep incline to a small 
HESCO’ed base (i.e. surrounded by HESCO walls) with a metal door 
about 80 metres away. I started running uphill towards the base in the 
oxygen-deprived air, in my PPE, and dragging enough jack rations to last 
me 14 months.12 I bashed on the metal door, and after a few moments it 
was opened by a soldier who just looked at me.
I said, ‘Hi, I am the new STABAD [stabilisation adviser] from AusAID.’ 
Answering in a strong southern US drawl after a rather pregnant pause, 
the man at the door said: ‘OrzAID? Never heard of ‘em, but get in here 
real quick.’ Yes, I was not at Mirwais but a small combat outpost. After 
the mistake was realised, I was quickly collected and taken to the more 
substantial Mirwais. My departure from Afghanistan was also rather 
different from what I would have liked.
12  PPE: Personal Protective Equipment—ballistic vest, helmet and glasses. Jack rations are civilian 
food taken to the field to enliven standard issue rations.
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Lieutenant Christian Johnston, Afghan mentor team leader for 
Combat Team B, 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, looks 
on as his Afghan National Army counterpart speaks with an Afghan 
community member near Patrol Base Mohammed, Uruzgan province, 
Afghanistan, 2010.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
I think it is fair to say that the in-country civilians from DFAT and 
AusAID did not see the need for stabilisation advisers to be deployed. 
Initially they were not as enthusiastic about our deployment as one might 
have expected. I put it down to concern that we were encroaching on their 
patch, but in reality, there was much for all of us to do and scope to assist 
each other. However, when I arrived at Mirwais I was warmly welcomed 
by the ADF, perhaps since I had served with several of them on previous 
peacekeeping missions. Although many did not know or understand what 
I could add to the mission, I was housed in a tent along with the US 
PRT members and National Guard Security Detachment. I then decided 
that I would invite a different soldier into each of my meetings with the 
community and district officials, so that they could see and understand 
what they were risking their lives for.
The challenges were something I had not confronted in more than 20 years 
of working in developing countries, including in the north of Afghanistan 
in 2009. It was not just the security issues. There were tribal rivalries; 
communities lacked the fundamentals of basic hygiene and education; 
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and, in the words of the famous Fred Smith song, ‘And the Education 
Minister can neither read nor write, and the Minister for Women runs the 
knock shop there at night’.13 It truly was another world.
Security
The greatest impediment to undertaking my role was the lack of 
security. Not only could I not move outside the base without a security 
detachment, but it also took enormous planning, and approvals had to 
be sought. This meant that ad hoc movements or meetings were almost 
impossible. The result was that our ability to respond to issues in real time 
was severely hampered. Owing to security concerns, we could not inform 
either government or tribal leaders of our intentions to meet them, which 
meant that we would arrive at offices only to find them vacant. It was very 
frustrating for all of us. 
I also found that I was not granted permission to travel to villages where 
it was important to show the flag due to security concerns. This meant 
that those villages that were vulnerable to Taliban influence often did not 
receive the support from the coalition or GIRoA officials that might have 
helped them resist the insurgency. It was a vexed issue, as failing to assist 
these villages could have reinforced their view that the government did 
not care about them or favoured other villages over them.
Achievements
Although the challenges were enormous, there were equally numerous 
achievements of which Australia, the coalition and the PRT can be 
justifiably proud, improving the quality of life for a significant portion 
of the Uruzgan population. These include:
• A functioning hospital in Tarin Kowt, with a women’s wing and 
surgery unit.
• Health facilities increased from nine in 2006 to 29 facilities in 2013, 
and 322 health posts in operation throughout the province, staffed 
by 106 healthcare professionals and 493 volunteer community health 
workers.
13  See www.asiaeducation.edu.au/docs/default-source/curriculum-resources-pdf/dust-of-uruzgan.
pdf?sfvrsn=4.
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• Improved maternal health care—up to 80 per cent of women received 
at least one antenatal visit, up from 50 per cent in 2007, and 24 new 
midwives and 26 nurses were trained.
• Lessons in hygiene and health were delivered to 4,400 children.
• Between January and June 2013, 12,470 health consultations were 
provided.
• More than 8,700 children under five screened for malnutrition, and 
more than 300 children with severe malnutrition were referred to 
treatment centres and counselling.
• The number of schools increased from 34 in 2006 to around 200 active 
schools in 2013, including 26 girls-only schools and 19 co-ed schools.
• An all-year, commercially capable civil airfield was opened.
• More than 320 kilometres of roads were improved, including 200 
kilometres of paved roads across the province.
• Several government buildings were constructed.
• Agriculture production slowly improved and passed pre-conflict levels.
• Rural infrastructure was improved to protect against floods, droughts 
and other disasters.
Although we were supposed to give prior warning of our intention to 
visit schools, we often took the opportunity when nearby to see if they 
were being utilised. Some schools were not but many more were, and it 
was heartening to visit a school in a remote area and to see a classroom 
crammed with young girls embracing the opportunity to learn.
Challenges
It would be disingenuous of me to pretend that our programs were 
delivered without problems or that we were not taken advantage of, and 
we found ourselves often in the middle of tribal disputes, delivering aid to 
areas that did not need it and failing others that did.
Communities like those in the Chora Valley have been through extended 
periods of war, and in the absence of the rule of law, they become 
survivors, trusting no one, and understandably willing to try to get 
anything they could to assist their family and community. Promises by 
GIRoA and foreigners are easily made and often broken, and those who 
make them are soon gone, either rotated out or the mission completely 
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withdrawn. In this environment, achieving effective aid delivery requires 
strong cooperation between all donors and implementing partners, 
showing a unified face to the community to avoid governments, NGOs, 
the United Nations and so on from being played off against each other. 
It is often the case that many problems were already entrenched before 
Australia’s arrival, the situation being no different in Uruzgan.
With the need for quick results, it became clear that little or no due diligence 
had been undertaken, and mistakes were made. This was also in part due 
to the military trying to get quick runs on the board with the community, 
with quick impact projects and the US Commanders Emergency Reserve 
Program (CERP) funding.14 Joint pre-deployment training between ADF, 
PRT and civilian members could have mitigated these issues, resulting in 
a more coordinated approach between the military and civilian elements 
from the pre-deployment phase throughout the mission.
When I arrived in Chora, there was no district governor and the head 
of the 2nd Kandak of the Afghan National Army15 was acting in the 
role. This was problematic, as several suspect tribal leaders whom he had 
dealings with in the security context were hostile to him, and this was 
having a negative influence on community trust in his role representing 
the Afghan government. I was tasked with finding a suitable successor, but 
no one wanted the job. Although a salary was attached, it was very rarely 
paid, so the only way of supporting oneself, it appeared, was through graft 
and corruption. The position also came with a target on one’s head, as the 
Taliban regularly executed GIRoA officials.
The first thing I had to do was negotiate a number of problems created by 
the well-meaning US PRT members. They had paid for a tube well, taking 
assurances from a village leader on face value, so they had not undertaken 
any due diligence. The tube well was sunk on private property, which was 
then walled off. The owner then commenced charging the community 
for water. This angered the villagers and had the potential to provoke 
animosity towards the PRT. As a solution, the PRT agreed to pay for 
three additional tube wells in the village at $5,000 each. However, being 
paid in advance, the contractor was never seen again, and neither were the 
14  The purpose of the CERP program is to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility by carrying out programs 
that will immediately assist the indigenous population.
15  Kandak is equivalent to an Afghan brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Gul Agha acted in both roles.
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tube wells. Basic understanding of contracting practices, using AusAID 
civilians as a resource, and working through government officials might 
have prevented this.
The actual cost of goods and services in the community was not known 
to the PRT. This made it difficult to ensure due diligence when awarding 
contracts even for projects as simple as a tube well, and this problem was 
multiplied exponentially for major constructions. Tube wells that should 
have cost between US$800 and US$1,000 were often charged US$5,000 
to coalition forces, and on occasion several times more. Once precedence 
of prices had been set, very few Afghan contractors were willing to do work 
for a lower price, thereby reducing the number of projects that could be 
implemented and communities assisted, and decreasing the effectiveness 
of the mission. Often quotes had to factor in illicit payments to various 
government, police and tribal leaders to allow projects to proceed.
We were travelling ‘outside the wire’ five to six days per week, visiting 
community and tribal leaders and district government officials. However, 
they were rarely in the district governor’s office, and we could not forewarn 
that we were visiting owing to security concerns, leading to lots of wasted 
time. However, it became clear that, as most government employees, 
including teachers and police, rarely received any salary, they had an 
understandably relaxed attitude to work.
The issue could not be resolved at district or provincial level because 
donors would contribute funding to the government or specific ministries 
at the national level. However, by the time funds trickled down from 
government ministers, to ministries, to provincial and then to district 
level, with each taking a share, there was little or, on many occasions, 
nothing left for the actual employees to receive.
Eventually a new district governor was appointed. He came from another 
district in Uruzgan after being removed from his previous role … yes, for 
graft and corruption. He quickly aligned himself with a powerful warlord, 
and I spent a great deal of my time trying to prevent the two of them from 
taking control of a large AusAID-funded flood mitigation project, which 
was designed to provide employment to representatives of each tribe.
Members of other tribes and villages marched in protest against them. 
Without the intervention of the ANSF and the coalition, it would have 
resulted in a violent confrontation. After some tense mediation, the original 
work-sharing agreement was upheld and the status quo was maintained—
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for a while. I spent a considerable amount of time mentoring the district 
governor on basic principles of good governance, and for the rest of my 
deployment he was relatively cooperative. Emblematic of the lack of 
stability in government, the district governor was later removed, and the 
tribal leader disappeared after being linked to the insurgents. The lack 
of continuity in positions, owing to corruption or political interference, 
continually undermined the effectiveness of our capacity-building and 
institutional-strengthening efforts.
When Australia took control of the province and the PRT, we inherited 
several large, incomplete projects from the Dutch. AusAID had to 
oversee the final implementation phases of these projects, in concert with 
Kabul-based Dutch representatives. One of these was the much-lauded 
Tarin Kowt–Chora road. Initial planning had been for no culverts along 
the route, because we knew that insurgents would use them to deploy 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Where watercourses intersected 
the road, there were to be dips or wash-aways instead. However, owing 
to  the failure in ensuring oversight of the project, the 30-kilometre 
roadway had some 120 culverts constructed by the time we took control. 
Several days before the road’s opening, the security contractor withdrew 
his services and sought increased funding to re-secure the road. This was 
not forthcoming, leaving the length of the road vulnerable to insurgents 
or others.
Within an hour of the official opening of the road in Chora by the Dutch 
ambassador and minister, the first insurgent-placed IED blew a culvert. 
As a result, the official party had to be flown back to Tarin Kowt, as it was 
deemed too dangerous for them to travel back along the newly opened 
road. This, of course, resulted in a major embarrassment and loss of face 
for the ANSF, which could not maintain security, and for the coalition, 
even though the Dutch had built it.
Nearby communities knew that insurgents were placing IEDs; however, 
they decided, on the basis of their long-term survival prospects, not to 
inform on them to the ANSF or coalition. Within five months, most 
of the 120 culverts along the road had been blown, usually as coalition or 
ANSF vehicles passed. The result was that no Afghans would use the road, 
choosing to travel through the dasht (desert) instead.
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Construction of projects that communities did not want was also 
problematic. In Chora, for instance, the Dutch constructed a new 
commercial hub of shops and a market, known as the Caravanserai, 
opposite the district government buildings. The only problem was that 
none of the shopkeepers wanted to move their businesses from the newly 
sealed road in the centre of town to the Caravanserai, especially when they 
found out that they would have to pay rent for the privilege. As a result, 
the Caravanserai was never inhabited, and its shoddy construction meant 
that within six months of opening, it was already falling apart.
In an area where two villages coexisted amicably, side by side, the 
construction of a dam almost brought them into conflict. Awi 1 and 
Awi 2 were two villages that shared a common water supply, which had 
never dried in living memory. Someone decided that the construction of 
a dam to capture this water would be of benefit to the community. Both 
villages agreed, and construction had taken place by the time I arrived 
in country. I was tasked with finalising the contract between donor and 
contractor. The villagers were refusing to allow the dam to be filled, yet 
without ensuring that it worked we could not make the final payments. 
With many visits backwards and forwards taking up a huge number of 
soldiers and assets, we finally identified the problem. The villagers did not 
actually understand what a dam was. They had never seen one, and it had 
never been discussed with them during the planning. By this time, they 
were using the dam as a public lavatory and did not understand the nexus 
between this and the fouling of their drinking water. We finally managed 
to persuade them to divert the water to fill the dam, which thankfully 
held. The contractor was paid; however, on our next visit the dam had 
been drained, and to my knowledge was never used again.
Nevertheless, we then received many requests from villages for dams, 
and we subsequently identified that each village was hoping for the same 
pay-off as Awi from the contractor, which was some US$20,000, and 
a similar amount to the district police chief to allow construction workers 
safe passage along the road. We could not instigate any action against the 
police chief, as he was killed shortly after by an insurgent IED.
In another instance, an Afghan police officer requested us to provide a dam 
to drought-proof the water supply of his remote village. We travelled 
to the village to undertake an assessment; however, after a community 
meeting, we discovered that the land where the dam was to be located 
was owned by the head of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the area, 
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which he had failed to disclose. The dam would have meant he controlled 
the village water supply, which could have resulted in instability and the 
village turning against the police. We declined to fund the dam, and 
instead funded the extension and construction of the existing concrete 
holding tanks situated on communal land in the centre of the village. 
Attending these locations is the only effective way of ensuring that 
appropriate aid that does not destabilise communities, but this came at 
a cost in resources and time.
Investigating the cause of a mobile phone tower being non-operational 
after 5 pm every day until sunrise, we discovered that the operators had 
been coerced by insurgents to limit hours to daylight only, preventing 
the population from reporting the insurgents operating at night in the 
district. The operators had complained to the local police post only 
some 500 metres away. The ANP replied that as they did not receive any 
salary, they had essentially made a non-aggression pact with the Taliban. 
So, to prevent the Taliban attacking them, they would allow the Taliban 
to control the towers’ transmission hours.
These few examples are symptomatic of the challenges confronted by the 
coalition, ANSF and, provincial and district governments when there is 
limited support from the central government.
The civilian–military coordination in the province improved when 
Australia took the lead, and many of the problems between the ADF and 
civilian actors were mitigated by joint training, exercises and coordinated 
deployments. In these circumstances, the joint leadership model 
worked well.
What this review has shown is that, in all probability, there will always be 
challenges with deployments to environments like Afghanistan given the 
low base level of education, transport and communications. Developing 
people and infrastructure requires a long-term commitment in order to 
overcome generations of neglect. Once the announcement was made that 
the coalition was withdrawing, it was an uphill battle to persuade the 
population to reject the insurgents and support the ANSF, especially in 
areas where they had not received significant development assistance.
The real risk with short-term engagements such as in Uruzgan is that 
instead of strengthening institutions, we develop and strengthen 
individuals. In the case of Afghanistan, this often leads to an imbalance of 
power, corruption and even further conflict. We saw examples of this in the 
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coalition’s interactions in Uruzgan. The other side effect of concentrating 
power in individuals is that it creates a target for both insurgents and 
their rivals. Removing the individual by undermining them or, in the 
Afghan scenario, by killing them was a common and effective practice 
in Uruzgan. On 26 March 2011, while returning from a meeting with 
the district governor, my PRT patrol was attacked by a 12-year-old child 
suicide bomber and as a result I and three US soldiers were critically 
wounded, effectively ending the work of the PRT in Chora.
In closing, the unique nature and circumstances of the commitment 
to Uruzgan limited a long-term and sustainable approach to assist the 
Afghan Government to develop and strengthen the institutions. The need 
to deliver aid to assist securing community support and to assist coalition 
forces resulted in short-term gains, with some possible longer-term benefits 
being drawn from individuals who received training and education from 
Australian official development assistance. There was little long-term 
benefit in the capacity-building of individuals versus institutions, as many 
of those individuals were targeted and killed or subsequently left their 
positions. The increased spread of the insurgency throughout the province 
after the withdrawal of coalition forces had deleterious effect on many of 
the completed projects. Insurgents gained control of most of Uruzgan.
On balance, I do not think that we can judge the effectiveness of our 
intervention at the time of our departure. Instead, the sustainability of 
our efforts needs to be evaluated several years after our withdrawal. This 
would identify whether or not the seeds sown have been allowed to grow, 






An historically significant aspect to Australia’s involvement in the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars from 2001 to 2014 was the emergence of 
the so-called gender dimension. There are two broad components to 
consider: internal issues––the changing nature of the ADF’s own troops; 
and external issues––the character of these wars, such as the ‘war among 
the people’ and counter-insurgency dimensions, in which gender issues 
became more prominent. This chapter draws on contributions from 
a range of ADF members and is divided into two parts corresponding to 
the two types of issue.1
Internal issues—own troops
The Afghanistan and Iraq wars were notable for seeing the first mass 
deployment of women in warlike operations in combat-related roles in 
Australian history. Although it might seem obvious to state, the most 
significant story to emerge is that women were well integrated into teams 
and well trained, and that they performed under pressure. This story is less 
well known, and is the focus of this chapter.
1  Contributions by Kellie Brett, Deb Butterworth, Fiona Grasby, Leanne Iseppi, Paula Ivanovic, 
Amanda Johnston, Marija Jovanovich, Bevan McDonald, Stacey Porter, Grant Prendergast, Janelle 
Sheridan, Donna Sill, Kelley Stewart and Jasmine Young.
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However, a second, parallel and more negative story of gender and 
the  ADF during this period must also be recorded. External inquiries 
into ADF culture around 2012–14 identified and sought to remedy 
a  range of discrimination and abuse problems that had occurred from 
the 1960s onwards.2 It was found that for both genders, the severity of 
abuse was much decreased between 2001 and 2011 compared to earlier 
periods; however, proportionally, rates were still higher for females.3 These 
cultural difficulties likely affected female retention during the 1990s, 
something that was already challenging to maintain owing to general 
societal attitudes about gender and vocational choices. Operationally, this 
meant that there were low numbers of women in the ADF, just as the ‘war 
among the  people’4 and counter-insurgency aspects of modern warfare 
came to the fore, and thereby, militarily, gender issues also became more 
important. Although these abuse issues internal to the ADF are deeply 
troubling, they need to be placed in context; similar problems occurred 
in wider Australian society at the same time, reflecting the influence of 
broader sociocultural factors.5
A finding that immediately emerged from my initial inquiry into ‘own 
troops’ is that data capture and analysis of this area is limited. Accordingly, 
this account relies on select voices from the field to illustrate the types of 
lesson that arose and does not claim to be a definitive, all-encompassing 
account.
2  Defence Committee, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture—A Strategy for Cultural 
Change and Reinforcement, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2012, and Defence Abuse Response 
Taskforce, Report on Abuse in Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2014.
3  Defence Committee, Pathway to Change, pp. 288–9.
4  ‘War among the people’ refers to conflict scenarios in which there are no clear delineations of 
combat zones or safe rear echeons. Armed violent individuals or groups and/or military forces undertake 
operations in urban or rural areas, where civilians live and work. An example is bombing of a busy 
marketplace. The widely used term is attributed to British General Rupert Smith, who introduces it in 
his book, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin, London, 2012.
5  R. Knowles, H. Szoke, G. Campbell, C. Ferguson, J. Flynn, J. Lay and J. Potter, ‘Expert 
Advisory Group on discrimination, bullying and sexual harassment: Report to Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons’, Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Melbourne, 2015, www.surgeons.org/-/
media/Project/RACS/surgeons-org/files/operating-with-respectcomplaints/expert-advisory-group/
background-briefing-16-june-15-final.pdf?rev= 7b721 c1d5a264a 5983f715783a 3ab18f&hash= 
DE07 ACB50DC25A6D5C8400405C164B43 (retrieved 20 October 2020), and Australian Human 
Rights Commission, Change the Course: National Report on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment at 
Australian Universities, Australian Human Rights Commission, Canberra, 2017.
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Women in ADF operations in the Middle 
East: Business as usual
Interviews that I conducted with senior female regimental sergeant major 
(RSM) equivalents of each service found that women characterised 
the Middle East deployment as ‘business as usual’. Areas like logistics, 
intelligence, communications and medicine had long been gender-
integrated. Operational expertise had been steadily built from the late 
1980s, for example, from Fiji in 1987, to the First Gulf War in 1990, 
and various deployments during the 1990s such as in Rwanda, Somalia 
and Timor Leste. It was the actions undertaken in the 1990s—the long 
investment in mainstreaming women into units, training regimes, posting 
cycles and selection for deployments—that allowed women to develop the 
requisite experience to perform in the Middle East.
In the RAN, ships had already long examined and resolved a range of 
pragmatic gender-related issues, such as sleeping quarters arrangements, 
and whether women should wear head scarves when ashore in some 
locations. RAN women were exposed to more hostile action, collectively, 
than seen before. For example, HMAS Stuart was part of a multinational 
naval security force in the Persian Gulf when, on 24 April 2004, hostilities 
erupted. There were two concurrent attacks: a dhow acted as a suicide 
bomb against a USS Firebolt boarding party, killing three crew members, 
while shortly after, an insurgent speedboat, laden with explosives, attacked 
an offshore oil rig. Commander (now Commodore) Michele Miller was 
the Executive Officer (XO) at the time and played a key role in leading 
the HMAS Stuart response.6
In the Army, the Centre for Army Lessons database reflects that army 
women’s employment in standard non–arms corps environments has been 
uneventful. Nonetheless, soldiers indicated that they required additional 
focus and strategies to fit in when attached to combat arms corps units. 
Cognitive bias might have influenced the inclusion of women in some 
operational activities (such as tactical reconnaissance activities), typically 
required for the conduct of their roles. Generally, like their male peers, 
6  D. Ellery, ‘Captain Miller has a firm grasp of the Navy’s tiller’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 
2011, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/captain-miller-has-a-firm-grasp-of-the-navys-tiller-20111014-
1v6i8.html (retrieved 1 April 2020).
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women filled new functions needed to suit operational needs. For example, 
Lieutenant Colonel Amanda Johnston worked on Taliban reintegration 
programs throughout the provinces.
The ‘no women in combat’ rule for the Army was not lifted until 1 January 
2013; hence women were not employed in direct land combat roles in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the blurring lines of where the battlefield 
began and finished saw many women working in locations where they 
were under mortar fire, such as the Force Level Logistic Asset – Baghdad. 
Others experienced incidents involving improvised explosive devices 
during convoys and the like. One radio operator in Iraq provides an 
interesting anecdote:
Her contingent received sporadic indirect fire, and they did not 
have an indirect fire warning system. To cope with the pressure, 
the corporal would listen to music … As section commander, she 
would talk to her team and check on matters like if they were getting 
enough sleep and they were communicating with people at home.7
Female soldiers kept their sense of humour, as shown through feedback on 
the resupply system for basic items: ‘The full briefs that are only worn by 
grandmas need to be replaced with standard black underwear otherwise 
they will only be used for rifle pull-throughs.’8
This was regarded as a routine part of army deployment for many. Some 
individuals sought to apply the ‘no women in combat rule’ to prevent 
women from visiting units like the Security Detachment in Baghdad 
and other ‘red zone’ areas. However, generally, operational imperatives 
required this rule to be broken. It became obvious that with modern war, 
where there is no front line, such rules lacked relevance and often ended 
up being ignored.
By the time of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, women had become so 
integrated into the Australian Army’s approach to land operations that 
Australian policies on women in combat lagged behind reality. Although 
this issue had been long realised on preceding operations, it had not 
precipitated any consequent review of policy or force structure before 
Middle East operations. This suggests a gender blind spot in national 
security strategic planning forums and post-operational analysis activities.
7  Anonymous comment found in ‘Centre of Army Lessons’ database for Middle East deployments.
8  Anonymous comment found in ‘Centre of Army Lessons’ database for Middle East deployments.
253
15 . THE GENDER DIMENSION
Despite this lag, Army women gained substantial senior leadership 
experience during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which bodes well 
for the development of the future force. It is also historically significant. 
The first female RSM appointment in the Middle East, Warrant Office 
Class 1 Lynne Foster, occurred in 2006. By 2014, the Army had 12 female 
RSMs in total, and six of these had also served in an RSM capacity on 
operations in the Middle East. At the officer level, women also filled 
more senior operational leadership roles than seen before. For example, 
Major General Simone Wilkie served as both Assistant Chief of Staff on 
the Headquarters Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) in 2007 and 
as Assistant Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF) 633 in Afghanistan in 
2011–12. Major General (then Colonel) Sue Coyle also served as a deputy 
commander of the JTF 636 Afghanistan in 2014.
When it comes to the Air Force, aside from long-standing roles in such 
areas as communications and logistics, Air Force women played critical 
operational roles. This was particularly so in the Air Traffic Control 
element at Baghdad airport in the early phase of the Iraq War. Others also 
worked in military policing roles among the population.
What was new about the Middle East deployment was the more extensive 
role women played as aircrew. For example, Warrant Officer (then Flight 
Sergeant) Paula Ivanovic was a loadmaster on C-17 Globemaster aircraft 
for 21 missions in Afghanistan, from 2007 to 2010. Before the Middle 
East conflict, this was a role almost exclusively performed by men. AP-3C 
Orion aircraft pilot Squadron Leader Marija Jovanovich completed three 
tours, in total, flying more than 100 missions. Her crew provided overland 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to coalition troops 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and maritime surveillance in the Persian Gulf and 
the northern Persian Sea, and conducted counter-piracy operations off the 
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
Flight Lieutenant Jasmine Young, a weapon systems officer on the F/A-18F 
Super Hornet fighter aircraft, was the first female Australian deployed 
to air combat operations. She executed pre-planned and dynamic strike 
missions against Daesh in Iraq from 2014 to 2015. Aircrew also includes 
those working with the IAI Heron remotely piloted aircraft, such as 
sensor operator Flight Lieutenant Janelle Sheridan. While the Air Force 
had some female air combat officers qualified for fast jets, these aircraft 
did not deploy to the Middle East during the 2001–14 period.
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An RAAF C-17 Globemaster prepares to land at Tarin Kowt, 2012.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
On being interviewed about her experiences as aircrew, Squadron Leader 
Marija Jovanovich agreed with the ‘business as usual’ concept:
Although there are not many of us, female aircrew are fully 
integrated into 92 Wing. Both as a co-pilot and as a captain, 
I always felt like I belonged and my gender was never an issue. 
I also had a highly competent female navigator on my crew for the 
2010 tour, and the same applied to her.9
One minor problem was that sometimes separate sleeping locations were 
created for female aircrew. This arrangement was not ideal as it meant 
that the women’s sleep was disrupted by other women working different 
shifts. When mixed-gendered aircrew were accommodated together, no 
problems were experienced.
Beyond the service-specific experience of women outlined so far, some 
other interesting leadership and teamwork dimensions are worth reflecting 
upon. The above descriptions indicate that there are many positive aspects 
about the way in which women had been mainstreamed into the ADF’s 
various units by the time of and during Middle East operations. Part of 
this success might also relate to the idea that, regardless of service, the 
9  Conversations with author.
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mentality of ‘a soldier is a soldier’ (a sailor is a sailor and so on) was 
pre-eminent. Primarily, ADF members regarded themselves as members 
of a team, in which gender was not a conspicuous issue. However, the 
preference for the ‘soldier is a soldier’ approach meant that sometimes 
gender aspects were not considered when they needed to have been. 
For example, initially combat body armour did not fit women well, while 
pre-embarkation training did not address the risk of rape, for both men 
and women, on some deployed bases. As highlighted elsewhere, research 
insights from the new field of ‘men’s studies’ might have helped the ADF 
to better support deploying men.10
One insight to emerge was that, when it came to resolving gender-
related issues on deployment, the critical point was the person’s chain 
of command. This has implications for the focus of gender policies; 
specifically, investment in leaders’ knowledge, skills and behavioural 
repertoires to manage diverse teams might be the key to success.
Despite external review findings that some men made women’s service life 
difficult, history must also record that there were many other ADF men 
who played a positive role in this story. From the 1990s onwards, it was 
a numerical reality that many ADF men were responsible for training, 
mentoring and developing these pioneering women. It should be noted 
that some of these men showed more acceptance towards military women 
undertaking a non-traditional work role than was seen in wider Australian 
society. In many units, strong teams and collegial connections developed 
over a sense of shared purpose. The success of this varied by unit and type 
of function; however, it suggests those areas of the ADF that achieved 
cohesion might have excellent lessons to offer other units still embarking 
upon this task.
In addition to issues of leadership and teamwork, the issues of parenthood 
had to be managed as well. Although the ADF has long had measures 
and systems in place to support deploying fathers, it is likely that some 
of the thinking around this had become dated. For example, societal 
shifts involve more dual-income families. Additionally, the ‘longest war’ 
nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars might have had particularly 
harsh consequences for fathering duties, which might not be properly 
understood and might require further analysis.
10  E.G. Boulton, Teaming: An Introduction to Gender Studies, Unshackling Human Talent and 




The report ‘Mothers in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO)’11 
found that women greatly valued their deployments from a professional 
perspective, and were creative and resourceful in finding ways to 
constructively manage separation from children. Nonetheless, although 
ADF women achieved this, they sometimes also faced harsher criticism over 
their decisions than fathers might have experienced. Wing Commander 
(then Squadron Leader) Kelley Stewart, OIC Medical, Task Group 633.2, 
in 2006 summed up the sentiment here, when she wrote:
The main issue for me … is Mother Guilt with a capital ‘G’. 
There can be a lot of pressure applied or inferred … You often 
feel the urge to justify why you want to leave them all to deploy 
operationally. Why? Because this is our job and it’s what we joined 
up to do … Another mother at school had said, ‘There is no 
mother’ about my family. Luckily, the Family Day Care mum set 
them straight.12
Generally, mothers required additional time before deployment to make 
various family support arrangements while for others it was the post-
deployment phase that was most difficult. As Wing Commander Stewart 
observed, ‘[O]n returning from deployment to Afghanistan, she was 
informed that she would be involved in three major training exercises 
after returning from operational duty. She was heartbroken over how she 
was going to tell her family …’.13
Women’s partners and husbands (whether civilian or also serving in the 
military) were a new demographic that, initially, might not have been well 
understood by ADF units and the Defence Community Organisation.
A related issue was that the Australian population, in general, was largely 
oblivious to the changing role of women in the ADF. This particularly 
affected female veterans. A study in this area found that female veterans 
perceived that they were not regarded as (and were not treated as) ‘real’ 
veterans.14 However, male veterans also reported this experience, especially 
11  E. Lawrence-Wood, L. Jones, S. Hodson, S. Crompvoets, A. McFarlane and S. Neuhaus, ‘Mothers 
in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO): The health impacts of maternal deployment to an 
area of operations’, Applied Research Program, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2014.
12  K. Stewart, ‘International Women’s Day 2006—inspiring potential’, Newsletter, Defence 
Community Organisation—South Australia, 8 March 2006.
13  Ibid.
14  S. Crompvoets, Health and Wellbeing of Female Vietnam and Contemporary Veterans, Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2012.
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the younger ones. Arguably, though, the challenges faced internal to the 
ADF have not been nearly as challenging as those external to the ADF, 
as the rest of this chapter sets out to illustrate.
External issues—a gendered area 
of operations
Although women within the ADF were ready—that is, well trained and 
integrated into teams—arguably neither the coalition nor the ADF were 
ready for a gendered battlefield. Gender became significant in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for three reasons.
First, ‘rescuing Middle Eastern women’ was a conspicuous part of the 
narrative that accompanied the rationale for both wars. For instance, at 
a press conference two weeks before the US-led invasion of Iraq, Paula 
Dobriansky, then Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, flanked by 
four members of a group called Women for a Free Iraq, declared: ‘We are 
at a critical point in dealing with Saddam Hussein. However, this turns 
out, it is clear that the women of Iraq have a critical role to play in the 
future revival of their society.’15
In their book What Kind of Liberation?, Nadje Al-Ali and Nicole Pratt 
argued that ‘women’s causes’ became part of an empire-building approach 
that backfired on Iraqi women and undermined their own sense of agency. 
They insisted that the most damaging impact to women in Iraq came 
from the degradation of the security environment. Women’s rights and 
how this was progressed was a significant part of these conflicts. At times 
this became at least an ideological battleground, and at worst it influenced 
targeting choices made by al-Qaeda, the Taliban and later Daesh.
The second reason gender became important in Afghanistan and Iraq is 
because, although this varied by geography and time, one of the features 
that did emerge was that of ‘war among the people’, at other times 
described as the ‘three-block war’ phenomenon. This concept, articulated 
by US Marine Corps General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s, envisaged 
the close relationship between combat operations, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance undertaken simultaneously within the space 
15  N. Al-Ali and N. Pratt, What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 2009, p. 56.
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of three neighbouring  city blocks. In this context, women, children and 
communities were integrated into battlefield and conflict zones to an extent 
not seen by the ADF or modern Western militaries in living memory.
Third, there was a new international legal framework influencing security 
and military operations. In 2000, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
was adopted by the UN Security Council, followed by a wave of other 
WPS-related Security Council resolutions . UNSCR 1325 ‘reaffirms the 
important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
… and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full 
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and security’.16
To explore lesson learned, five aspects will be considered: female 
engagement teams (FETs); gender advisers (GAs); Australian commanders’ 
perspectives; the strategic approach to WPS; and general lessons.17
Female engagement teams
In response to the ‘war among the people’ dimension, the United States 
raised FETs in Iraq, most notably though its Lioness program.18 An early 
lesson was that the women were not adequately trained in crew-served 
weapons systems and patrolling techniques used by the Marines, which 
differed from those taught by the US Army in basic Infantry Minor 
Tactics training.19
ADF members became involved in FETs as part of a larger approach 
managed by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan. Australian Major Grant Prendergast was the FET 
Commander for ISAF from March to October 2012. He introduced 
new initiatives, such as requiring completed FET patrols to produce 
a  ‘quad-slide’ summarising key insights and learnings from each patrol 
within 24 hours, synchronising efforts of FET patrols, and facilitating 
16  Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, ‘Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and 
Security’, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps (retrieved 25 March 2020).
17  The analytical time-period has been extended from 2014 to 2017 to capture WPS lessons, which 
were pertinent to the Middle East yet did not begin to be progressed by the ADF until around 2012.
18  M. McLagan and D. Sommers, Lioness (documentary), Roco Films/Public Broadcasting Service, 
USA, 2008
19  M. Mackenzie, Beyond the Band of Brothers: The US Military and the Myth that Women Can’t 
Fight, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.
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a  process whereby they could all collectively learn from each other. 
FETs were given formal orders, end-states and detailed information 
messaging guidance.
Through these more structured and regular FET activities, nascent 
standard operating procedures emerged. Major Prendergast concluded 
that FETs were effective in aiding in situational awareness, for example on 
Taliban presence; however, great care was required when planning how and 
when to employ FETs owing to risks to local women and FET members. 
Sometimes the risks were so high that it was not worth employing FETs 
directly. FETs were created in theatre, and women were drawn from 
existing units undertaking a 55-hour certification course while deployed. 
RAAF Warrant Officer Fiona Grasby was the second in command of the 
Force Protection and Security Section Multi-National Command, Tarin 
Kowt, from July 2012 to January 2013. She observed:
We searched the women and children in a partitioned area at the 
Main Entry Control Point, away from the men, and would then 
monitor them until … we were required to escort them to the 
flight line. We were cognisant not to be too familiar with women 
who visited regularly (in the view of others), as they may have then 
been used to target us. Behind the safety of the screens, though, 
there were hugs and food swapping and gift giving. Being aware of 
the atmospherics was paramount.20
Australian special forces also experimented with FET patrols in 
Afghanistan, using medics and local contractors. However, it was assessed 
that these were not well integrated into what was called ‘human terrain 
analysis’ or intelligence collection plans. There were various attempts 
to recruit Afghanistan nationals for indigenous FETs; however, these 
attempts failed.
The Australian Civil-Military Centre conducted some analysis on FETs, 
but noted a key problem was that there was not enough data or knowledge 
about FET activities to draw definitive conclusions. Nonetheless, 
they assessed that, on the basis of limited knowledge, FETs appeared 
to be a  ‘useful operational tool that ought to be integrated into future 
operational planning’.21
20  Conversation with author.
21  H. Studdert and S. Shteir, Women, Peace and Security Reflections: From Australian Male Leaders, 




Apart from FET, another category of engagement for women was as 
gender advisers (GAs). The ADF deployed a number of GAs into Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The role of the GA varied greatly, reflecting that some 
were deployed when such initiatives were in start-up phases—whereby 
obtaining  funding and agreements was a large part of their tasking—
while later GAs could focus upon pragmatic operationalisation of 
WPS objectives.
Over several rotations some WPS objectives were progressed, despite the 
extreme difficulties involved. For example, a girls’ school was established 
in Tarin Kowt, and Afghan women were trained as police officers and 
army officers. A ‘soldiers’ card’ on WPS was developed, and briefings 
were incorporated as part of the mainstream component of the Force 
Preparation and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration 
(RSO&I) processes.
GAs were well prepared for their roles through being sent on a variety of 
specialised training courses, such as those conducted at the Nordic Centre 
for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden, and other NATO-sponsored 
courses. Additionally, GAs were considered to be highly collegial, allowing 
informal learning to occur in addition to the formal programs.
What emerged is that the GA role is complex and required understanding 
a wide range of legislation and policies from the United Nations, NATO, 
coalition forces, the ADF and the relevant countries within the area of 
operations. Given the significant challenges in unravelling various levels 
of rulings, GAs did not have formal authority, but relied upon their 
ability to persuade and influence to make a difference. An example of this 
circumstance is the experience of Captain Stacey Porter, RAN.
Captain Porter was assigned as the senior GA to the Commander, Resolute 
Support Mission, Afghanistan, from April 2016 to February 2017. 
She observed that while the gender training was largely tactical in nature 
and about instilling a gender perspective in all aspects of operations, this 
was not strictly what she did; instead, she was working at a high level 
in collaboration with ministerial, political, civil society, international 
community and vice-regal actors.
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Afghanistan launched its National Action Plan (NAP) on 13 June 2015, 
but during Porter’s time she observed that, on the ground, very little 
work was being done to implement many of its actions. She attributed 
this slow progress to three factors. First, the immediate problem that 
Afghanistan was still largely a country at war; the Afghans continued to 
fight the Taliban and the 14 other terrorist groups that existed in their 
country, so it was not surprising that other issues took precedence at the 
ministerial level.
The second reason for the slow traction on the NAP was the backlog 
of legal and legislative issues to be resolved. For example, much work 
was being conducted on trying to get approval for the draft penal code, 
which sought to address challenges like the incompatibility of Afghan law 
with Afghanistan’s obligations under international treaties (including that 
of human and women’s rights, which was not ratified). Other work was 
concentrated on the High Peace Council, a body appointed by President 
Karzai to negotiate reconciliation with the Taliban.
Finally, there were cultural issues. Women’s political marginalisation and 
other forms of gender discrimination were the norm. Explaining this, 
Porter remarked: ‘While I was deployed, a six-year-old was married off 
to a 60-year-old in exchange for a goat, a bag of flour, and a jar of ghee 
… When these norms exist, you can appreciate the uphill battle we had.’
Porter reflected that, at the end of the day, NATO was institution-
building in Afghanistan. To do so, NATO concentrated on advising the 
Afghans how to become independent and self-reliant. The view was that 
any solutions had to be Afghan-led and process-based. However, by the 
time Captain Porter left some nine and a half months later, she observed, 
‘NATO was starting to realise that this approach was going to take a lot 
longer than they realised’.
Porter commented that the biggest challenge was encouraging the move 
from merely increasing recruiting figures to advising the Afghans on the 
development of a human resource strategy for women in the security 
forces. Crucial to this was having females assigned to positions on the 
manning document, or Tashkil, so that adequate specialised training and 
career management could be achieved.22




Australian commanders, from tactical to strategic levels, provided further 
useful insights on WPS. For instance, at the tactical level, an Air Force 
ground defence officer made this observation:
Women still were not allowed to join as [Air Defence Guards/
Ground Defence] when we were in Iraq, and for most of our time 
in Afghanistan. I remember it was an issue when I was attached 
to [the Royal Air Force] and we were patrolling [the area] around 
Kandahar because we couldn’t enter any compounds with women 
in them and I remember wishing we had some girls so that they 
could access certain areas that otherwise we could not. About this 
time [the US Marine Corps] started using female platoons for that 
exact purpose. Beyond that, small numbers of female dog handlers 
and security police performed security (as opposed to ‘combat’) 
roles, at bases such as [Al-Minhad Air Base].23
At the operational level, Bernard Philip, from DFAT, headed the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan from 2010 to 2011. Considering 
WPS, Philip’s reflections capture the immense difficulty of engaging women 
in Uruzgan—Taliban heartland. He decided to avoid direct action on 
gender issues, explaining that this decision was ‘the product of an intuitive 
judgement that a direct approach to gender equality would be counter-
productive and constitute a red line for the male leaders of Uruzgan’.24
He therefore pursued indirect methods such as aid programs to support 
children. Of these indirect methods, Philip assessed that perhaps the 
most enduring was the example of gender inclusion the PRT provided, 
especially in allowing Afghan men to experience it. Male Uruzghani 
leaders were enthusiastic about meeting Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
and Major General (then Brigadier) Simone Wilkie on her visits, and 
they worked well with female leaders within the PRT. Philip noted that, 
somewhat ironically, PRT civilian female diplomats and advisers
enjoyed some of the closest and most productive relationships with 
key tribal and government leaders. I remember one of our female 
diplomats being especially effective in strengthening the resolve of 
a key tribal leader to remain engaged with the government and to 
discourage his tribe from supporting the Taliban.25
23  Conversations between an anonymous male RAAF ground defence officer and author.
24  Studdert and Shteir, Women, Peace and Security Reflections, p. 50.
25  Ibid.
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At the strategic level, Major General Fergus McLachlan was a senior 
military planner with the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan from November 2012 to November 2013. He assessed that 
the overall mission would have been better positioned to address WPS 
issues if they had been integrated into earlier ISAF planning activities.26 
Another lesson is the deeper insights into Taliban strategy. McLachlan 
notes that the Taliban sought to attack the social cohesion of the Afghan 
community and that one way to do so was through targeting women 
and girls. Their cold-bloodedness in pursuing this strategy was evident 
in such incidents as the bombing of a busload of women and girls. 
This led McLachlan to observe: ‘We have an increasingly sophisticated 
understanding that we must also defeat the enemy across their range of 
objectives, including their deliberate targeting of women and girls.’27
To counter this, the ISAF sought to shift responsibility for town security 
to police forces, so that military forces could be freed up to pursue the 
Taliban outside the township. McLachlan, again, commented:
We made gains for the security of women and girls in Afghanistan 
by moving the violent clashes between the Taliban and the 
security forces away from the population centres … In Kabul and 
Kandahar, Afghan police chiefs gained control of their cities—the 
two largest cities in the country became increasingly safe places for 
women and girls—but only as a subset of broader security gains.28
The strategic approach to Women, Peace 
and Security
Reflecting on the issue of WPS and whether there was a strategic approach 
and analysis, various GAs and commanders agreed that the ability to 
progress WPS objectives was extremely difficult, mostly owing to the 
cultural contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also owing to the existence 
of a war. However, it is also possible that progress was hindered by the 
way WPS was conceptualised and managed. As Captain Porter observed, 
‘Effectively, NATO forces are conducting what we term non-combat 
operations in a combat environment.’29
26  Ibid., pp. 55–61.
27  Ibid., p. 61.
28  Ibid., p. 60.
29  Conversations with author.
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Initiatives seemed burdened by bureaucratic paperwork, legislative tasks, 
transferring WPS objectives into policy, and then funding cycles. Part of 
this was because WPS was not treated as an operational matter but rather 
an administrative one. For example, if the key present hurdle in Afghanistan 
is the legislative backlog, the logical solution would be to bolster legal and 
policy support. It is not clear, however, that such a reorientation of effort 
was considered, let alone implemented. In general, one wonders where the 
role of creative or transformative thought exists in the WPS space—for 
example, the application of design thinking to the problem, or the conduct 
of large multidisciplinary problem-solving workshops and conferences, as 
have occurred for other intractable security dilemmas. It was not apparent 
that any agency had either the mandate or the resources to undertake 
this task. Government progress reports during this period focused on 
compliance rather than effectiveness, and seemed to paint a universally 
‘good story’, which did not identify problems or opportunities to improve 
a new initiative in its critical start-up, growth phase.30
Perhaps related to the lack of strategic analysis has been the issue of 
lukewarm attitudes towards WPS activities by some within the security 
sector. GAs had quite different perspectives on this, several noting 
excellent support, especially from command levels. Others thought it 
was personality dependent, while another noted that what she called the 
‘middle management level’ of the ADF could be sceptical. This often 
related to people not understanding what WPS was about, or getting it 
confused with general internal institutional equity initiatives. One GA 
speculated as to whether the impact of external investigations into the 
ADF on gender issues during 2012–14,31 which involved some painful 
revelations and sudden changes, have indirectly undermined some 
people’s enthusiasm for WPS initiatives. Porter, for instance, in her role as 
senior GA to the Commander, Resolute Support Mission, in Afghanistan 
in 2016, observed:
I was quite unprepared for the comments that came from within 
RSM [Resolute Support Mission] such as ‘what about the men?’ 
and ‘why are we putting gender before the fight?’ … I had to 
remain diplomatically stoic in the face of not only Afghan cultural 
and organisational resistance but that of coalition complaints.32
30  Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Progress Report on the Australian National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security: 2012–2018, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2016.
31  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Report on Abuse in Defence, and Defence Committee, 
Pathway to Change.
32  Conversations with author.
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Similarly, Lieutenant Commander Donna Sill, GA to Commander 
JTF 633 in 2017, observed: ‘The most regular question has been “but 
how is this relevant to my job?” The gender adviser role is primarily about 
developing awareness of gender-related issues and developing tools that 
allow others to answer this question themselves.’33
The impact of some of this disinterest or doubt subtly slowed the ability 
of GAs to progress WPS initiatives, while others would argue that 
dealing with such attitudes was and remains part of the GA role. Some 
people’s ambivalence towards WPS initiatives could reflect deeper general 
Australian cultural attitudes to traditional gender roles and activities of 
the military. Addressing such attitudes will require broader approaches 
before further progress can be achieved.34
General lessons
Overall, in relation to the gender dimension of the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars, and how the coalition and ADF responded to it, four key lessons 
have been identified. The first and most important lesson is that there 
were opportunity costs of ‘gender ignorance’ or inadequate analysis before 
the outbreak of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and during the conflicts. 
Coalition operations could have benefited from a greater understanding of 
gender-related issues in the early framing, conceptualisation and planning 
phases of operations. In addition to those already discussed, there are 
a number of additional aspects, which I will just touch on here.
The first is masculinity studies, which could have aided analysis of the 
human dimension. See, for example, work on Afghan men by Echavez, 
Mosawi and Pilongo, who analysed views of masculinity by different groups 
in Afghanistan, finding that the prevailing view was that men were nafaqah 
providers, responsible for family security, safety and all ‘living support’ and 
financial needs.35 Second is pedophilia and especially bacha bāzī (or  ‘boy 
rape’, as it is commonly referred to in Afghanistan). The high-profile 
case of US Sergeant First Class Charles Martland, who in 2011 assaulted 
an Afghan police officer who had raped a 12-year-old boy, brought to 
33  Conversations with author.
34  Boulton, Teaming.
35  C.R. Echavez, S. Mosawi and L.W.R. Pilongo, The Other Side of Gender Inequality: Men and 
Masculinities in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, 2016, p. 19.
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global attention the lack of adequate coalition policies to deal with such 
incidents.36 Third is counter-insurgency and gender; other analysis suggests 
that counter-insurgency efforts would have been improved had greater 
efforts been made to incorporate women.37 Fourth is the issue of women 
in special forces and arms corps functions. If women had been employed 
more strategically, it is possible they might have helped with situational 
awareness, thereby improving planning and benefiting the entire force. 
There are many unknowns about Iraqi and Afghan women’s perspectives 
and experiences at critical moments of the campaigns. Although these 
details might have been included in post-mission reports, they have been 
less visible in mainstream military accounts in the public arena. This leaves 
a knowledge vacuum, potentially limiting strategic discourse. Fifth is the 
issue of people who identify as LGBTI. Greater attention to lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) issues might have allowed early 
warning on the extreme vulnerability of LGBTI locals to violent attack and 
executions by groups like Daesh,38 and to have enacted warnings proactively 
or to have initiated other protective strategies.
The second lesson is that the ADF conducted WPS-type activities before 
Australia adopted UNSCR 1325 but used different language to describe 
them. For example, in 2003–04, the Security Detachment in Baghdad 
was heavily involved with the kindergarten in their area of operations, and 
they connected to the entire community in layered ways. This approach 
was often considered standard practice, sometimes managed through 
civil–military cooperation constructs.
Colonel Studdert’s quite amazing account of how he used an understanding 
of gender dynamics to achieve operational outcomes, as part of the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992–93, is another 
example.39 These instances demonstrate that the stereotype of military 
males being ignorant about such issues might not be fair. It is possible 
that this type of existing expertise, which relates to the WPS task within 
conflict zones, has not been properly acknowledged nor harnessed.
36  K. Jahner, ‘Green Beret who beat up accused child rapist can stay in Army’, Army Times, 28 April 
2016.
37  M. Anderson, ‘Where are the women? The unfortunate omission in the Army’s COIN doctrine’, 
Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy, West Point, 2017.
38  J. Stern, ‘The UN Security Council’s Arria-formula meeting on vulnerable groups in conflict: 
ISIL’s targeting of LGBTI individuals’, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 48, 
pp. 1191–8, 2015, nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/NYU_JILP_48_4_Stern.pdf (retrieved 
30 April 2020).
39  Studdert and Shteir, Women, Peace and Security Reflections, p. 7.
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The third lesson is that gender lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan should 
not drive conceptual development. Although the Iraq and Afghanistan 
experience provides valuable WPS lessons, it might be unwise to use this 
experience as a template for future planning. In other regions, such as the 
Asia Pacific or Africa, women have far different, often considerably more 
influential roles in their societies. Such environments might demand 
greater resources and a more comprehensive approach than was possible 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The fourth lesson is that Australian national policy setting on WPS is 
slow. For instance, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325 on 
WPS in 2000; however, Australia did not commit to implementing it 
until 2015. This 15-year delay meant that the ADF did not have WPS 
policy and a developed WPS capability in place in time for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined a range of gender-related issues as they concern 
ADF operations, both internal to the ADF and external. The activity 
that occurred from the late 1980s to expand women’s military roles and 
mainstream women into standard military units was at times difficult 
and flawed, with recurrent scandals prompting external reviews. These 
received immense media attention and dominated the Australian public’s 
perception of women and the military. However, a ‘good story’ quietly 
paralleled this period as well.
By the time the Afghanistan and Iraq wars commenced, in many areas 
of the ADF women were well integrated into teams, were well trained, 
and had the requisite experience to perform well under pressure. 
Although both wars had tragic outcomes, ADF women gained invaluable 
operational experience and a depth of expertise that increased as the wars 
progressed. It is unfortunate that the Australian community, during the 
conduct of the wars, were largely kept ignorant of the brave, resourceful 
and historically significant feats of various ADF women, instead receiving 
an almost ceaseless and unbalanced story of ADF women as victims. 
Another untold story is that, owing to numerical realities, in the main, 
it was ADF men who effectively trained and developed these pioneering 
women, from the late 1980s onwards.
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To be sure, there was a distinction between the vast bulk of ADF units 
and specialities that were long used to working in mixed-gender teams 
and those units for which mixed-gender teams was still a novel experience. 
Not surprisingly, leaders from generally mixed units had solid repertoires 
of skills for managing minor gender issues that might arise and were able 
to set command climates that supported cohesion. For mothers, some 
flexibility was often needed, and the chain of command was the critical 
point that determined how possible and successful their deployment was. 
The impact of the ‘longest war’ on fathering duties requires analysis.
Like most Western military forces, the ADF was not ready for a gendered 
battlespace at the start of the century. New capabilities were often developed 
in theatre and then, perhaps owing to culturally related trepidation or 
a lack of expertise, were not properly analysed or developed. The setting 
up of capability to address WPS was unfathomably slow compared to 
responses to other new dimensions, like IED, cyber or drone warfare. 
Indeed, the promise of WPS has not yet been realised.
There were six inquiries into aspects of ADF culture during the period 
2011–14 (with gender issues being prominent). It is possible therefore that 
gender issues became associated with pain and shame. This might have 
subtly influenced some individual, and possibly institutional, support for 
WPS activities. In essence, the effect of this is that WPS issues remain 
underanalysed and could suffer from being segregated from mainstream 
capability development and operational planning processes. In general, 
limited data capture or inclusion of the gender dimension in multiple 
routine post-operational review and analysis activities hinders the ability 
of the ADF to understand the gender dimension in a sophisticated way. 
This, in turn, limits the ADF’s collective ability to refine methods and 
exploit emerging opportunities.
Without women in arms corps or special forces, it is likely that the ADF 
lacked certain unique capabilities that could have been advantageous. 
Although three Victoria Crosses were awarded to men, no Nancy Wake 
equivalent emerged, nor had the opportunity to emerge, in these conflicts. 
Other opportunities were also likely to have been lost through ignorance 
of other issues such as masculinity studies.
As a final point, a key lesson is that national strategic security planning 
needs to be forward-looking regarding demographic and societal changes, 
which affect not only our own troops but also the external operating 
environment.






Lessons and legacies of the 
war in Afghanistan
William Maley
In 1897, Rudyard Kipling penned some verses to mark Queen Victoria’s 
Diamond Jubilee. Kipling is often seen as virtually the poet laureate of 
British 19th-century imperialism, but his words on this occasion, a poem 
called Recessional, offered a warning against the sin of hubris:
Far-called, our navies melt away,
On dune and headland sinks the fire,
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday,
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget.
It is quite common at conferences dealing with Afghanistan to hear 
some speaker quote Kipling’s words about that country, although 
Kipling never set foot in Afghanistan, and images of Afghanistan in the 
19th  century offer a poor guide to the complexities of Afghanistan in 
the 21st century. Kipling’s Recessional, however, does have some lessons to 
offer. One is that military power can be a crude tool for realising political 
objectives. Another is that well-intentioned actions can have unintended 
consequences. But a third, perhaps not intended by Kipling, is that how 
one assesses particular actions might crucially depend upon the point in 
time at which one attempts an assessment. This was captured in Hegel’s 
famous comment that the Owl of Minerva spreads her wings only when 
dusk is setting, and in the remark of Zhou Enlai, who, when asked what he 
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thought was the main consequence of the French Revolution, responded 
that it was too soon to tell. Today there is no shortage of works, some 
of high quality, proclaiming the international enterprise in Afghanistan 
after 2001 to have been a failure.1 This judgement, however, might be 
premature. While no one would dream of pronouncing it a dazzling 
success, the jury is ultimately still out, and large numbers of Afghans 
have no desire to return to the environment that confronted them before 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM overthrew the Taliban regime 
in October and November 2001.
In seeking to draw lessons from experience in Afghanistan, inevitably 
different observers will come up with different conclusions. This is in 
part because various actors involved in the Afghanistan theatre became 
engaged on the basis of different interests and values. But that said, it is 
worthwhile to pay some attention to the attitudes of ordinary Afghans, 
whose perspectives are almost always omitted from explorations of this 
kind. Yet we have clearer windows into their thinking than we often 
have into the policy processes of Western countries that became involved 
in Afghanistan. Since 2004, the Asia Foundation has been conducting 
rigorous surveys of mass opinion in Afghanistan, and the results are 
quite illuminating. An enduring question has related to the mood in 
Afghanistan, with respondents being asked whether they thought things 
in Afghanistan were going in the right direction or in the wrong direction. 
In 2004, the mood was one of optimism: 64 per cent responded positively 
and only 11 per cent negatively. There was a stark shift by 2006; the 
percentage responding positively had dropped to 44 and the percentage 
responding negatively had risen to 21. From 2008, perceptions steadily 
improved, with those positively inclined rising from 38 per cent in 2008 
to 58 per cent in 2013, although the percentage with a negative view also 
rose, from 32 per cent to 37 per cent. With the substantial withdrawal 
of foreign forces, however, the national mood again took a turn for the 
worse: in 2017, fully 61 per cent concluded that things were going in 
the wrong direction, with only 33 per cent of the view that things were 
going in the right direction.2 
1  See for example N. Coburn, Losing Afghanistan: An Obituary for the Intervention, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2016; F. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in the 9/11 
Wars, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2017; and A.B. O’Connell (ed.), Our Latest Longest War: 
Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2017.
2  Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2017: A Survey of the Afghan People, Asia Foundation, Kabul, 
2017, p. 203.
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Major General Abdul Hamid, Commander 205th Hero Corps, Afghan 
National Army, addresses tribal elders at a Shura held at an Afghan 
National Army base in Chah Chineh, Afghanistan, 2013.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
Interestingly, the two main plunges in confidence took place 
when international attention shifted away from Afghanistan, with 
the deterioration of the US position in Iraq in 2005–06, and with the 
completion of transition in Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Whether 
this represented causation or merely correlation is difficult to tell, but it 
does suggest that when international forces substantially withdrew from 
Afghanistan, ordinary Afghans were not cheering the process.
In the remarks that follow, my aim is to focus on some specific lessons 
for military deployments that might be of value to the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) in the future, as well as on the ongoing problem of 
insurgency and on questions related to where Afghanistan might go from 
here. Before doing so, however, there are two overarching observations 
about the situation in Afghanistan that are potentially relevant to other 
conflict zones in which Australian forces could be deployed.
First, Afghanistan since 2001 has been exposed to the forces of 
globalisation to a greater extent than virtually any other country in the 
world. The effects have been all the more dramatic because of the extent 
of the isolation of the country during the period of Taliban rule following 
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the fall of the Afghan capital in September 1996.3 Opening Afghanistan 
to the wider world has been one of the greatest achievements wrought by 
the international presence in the country. With 70 per cent of the settled 
population under the age of 30,4 the scope for the Afghan population 
to prove receptive to new ideas and new ways of proceeding might be 
somewhat greater than is often thought. The crucial point to note here 
is that military deployments do not take place in an environment that is 
frozen and fixed. On the contrary, the context of deployments is almost 
always one that is subject to dynamic forces at a number of levels. From 
a longer-term point of view, societies are in a process of near-constant 
change and adjustment while, on a day-to-day basis, individual actors 
are routinely reconfiguring and renegotiating their relationships and 
recalculating what kind of alignments will best serve their interests in the 
absence of the kind of certainties that the existence of a consolidated state 
can offer.
Second, the psychology of the situation in a fraught environment such as 
that of Afghanistan could be absolutely central to the success or failure 
of international interventions.5 Put bluntly, it does not pay to be on the 
losing side if one is an ordinary Afghan, and the importance of military 
deployments might lie not so much in what they physically achieve but 
in the wider psychological climate that they foster. This, in turn, will 
depend to some extent on how well international militaries understand 
the minutiae of their operational environment. Given the complexity of 
Afghan society, mastering such detail would be no easy task,6 but failure 
in this sphere can lead to misdiagnosis of conflict formations, with 
serious ramifications for the effectiveness of both kinetic operations and 
reconstruction activities.
3  See H. Mohammadi, Tasir-e jahanishodan bar farhang dar Afghanistan, Entesharat-e Farhang, 
Kabul, 2014.
4  Central Statistics Organization, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2016–17, CSO, Kabul, 2016–17, 
p. 5.
5  W. Maley, ‘Afghanistan on a knife-edge’, Global Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1, 2016, pp. 57–68.
6  See W. Maley, ‘Studying host-nationals in operational areas: The challenge of Afghanistan’, in 
Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, ed. J. Soeters, P.M. Shields and S. Rietjens 
(eds), Routledge, London, 2014, pp. 53–64.
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Some lessons for military deployments
There are a large number of lessons one might potentially extract from 
the international deployment in Afghanistan from 2001, and different 
analysts will likely produce different lists. The following seven points 
therefore are in no sense definitive; they simply reflect what this writer 
considers worth canvassing with an interested audience.
First, military deployments always need to be linked to a political strategy. 
One of the enduring criticisms of the international involvement in 
Afghanistan after 2001 was that, following the overthrow of the Taliban 
regime, the precise aims of international action were relatively unclear, 
leading to improvisation on the ground and contradictory assertions at the 
higher policy level as to the purpose of the mission.7 This does not foster 
the confidence on the ground on the part of locals that should be central 
to any such mission to encourage, and it can lead soldiers to be deeply 
frustrated at the wilderness of mirrors in which they seem to be living. This 
of course is not a problem that militaries can resolve on their own; rather, 
it depends upon the willingness and ability of senior political leaderships 
to develop a coherent image of what they are seeking to do. Great wartime 
leaders, such as Winston Churchill, are almost always individuals who 
prove capable of articulating and driving a grand strategic vision that offers 
a pathway for achieving defensible and desirable goals. In the Afghanistan 
case, part of the problem was that there was no Churchill on hand to 
perform this task, and another was that the countries contributing forces 
to Afghanistan did not see themselves as being on a war footing.
Second, it is not possible to stabilise a disrupted state such as Afghanistan on 
a province-by-province basis. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
approach that took shape in Afghanistan provided some opportunity to 
do good for some people, but it neither constituted a coherent model for 
reconstruction activity nor supplied a workable framework for addressing 
the problem of ambient insecurity. The ‘ink spot’ theory positing that 
local stability, created by the deployment of a PRT to a particular area, 
might then spread more widely proved to be ill founded for several 
reasons. On the one hand, while Afghans are not ingrates, they are also not 
inclined to align themselves politically on the basis of gratitude for what 
7  See S. Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 2012; and D.P. Auerswald and S.M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Together, Fighting 
Alone, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014.
NICHE WARS
276
has been done for them in the past rather than on the basis of a rational 
calculation of what is likely to happen to  them in the future. On  the 
other hand, there is evidence that in areas that were already contested 
between the government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition, aid 
was more likely to aggravate conflict than defuse it, providing ‘soft’ targets 
for attack and inspiring the enemy to concentrate its firepower.8 Both of 
these considerations worked against aid delivery producing a significant 
political dividend.
Third, in a number of further senses, aid can act as a fuel for conflict rather 
than function as a flame retardant. In many parts of Afghanistan, there are 
long-standing, ongoing conflicts that do not fit easily into a simple model 
of enmity between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.9 International 
actors might inadvertently find themselves injecting resources into conflicts 
of this kind, conflicts of the dynamics and dimensions of which they are 
blissfully unaware. For example, the Helmand Food Zone Programme, 
trumpeted as a major counter-narcotics endeavour, ended up feeding 
the patronage networks of the provincial governor,10 in a way that was 
profoundly corrupting of Afghanistan’s wider state-building enterprise.11
Fourth, ‘stability’ can prove remarkably tenuous. The classic example of 
this was the fall of the town of Kunduz to Taliban forces for a fortnight 
from 28 September 2015. Kunduz was not a hamlet in the middle of 
nowhere. It was a strategically important urban centre where a German 
PRT had been deployed for a considerable period of time.12 Through much 
of 2015, the situation in the vicinity of the town had been deteriorating, 
but this meant that when it eventually did fall to the Taliban, it was 
hardly an event that came out of the blue.13 The human consequences for 
8  R. Sexton, ‘Aid as a tool against insurgency: Evidence from contested and controlled territory 
in Afghanistan’, American Political Science Review, vol. 110, no. 4, 2016, pp. 731–49.
9  M. Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, Hurst & Co., London, 
2014.
10  D. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan, Hurst & Co., London, 
2016, pp. 225, 242.
11  S. Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, W.W. Norton, New York, 
2015, pp. 59–60.
12  See W. Maley, ‘Civil–military interaction in Afghanistan: The case of Germany’, in Reconstructing 
Afghanistan: Civil–Military Experiences in Comparative Perspective, ed. W. Maley and S. Schmeidl, 
Routledge, London, 2015, pp. 98–109.
13  M. Kamal, ‘L’offensive de Koundouz: Le contexte militaro-stratégique’, Les Nouvelles d’Afghanistan, 
vol. 151, pp. 7–11.
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ordinary Afghans were devastating,14 and the psychological effect in other 
parts of Afghanistan proved considerable, even though government forces 
managed to reassert control over the town from 13 October. The same 
was true of the fall of the strategic town of Ghazni in August 2018, an 
event for which the Afghan Government and its backers were not prepared 
despite clear warning signs, and which sent reverberations through many 
other parts of Afghanistan.15
Fifth, while it might be convenient in the short run to ground one’s 
engagement with the local population in friendships struck with those 
who appear to be ‘strongmen’, in the long run this tends to be at the 
expense of sustainable institutional development. A crucial point to bear 
in mind in Afghanistan is that when you make a friend, you can also make 
an enemy. Much political activity in Afghanistan is based on networks, 
and different networks can be in brutal competition with each other.16 
But network relations are also in a process of constant renegotiation, 
and cannot be taken for granted. In 2010, a senior Australian general 
described the police chief in Uruzgan, Matiullah Khan, as ‘our guy’.17 
This observation was alarming in two critical respects. In Afghanistan, 
no political actor is ever ‘our guy’. Local actors, quite understandably, 
almost always have objectives of their own that need not coincide with 
those of their international backers,18 and Matiullah certainly had his 
own agenda.19 In addition, individuals are not institutions, and can be 
eliminated quickly once they have acquired the wrong enemies. This 
was what happened to Matiullah, who was assassinated in Kabul in 
March 2015.20 A cynic might say that by this time, he had exhausted his 
usefulness to the ADF; but of course, the relationship between the ADF 
14  UNAMA, Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Special Report on Kunduz 
Province, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Kabul, 2015, pp. 13–18.
15  See N. Azadzoi and R. Nordland, ‘Afghanistan says it controls key city, but ravaged streets show 
otherwise’, New York Times, 12 August 2018.
16  See T. Sharan and S. Bose, ‘Political networks and the 2014 Afghan presidential election: Power 
restructuring, ethnicity and state stability’, Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 16, no. 6, 2016, 
p. 616; and T. Sharan, Dawlat-e Shabakahi: Rabeteh-i Qodrat wa Sarwat dar Afghanistan Pas az Sal-e 
2001, Vazhah Publications, Kabul, 2017.
17  D. Oakes, ‘General defends Afghan warlord ties’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 2010.
18  See W.C. Ladwig, The Forgotten Front: Patron–Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
19  S. Schmeidl, The Man Who Would be King: The Challenges to Strengthening Governance in Uruzgan, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, 2010.




and Matiullah had wider implications for the long-term effectiveness of 
what Australia had been attempting to achieve in Uruzgan.21 The dangers 
of dependence on individuals is a pervasive one, and was again illustrated 
with the assassination on 18 October 2018 of the ‘strongman’ of Kandahar 
Province, the 39-year-old police chief General Abdul Raziq.22
Sixth, time is the ultimate scarce commodity, and it is often in short 
supply in undertakings such as that in Afghanistan. April 2018 marked 
the 40th anniversary of the communist coup in Afghanistan that tipped 
the country into disorder, and it has not enjoyed much serenity since 
that disastrous event. When a country has experienced four decades 
of dislocation, it is naïve in the extreme to think that it will be able to 
rapidly recover from all the accumulated consequences. Yet the time 
frames of international missions, let alone the domestic politics of the 
states contributing to them, rarely make much allowance for this, and the 
consequence can be a neglect of sustainability, a focus on ‘quick impact 
projects’, and a reluctance to engage in relationship-building except with 
what might appear to be existing powerholders.
Seventh, exercises of the kind in which the ADF engaged in Afghanistan 
might from the point of view of political leaders be almost entirely 
unrelated to the needs of the people whom nominally one is helping. 
This is not for one moment to challenge the genuine commitment of 
Australian personnel at the operational level to aiding the local population 
of Afghanistan, but simply to recognise that Australia’s strategic narrative—
to the extent that it had one of its own at all—was not focused on aiding 
Afghans but on preventing Afghanistan from being used as a terrorist 
base for attacks on other peoples, and on consolidating Australia’s alliance 
relationship with the United States.23 These are not trivial objectives, 
and might well have been formulated as they were in order to make 
the deployment to Afghanistan more palatable to the general public in 
21  See also C. Masters, No Front Line: Australia’s Special Forces at War in Afghanistan, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 2017, pp. 262–3.
22  T. Shah and M. Mashal, ‘Taliban assassinate Afghan police chief ahead of elections’, New York 
Times, 19 October 2018.
23  See W. Maley, ‘PRT activity in Afghanistan: The Australian experience’, in Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan: Multi-national Contributions to Reconstruction, ed. N. Hynek and P. Marton, Routledge, 
New York, 2011, pp. 124–38; and W. Maley, ‘The war in Afghanistan: Australia’s strategic narratives’, 
in Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, ed. 
B. de Graaf, G. Dimitriu and J. Ringsmose, Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 81–97.
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Australia. However, in treating assistance to the people of Afghanistan 
simply as a means to some other end, it ran the risk of devaluing them, an 
experience with which they are all too familiar.
The problem of insurgency
The great failure of the international enterprise in Afghanistan from 2001 
to 2014 was that it at no time came effectively to grips with the principal 
factor driving ongoing insurgency, namely the availability to the Taliban 
of operating bases and support in Pakistan.24 As recently as 1 March 2016, 
the Pakistani Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj 
Aziz, admitted in a presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations 
in Washington, DC, that the ‘leadership’ of the Afghan Taliban ‘is in 
Pakistan’. The attack on Kunduz in 2015 was not carried out by a rag-tag 
peasant army but by what David Kilcullen has called ‘professional full-
time fighters, put through rigorous training by experienced instructors in 
the camps in Pakistan, with uniforms, vehicles, heavy weapons, encrypted 
radios, and a formal command structure’.25 Afghanistan has serious 
problems of poor governance, but what makes them critical is the ongoing 
‘creeping invasion’ by its neighbour to the east, using surrogates as a tool 
to try to deny influence in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s great regional and 
geopolitical rival, India.26 This problem is not one that Afghanistan is 
in a position to confront on its own, and nor is it one for the militaries 
deployed to Afghanistan to solve. Unfortunately, it is also not one that 
most leaders of states that have contributed forces to Afghanistan have 
been prepared to take up either, although President Trump has now begun 
to address it.27 The result has been to put Afghanistan in a kind of holding 
pattern, which it will most likely continue to occupy unless and until 
diplomatic and political pressure is brought to bear on Islamabad to cease 
its destructive activities. Ironically, there is a strong interest-based case for 
Pakistan to do so, since its nurturing of the Afghan Taliban predictably led 
to the emergence of a Pakistani spin-off that has brought terror and grief 
24  See C. Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
New York, 2014.
25  D. Kilcullen, Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror, Black Inc., Melbourne, 
2016, p. 77.
26  W. Maley, Transition in Afghanistan: Hope, Despair and the Limits of Statebuilding, Routledge, 
New York, 2018.
27  Z. Khalilzad, ‘Why Trump is right to get tough with Pakistan’, New York Times, 23 August 2017.
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to different parts of Pakistan. But regrettably, senior Pakistani generals 
tend to be insulated from the ill-effects of the actions undertaken by 
their forces.
The consequences within Afghanistan have been dire. Kabul has become 
an increasingly dangerous place for ordinary Afghans. On 23  July 
2016, a peaceful demonstration, largely comprising members of the 
historically marginalised Hazara ethnic minority,28 was struck near 
Deh Mazang by bombers, and more than 80 participants in the protest 
were killed. In  August 2016, Taliban terrorists attacked the campus of 
the American University of Afghanistan, killing students and faculty 
members.29 On 8 March 2017, gunmen attacked the Sardar Daud Khan 
hospital in Kabul, killing doctors and patients. And on 31 May 2017, 
a massive explosion was triggered near the German embassy in Kabul 
by a suicide bomber, killing more than 90 people and wounding nearly 
500.30 Bombings since then have continued to claim lives, especially those 
of Hazaras. Rural Afghanistan has become even more dangerous, with 
Hazaras at particular risk when attempting to travel from one part of the 
country to another. The specific targeting of civilians makes these attacks 
not just acts of terrorism but also war crimes. It is by no means clear how 
all this will end.
Where to from here?
Given the reluctance to confront Pakistan over its meddling in Afghanistan, 
Western powers have gone down a rather different path, floating instead 
the idea that Afghanistan can be stabilised through an agreement with the 
Taliban. A number of the more notable writings of this ilk carry a distinct 
whiff of fantasy. For example, in March 2017, a former US ambassador to 
Pakistan, Richard G. Olson, wrote: 
Pakistan’s cynical support for the Taliban is merely the most 
visible of the hedging strategies that various neighbours, including 
the Iranians and the Russians, have adopted to ensure that they 
28  N. Ibrahimi, The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, 
Hurst & Co., London, 2017.
29  M. Mashal, M.F. Abed and Z. Nader, ‘Attack at university in Kabul shatters a sense of freedom’, 
New York Times, 26 August 2016.
30  M. Mashal, F. Abed and J. Sukhanyar, ‘Deadly bombing is among worst of Afghan war’, New York 
Times, 1 June 2017.
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have some armed Afghan faction beholden to their interests. 
A comprehensive political settlement would remove the security 
dilemma that drives these counter-productive interventions.31 
This argument is radically misconceived on three fronts. First, there is no 
real equivalence between the massive and decisive support that Pakistan 
provides to the Taliban and the petty meddling in which various circles in 
Russia and Iran have occasionally engaged. Second, Pakistan’s behaviour 
cannot be understood simply in terms of the idea of a security dilemma: 
its actions involve more than a response to the structural features of the 
international system that can generate security dilemmas in their classic 
form.32 Third, a ‘comprehensive political settlement’ of the kind that 
Ambassador Olson advocates would need to address not just the situation 
in Afghanistan but also the bilateral rivalry between India and Pakistan 
over Kashmir, a rivalry that has defied all endeavours to overcome it since 
the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The belief that the Kashmir 
conflict is ripe for resolution verges on the delusional.
An even more remarkable article on negotiations was penned by another 
former US official, Laurel Miller, who defined the problem as ‘vested 
interests on all sides in continuing the war’, and argued that the United 
States could influence the Taliban’s calculations through ‘applying military 
pressure and offering political opportunity’ and ‘using our leverage with 
the Afghan political elite to ensure their commitment to negotiating’.33 
But there is far more to the conflict in Afghanistan than simply vested 
interests. The Taliban continue to embody a vision of social order that 
is anathema to the very groups whose emergence since 2001 the United 
States and its allies have celebrated, such as educated women, who fear 
that their gains could be sacrificed as part of a negotiation.34 The conflict 
here is much more one of values than of interests. Furthermore, after the 
Taliban’s abominable behaviour in Kunduz in 2015 and Ghazni in 2018, 
few Afghans are under any illusions about what creating space for the 
Taliban might involve, and many would be affronted by the suggestion 
that the United States has any right to offer ‘political opportunity’ to 
the Taliban, especially when the 2017 Asia Foundation survey found 
31  R.G. Olson, ‘The art of a deal with the Taliban’, New York Times, 29 March 2017.
32  See N. Motwani, ‘Afghanistan and the regional security contagion’, in Afghanistan—Challenges 
and Prospects, ed. S. Bose, N. Motwani and W. Maley, Routledge, London, 2018, pp. 219–40.
33  L. Miller, ‘A peace “surge” to end war in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 23 July 2017.
34  E. Cameron and and J. Kamminga, Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in 
Determining Afghanistan’s Future, Oxfam International, Oxford, 2014.
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that 80 per cent of Afghans had ‘no sympathy at all’ for the Taliban.35 
The United States, unfortunately, brings some baggage to the table on this 
issue: on 3 October 1996, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South 
Asia, Robin Raphel, notoriously stated in an interview for the BBC that 
‘We have no quarrel with the Taliban in terms of their political legitimacy 
or lack thereof ’.36 Talk of ‘talking to the Taliban’ has now been around for 
more than a decade,37 and nothing of substance has come of it. This alone 
should make one wary of overestimating what negotiations of this kind are 
likely to deliver. If diplomacy has a role to play, it is in bringing concerted 
pressure to bear on Pakistan to cease its destabilisation of Afghanistan and 
to act as a responsible member of international society.
It is highly unlikely that the Taliban could overthrow the Afghan 
Government by a grinding military campaign of the kind that Soviet 
forces mounted from 12 January 1945 to seize Berlin. That has never 
been the main danger that the Afghan Government faces, and it is not 
in general the way that regimes in Afghanistan change. The danger for 
the Afghan Government is more insidious. It is that simultaneous threats 
to a number of towns such as Kunduz and others of similar significance 
could trigger a ‘cascade’,38 in which actors who did not like the Taliban 
might nonetheless calculate that the Taliban were well on their way back 
to power and that it would be opportune to switch sides. It was cascades 
of this kind that brought about the collapse of the communist regime 
in late April 1992 and the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. This 
is where a continuing foreign presence could be psychologically critical. 
As long as international actors affirm a commitment to the survival of 
the post-2001 political order and retain forces on the ground that make 
such a commitment seem credible, a cascade is unlikely on the whole 
to eventuate.
In conclusion, is Afghanistan, now, of anything more than academic 
interest to most Australians? Perhaps not, but there are some rather good 
reasons why Australia should retain a focus on what is happening in the 
country where so many ADF personnel served and precious lives were lost. 
No one should underestimate the dangers that could flow from a spreading 
perception that the international enterprise in Afghanistan after 2001 had 
35  Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2017, p. 228.
36  Cited in W. Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 90.
37  W. Maley, ‘Talking to the Taliban’, World Today, vol. 63, no. 11, 2007, pp. 4–6.
38  C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, pp. 94–102.
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failed. At the very least, refugee movements out of Afghanistan, already 
very substantial,39 could be expected to increase. Much more dangerously, 
just as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 prompted radical 
Islamists to claim that the lesson was that religion was a force multiplier 
that could defeat even a superpower, so a perceived Western failure in 
Afghanistan in the 21st century could easily inject similar claims into 
radicals’ discourse directed at impressionable ears. But perhaps most 
dangerously of all, extremist groups in Pakistan such as Lashkar-e Toiba 
might well be tempted to try another major terrorist strike against India, 
comparable to the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Were this to occur, 
no one could be sure exactly how India under Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi might react. The risk of a serious escalation in conflict between 
India and Pakistan could certainly not be ruled out.




American and British 
experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001–04
Dan Marston
The experience of the US and British militaries in the recent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq can be understood in five core lessons identified.1 
From my perspective, these are:
• There was a lack of clear and realistic strategic debates for use of force 
by both countries.
• There were breakdowns in civilian–military relations in both countries.
• There were breakdowns in trust between the two key allies: the United 
States and United Kingdom, especially in Iraq.
• There was tactical-level reform on the battlefield by both the United 
States and United Kingdom; however, winning tactically on the 
battlefield does not equate to strategic victory.
• There were problems created by ignoring the ‘mosaic of the battlefield’ 
and attempting to apply simplistic narratives and solutions to 
complex scenarios.




Why is there a need for a critical and deep assessment of the wars? We have 
fought difficult wars that need to be properly analysed. All experience of 
war needs to be analysed and the lessons identified disseminated properly. 
Afghanistan and Iraq are wars, and the key lessons to take away from them 
are timeless and relevant to both the United States and United Kingdom 
for future war.
As we all know, war is extremely difficult, complex and ugly, and it 
always has been. The last two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been difficult, but no more complicated, I would argue, than the 
Roman invasion and occupation of Gaul. This chapter is based upon my 
work and research with US and UK officers, non-commissioned officers 
and soldiers, from 2006 to the present in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
I engaged with 65 battalions, 27 brigades, 14 divisions, 10 corps and 
multiple command generals of the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), 
Commander ISAF and Operation IRAQI RESOLVE. In the end, more 
than 80 per cent of these men and women understand and understood the 
need for analytical debates that dealt with the width, depth and context to 
understand the war they were and are engaged in.
Lack of strategic debates
The decision-making and debates for the use of force in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq have not been as robust as they should have been. National 
interest was never clearly defined by either the United States or United 
Kingdom throughout either campaign. Most politicians and senior 
military commanders did not ask the difficult questions supporting the 
key question: to what end? They did not consider worst-case scenarios in 
terms of the potential sacrifice of both the countries, as well as considering 
the potential destruction of the enemy and the countries we were invading. 
We did not honestly consider the reality that when a country uses force, 
it will probably mean a bloody exercise and that, for all the technological 
advances of weapons, people are going to be killed and maimed—
including our own soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen as well as the 
enemy. The silver lining to this bleak assessment is that many US and UK 
officers, from all levels of command, are asking key questions informed by 
their experiences, such as: can we define the national interest? Why have 
we deployed forces? Do we have a coherent strategy that is tied to national 
interest and to the overall question of ‘to what end?’ This is a key lesson 
identified from the experiences of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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Civilian–military issues
In both the United States and United Kingdom, civilian–military relations 
have broken down at different times, owing to the strain of the war and lack 
of clarity over strategic end states. Many within the political and military 
leadership blamed one another for the apparent quagmire that occurred in 
the summer of 2003 in Iraq. Most of the leadership on both sides of the 
Atlantic did not engage in robust debates before launching these wars and, 
by 2004, we started to see some rifts within the leadership as the war in Iraq 
did not go to plan and Afghanistan appeared to be losing momentum.
By 2006 and early 2007, many policy-makers and military leaders were 
questioning the commitment to the wars, especially in Iraq. This was also 
a period where many people would accuse some of the military leadership 
in both countries of giving politically aware advice to policy-makers, 
instead of sound military advice. This was especially true in the context of 
the British experience in Iraq in 2007.2
There are two high-profile examples that illustrate the apparent breakdown 
in relations. The first occurred in 2010, when General Stanley McChrystal 
resigned from his post in Afghanistan as Commander ISAF. This example 
highlighted an evident breakdown in communications between senior 
military and political leaders within the United States. The other example is 
from the United Kingdom, when then Chief of the Defence Staff, General 
Sir David Richards, had an open debate with the then British Government 
and people regarding the ‘covenant’ and the role of the military in society.3
Although many people in Britain have applauded the establishment 
and findings of the Chilcot (or Iraq) Inquiry, other observers point to 
a lost opportunity.4 Many journalists and commentators have focused 
2  See some the following recent studies by Brigadier (ret’d) B. Barry, which cover some key issues for 
British experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘Bitter war to stabilize southern Iraq—British Army 
report declassified’, Adelphi Series, International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 56, issue 461, 
London, 10 October 2016; and Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2017. See further H. Strachan, R. Iron and 
J. Bailey (eds), British Generals in Blair’s Wars, Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK, 2013, for more 
detailed discussions of these issues.
3  See the following article, which hints at the tensions: C. Coughlin, ‘A last salvo from General Sir 
David Richards’, 17 July 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10185613/A-last-salvo-
from-General-Sir-David-Richards.html (retrieved 2 April 2020).




exclusively on the decision-making regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
while failing to address the more damning evidence relating to the difficult 
civilian–military debates in the post-2003 phase of the war and the many 
tensions and lessons identified during this period. The US debates in late 
2006 and early 2007, regarding whether to ‘surge’ or ‘not surge’ in Iraq, 
offer a similar level of lessons and debates from which much could and 
should be learned.
Breakdown in trust with allies
Another major issue that occurred was the breakdown in trust between 
the two key allies, the United States and United Kingdom. Much of this 
breakdown came down to arrogance: both countries were guilty of not 
understanding the long-term impact of invading and occupying two 
different countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. Both countries discounted the 
impact of using force with no clear end state in either country.
Both countries were also arrogant regarding the perceived response from 
their respective populations. Many of the policy-makers and military 
commanders expected that the populations would see their militaries as 
liberators—an assumption in which we were very much mistaken.
The levels of arrogance and distrust between the United States and 
United Kingdom reached the high-water mark in Iraq. Although Britain 
agreed with the initial planning of the campaign, it quickly distanced 
itself from the breakdown of the security situation in Iraq. The British 
hunkered down in Multi-National Division – South East (MND-SE) 
and attempted to withdraw from the war as quickly as possible. As the 
US military and civilian organisations in Baghdad attempted to come 
to terms with the rise of violence from the summer of 2003, there was 
a growing disconnect between the two allies. The level of arrogance started 
to permeate the British policy and military leadership as they claimed to 
have pacified MND-SE and Basra in particular. Senior British military 
officers specifically stated that the US military had much to learn from the 
British expertise when dealing with the rising insurgency.5
5  An example of this: BBC News, ‘UK general attacks US Iraq policy’, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
6973618.stm (retrieved 3 April 2020).
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Major Cootes, Chief of Engineers on Multi-National Corps — Iraq, 
in 2005 surveying a bridge that was partially destroyed by a VBIED 
attack in 2004.
Source: Courtesy of the Department of Defence.
In 2005–06, both militaries were trying to come to terms with the 
occupation. Many within the British junior and mid-level leadership 
questioned both so-called British expertise and criticism of US efforts. 
Nevertheless, British media commentators and policy-makers in London 
continued to follow this simplistic narrative, and by 2006 the two allies 
were on divergent paths in Iraq. This was particularly ironic as the US 
military had been undergoing a major transformation to deal with the 
reality of the conflict they were facing. Meanwhile, British arrogance 
would come back to hurt them by 2008.
Many American and British senior officers in MNF-I were doubtful 
about the validity of reporting from Basra by late 2007 and early 2008. 
They understood that most of the ‘dishonesty’ coming through could 
be attributed to the disconnect within the British Government and the 
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pressure to withdraw from an unpopular war.6 The issue is that many 
professional soldiers, NCOs and officers in the British Army understood 
that the previous narrative of ‘expertise’ had been incorrect, and felt 
that their senior command was not being honest with their US allies. 
In February 2007, I wrote a report after my second visit to Iraq in six 
months, in which I stated:
I was upset with what I saw and heard in Basra. This may sound 
a bit over the top, but the honour of the British Army and its 
reputation [are] at stake. Overall, the mood amongst many British 
officers is frustration. They want to be boots on the ground 24/7, 
like they perceive the Yanks are in the north … Allow the boys on 
the ground to storm back into Basra, start up company bases with 
embedded Iraqis and think long term … get the British Army 
thinking more about long term and less about force protection. The 
last thing we need is for a USMC regiment or US Army Brigade to 
come south in the future to do the job. Such an eventuality would 
be humiliating for the British Army.7
The end result was a complete breakdown between the British and 
Americans in Iraq. The British were withdrawing, based not upon the 
situation on the battlefield but upon political requirements in London.8 
The culmination of this breakdown and distrust came to a head in 
March 2008, during Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS (CoTK). 
As a senior British officer stated:
The opening moves of Operation CoTK did indeed expose our 
lack of situational awareness and lack of resources to take the fight 
to the enemy. This led to the Iraqis and the Americans doubting 
our commitment and ability, and tarnished our reputation.9
Luckily, after this breakdown, interactions and coordination improved 
for the war in Afghanistan, for later operations in Iraq, and for Syria 
and beyond.
6  See the findings of the Iraq Inquiry for an in-depth discussion of the breakdown between 
the United Kingdom and the United States and the disconnect with the policy-makers in London 
and the field commanders in Iraq. For further details, see webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20171123123237/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk (retrieved 3 April 2020).
7  Report to MNF-I and MND-SE, February 2007 (copy held by author).
8  Daniel Patrick Marston, ‘Operation TELIC VIII to XI: Difficulties of twenty-first-century 
command’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2019, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1672161.
9  Comments from senior British officer from Operation CoTK, 2008.
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There was also some arrogance from US Iraq War veterans after 2008, 
notably when they deployed to Afghanistan. Many assumed that they 
could apply the same tactics, techniques and procedures to the very 
different war in Afghanistan. Luckily, we were able to limit the influence 
of these attitudes and avert any serious damage. A US Marine Corps 
report from early 2007 was blunt in its message to Iraqi veterans:
Afghanistan is not Iraq. The people, culture, terrain, and climate, 
and the nature of the enemy differ greatly between the two 
geographic areas. Units are responsible for substantial operating 
areas and as a result their influence can span all the war-fighting 
functions as is noted by Operation Enduring Freedom veteran 
units … than that found in Iraq.10
Tactical reform
One key lesson of these conflicts was that tactical reform did occur on 
the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, for both US and British forces. 
Reform was generally bottom up and was slowly tied to home stations 
and systems, and followed time-honoured traditions of staring defeat in 
the face, learning from the battlefield, and wanting to win—all of which 
provide key lessons for the future. The process supported a transformation 
of units and formations to defeat the enemy—whoever that may be. 
The US Army, US Marine Corps and British Army tactically adapted to 
a war—it was not a counter-insurgency moment.11
Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred within the US Army and 
US Marine Corps before the arrival of General David Petraeus and 
the publication of  the US Army counter-insurgency field manual, FM 
3-24. For some units and formations, it began in 2003, on the road to 
Baghdad.12 The Petraeus and 3-24 moment provided the needed ‘top 
cover’ for units, formations and commanders in both theatres—leading 
to a post-war narrative that is somewhat different from the reality on 
the ground. As  many officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers 
10  Internal USMC report, 2007.
11  See my article ‘Smug and complacent? Operation TELIC: The need for critical analysis’, British 
Army Review, vol. 147, 2008, pp. 16–23, for a more detailed discussion.
12  Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM3-24 & MCWP3.3-33.5 Insurgencies and 
Countering Insurgencies, Washington, DC, May 2004. One need only to look at the 1st Marine 
Division and 3rd Infantry Division reporting and after-action reports to see that the soldiers, NCOs 
and officers were quite critical of problems that occurred and the need for constant adaptation.
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attempted to come to terms with the wars in front of them, they were 
quite open to  new ideas. The following two examples from a British 
officer and an American officer, both veterans of the Afghanistan war, 
highlight the constant assessment and debates needed within a military 
organisation to deal with the complexity of war.
The British officer, a veteran of the first Herrick operation (involving 
the deployment of British forces in Afghanistan in 2002) in Helmand 
Province, stated in 2006:
We must also avoid dressing COIN [counter-insurgency] up as 
something fundamentally new. We must be wary of losing sight 
of the lessons from previous campaigns … [A]dditionally, as in 
previous COIN campaigns, WARFIGHTING is an element of 
COIN … Many of the lessons learned from the battlegroups 
resulting experiences are not new. Common themes from previous 
UK COIN campaigns and conflicts were all evident in the 
operations conducted in Helmand Province. The key lesson is that 
we ignore previous experience of such campaigns and those of our 
allies at our peril.13
The US Army officer, a veteran of Regional Command East, stated in 2007:
While a population focused strategy relies heavily on non-kinetic 
means, it increases kinetic operations as well. ‘Planting the flag’ in 
the heart of known enemy sanctuaries dislocates the enemy both 
physically and psychologically. He must fight back or lose. Task 
Force Spartan experienced a sharp rise in combat over previous 
rotations, but thanks to the close combat skill and firepower of 
American units, killed exponentially more enemy than suffered 
friendly casualties. The metric of enemy dead is not useful in 
gauging COIN success, but it does provide insight into the degree 
to which a unit has separated the enemy from the populace. 
Killing, capturing, forcing to flee, or convincing the enemy to 
reconcile are all ways to achieve separation.14
These quotes give some indication that the US and British militaries 
were learning institutions over the course of these two wars, and could 
be proud of their abilities to adapt, as their fathers, grandfathers and 
13  Comments from a British officer, 2008.
14  Comments from a US Army officer, 2007.
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great-grandfathers had done since the First World War. The question that 
remains is: have they taken these experiences and dived deep enough with 
critical analysis to draw some key themes for future wars?
Mosaic of the battlefield
This final theme or lesson is linked heavily with the previous lesson. 
Throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were times when 
policy-makers and military commanders attempted to apply ‘blanket 
solutions’ and/or narratives for the various districts and provinces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and each year of the campaign without understanding 
the need for context. As many veterans were aware, Basra was different 
from Al-Anbar, which was different from Mosul in Iraq; in Afghanistan, 
Regional Command (RC) South was different from RC South-west, which 
was different from RC East. Each year of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
was different from the previous and subsequent years. This is true in all 
wars—a fact that many have failed to recognise when they create their 
narratives or so-called lessons learned.
I made this point clear to the Commanding General, International 
Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) in Afghanistan in 2010:
While this concept may be obvious at the COMISAF level, 
there is a need for clear and consistent recognition that each 
battalion’s area of operation (AO) will have different solutions … 
[a]nd that the commanders need to be allowed to develop these 
different solutions and pass along their knowledge. It must also 
be recognised and made clear that all lessons may not be applied 
everywhere. Each area of operation needs to be allowed to come 
up with their own solutions in order to succeed. There is a need to 
share information and lessons, but all commanders understand that 
[there] is no silver bullet … Clarity in communication is essential, 
with due respect for the chain of command, the commanding 
officers of the AOs need to feel confident that they are right to use 
their judgement in tailoring solutions for their AO.15




The five themes or lessons outlined here still need to be analysed and 
debated among the US and British policy and military leadership—before 
people move on to the next perceived threat. These five issues are sure to 
rear their heads on the next battlefield, wherever it may be, as they are 
timeless in history. The core reason why they need to be debated was best 
summed up by a former US Army General, William Sherman, who stated 
in 1872: ‘There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, 
but boys, it is all hell.’
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Lessons and legacies 
of the use of force
Peter Leahy
The lessons and legacies from Australia’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
neither start in 2001 nor finish in 2014.
The Australian Defence Force and the Australian Army were not ready for 
the war in Afghanistan, and consequently there were severe limitations on 
what could be done in both deployments. The ADF arrived at this situation 
because of decades of errant strategic guidance and an underinvestment 
in defence capabilities, especially the Australian Army, in the last quarter 
of the 20th century.
Today, there are still lessons to be learned and legacies to be realised as 
Australia remains engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These current 
lessons and legacies will continue to shape the ADF of the future, but 
only if there is the wit and wisdom to recognise them and do something 
about them.
Aim
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the major lessons and legacies 
for the Australian Army from the deployment to the Middle East from 
2001 to 2014. The chapter will propose nine lessons at the strategic and 
operational levels and three legacies, which have yet to be fully realised.
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Apart from acknowledging significant improvements in equipment, 
collective training, combined arms cooperation and the development 
of defensive measures against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at 
the tactical level, these lessons will not be covered in any detail. Overall, 
care must be exercised in making tactical judgements because, as many 
have said, it is a poor practice to benchmark your tactical prowess against 
adversaries such as the Iraqi Army in 2003, and the Taliban throughout 
the duration of the fight in Afghanistan. In summary, the lessons and 
legacies to be covered are highlighted here. The nine lessons are:
• Be ready for the most likely conflict.
• Have a strategy.
• You can’t go to war quickly without introducing risk.
• You can’t make a flexible and versatile force out of nothing.
• Equipping the force is difficult, expensive and time consuming.
• Doctrine is important.
• When designing the force, a clear mission is essential.
• ‘Whole of government’ should mean whole of government. 
• A combined arms approach is essential.
The three legacies are as follows:
1. any decision to go to war should be subject to parliamentary debate 
and vote
2. the alliance with the United States is important but it is not the only 
reason to go to war
3. a new community-based approach to caring for our wounded is 
emerging.
Lessons from the British and 
US experience
Several official and unofficial publications have highlighted various lessons 
from the perspective of the United Kingdom and the United States.
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In the case of the United Kingdom, the principal report was the Iraq 
Inquiry, chaired by John Chilcot, which examined the UK’s policy on Iraq 
from 2001 to 2009. The inquiry sought to answer two questions: whether it 
was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and whether Britain 
could—and should—have been better prepared for what followed.1
The inquiry covered an enormous amount of material, and almost 
exclusively dealt with Iraq. However, the value of the inquiry report is 
that, like Australia, Britain was a junior partner of the US-led alliance in 
Iraq and has had a long-term security relationship with the United States. 
The British lessons are therefore useful when considering the Australian 
position. For those who might be wondering, a similar Australian inquiry 
is not necessary. It would no doubt come to very similar conclusions as 
those reached in Britain’s Iraq Inquiry.
In a very British manner, the Iraq Inquiry concluded: ‘The Iraq of 2009 
certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in January 2003: 
it fell far short of strategic success.’2 Another, now obvious and striking, 
lesson is found in the conclusion of the inquiry: ‘It is now clear that policy 
on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence. The flawed premises 
were not challenged and they should have been.’3
Linking the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the inquiry observed: 
From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient 
resources to do so. Decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by 
the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.4
The Iraq Inquiry also determined that the United Kingdom chose to 
join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament 
had been exhausted. It judged that ‘military action at that time was not 
a last resort’.5
1  J. Chilcot, ‘Statement by Sir John Chilcot’, in Report of the Iraq Inquiry, 6 July 2016 [hereafter 
Chilcot, ‘Statement’], p. 1, webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123519/http://www.iraq 
inquiry. org.uk/media/247010/2016-09-06-sir-john-chilcots-public-statement.pdf (retrieved 3 April 
2020).
2  Executive Summary, Report of the Chilcot Inquiry, 6 July 2016, p. 109, webarchive.national archives. 
gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/ (retrieved 3 April 2020).
3  Chilcot, ‘Statement’, p. 6.
4  Ibid., p. 10.
5  Ibid., p. 1.
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In relation to the preparation for what might follow the intervention, 
it concluded: ‘The Government’s preparations failed to take account of 
the magnitude of the task of stabilising, administering and reconstructing 
Iraq, and of the responsibilities which were likely to fall to the UK.’6
The Economist magazine, when reporting on the inquiry release, observed 
that Tony Blair was not a liar or a war criminal. However, The Economist 
also observed that Tony Blair was a man steered by a fatal combination of 
hubris, wishful thinking and moral fervour into an ultimately disastrous 
course of action.7
Another crucial finding from the Iraq Inquiry was: ‘Above all, the lesson 
is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and 
challenged with the utmost rigour.’8
Now let us turn to the lessons from the perspective of the United States. 
One provocative article by Stephen M. Walt, in Foreign Policy, provides 
a guide to what some have proffered as lessons learned in Iraq from a US 
point of view.9
The first observation from Walt is that the United States lost in Iraq. Walt 
then notes, in a series of statements: be careful which wars you choose; 
boneheaded decisions follow when there is no open debate about what to 
do; and the United States did not really understand Iraq and relied too 
much on ‘ambitious exiles’ for advice and intelligence. Walt also notes 
that the force must be prepared to adjust, that regional allies are required 
and that you should not assume that their interests are the same as yours. 
In yet another lesson, he records that ‘winning a battle is easy when you 
have an overwhelming force and then, winning the occupation or the 
peace via a counter-insurgency campaign is a whole lot harder to do’.
In conclusion, Walt states, ‘The real lesson of Iraq is not to do stupid 
things like this again.’10
6  Ibid., p. 9.
7  Economist, ‘Iraq’s grim lessons’, 6 July 2016, www.economist.com/britain/2016/07/06/iraqs-grim-
lessons (retrieved 3 April 2020).
8  Chilcot, ‘Statement’, p. 12.
9  S.M. Walt, ‘Top 10 lessons of the Iraq War’, Foreign Policy, 20 March 2012, foreignpolicy.com/ 
2012/03/20/top-10-lessons-of-the-iraq-war-2 (retrieved 3 April 2020).
10  Ibid.
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The time before 2001
In America’s First Battles, the authors review such battles as Buna and 
Kasserine Pass in the Second World War, Task Force Smith in Korea and 
the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam and conclude that the US Army was 
ill-prepared for all its first battles from 1776 to 1965. A similar conclusion 
could be made for Australia’s first battles.11
In 2001 many in the Australian Army were veterans of what General 
David Hurley famously called the ‘Long Peace’. Over this period, roughly 
from the early 1970s until the late 1990s, the Australian Army largely 
remained at home. Apart from a small number of UN postings and 
a brief burst of deployments around the early 1990s with operations in 
Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda, about the only thing the Army did was 
get smaller.12
After these uncommon deployments, a few Army thinkers began 
researching the most likely nature of future wars. They were influenced by 
such authors as Robert Kaplan in The Coming Anarchy and Paul Kennedy 
in The Troubled and Fractured Planet.13 These Army thinkers agreed with 
the judgements in successive Defence White Papers that a direct assault 
on the Australian continent was unlikely. In their view, the defence 
capabilities required were those with global reach to deal with wars among 
populations in distress away from Australian shores. These ideas took hold 
inside the Army but did not spread much further.
Instead, under the powerful ‘Defence of Australia’ policy, the Army was 
assigned the role of ‘goalkeeper’ against a mythical enemy. In the ‘Army 
21’ review of the mid-1990s, the Army was given strategic guidance that 
its primary task was to defeat an understrength enemy raider battalion 
somewhere in the north of Australia. Predictably, these infamous ‘thugs 
in thongs’ never came. Strategic guidance, which favoured naval and air 
forces to interdict an invasion across the sea–air gap to Australia’s north, 
was wrong. The Army languished, as a home-only force, without realistic 
guidance and an inadequate budget.
11  C. Heller and W. Stofft (eds), America’s First Battles, 1776–1965, University of Kansas Press, 
Kansas, 1986.
12  From approximately 34,000 around the time of the withdrawal to around 25,000 around the 
time of the deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
13  T. Frame and A. Palazzo (eds), On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army Since East 
Timor, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2016, p. 64.
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The 1994 Defence White Paper contained an assumption that the 
ADF would force structure for the defence of Australia. Resourcing for 
expeditionary tasks was to be in the ‘margins’. The margins were tightly 
controlled and were estimated to be around 15 per cent. This was not 
enough to ensure that the Army was ready for the missions and tasks that 
would be required within the next decade.
After the change of government in 1997, the focus on continental defence 
began to change subtly and strategic guidance began to shift ever so 
slightly to an offshore role for the Army. However, the change in guidance 
did not permeate adequately through to strategic guidance, resourcing 
and capability development to result in meaningful and timely changes to 
force structure and preparedness of the ADF and Army before East Timor.
East Timor was a bit of a wake-up for the ADF. I say ‘bit of a wake-
up’ because even by October 2001, when the deployment to Afghanistan 
began, the lessons of East Timor had not been fully understood, interpreted 
and implemented. The reality of East Timor was that the ADF struggled 
even when faced with such a geographically close and relatively benign 
task. There were significant deficiencies in strategic lift, communications, 
logistics over the shore, joint and combined operations, equipment stocks, 
coalition management, force preparedness and readiness. But at least East 
Timor did bring about a growing realisation that the defence force that 
faced the last battle of the 20th century was not the defence force needed 
to face Australia’s first battles of the 21st century.
The reader might wonder about the relevance of this preamble, but it 
gets to the core issue of getting the strategy right. We in Australia have 
a patchy record on this account, but we are not alone. The British author 
and strategic thinker Basil Liddell Hart defined strategy as the calculation 
and coordination of ways and means to achieve ends. It is difficult to 
reconcile Liddell Hart’s strategic equation with the situation in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Just what were the ends, and were the right ways 
and means applied?
Could anyone then and can anyone now answer three basic questions for 
both Afghanistan and Iraq: what is the shape of peace, what does victory 
look like, and what is the exit strategy?
The lessons of both Afghanistan and Iraq, at the strategic level, belong 
mostly to the United States. As Neil James from the Australia Defence 
Association states, Australia is a strategy taker, not a strategy maker. 
The  United States took the policy lead in Afghanistan and Iraq at the 
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beginning of both conflicts, and Australia largely acquiesced to the US 
strategy and narrative for both conflicts. Although Australia sought to 
contribute to the strategic discourse, it had limited influence. Indeed, 
how much impact can be expected from any individual nation in large 
coalitions such as those involved in Afghanistan and Iraq? The US-led 
anti–Islamic State or Daesh coalition has consisted of more than 
50 nations—try finding consensus among that lot!
In October 2001, there was a clear objective in Afghanistan: kill al-Qaeda 
and their Taliban supporters in revenge for the 9/11 attacks and take away 
their sanctuaries and bases in Afghanistan. Vengeance might feel good, 
but it is not an adequate strategic objective.
In the years since al-Qaeda fled from Afghanistan across the border into 
Pakistan, after the battle of Tora Bora, it is difficult to identify a clear 
and constant strategy for Afghanistan. Instead, there has been a parade 
of missions and regularly changing force structures and force levels 
contributing little to an overarching and consistent strategy and a clear 
focus on an agreed and achievable end state.
As this chapter was being written, the overall situation in Afghanistan 
looked dire. In February 2017, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the US commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, 
warned that US troop levels were not adequate to prevent the Taliban 
from continuing to retake territory, especially in Helmand Province, the 
heartland of the insurgency. Senator John McCain at the same Senate 
hearing suggested that instead of playing ‘not to lose’, the United States 
needed a strategy to defeat the Taliban.
When it comes to Australia’s lessons from the war in Iraq, the Australian 
defence official, Al Palazzo, has done the Australian public a service through 
his observations and conclusions in his report on Iraq, The  Australian 
Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010. Although the report does not 
incorporate Cabinet and other high-level government documents, it is 
a good start to understanding Australia’s involvement in Iraq and is an 
important contribution to the development of the lessons and legacies of 
Iraq. The journalist David Wroe, from the Sydney Morning Herald, when 
releasing the book, wrote:
The report concludes that Howard joined US President George W. 
Bush in invading Iraq solely to strengthen Australia’s alliance with 
the US … The result was a contribution that was of only modest 
military use and, in many cases, made little sense. Politically, 
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delivering the right force was secondary to the vital requirement 
of it just being there … yet frustrated commanders often asked 
what they were doing in Iraq and many took to writing their own 
mission statements. One commander wryly summed up his time 
in Iraq thus: ‘We did some shit for a while and things didn’t get 
any worse.’14
There is a problem with Australia’s strategic approach to Iraq. The problem 
relates not so much to the initial decision to depose Saddam Hussein but 
with what happened after he was removed. Few predicted the development 
of a nationwide insurgency, nor did they foresee the unleashing of local 
and regional sectarian forces, which have led to turmoil and instability 
in Iraq and many regional states. The overconfidence and ignorance of 
local conditions of the American neoconservatives, who were the major 
cheerleaders for the invasion, led coalition forces into a morass from 
which it has been difficult to find any way out.
The Australian Army arrived at 2001 undermanned, underequipped and 
unprepared for what unfolded in the first decade of the 21st century. 
It was not ready for what became and remains a series of concurrent, 
competing and at times intense global missions.
On 10 September 2001, who would have imagined that Australian troops 
might soon deploy to Afghanistan? In October 2001, as Australian special 
forces deployed to Afghanistan, who would again have imagined that 
inside 18 months Australian special forces would launch into the western 
desert of Iraq? For both countries, there were many unanswered questions: 
who had the maps; how would the force get there; what language did the 
locals speak; was the right clothing and equipment available?
This quote from Palazzo states the situation very clearly:
From the perspective of the stocks available the reality was that 
in mid-2002 little of the Australian Army’s order of battle was 
readily deployable for a war with Iraq, even against an opponent 
that would prove as strategically, operationally and tactically inept 
as the regime of Saddam Hussein.15
14  D. Wroe, ‘The secret Iraq dossier’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 2017.
15  Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq: 2002–2010, p. 172, www.smh.com.au/
interactive/ 2017/pdfview/ViewerJS/#../The_Australian_Army_in_Iraq.pdf (retrieved 3 April 2020).
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Haunted by the memory of what happened to the unprepared Australian 
infantry units rushed into battle on the Kokoda Track in the Second World 
War, the ADF should know well the dangers of deploying inadequately 
equipped and prepared troops into combat. Troops should not be asked 
to accept this level of risk. The risk should be mitigated before conflict. 
The responsibility to address this risk lies with government and its 
fundamentally important dual functions of determining strategy and 
allocating appropriate budgets. Government is not entirely to blame as 
the military have not been particularly competent at articulating this risk 
to government. In part this is because the Australian Army has tended to 
focus on developing skills at the tactical level and up to the operational 
level of war. We have tended to leave the strategic level to others to manage.
The operational level of war is generally taken to be how a strategy is 
achieved by assigning missions, tasks, timings, geographic boundaries and 
resources. It is the ways and means portion of Liddell Hart’s strategic 
equation. Important operational lessons for Australia from Afghanistan 
and Iraq are: demand, designing the force, equipping the force, doctrine 
and whole-of-government intent.
The hallmark for the period from 1999 to 2017 was the duration and 
consistency of the demand for combat forces. This showed that the 
force, as at 2001, was not large enough to sustain multiple operational 
deployments. Subsequent decisions taken, during the decade, to expand 
the force through such programs as the Hardened and Networked Army 
and the Enhanced Land Force have somewhat eased the pressure. However, 
there remain limits to what the ADF can do. Further expansions and 
force structure adjustments to all three services might still be necessary 
to cope with ongoing demands and future contingencies. One way of 
dealing with high demand is to adjust the duration of deployments. 
Longer deployments of individuals and formed bodies mean fewer troops 
are required. Of course, the situation has not been as bad as during the 
Second World War when troops went to war unsure of how long they 
would be away and when the Australian auxiliary forces included the 
equivalent of 14 divisions—a stark contrast to the far smaller Army of 
the early 21st century.
The initial deployments to the Middle East, in 2001 and 2003, were 
set at six months. This was on the basis that a prolonged campaign was 
not anticipated, the intensity of operations was not expected to be high, 
and six months was considered a reasonable time for individual and unit 
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deployments. As pressure came on from other deployments in Bougainville, 
Iraq, Solomon Islands and East Timor, the immediate solution to 
concurrency pressures was to extend the duration of deployments and 
to limit the nature and type of tasks accepted from the coalition. This took 
careful management and explanation.
Multiple deployments to multiple theatres take a toll on individuals and 
their families. One significant aspect of managing demand for combat 
readiness since the start of the century is that there has been little respite 
for many elements of the ADF. Much has been asked of our soldiers, sailors 
and airmen and their families, and they have delivered magnificently.
Decisions to commit forces to an operation are taken at a political level. 
These decisions, while conscious of the need to deploy force, are not 
always conscious of the appropriateness and availability of the force. This 
was particularly so in the context of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Designing suitable forces took a lot of negotiation, manoeuvring and 
management with government and with coalition partners. In the case 
of Afghanistan, in 2001, there was no realistic choice other than to send 
the SAS Regiment. This was also the case in the March 2003 deployment 
to Iraq. They were the most ready and appropriate forces for the assigned 
tasks. Beyond these initial deployments, an enormous amount of work 
was required to determine the task to be undertaken in follow-on phases 
and then prepare the appropriate forces.
It is no secret that the United States would have preferred that Australia 
offered more powerful, versatile, combat-oriented forces. The forces 
that deployed were a product of the available forces, their capability and 
the assessment of the risk. The Army was particularly concerned about 
the lack of armoured protected mobility and firepower available for 
deployment to Iraq in 2005. Once the task and appropriate force were 
determined, the force then had to be regrouped and prepared. The fact 
that the force eventually deployed to Al Muthanna as a combined arms 
group (made up of 52 different units), rather than an established unit, is 
a telling comment on the inappropriateness of the unit, regimental and 
corps structures of the day.
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In the early days, the Army was not good at designing deployable forces. 
Things were often rushed and haphazard. Forces were ‘going, ready 
or not’. It was only in later deployments that a system was developed 
that appropriately trained, prepared and assessed the force and formally 
handed it over for deployment to Joint Operations Command.
Any deployed military force should have the best equipment. In  the 
early part of the deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, the extant 
defence procurement system was unable to cope with the demands of 
the deploying forces. It was not responsive enough to match the rapidly 
changing requirements and too slow to deliver the necessary equipment. 
Peacetime procurement processes proved to be totally inappropriate. 
It was only with the introduction of a hastily developed rapid acquisition 
system that deployed forces began to be supplied with the right equipment 
in a timely manner.
In the early days of both deployments, there were many pronouncements 
about how these would be whole-of-government deployments whereby 
a  range of government agencies beyond the Defence portfolio would 
engage and assist in accomplishing the assigned missions. But there was 
more talk than action. In the deployments to both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
AusAID was seldom seen in the field, and in Afghanistan AFP elements 
were largely confined to the base at Tarin Kowt. Things improved somewhat 
over the years, but issues of security, protection and capacity will always be 
a constraint on what civilian agencies can do. An exception was Australia’s 
external intelligence agency, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, 
which gave sterling support providing an intelligence edge to Australian 
soldiers in the field.16
Achieving the appropriate balance between security, stability and 
development will always be a difficult task. The military are clearly not the 
best force to be involved in the detailed work of development and delivering 
aid, but sometimes they are the only force available and able to do the 
task safely. One of the few official ‘lessons learned’ documents authored 
principally by Ric Smith and published by the Australian Civil-Military 
Centre was Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government 
Mission. It is a rather narrow report, which by its own admission does not 
evaluate the effectiveness of the effort in Afghanistan but merely identifies 




a number of areas worthy of consideration when planning and responding 
to future contingencies. It provides little tangible discussion to enhance 
the whole-of-government discussion. It acknowledges that it was not 
until April 2009 that the whole-of-government approach saw significant 
deployments of civil elements into the field—more than seven years after 
troops first deployed to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. It also 
acknowledges that at the policy level, interdepartmental involvement 
was relatively light in the early period but intensified from 2006 until 
it acquired a more genuinely whole-of-government character by 2009.17
The report recorded 17 key lessons.18 Included among them were the 
need to:
• involve all relevant departments and agencies in whole-of-government 
policy development and planning from the outset
• establish a senior-level, inter-agency group to oversee policy 
development and provide a high-level nexus with the National Security 
Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries’ Committee on National 
Security
• agree principles and protocols to be developed at the outset of the 
mission to define working relationships and responsibilities between 
different services and agencies
• establish a cross-agency public affairs capability to highlight the 
whole-of-government nature of the mission.
An area where commanders, in the field, were left with little support 
was in the development of doctrine. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the campaigns rapidly morphed into a counter-insurgency effort with 
a constantly changing balance of tasks around the four-phased concepts 
shape, clear, hold and build. Commanders on the ground saw the need 
to support the local population and set about doing so on their own, but 
without adequate doctrine. Doctrine was eventually developed and was 
influenced by the experiences of those on the ground. Supporting this 
effort was an increased focus on immediate lessons learned, which were 
fed directly back into the force preparation cycle and mission rehearsal 
exercises.
17  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole of Government Mission, 
ACMC, Queanbeyan, p. 7.
18  Ibid., pp. 8 ff.
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In many ways, the deployments were set-and-forget missions. By deploying, 
Australia had achieved the coalition aim: there were flags on the table. 
Commanders were certainly left to cope with changes to the operational 
environment without adequate strategic guidance. Commanders in the 
field stated that they received little strategic guidance on what their 
objectives were.19 They were right to complain.
Moving beyond the issue of operational lessons lies the issues of legacies. 
A legacy is a gift or bequest handed down from those who have gone 
before. They are significant issues that shape the nature of the force and 
how it fights and how it is perceived by the public and the international 
community. The Anzac legacy of service and sacrifice is an example, and 
Australian forces deployed to the Middle East have proudly sustained and 
added lustre to the legacy of those who went before them.
It is too soon to identify clear legacies from the current experience of 
Australia’s niche wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, there are three 
likely candidates: the decision-making process to go to war in the first 
place, the influence of the US alliance on Australian calculations, and the 
limitations in the treatment of wounded veterans.
Observations from the United Kingdom and the United States question 
the wisdom of the decision to go to war in Iraq. In Australia, where the 
prime minister reserves to him- or herself ‘crown prerogative’ on the 
decision to go to war, it is unacceptable, except in the case of a defence 
emergency, that the nation can be taken to war without parliament and 
the public being fully engaged.
Today, after nearly 20 years, Australia remains at war in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. For both locations, there has been very little public discussion or 
debate on the decisions to go to war and the daily repeated decisions 
to stay at war. Apart from relatively minor changes, Australia’s strategy—
what there is of it—in both places has remained the same. This is no 
way to make national security decisions. Such an approach is a disservice 
to the public and to those in the ADF required to deploy on multiple 
occasions to combat operations over such a long period.
19  Various conversations with the author.
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As some express concern over the decisions President Trump might 
make, the historic and almost automatic response of Australia to become 
involved in the United States’ wars is of concern. The United States, let 
alone the rest of the world, has yet to be convinced of the wisdom and 
maturity of Trump’s foreign policy choices and actions. Where might 
a new US president take Australia, and is there any assurance that an 
Australian prime minister, in exercising crown prerogative, might not 
exercise similarly poor judgement?
There is cause to review crown prerogative. George Williams, Dean of 
Law at the University of New South Wales, in an opinion piece wrote:
Parliament should pass a law requiring that it debate any proposal 
to commit Australian troops. A decision by the Prime Minister 
to go to war should also be subject to a veto by a majority vote 
of both houses of the federal Parliament. This would provide 
a  much-needed circuit breaker, thereby reducing the possibility 
of Australia taking part in another inadvisable foreign conflict.20
Under a convention introduced in 2011, Britain is required to take 
deployment decisions to parliament for debate.21 The United States has 
the War Powers Act, and in Russia, President Putin in 2015 asked the 
Russian parliament for authority to bomb in Syria. Australia is alone, 
among its major allies and world powers, regarding the decision to go 
to war. An initiative to engage parliament in decisions to go to war such 
as those proposed in the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Approval 
of Overseas Service) Bill 2010 [No. 2] would be a fitting legacy of the 
Australian experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.22
The ANZUS Treaty is a key element behind the choices that Australia 
makes about going to and staying at war. Some argue that to guarantee 
continued benefit from the alliance, Australia needs to be involved in all 
US military activities. Their fear is that if requests from the United States 
for support are declined, then the United States might not respond to 
Australian requests for support in the event of a future defence or security 
emergency.
20  G. Williams, ‘Why Australia must learn from our mistakes in the Iraq War’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 March 2017, newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/why-australia-must-learn-our-
mistakes-iraq-war (retrieved 24 April 2020).
21  C. Mills, ‘Parliamentary approval for military action’, House of Commons Library, 13 May 2015.
22  S. Ludlam, ‘Debate on the War Powers Bill’, 7 July 2011, scott-ludlam.greensmps.org.au/articles/ 
debate-war-powers-bill (retrieved 3 April 2020).
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There can be no disputing that the alliance with the United States is 
important to Australia. The ADF gains privileged access to intelligence, 
technology, armaments, logistics and strategic lift. The result is that 
Australia is more powerful and influential than it could ever expect to 
be without the alliance. However, a balance must be achieved between 
sustaining the alliance for capability and security reasons, and meeting 
Australia’s sovereign national interests. This leads to the question: does 
Australia’s level of dependency on the US alliance hinder its ability to 
make independent decisions based on its own national security interests?
Given the emerging judgements on the intervention in Iraq, and the 
apparent intractable nature of the conflict, questions must be asked about 
whether going to Iraq was the right thing to do. As with Afghanistan, the 
fundamental question is whether the Australian commitment was about 
supporting the alliance or acting to support its own national interests, be 
they security, moral or humanitarian.
It is a good thing that Saddam Hussein is gone, but while democracy 
and secularism have been introduced in Iraq, they have not taken a firm 
hold. The situation in Afghanistan is similar and becoming worse. Despite 
16 years of a coalition presence in the Middle East, the terrorist base has 
expanded, democracy has not taken hold, there is unprecedented turmoil 
and Western influence has been diminished in part to be replaced by 
Russia, Turkey and Iran.
It is difficult to imagine the future circumstances in which US and 
Australian interests might not coincide, but Australia must be alert to 
the potential for our interests to diverge and be prepared to say no to any 
request from the United States to deploy forces to a conflict that is not 
clearly in our national interests.
During the ‘Long Peace’, the ADF, with tight personnel ceilings, had little 
room for those who were not able to meet fitness and readiness standards. 
Those with injuries were generally discharged quickly. As  combat 
operations began and casualties occurred in both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
many quite rightly started to question these quick discharges. Surely 
those who were wounded in battle were owed time to recover from their 
wounds and, if possible, the option to continue their careers, to the best 
of their ability, in the ADF. Why would soldiers go forward into battle if 
they were not going to be looked after if they were wounded? The ADF 
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was not adequately prepared to meet this obligation to its soldiers, sailors 
and airmen. The turnaround occurred but only after some solid prodding 
of the Defence bureaucracy.
There are three primary areas requiring improvement: the medical 
treatment and retention of the physically and psychologically wounded 
while in-service, the official government support provided to veterans 
after discharge, and the community support that can also be provided 
after discharge. Once the obligation to the wounded was recognised, 
the care and attention provided inside the ADF has been world class. 
One lingering area of concern is that those with psychological injuries 
tend to be discharged rather quickly, which means that injuries of this 
type are sometimes not declared and are therefore untreated or at least 
independently managed.
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs does a commendable job of caring 
for the wounded once they are discharged. Regrettably, the department 
suffers from a less than desirable public image, but is aware of this and is 
pursuing internal reforms. These reforms need to be expedited. Everyone 
eventually leaves the military with most fitting back into the civilian 
community with little trouble. Some among the approximately 72,000 
who have served in the ADF since 1990 with physical and psychological 
wounds find it more difficult to reintegrate into civilian life. For many, 
their recovery will be a lifelong journey during which they will need the 
support of their family, friends and the broader Australian community. 
In the last five to 10 years, a number of newly formed community-based 
organisations have been making a significant additional contribution 
to support veterans and assist in their successful reintegration to the 
country. These organisations should be encouraged as they develop a new 
community-based approach to caring for our wounded.
Conclusion
The Australian Army has been through a period of intense operational 
tempo over nearly two decades. Deployments have been global and 
continuous. They have varied greatly in nature and intensity. A great 
number of lessons have been learned, and their realisation has made 
the force more robust and combat ready and better able to cope with 
future demands.
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Overall, the deployments have been handled adequately, and the Australian 
Army, although at times hard pressed, has provided government with 
manageable options and combat-ready forces. However, these forces 
were heavily restrained by the capabilities of the force in being in the 
early stages of both deployments. They remain so today. This means that 
the focus has been on protection, training, mentoring and support tasks 
rather than offensive missions.
Risk has been managed but, in the early stages of both deployments, 
was weighted towards the individual soldier rather than residing where 
it should be at government level. To mitigate this risk, government must 
provide realistic strategic guidance and adequate budgets. Neither were in 
place in 2001 and 2003 and, in many respects, are still not in place now.
The major lessons from the conflicts have been around honouring Basil 
Liddell Hart’s strategic equation of the necessary ways and means to 
achieve the desired ends. This has not been done well, and there have 
therefore been considerable difficulties around articulating a strategy and 
assigning missions. So too were there problems in meeting the demands 
for combat forces, designing the force, equipping the force, developing 
relevant doctrine and providing a functional whole-of-government effort.
There are no clear legacies from these conflicts, but there are three 
candidates: first, the development of a parliamentary convention to debate 
and approve the commitment of ADF elements to conflict; second, the 
realisation that committing forces should not be based solely or even 
primarily on protecting the alliance but on clearly articulated Australian 
national interests; and third, an obligation to look after the wounded and 
a dedication to making them the best reintegrated generation of soldiers 
in our nation’s history.
Although some lessons have been learned during the period 2001–14, 
there are more to be learned from current operations. As of mid-2020, 
the ADF remains in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the world order is under 
unprecedented strain. There is more work to be done, and Australia will 
be involved. The obligation to learn from the effort and sacrifice of our 




The Official History of 
Australian Operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
Australian Peacekeeping 
Operations in East Timor
Craig Stockings1
Australia has commissioned official histories to record its experience 
on military operations five times over the last century: C.E.W. Bean in 
the First World War; Gavin Long and his team for the Second World 
War; Robert O’Neill for the Korean War; Peter Edwards for the Malayan 
Emergency, the Indonesian–Malaysian Confrontation and the Vietnam 
War; and David Horner for the peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance 
and other post–Cold War operations up to but excluding East Timor. 
I am humbled to be the next in line to carry this mantle, and this chapter 
outlines the scope and some of the challenges faced in writing this 
multivolume history.2
1 This chapter was written in 2018.
2  A version of this chapter was published as C. Stockings, ‘A continuing tradition … but a whole 
new ballgame: The Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Australian 
Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor’, in Charles Bean: Man, Myth and Legacy, ed. P. Stanley, UNSW 
Press, Sydney, 2017, pp. 215–28.
NICHE WARS
314
The effort to write the Official History of Australian Operations in the 
Middle East and East Timor has only just begun. Yet the history of 
this history project, even at this early stage, is important—for it frames 
what is a unique set of circumstances and contexts that surround this 
undertaking. There is no question that each of the five official histories 
that have preceded it have faced their own specific challenges and enjoyed 
their own individual advantages. At the same time, however, to me at 
least, the evolution of the process seems to have been incremental. I would 
put it to you at the outset that this series, dealing with a wide range of 
ADF operations both near and far from Australian shores, marks not 
a development or evolution of past experience so much as marking a new 
paradigm. Such a bold claim requires explanation—and I will certainly get 
there—but let me make one important early point. That is, this project 
is not, and cannot be, a repeat of past experience, updated for a new 
era. This is especially so in terms of the mechanics of research, and the 
environment in which my team labours. It is less so, of course, in terms 
of the tradition and philosophy behind past Australian official histories, 
which I seek to extend and enhance.
History of a history
Although talked about in a number of academic, public service and 
even political circles for some time, the real impetus for establishing 
a new Official History series came primarily through the tireless 
efforts of Emeritus Professor David Horner, the Official Historian of 
Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations. 
Importantly, when Horner was appointed in 2004, Cabinet authorised 
the researching and writing of the history of all multinational operations 
and post–Cold War operations in which Australia has participated since 
1947, excluding the recent operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Horner never stopped agitating for the inclusion of ongoing operations in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor to be taken within his or a subsequent 
Official History series. At every chance, including at the launch of the 
first volume of his peacekeeping series in April 2011, Horner spoke of 
the ‘national disgrace’ in the ongoing failure to capture and publicise the 
history of these operations. 
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At this point wheels began to turn once more. Kevin Rudd, then 
foreign minister, gave his support at the book launch, and Horner was 
commissioned by the Australian War Memorial in September 2011 to 
draft a feasibility study of the possibility of writing a new Official History 
series capturing Australian involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was 
completed by the following March and turned into a Cabinet submission 
by the War Memorial. Three times this submission was put forth, 
containing options either to expand the peacekeeping series to include 
East Timor and other operations up to 2006, or to raise a new series for 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The first submission was set aside with the fall of 
the Gillard Government, the second time put on ice when Rudd called an 
election, and lost to Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
There were compelling reasons, argued in the submission, for a new 
Official History to capture the large-scale and ongoing operations in 
the Middle East. The proximity and sensitivities surrounding these 
operations, it was argued, ought not to preclude it; after all, Bean’s first 
volume appeared in 1921. A new series, written as close as possible to 
the events they were chronicling, would provide a public so interested, 
yet so disconnected from these events, with an authoritative account of 
Australian involvement.
This was all well and good, but there soon emerged a rather obvious 
spanner in the works. If the peacekeeping Official History series traced 
ADF operations up to and including the first Iraq War, and the series 
proposed in 2012 picked up the story of Afghanistan and the second war 
in Iraq, what then of East Timor? The blunt answer was not, of course, 
that Horner or the War Memorial had failed to consider operations in this 
theatre from 1999 to 2012. Indeed, the expansion of the peacekeeping 
series to include East Timor had been a submission in itself, wrapped up 
in broader ‘omnibus’ Cabinet submissions that had also called for a new 
Official History of Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, political 
signals were such that it was pointless to press the issue. Horner had been 
‘warned off’. There were sensitivities and reputations mixed up in events 
in East Timor that were much closer to home than those in the Middle 
East—and this marks one of the challenges my project faces.
At last, in mid-2015, the government determined that a new multivolume 
Official History series should be produced to document Australian 
involvement in Iraq (2003–11), Afghanistan (2001–14) and East 
Timor (1999–2012). This then is the origin of my rather long title as 
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Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and Australian Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor. The division 
still stands. I have oversight of a series dealing with the Middle East, and 
a separate series dealing with East Timor—all under the banner of the title 
above. It is worth remembering, however, that the nature of the Official 
History project over which I now preside was a function of the long, 
complex process undertaken by Horner and others designed to get the 
project approved by the government. Political considerations first and 
foremost—historical considerations a distant second.
My remit
The national significance of this project speaks for itself. Australia’s 
involvement in the Middle East has been complex and long-running. 
As many as 40,000 Australian Defence Force personnel are believed to have 
served or supported these deployments over 13 years of operations. Forty-
three Australians died on active service in these theatres, and hundreds 
were wounded. Equally, Australia’s involvement in East Timor from 1999 
to 2012 was an instrumental part of East Timor gaining its independence. 
The INTERFET deployment of 1999–2000 was Australia’s largest mission 
conducted under UN auspices and the largest overseas deployment since 
the Vietnam War. Taken in total, these operations constitute an important 
part of Australia’s recent past, and one that clearly needed to be chronicled 
in an analytical and authoritative manner.
The formal offer of the position of Official Historian was made to me via 
a letter from the Prime Minister. The task was made quite clear. ‘You will be 
responsible for delivering the Official History by July 2022.’ Importantly, 
my commission provided for full access to relevant government files and 
records, authorised under official access conditions as set out in the Archives 
Act 1983, subject only to national security requirements and restrictions. 
The letter closed with a reminder—not that one was required—that 
Australia has a long tradition of producing official histories telling the 
story of Australians at war. ‘The role of Official Historian is one of great 
national significance,’ I was told. The shadows of not only Charles Bean 
but also of Gavin Long, Bob O’Neill, Peter Edwards and David Horner 
perched on my shoulder. They are there still.
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Governance
I did previously mention the significant differences between my project 
and those that have gone before. One key aspect in this regard is the type 
and level of governance imposed upon, and within, the project. I have 
been well funded for this task, to the tune of $12.6 million. For this, I am 
of course most grateful. It is a level of resourcing not available to past 
official historians. The flip side of deep government and War Memorial 
investment in the project is, however, an extremely tight timeline and 
reasonably rigid governance frameworks. We have six years to complete 
these dual series, including the authorship of one of the volumes. 
My authors will each have five years to finish their respective volumes. 
This is a great deal tighter than any Official History project to date. It is 
a tough ask. Yet funding allows for each author to be assigned a full-
time research assistant. In terms of project management support, I have 
also employed a full-time project administrator/support officer. I am 
sure previous official historians are staggered by the staff and funds at 
my disposal, but I am sure they are equally staggered by the expectations 
of delivery. This is a different project from those that preceded it.
Perhaps another indication of the differences the project faces, labouring 
under considerable delivery expectations, are the administrative structures 
that surround it. The very first ‘committee’ established by me was the 
Official History Consultation Group. I raised this group for the sole 
purpose of providing expert external and scholarly advice on issues 
related to the Official History project, as they arose. The first task of this 
committee, when it met, was to examine the scope and volume structure 
of the official histories series as was approved in mid-2015 (largely 
unchanged from Professor Horner’s earlier studies). The proposed volume 
structure was a single volume on East Timor, two volumes on Iraq and 
four on Afghanistan. The Consultation Group was unanimous in its 
conclusions that this was perhaps not the best spread of volumes and 
recommended changes. After all, as I mentioned earlier, this structure was 
a function of the long, complex process undertaken to get the Official 
History project approved. The question of the inclusion of East Timor 
in this series had been particularly vexed, and only agreed upon after 
approval was given to address both Iraq and Afghanistan. That is, a six-
volume study of the Middle East was envisaged before the question of East 
Timor was decided. East Timor was subsequently ‘added’ to the project as 
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a pseudo-independent volume. At no time was the original scope of the 
Official History project the product of considered analysis or calculations 
of all three conflicts in a seven-volume, ‘dual’ series.
In this light, the Consultation Group recommended not one but two 
volumes for East Timor, a single volume for Iraq (which might need to spit 
into two in the future) and three for Afghanistan. A chronological approach 
was to be maintained. No stand-alone thematic volumes concerning 
single-service activities, or activities at the political and strategic level, 
were considered appropriate. You might have noticed a  mathematical 
mismatch here in that this totals six volumes, not the seven originally 
approved. The recommendation to reduce the series from seven to six 
volumes was made on scholarly and historical grounds. Yet I am not shy 
to admit that it also resulted in close to $1 million in salary savings that 
I knew, even then, would be required elsewhere. These recommendations 
were taken to the Memorial’s senior management group, which approved 
them without question or complaint. The Memorial Council and the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs were informed of the outcome. The ease 
of passage of my recommendations in this regard gave me pause, and 
a sigh of relief. This was the type of support and the relationship between 
the project and its host institution that would allow us to succeed.
The second committee I raised is the Official History Records Access 
Steering Group. The purpose of this group is to act as an SES-level 
coordination body, above the ‘operational’ level of interaction between 
the project and select government departments, including Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence and the AFP. Other 
relevant agencies, particularly those with an intelligence and security bent, 
have requested direct and singular access to the project via the Official 
Historian and are not represented in this committee. More specifically, 
the steering committee will help identify the most appropriate methods 
by which necessary files and data can be made available, facilitate the 
flow of records into the project, and maintain protocols and pathways 
for project and external agency staff to work together. Last, it will act as 
a point of conflict resolution, to identify and resolve the difficulties that 
might arise with regard to the provision of appropriate and timely records 
to the Official History project.
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Records
A further indicator that this Official History project cannot and will not 
be a mirror image of past experience is that the nature of records and 
proximity to the conflicts under examination. I anticipate, in general 
and philosophical terms, that research data behind the volumes will come 
in two types, requiring two distinct historical methodologies. The first 
will be oral sources. A significant benefit of conducting this project so 
close to the conclusions of the operations under scrutiny is the wholesale 
availability of veterans. Acknowledging the perpetual challenges of 
oral sources, the nuances, explanations and ‘stories’ behind events 
will not appear on a documentary record. The gap will be covered by 
a comprehensive interviewing program.
Not surprisingly, the second source of data for this project will come 
from written, visual and hardcopy documentary sources in a range of 
formats—from Cabinet papers to emails. These will be sources primarily 
from uniformed and civilian Defence (including organisations like the 
Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Signals Directorate), 
but, given the nature of these conflicts, important contributions will be 
required from those other agencies represented on the Records Access 
Steering Committee—DFAT, PM&C and the AFP—as well as the Office 
of National Assessments, the United Nations, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross and so forth. Much Defence data exists on the ‘Objective’ 
records management system and is, more or less, searchable. In addition 
to Objective-accessioned material, other data, particularly from the earlier 
period (1999–2002), resides in more traditional repositories including 
the Army History Unit, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Office of Air Force 
History, various Defence headquarters, Defence Archives (Queanbeyan, 
Lidcombe and so on).
The procedure by which the project will access this type of information—
across all relevant government agencies, including Defence—has been 
settled upon by the Records Access Steering Group. First, the project will 
develop ‘requests for file lists’ (or RFFs) by volume (which equates to by 
theatre and time period). That is an initial batch of six RFFs will be written 
by the project. These RFFs will indicate the types and nature of data 
sought by the project and, in the case of Defence, where the project thinks 
such information might have been generated or held. Next, the project 
will submit RFFs to relevant agencies through their representatives on the 
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Records Access Steering Group. On receipt of the project RFF, agencies 
will conduct internal record searches and prepare file lists, which will then 
be sent to the Official Historian for internal project distribution. For 
Defence, this will require collating file lists from multiple headquarters, 
commands and archives. Project authors will examine these lists, and 
determine a subset of files it wishes to view. This list will be returned to the 
relevant agency. On receipt of the returned file list, each agency will liaise 
directly with the project (through the Records Access Steering Group) 
to work out the details of access. In order to test the system described, 
an RFF based on the first East Timor (INTERFET) volume has recently 
been completed.
The final type of record relevant to the project is a large volume of data 
that has not been accessioned into Objective or Defence’s legacy records 
management systems, nor catalogued into a physical collection within 
Defence, but rather data that sits unindexed and unaccessioned in 
a collection of hard drives returned from overseas, at Headquarters Joint 
Operations Command and other Defence repositories. This is a huge 
volume of data, appearing at upwards of 20 terabytes—literally millions 
of pages. These records are, at present, unsearchable and therefore of no 
use. However, Defence has initiated Project RORI; basically, a process 
to electronically ‘ingest’ these files, which stretch across the period from 
1999 to the present, into Objective.
My philosophy
I think it appropriate to close with some comments on my personal 
outlook or philosophy as an Official Historian. I would begin by 
saying I suspect I differ very little from my predecessors in this regard. 
Official histories are, in many ways, a record of government actions 
and decisions based on government sources. They are a foundation and 
scaffold for future historians, and an accessible way for the public and 
the veteran community to gain insight into the operations and theatres 
under examination. This is particularly important today, given the serious 
disconnection between these ‘wars’ and the wider Australian public. I think 
it important too, given what I would describe as a significant mismatch 
between the public narrative of events in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the true historical record. The perception of Australian activities and 
decision-making does not, in many ways, match wider understandings 
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of those events. Here let me cast your minds back, for example, to the 
difficulties faced in gaining government approval for East Timor. There 
are reputations and legacies in play here that might not welcome a robust 
investigation and publication of the historical record. There are, possibly, 
institutional sensitivities at stake. There are also contemporary political 
and diplomatic considerations that might find a  searching study of the 
recent past inconvenient. These are my challenges.
In response to problems of this type, let me offer a simple outlook that 
will certainly be captured in my brief to authors, and which represent 
a philosophical pillar of the project. We will not self-censor. We will 
include the good with the bad—frictions and mistakes are as valid a part 
of the historical record as triumphs. Successes in spite of institutional 
shortcomings enhance the legacy of those involved, not the reverse. 
We  will write as we see it, and as the evidence trail indicates. If this 
outlook adds complications in future, then that will be dealt with then. 
The exception is, of course, security considerations. I have no problem 
with this at all. Others issues dressed up as security, however, might prove 
a different matter.
In terms of other aspects of Official History philosophy, one member 
of the author selection panel was inclined to ask potential candidates 
which of the past Official History series they would model their work 
most closely upon. It is a fair and interesting question. My answer would 
have been Gavin Long. The central reason here is that Long worked 
under the considerable weight of expectation set by Bean—so much so 
that his notebooks and correspondence abounds with efforts by actively 
serving officers to ‘influence’ him with an eye to how they might look in 
Bean ‘mark two’ series. Yet Long, particularly in To Benghazi, published 
in 1952, manages to my mind to weave in critiques and criticism where 
appropriate, without appearing cynical and within the context of what 
was expected of him. I have always appreciated this approach—a type 
of bravery in the context of his time. The only problem here is, perhaps, 
his over-subtlety. One needs to be aware of the problems to glean the full 
meaning of Long’s tangential references. Most, I think, would have been 
lost on the wider public. To those within the tent, however, they would 
have stood out markedly. Given the framework, era and expectations he 
worked under, Long could never have been more explicit. I would hope to 
follow a similar line—with the caveat that with changing times and public 
expectations I need be much less discrete.
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Yet Long had his faults—or, more accurately, he made his concessions 
and compromises. Again, to use the example of To Benghazi, in an 
otherwise comprehensive and excellent account, and admittedly with the 
multifaceted pressures incumbent upon him, Long perpetuated many 
of the misguided wartime interpretations of events in North Africa. 
Interestingly, somewhat akin to Bean, he later conceded that the ‘one 
objective of the Australian war histories is frankly a nationalistic one—to 
contribute to the statement of a national tradition’.3 Although far less 
interested than his predecessor in glorifying the ideal and achievement 
of the individual Australian soldier, Long nonetheless mirrored Bean’s 
stressing of the primacy of Australian infantrymen on the battlefield. His 
conclusions are seriously undermined by a determination not to break 
the Anzac tradition of making Australian infantry, equipped with the 
individual and collective tools of inherited national character, the key 
determinant of victory. Long was unequivocal that the ‘decisive work’ in 
North Africa ‘was done by ingenious and resolute foot soldiers’—making 
light of the all-important British logistics, gunners, machine-gunners and 
tank crews.4 Well aware that at the time of writing there were still sufficient 
survivors left to challenge this rather ahistorical argument, Long chose 
to land the first blow, careful to make use of a colourful and obscuring 
analogy: ‘To ascribe the success either to tanks as the overwhelming arm 
(as some writers have done), or to the artillery’, says Long, ‘is to present 
Hamlet without the Prince’—poetic nonsense, I am afraid.5
It is easy, however, to point fingers, and I admit freely and openly that 
the blow-torch has yet to be applied to me or my project. But at this 
early stage I chose not to follow this path. My aim is not a ‘nationalistic’ 
one—it is not celebratory or commemorative. It is historical, purely and 
simply. The day the project fails to engage with difficult and sensitive 
issues in a forthright manner is the day credibility is lost. There are simply 
3  Originally quoted by A.G. Austin in his review of D. Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, 
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961, in Historical Studies, vol. 10, no. 39, 1962, pp. 392–3. 
See also J. Ross, The Myth of the Digger, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, p. 117; K.S. Inglis, ‘The 
Anzac tradition’, Meanjin Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1, 1965, p. 32.
4  G. Long, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, vol. 1: To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, 1952, p. 205; F. Berryman, ‘The Battle of Bardia: The AIF’s First Battle in World War II’, 
Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 
84/370.
5  Long, To Benghazi, p. 205.
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too many veterans who know better—and that is not my style in any case. 
Yet I say this now, when philosophies are cheap and words simple to cast 
… ask me again in six years time.
All of which brings me back to the question at the heart of the conference 
that led to the production of this book. That is, does Bean loom large for 
me and the most recent Official History series, or is he withdrawing into 
the shadows? Like any good historian, let me give an annoyingly qualified 
answer. As I have alluded to throughout this talk, my project and Bean’s 
epic undertaking share little common ground in terms of process, context 
and the mechanics of researching and writing. In this regard, Bean feels 
of little use to me. He has little to tell. Even in terms of audience, times 
have changed dramatically since Bean’s volumes were published. I feel the 
educated public and veteran community is more cynical, for example—in 
positive and negative ways. They are perhaps more willing to accept and 
digest criticisms of Defence and government decisions and actions than 
the past. I am in this regard perhaps freer to tell the blunt truth than Bean 
(or Long) would have been. On the other hand, there will be a portion 
of our readership so enamoured of the Bean-inspired connection between 
military achievement and national identity as to reject some of our more 
difficult findings and conclusions out of hand. Where Bean does perch 
on my shoulder, however, is less connected to the conduct of my project 
than to the weight of expectation I believe I place on myself. Bean made 
the conception of what an Official History is in Australia, and what it 






Niche Wars sets out to help provide some meaning to an otherwise hard 
to explain, let alone understand, series of choices made by successive 
Australian governments from 2001 to 2014. A string of decisions was 
made that saw Australian forces deploy carefully calibrated contributions 
to various places across the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, but also in neighbouring countries. The book’s authors have made 
contributions spanning Australia’s commitment of troops to Afghanistan 
after the 9/11 attacks in the United States through the decision to support 
the US invasion of Iraq and then dealing with the consequences of that 
decision both in Iraq and back in Afghanistan.
Building on contributions made at the ‘War in the Sandpit’ conference 
on Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the book 
outlines a wide range of observations and potential lessons for Australia as 
it considers the utility of force and the pitfalls of short-term thinking in 
the pursuit of its national interests.
The book helps us to understand the choices made as well as the 
incomplete and, at times, incorrect information at hand that led to certain 
fateful decisions. While not addressing the Brereton Report of November 
20201 in any detail as it was released on the eve of publication, this book 
helps to explain some of the context of the gravely flawed decisions that 
1 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Afghanistan Inquiry Report (‘the Brereton 
Report’), afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/IGADF-Afghanistan-Inquiry 
-Public-Release-Version.pdf (retrieved 24 November 2020).
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led to the atrocities reported upon by Brereton—ones that have brought 
shame on the ADF, the Australian Army and the special forces. It also 
is intended to help consider the implications arising from the recent 
past for contingencies that might arise in future. The benefit lies in the 
broad range of views, including those of politicians, senior commanders, 
government advisers, international counterparts, diplomatic and aid 
agency representatives, operational-level decision-makers, contingent 
commanders, and men and women of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Niche Wars serves an important purpose: one that reflects on the mission of 
the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at The Australian National 
University, to understand Australian military operations, Australian 
Defence policy and security affairs of the Asia Pacific, or  Indo-Pacific, 
writ large. This is all within the context of the field of strategic studies that 
was defined, in Australia’s case, by SDSC’s founder, Professor Tom Millar 
and his successors as head of SDSC, Robert O’Neill, Desmond Ball, Paul 
Dibb, Hugh White, Brendan Taylor, myself and now Brendan Sargeant.
SDSC teaches three degree programs: a Bachelor of International Security 
Studies and a Master of Strategic Studies at the Acton campus, and the 
Military and Defence Studies Program, as part of the master’s degree 
taught by SDSC, at the Australian Command and Staff College in the 
Canberra suburb of Weston. As noted in the introduction, a range of 
autobiographical and biographical accounts of certain aspects of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have already been written. Yet there remained 
a need for a book that would be useful for courses taught on these degree 
programs about Australia’s experience—one written from the point of 
view of the practitioners, the crafters and implementers of Australian 
defence policy.
The inspiration for this book came from a discussion between myself 
and Colonel Marcus Fielding—the President of Military History and 
Heritage Victoria (MHHV)—himself the author of Red Zone Baghdad, 
a book written as a reflection on his experiences on deployment to Iraq 
in 2008 and 2009. As Fielding observed in the foreword to this book, we 
became fast friends working together in the lead-up to and conduct of 
the deployment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) sent 
in response to the crisis in East Timor following the vote over autonomy 
that led to East Timor’s independence. Our first collaborative work after 
I joined academia was the 2014 conference held to mark the fifteenth 
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anniversary of the intervention in East Timor. That resulted in East Timor 
Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET, published by Melbourne 
University Press in 2015.
I note that the collaboration between MHHV and SDSC goes back to 
the conference arranged by MHHV and SDSC that led to Australia 1942: 
In the Shadow of War, edited by Peter Dean and published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2012. Building on this experience, the ‘War in the 
Sandpit’ conference drew inspiration from this model and has delivered 
the array of speakers and authors now assembled in this book.
The key questions addressed in the chapters of this book are worth 
revisiting at this juncture: what happened? How well did Australians 
understand the nature of the fight in which they were becoming involved? 
Were there other viable approaches to the options taken along the way? 
Did Australia’s contribution add value to the coalitions? And what lessons 
can be learned for the future? The aim of the conference and this book has 
been to distil some key observations and lessons for the Australian Defence 
Force and Australia more widely, as it ponders its future circumstances. 
So how well did we do in answering these questions?
In terms of what happened, this book did not set out to offer 
a  comprehensive  review of every force contribution over the duration. 
That  is for the official historians to grapple with. Instead, selected 
contributions are made by those who were directly involved in decision-
making or in the conduct of operations. Most of the contributors spoke 
directly at the conference, although we invited some to contribute 
afterwards. Part 1, on the selection on policy and strategy, covered the 
contributions from Robert Hill, Ric Smith and Chris Barrie. Part  2, 
concerning the experience on operations in and around Iraq and 
Afghanistan, concerned the contributions from Dan McDaniel, Chris 
Westwood, Anthony Rawlins, Peter Jones and Jim Molan. Part 3, on joint 
forces, enablers and partners, is covered by the chapters from Michael 
Crane, Mick Lehmann, Elizabeth Boulton, Alan Ryan, Col Speedie and 
Steve Mullins, David Savage and Karen Middleton. The fourth and final 
part covers the lessons and legacies, with chapters from William Maley, 
Dan Marston, Peter Leahy, Craig Stockings and John Blaxland. In fact, 
virtually every chapter has lessons identified.
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At this juncture, it is worthwhile recapping the key lessons identified in 
the preceding chapters. The main points identified for parts 1 to 3 of the 
book are as outlined in the introduction, but the key lessons from Part 4 
are worth covering in additional detail here.
Maley listed seven lessons for military deployments. First, military 
deployments always need to be linked to a political strategy. Second, 
it is not possible to stabilise a disrupted state such as Afghanistan on 
a  province-by-province basis. Third, aid can act as a fuel for conflict 
rather than function as a flame retardant. Fourth, stability can prove 
remarkably tenuous. Fifth, in the long run, reliance on ‘strongmen’ tends 
to be at the expense of sustainable institutional development. Sixth, time 
is the ultimate security commodity, and it is often in short supply in 
undertakings of this kind. Seventh, treating assistance as a means to some 
other end runs the risk of devaluing the people affected.
Looking at the US and British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan from 
2001 to 2004, Dan Marston observed the following lessons were identified, 
if not learned. First, there was a lack of clear and realistic strategic debates 
for use of force by both countries. Second, there were breakdowns in 
civilian–military relations in both countries. Third, there were breakdowns 
in trust between the two key allies, especially in Iraq. Fourth, there was 
a tactical-level reform on the battlefield by both the United States and 
United Kingdom; however, winning tactically on the battlefield does not 
equate to strategic victory. Fifth, there were problems created by ignoring 
the ‘mosaic of the battlefield’ and attempting to apply simplistic narratives 
and solutions to complex scenarios.
Peter Leahy draws a list of nine lessons and legacies from Australia’s 
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. First, the ADF should be ready 
for the most likely conflict. Second, have a strategy. Third, you cannot 
go to war quickly without introducing risk. Fourth, you cannot make 
a flexible and versatile force out of nothing. Fifth, equipping the force 
is difficult, expensive and time-consuming. Sixth, doctrine is important. 
Seventh, when designing the force, a clear mission is essential. Eighth, 
‘whole of government’ should mean whole of government; and ninth, 
a  combined arms approach is essential. In compiling his nine points, 
Leahy acknowledges the significance of the work of Dr Albert Palazzo, 
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who wrote the redacted report on the Australian Army’s experience in 
the Iraq War, made public through the revelations of Fairfax journalist 
David Wroe.2 
He also suggests that there are no clear legacies from these conflicts, but 
there are three candidates. First, he calls for a parliamentary convention 
to debate and approve the commitment of ADF elements to conflict. 
Second, he argues that such commitments should not be based solely or 
even primarily on protecting the Australian–US alliance but on clearly 
articulated Australian national interests. Third, he calls for an obligation 
to look after the wounded and a dedication to making them the best 
reintegrated generation of soldiers in the nation’s history. To Leahy, and 
many others, the obligation to learn from the effort and sacrifice of 
those soldiers involved in Afghanistan and Iraq is a sacred one that must 
be honoured.
In terms of how well understood was the nature of the fight in which we 
were becoming involved, this book indicates that Australia had a lot to 
learn. At each critical juncture, decisions were made that, even without 
the benefit of hindsight, could have been made slightly if not significantly 
differently. No one knows the future, and the decisions made at any point 
in time cannot easily be judged fairly looking back. But some observations 
can be made about the importance of thinking through the longer-term 
ramifications of decisions, thinking through the strategy; that is, the 
ways, the means and, importantly, the ends of a plan; to make sure it is 
as carefully considered as any decision can be, informed by the past and 
the present.
One of the striking features of the experience of Australia’s wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as outlined in these pages, is how each of the 
decision points along the way seems to have been reached and acted on, 
mindful of one underlying long-term concern—namely, maintenance 
and support of the US alliance. Yet this was undertaken principally with 
short-term priorities and concerns in mind. It was these short-term factors 
that drove the tangible contributions the government decided to offer at 
each juncture.
2  Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq 2002–2010.
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The rotation of naval forces in the Gulf, for instance, was contingent on US 
priorities and the contribution calibrated to what Australia could sustain 
without a significant increase in the size of the fleet. Essentially, Australia 
maintained a peacetime naval force structure, despite the rhetoric of an 
existential global so-called War on Terror. Similarly, the RAAF tailored 
contributions to fit in with routine training and operational priorities. 
Over time, of course, the cumulative effects of such decisions meant 
that Australia’s contributions were hard to explain in other than quite 
woolly terms.
Moving to land forces, the Australian Government envisaged the 
contribution of the special forces in October 2001 as a one-off and short-
term contribution. Subsequent land force contributions to the war in Iraq 
also were carefully contained to exclude post-conflict, or so-called Phase 4, 
operations to aid in the reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq. Then again, 
the return of special and conventional land forces to Afghanistan was 
with relatively short-term priorities in mind. As one quite senior officer 
cynically confided in 2006 when Australia was redeploying land forces 
to Afghanistan, the mission was accomplished: Australia had managed 
to get the Dutch into Uruzgan Province and Australia into NATO. This 
betrayed a remarkably superficial understanding of what it means to 
commit Australian young men and women into probable combat. It also 
reflects the ongoing lack of planning beyond the horizon, with the longer 
term ramifications in mind.
Little did planners seem to realise that a rotation of land forces, centred on 
an engineer regiment, the First Reconstruction Task Force (RTF1), would 
make ensuing demands on Australian forces that successive Australian 
governments simply were not prepared to meet. Indeed, the deployment 
of RTF1 came at a time when a crisis in East Timor stretched the ADF, and 
particularly its land forces, to the edge. As I pointed out in The Australian 
Army from Whitlam to Howard, the unprecedented operational tempo 
saw five of the six Regular Army commanding officers of the infantry 
battalions in the Royal Australian Regiment deployed on operations 
concurrently.3 This was not sustainable without either capping Australia’s 
involvement to carefully calibrated niche contributions or significantly 
expanding the force.
3  Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 317.
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A similar point again can be made about Australia’s contribution to Iraq 
from 2005 onwards. As the authors of several chapters have pointed out, 
Australia’s contribution to the Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG) and the 
subsequent Overwatch Battle Group (West) (OBG(W)) was particularly 
constrained, to the point where British and US allies questioned the 
reliability, if not fidelity, of their Australian partners. Arguably, it might 
have been better to stay away than to make such a token force contribution 
in southern Iraq.
This pointed to the enduring peacetime mindset that saw no great urgency 
in expanding the land force in anything remotely akin to the expansion 
of forces during the Second World War (with its equivalent in terms of 
land forces of 14 divisions), let alone the period of Confrontation and the 
Vietnam War.
The Vietnam War parallel is particularly instructive, for it is here that the 
Australian Army, with its nine infantry battalions and associated arms 
and services that made up the brigade-sized 1st Australian Task Force, 
managed to maintain a rotation of forces through Phuoc Tuy Province 
in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Eager to avoid the heightened 
domestic political controversy associated with the expanded force enabled 
by conscription in the 1960s, the Australian Government did not seriously 
consider a significant force expansion that might have enabled a more 
robust and holistic force contribution. That was understandable on one 
level, although arguably an expansion of the force could have been achieved 
without conscription simply by better and more targeted advertising and 
improved conditions of service. Instead, repeated rotations placed an 
unreasonable strain, particularly on the special forces, to the point where 
their practices led to controversy and even disrepute.
The Vietnam parallel is also instructive in terms of thinking through 
what matters most to Australia. Beyond seeking to be seen as supportive 
of the US alliance, Australia’s Defence White Paper of 2016 lists three 
strategic priorities: a secure and resilient Australia, with secure northern 
approaches and proximate sea lines of communication; a secure nearer 
region, encompassing maritime South-East Asia and South Pacific; and 
a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.4 Yet, ironically, 
Australia’s carefully calibrated and constrained force contribution to 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reveals a certain dissonance here. The 
4  Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Canberra, p. 33.
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contrast with Australia’s contribution to the East Timor intervention in 
1999 is noteworthy. For that operation, Australia was prepared to be 
the lead nation, accept hundreds of casualties, if needs be, and assume the 
leadership role to ensure that the 22-nation coalition was successful in 
its mission. By 2020, Australian defence policy belatedly placed greater 
emphasis on security priorities closer to home in the Indo-Pacific region.5
In contrast, the approach taken in Afghanistan and Iraq stands in marked 
contrast. Despite having a significant stake in Uruzgan, Australia was 
deeply reluctant to offer to lead the provincial efforts on behalf of the 
coalition. Similarly, Australia was reluctant to stay for Phase 4, stabilisation 
operations, after the initial apparent victory in Iraq in 2003, or to expand 
the remit of its forces in southern Iraq when it did reluctantly redeploy 
there after repeated appeals from US and British allies from 2005 onwards.
In addition, there was little consideration of how to make a more profound 
and long-lasting contribution in a province like Uruzgan. This was in part 
because there was little if any appetite for taking responsibility for the 
province and driving the agenda there, with the long term in mind. In 
part this was driven by the lack of a coherent and sustained strategy for 
effective governance that dealt with the profound levels of corruption in 
Afghanistan. Absent this kind of strategic vision from the United States 
and other coalition partners, let alone signs of competent and effective 
governance emanating from the capital Kabul, there was little appetite 
for Australia to allow itself to be overexposed by its military contributions 
there. It bears repeating the point made by one senior officer commenting 
in mid-2006, the ‘mission’s accomplished’ already. Australia had managed 
to ‘get the Dutch into Uruzgan and us into NATO’.6 But this cynical 
calculus simply was not enough to justify the blood and treasure spent in 
the dust of Uruzgan. Critics might say that this is unfair as many good 
people tried very hard, over successive rotations, to make a real difference 
in Uruzgan. That is true. The point, though, is not to lay blame at the feet 
of the practitioners who did their best in difficult circumstances. Instead, 
it is to question the lack of thought-through strategy for what the ADF 
would do there and what effect it would have on those who served there, 
let alone what long-term effects their actions would generate in country. 
For this, the senior-most military leadership and their political masters 
5 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Canberra, 2020.
6  Personal recollection of author.
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must share responsibility: the military for not offering more frank, fearless 
and far-sighted advice, and politicians for not thinking beyond the prism 
of their own domestic political cycles.
As Craig Stockings has pointed out, the Official History of Australia’s 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan is in train, but we might have to wait 
a while longer before those volumes are published. This work does not 
seek to cover this gap, but it does include an assembly of some important 
voices; some with unique vantage points as actual eyewitnesses, and others 
who have deep scholarly expertise and capacity to make judgements. This 
volume is not a formal history, so no attempt has been made to present 
the material chronologically. What this means is that the reader has been 
able to take a more eclectic route to understanding Australia’s niche wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. After all, such thematic treatments are just as 
valid, and can be just as educative as formal histories.
There is merit for Defence to have external agencies undertake conferences 
of this type as part of the organisational learning process or as lead-in 
activity to the production of official histories. Indeed, many of the Official 
History authors attended the conference and expressed an appreciation of 
the information presented and the discussions that followed.
For Australia, the contributions made to the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq were deliberately constrained ones. Lessons were learned, experience 
was gained, capabilities were enhanced and alliance ties were burnished, 
but the experience was deliberately confined to the theatre of operations. 
Deployed forces put their heart and soul into their work. Yet there was 
a genuine reluctance in Canberra to embrace wholeheartedly the demands 
of the operational areas where Australian troops deployed. As a result, the 
mission often seemed opaque, the command authority constrained and 
the story allowed to be told through the media tightly managed. This 
too-clever-by-half strategy set the scene for some of the most shameful 
conduct of Australia’s military history whereby unlawful killings came 
to be accepted in certain quarters as part of the norm. Looking back, 
in the hearts of veterans, there is a palpable sense of disappointment, 
even shame. Perhaps, as it considers future contingencies, where more 
than niche contributions might be required, Australia can learn from 
this experience—that it should commit troops when it has formulated 
clear-eyed strategic goals that we all can live with.
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Appendix 1: Australian units 
and formations deployed to 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Chronology: 
Australia’s military 
involvement in Afghanistan, 
2001–present





Prime Minister John Howard announced that the 
government was invoking Article IV of the ANZUS 




The government directed the Chief of the Defence Force 
to have a range of military assets, including special forces, 
available to support the US under the ANZUS Treaty.
22 October 
2001
The first contingent of the Special Forces Task Group 
was officially farewelled in Perth as it departed to assist 
the US-led International Coalition Against Terrorism.
25 October 
2001
The government announced the deployment of Royal 
Australian Navy, Army and Air Force assets and personnel 
in support of coalition operations. The Army’s 16th Air 
Defence Regiment (16AD Regt) was officially farewelled 
from Adelaide to support the Australian maritime 
element in the war against terrorism.
1  Australian Parliamentary Library, ‘Australia’s military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001: 
A  chronology’, www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_





A contingent of four F/A-18 Hornets was officially 
farewelled from RAAF Base Williamtown as part of 
Australia’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. 
Although it was not disclosed at that time, the detachment 
was based at Diego Garcia.
27 November 
2001
The remaining soldiers from the Special Forces Task 
Group, making a total of 150 personnel, departed Perth 
to assist the coalition in Afghanistan.
3 December 
2001
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) advance party 
arrived in Afghanistan and was operating under 
Australian command in theatre.
5 December 
2001
Additional ADF personnel arrived in Afghanistan to 
assist the advance party.
15 January 
2002
Minister for Defence Robert Hill confirmed that around 
150 special forces personnel were in Afghanistan.
24 January 
2002
The Australian Government announced that Brigadier 
Gary Bornholt would replace Brigadier Ken Gillespie 
(later Chief of Army) as Australian Force Commander of 
Australia’s contribution to the coalition in March 2002.
February 2002 The second contingent of approximately 80 personnel, 
forming the Hornet detachment, was officially farewelled 




The first contingent of Hornet personnel was officially 




Australian Special Forces Task Group soldiers took part 




The first contingent of B-707 Tanker Transport aircraft, 
aircrew and support personnel from RAAF 84 Wing 
prepared to depart for Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan. 
The aircraft would provide air-to-air refuelling support 
for operations in Afghanistan.
28 March 
2002
The second contingent of the Special Forces Task Group 





On 28 March, the first B-707 aircraft arrived at Manas, 
and was shortly followed by a second RAAF tanker. 
A small team of RAAF mechanics and technicians 
and a team of logistics experts were deployed as part 
of the detachment. After six months in theatre, the 
first contingent of the Special Forces Task Group in 
Afghanistan was replaced by the second contingent.
3 April 2002 The first contingent of the Special Forces Task Group 
was officially welcomed home from Afghanistan at 
Campbell Barracks, Swanbourne, WA, following its six-
month deployment. One member was presented with 
the Distinguished Service Cross.
19 April 2002 Australia’s continued military commitment to the 
war against terrorism was assured by the Minister for 
Defence, Robert Hill.
7 May 2002 It was announced that the  Hornet detachment deployed 
to Diego Garcia had completed its mission and would 
return to Australia. This was the second air combat 
contingent under Operation SLIPPER, and it was not 
replaced.
16 June 2002 Minister for Defence Robert Hill announced: ‘[A] third 
rotation of Special Forces Task Group soldiers will deploy 
to Afghanistan in August as part of Australia’s ongoing 
contribution to the international coalition against 
terrorism.’ The authorised strength of special forces 
personnel operating in Afghanistan at that time was 150.
18 June 2002 A second B-707 contingent was officially farewelled 
from RAAF Base Richmond, NSW, to support air-to-air 
refuelling operations in Afghanistan from neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan.
3 July 2002 The first contingent of B-707 aircrew and support 
personnel officially returned to Richmond following 
a three-and-a-half-month deployment in support of the 
coalition.
22 July 2002 ADF personnel deployed to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
the Gulf in support of coalition operations had reached 





Six months after departing Australia, the second contingent 
of the Special Forces Task Group was officially welcomed 
home from Afghanistan at Campbell Barracks.
29 September 
2002
Approximately 80 RAAF personnel returned to 
Richmond following a three-and-a-half-month 
deployment to Kyrgyzstan. This was the final deployment 
of the RAAF’s B-707 aircraft to Kyrgyzstan as the 
fleet of B-707s were progressively retired from service. 
Responsibility for air-to-air refuelling operations was 
transferred to Australia’s European coalition partners. 
The RAAF prepared to deploy two AP-3C Orion aircraft 
for maritime operations in the Gulf.
20 November 
2002
As the focus of coalition operations in Afghanistan 
moved towards reconstruction efforts, the government 
announced: ‘[The] third rotation to Afghanistan will 
complete Australia’s special forces contribution. The SASR 
Task Group will begin withdrawing from Afghanistan in 
late November …’. The minister noted that operational 
tasking for Australia’s special forces elements in Afghanistan 
was insufficient to justify their continued deployment.
17 December 
2002
The third contingent of the Special Forces Task Group 
officially returned to Perth. On their return, the 




By February 2003, approximately 2,000 ADF personnel 
were reportedly involved in two operations in the 
Middle East: Operations SLIPPER and BASTILLE 
(the latter involved the forward deployment of ADF 
elements to the Middle East). Australia’s military 
commitment in the Middle East at that time comprised 
an Australian command team ‘in tactical control of the 
multinational interception force in the Persian Gulf ’ to 
support the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq. 
Australia maintained tactical control of six coalition 
vessels, including HMA Ships Anzac, Darwin and 
Kanimbla. In addition, a RAAF Orion detachment had 
been deployed to the Middle East in January 2003 and 
continued to conduct maritime patrols in the Gulf.
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18 April 2003 Following the withdrawal of special forces elements at the 
end of November 2002, it would appear that Australia’s 
military contribution to Afghanistan had been reduced 
to an Army officer deployed to the United Nations 




An Army engineering officer was deployed to Afghanistan 
to contribute to the coalition Mine Action Coordination 
Centre.
13 July 2005 The government announced Australia’s renewed military 
commitment to Afghanistan with a deployment of 
150 special forces personnel to conduct similar tasks 
undertaken during the 2001–02 deployment. The special 
forces deployment was approved for a 12-month period.
24 August 
2005
The first contingent of the Special Forces Task Group 
was deployed to Afghanistan; the first since Australian 
forces withdrew in September 2002. The task group 
comprised approximately 190 personnel from the SAS 
Regiment, 4th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 
Incident Response Regiment and logistics support. The 
task group’s mission was to conduct combat patrols in 
remote areas as well as reconnaissance and surveillance 
operations in collaboration with other contributing 




The ADF flagged that a military provincial reconstruction 
team might be deployed to Afghanistan around mid-
2006. It was also noted that Army mine clearance 
specialists had been deployed to Afghanistan since 2003 
and continued to assist in the removal of unexploded 
ordnance under Operation SLIPPER. An Army officer 
role, deployed to the United Nations in Afghanistan 






The government announced that an Army CH-47 
Chinook helicopter detachment would be deployed 
to Afghanistan in March 2006. The detachment was 
expected to remain in Afghanistan for the duration 
of the Special Forces Task Group deployment (until 
September 2006). However, should Australia deploy 




The government announced that Australia would 
contribute a 200-strong reconstruction task force to 
Afghanistan for a period of two years.
25 February 
2006
After returning to Australia from Afghanistan in January 
2006, west coast–based Special Forces Task Group 
members were officially welcomed home. Two members of 
the SAS Regiment received the Medal for Gallantry. The 
second contingent of the Special Forces Task Group took 
over from the first contingent sometime in early 2006. 
The Special Forces Task Group mission was expected to 
remain in Afghanistan until September 2006.
4 March 2006 East coast–based Special Forces Task Group members 
were officially welcomed home from Afghanistan.
13 March 
2006
Some 110 members of the 5th Aviation Regiment 
were deployed to Afghanistan with two Chinooks. The 
contingent was to provide heavy troop and medical 
evacuation airlift support to the 200-strong Special 
Forces Task Group already operating in Afghanistan.
8 May 2006 The first Australian reconstruction task force for 
Afghanistan, expected to comprise a 240-personnel 
deployment in July 2006, was announced. The Chinook 
helicopter mission was extended until April 2007 to 
support the insertion of the reconstruction force.
13 June 2006 The government announced that, from July 2006, 
the ADF would contribute a reconstruction task 
force to Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan. The first 
Reconstruction Task Force (RTF1) was expected to 
deploy in July 2006.
343
APPENDIx 2
25 July 2006 The first rotation of personnel from the Australian 
Army’s Chinook detachment departed for Afghanistan. 
The Army helicopter commitment was scheduled to 
cease in July 2007.
9 August 
2006
The government announced that an additional 150 
personnel would deploy to reinforce RTF1 and provide 
increased protection. This would bring the total RTF 
commitment to 400 personnel.
23 August 
2006
The RTF1 advance party departed for Afghanistan.
18 September 
2006




East coast–based members of the 200-strong Special 
Forces Task Group were officially welcomed home in 
Sydney. Two members received gallantry awards (Star 
of Gallantry and the Medal for Gallantry), and a Unit 
Citation for Gallantry was awarded to combat elements 
of the task group. The task group as a whole received 
the Meritorious Unit Citation. The Special Forces Task 
Group was deployed for a period of 12 months and 




West coast–based members from the Special Forces Task 
Group were officially welcomed home. Four members 
received gallantry awards and a unit citation for gallantry 
was awarded to combat elements of the task group. 




Minister for Defence Brendan Nelson noted that the 
Special Forces Task Group had returned to Australia 
in September 2006. Nelson also noted that Australia’s 
military commitment to Afghanistan in February 2007 
was approximately 400 personnel, including trade, 
engineer and infantry personnel.
8 April 2007 Members from the 5th Aviation Regiment, comprising 
110 Australian Army personnel and two Chinooks, 




10 April 2007 Prime Minister John Howard announced that another 
Special Operations Task Group of around 300 personnel 
were to deploy to Uruzgan, this time for a two-year 
mission. The role of the Reconstruction Task Force 
Protection Company Group, around 120 personnel, 
was extended until August 2008. Seventy-five RAAF 
personnel were to deploy to Kandahar airfield to provide 
an air surveillance radar capability and assume control 
of a portion of Afghan operational air space from mid-
2007. The overall military commitment to Afghanistan 
was expected to reach 950 personnel by mid-2007, 
eventually peaking at around 1,000 personnel in 
mid-2008.
15 May 2007 Special Operations Task Force deployed to Afghanistan 
in support of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operations in Uruzgan. The task force was made 
up of personnel from the SAS Regiment, 4th Battalion, 
Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), Incident 
Response Regiment and logistics support.
29 May 2007 The main RAAF contingent, including members from 
Darwin-based 114 Mobile Control and Reporting 
Unit and the RAAF’s Combat Support Group, was 
farewelled from Darwin shortly after a small advance 




The government announced the addition of a 
10-member mortar section, to support RTF operations 
in Afghanistan. Personnel were to be drawn from the 
2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.
4 October 
2007
By October 2007, approximately 900 ADF personnel 
had been deployed to Afghanistan (predominantly in 
Uruzgan and Kandahar), and another 110 were expected 
to deploy in February 2008 with two Chinooks.
8 February 
2008
Two of the 5th Aviation Regiment’s recently upgraded 





Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon announced that the 
government would maintain its current commitment in 
Afghanistan but would place a new emphasis on training 
Afghan National Army members. Fitzgibbon announced 
that an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
(OMLT) would soon be embedded within an Afghan 
army battalion (known as a kandak).
20 February 
2008
During the February 2008 Senate Additional Estimates 
hearing, the Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal 
Angus Houston, noted that Australia’s contribution to 
Operation SLIPPER included, at that time:
In addition, Operation SLIPPER receives 
support from the RAAF AP-3C aircraft and the 
C-130 Hercules aircraft which are dual assigned 
to both Operation SLIPPER and Operation 
CATALYST. This month we also redeployed 
two CH-47 Chinook medium-lift helicopters 
with associated flight crew and support staff, 
which totals 93 personnel.
… The government yesterday announced that 
further adjustment to the reconstruction task 
force is warranted to increase emphasis on 
the training of Afghani security forces. The 
provision of an operational mentoring and 
liaison team, or OMLT, will see us developing 
and mentoring an Afghan kandak, or infantry 
battalion. This adjustment will be achieved 
within our existing force capability; that is, an 
authorised establishment of 1,078.
13 March 
2008
Fifteen soldiers from Darwin’s 8/12 Medium Regiment, 
who spent six months in the United Kingdom as part 
of a bilateral program, were deployed in support of UK 
operations in Helmand Province.
April–May 
2008
In April 2008, the third Reconstruction Task Force 
(RFT3) completed its six-month tour of Afghanistan 
and was replaced by RTF4, comprising 400 combat 
engineers, infantry, cavalry and support staff.
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4 June 2008 Chief of Army Lieutenant General Peter Leahy announced 
that Army operational tours would be extended from six 
to eight months, beginning with the first Mentoring and 
Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF1), to be deployed to 
Afghanistan in October 2008.
29 June 2008 The Army’s Chinook detachment was officially welcomed 
home after being replaced by elements from Townsville’s 
5th Aviation Regiment.
10 July 2008 RAAF personnel deployed to Afghanistan’s Control 
and Reporting Centre in Kandahar for six months were 
officially welcomed home. The RAAF had provided 
personnel to this theatre of operations since April 2007. 
A third RAAF contingent had already deployed to 
Afghanistan, and a fourth contingent was commencing 
force preparation training.
15 July 2008 In his speech to the Brookings Institution, the Minister 
for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, summarised Australia’s 
contribution and rationale for operations in Afghanistan:
Australia’s contribution in Afghanistan is a 
substantial one. It includes a Reconstruction 
Task Force of some 400 personnel, a Special 
Operations Task Group of around 300 special 
forces soldiers, an Air Force Control and 
Reporting Centre, a Rotary Wing Group, 
logistics support and a national Command 
Element. More than 1000 personnel in all. This 
makes us the ninth largest troop contributor 




Darwin-based troops from the Army’s 1st Brigade (Light 




The MRTF1 took over from RTF4 on 16 October 
2008. In addition to reconstruction efforts in Uruzgan, 
the new rotation’s role also included capacity-building 
and mentoring of the Afghan National Army. The 
RTF mission ran for more than two years with the first 
deployment commencing in August and September 





Members of the RTF4 were officially welcomed home 
following their six-month deployment in Afghanistan.
2 November 
2008
Two Army Chinooks and 65 personnel were officially 
welcomed home following their eight-month deployment 
to Afghanistan. A third rotation was expected to deploy 
in February 2009 and begin flying operations in March.
16 January 
2009
Trooper Mark Donaldson was awarded the Victoria 
Cross: ‘For most conspicuous acts of gallantry in action 
in a circumstance of great peril in Afghanistan, as part 




The first Force Support Unit (FSU-1) deployed to the 
Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) to provide 
logistic support for all Australian military operations 
in the Middle East Area of Operations and MEAO 
Afghanistan.
29 April 2009 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia 
would increase its troop commitment in Afghanistan 
to 1,550 personnel. The increased troop level aimed 
to enhance the ADF’s training mission so that the 
Afghan National Army could take responsibility for 
security in Uruzgan sooner. This announcement was the 
first statement made about Australia’s future military 
drawdown. Some 120 additional personnel would be 
deployed as part of the Election Support Force.
5 May 2009 Australian Army officer Brigadier Damian Cantwell was 
appointed commander of the ISAF Election Task Force.
15 May 2009 Around 600 military personnel, predominantly from the 
1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, were deployed 
to Afghanistan as part of the second MRTF contingent.
9 July 2009 The RAAF’s two-year mission commanding the Control 
and Reporting Centre at Kandahar Airfield was officially 
completed. The command role was transferred to the 
United States Air Force.
8 August 
2009
Personnel from the MRTF1 were officially welcomed 






The contingent of 120 personnel, who had arrived in 
Afghanistan on 24 July 2009, commenced operations in 
support of Afghan national elections.
20 August 
2009
Afghanistan’s second presidential election was held, 
along with provincial council elections.
11 October 
2009
Members of the RAAF’s 41 Wing were officially 
welcomed home and acknowledged for completing the 
ADF’s two-year commitment commanding the Control 
and Reporting Centre in Kandahar.
23 October 
2009
The fourth Chinook detachment prepared to return home 




The ADF’s Force Communications Unit 3 (FCU3) 
was officially farewelled as part of Operation SLIPPER. 




Australia’s first leased Heron Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) commenced initial operations in Afghanistan. 
Five months previously, an Australian contingent of 
predominantly RAAF personnel had commenced 
working with the Canadian UAV detachment in 
Afghanistan to become familiar with the system.
20 January 
2010
Members of the first Mentoring Task Force (MTF1) 
contingent, mostly made up from the Army’s 7th 
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, deployed to 
Afghanistan at the same time as communication and 
logistic support elements were deployed to the MEAO. 
While the term ‘reconstruction’ has been removed from 
the title, MTF1 continues the same reconstruction 




Members of MRTF2 were officially welcomed home from 
Afghanistan following their eight-month deployment.
26 February 
2010
Major General Ash Power was appointed the first 
Australian officer to serve as Senior Military Adviser to 








The Minister for Defence, John Faulkner, announced 
that the personnel strength currently deployed to 
Afghanistan will remain at 1,550 for the year. The 
government announced that 10 personnel will be drawn 
from within Defence’s embedded Afghanistan staff ‘to 
develop a training concept for Afghanistan’s Combat 
Arms Artillery School’ located in Kandahar.
30 March 
2010
The fifth helicopter detachment comprising two 
Chinooks commenced operations in Afghanistan and is 
expected to remain for eight months.
17 April 2010 The second contingent of the Second Force Support Unit 
returned to Australia from the MEAO and Afghanistan 
after being replaced by the Third Force Support Unit, 
which commenced operations on 11 April 2010.
31 May 2010 The ADF’s mentoring role training elements of the 
Afghan military was expanded when MTF1 assumed 
responsibility for mentoring the Afghan National Army’s 
4th Brigade and a kandak previously mentored by the 
Netherlands. The Dutch are expected to transition 
further kandak elements to the ADF as they withdraw 
from Afghanistan by August 2010. A French-mentored 
kandak will also transition to Australian responsibility 
later in the year.
23 June 2010 Minister for Defence John Faulkner announced that 
with the Dutch withdrawing in August 2010, ISAF 
have agreed to new arrangements establishing a US-led 
multinational command structure in Uruzgan, which 
will comprise military and civilian elements. He also 
foreshadowed that Australia’s military presence in 
Afghanistan might be drawn down within the next two 
to four years.
9 July 2010 A RAAF C-130 Hercules detachment was officially 
welcomed home following a deployment to the MEAO 
in support of Operations SLIPPER and KRUGER. Their 
replacements had already commenced flying operations 





Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s first official travel was to 




The Prime Minister noted that progress was being made 
in training and through the Provincial Reconstruction 




The Prime Minister announced the date for a formal 
parliamentary debate on Afghanistan. A commitment to 
hold this debate was contained in the Australian Labor 




Opening the parliamentary debate on Afghanistan, 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard highlighted Australia’s exit 
strategy for Afghanistan, stating: ‘The international 




In a parliamentary update, the Defence Minister Stephen 
Smith focused on the transfer of security responsibility 
in Afghanistan, emphasising that ‘transition will be 
a process rather than a single event’ and that ‘we believe 
the Uruzgan transition process can occur over the 
next three years, between 2012 and 2014’.
13 October 
2011
The Defence Minister stated that Afghan forces were ‘on 
track’ to take over security in Uruzgan ‘by 2014’. He also 
confirmed that there would continue to be an Australian 
presence in Afghanistan after 2014.
21 November 
2011
Prime Minister Gillard updated parliament on the 
progress of Australia’s whole-of-government effort in 
Afghanistan. She reported on the progress made by ISAF 
and provided a plan for the next three years, whereby 
Australia would transition into more of a training role, 
with possible special forces mandate.
24 November 
2011
Defence Minister Smith updated parliament on a 
number of aspects of Australia’s commitment to the 
conflict, including detainee management and transfers 





Following President Karzai’s announcement of a second 
tranche of districts to be handed over to Afghan security 
responsibility, Prime Minister Gillard said that this 
‘underlines the progress made this year’.
3 February 
2012
Defence Minister Smith indicated his belief that Afghan 
national security forces would play the lead security role 
in ‘most if not all’ of Afghanistan by mid-2013. Smith 
also noted there was a ‘good prospect’ that Uruzgan 
would be in the third tranche of territories to be handed 
over to Afghan security control.
9 February 
2012
Defence Minister Smith emphasised that the 
international community needed to be making decisions 
about their post-2014 commitment to Afghanistan. 
Smith also outlined key issues that the government 
believed needed to be discussed at the upcoming NATO 
Summit in Chicago (20–21 May 2012).
18 March 
2012
Defence Minister Smith again noted that Australia 
expected that Uruzgan would be part of the ‘third 
tranche’ of areas to be transferred to Afghan security 
control.
17 April 2012 Prime Minister Gillard foreshadowed the forthcoming 
NATO–ISAF meetings in Brussels and Chicago and 
emphasised the success so far of the counterinsurgency 
mission in Afghanistan. The PM also flagged forthcoming 
transition stages and the expectations for ongoing 
support in Afghanistan.
19 April 2012 In their statement to the NATO–ISAF Foreign Affairs 
and Defence Ministers’ Meeting (16–19 April 2012), the 
Foreign and Defence ministers outlined that Australia 
would be open to providing training and a special forces 
contribution—‘under the right mandate’—in addition 
to financial contributions to the ANSF.
10 May 2012 In this parliamentary update, the Defence Minister 
focused on ‘detainee management’. Smith detailed the 
detainee management process, how it is monitored and 
how allegations of mistreatment are dealt with.
NICHE WARS
352
13 May 2012 The Afghan Government announced a third set of 
geographical areas to start the transition process, 
including Uruzgan.
16 May 2012 In the lead-up to the NATO Summit in Chicago, the 
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence announced 
that Australia would contribute $100 million annually 
for three years from 2015 ‘to help sustain and support 
Afghan National Security Forces beyond the transition 
process’.
20 May 2012 During the NATO Summit in Chicago, Prime Minister 
Gillard and Foreign Minister Bob Carr announced 
that Australian aid to Afghanistan would grow from 
$165 million per year—the 2011–12 budget figure—to 
$250 million per year by 2015–16. Also during the NATO 
Summit, Prime Minister Gillard and Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai signed the agreement to a comprehensive 
long-term partnership between Australia and the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan.
24 May 2012 Defence Minister Smith updated parliament on a 
number of aspects of Australia’s commitment to the 
conflict, including outcomes from the NATO–ISAF 
Chicago Summit, ADF and civilian casualties, and 
detainee management issues.
31 May 2012 The government announced that Australia was taking 
on the leadership role of Combined Team – Uruzgan 
(CT-U). There would be no change in average troop 
numbers or ‘authorised strength’. Australia would take 
command of CT-U in late 2012.
8 July 2012 Australia signed a memorandum of agreement with 
the Aghanistan Government to facilitate Australia’s 
development assistance contribution between 2012 and 
2017. This would focus on education, rural development 
and financial and electoral management.
17 July 2012 The Australian Government welcomed the formal start 
of the transition process in Uruzgan, noting that the 






Defence Minister Smith again updated parliament 
on Australia’s commitment to the conflict, including 
Australian and civilian casualties, high-profile attacks 
by the Taliban, green-on-blue incidents, detainee 




The Prime Minister  made a public statement concerning 
the recent deaths of five soldiers in Afghanistan, owing to 
an insider attack and a separate helicopter crash.
9 October 
2012
Defence Minister Smith’s paid a fifth visit to Afghanistan, 
where he discussed the transition progress with ISAF 
commanders and local Afghan leaders.
14 October 
2012
The Prime Minister addressed troops in Afghanistan, 
emphasising the importance of the mission in response 




Prime Minister Gillard addressed parliament once more 
on Australia’s commitment to the conflict, including the 
progress of transition arrangements, Australia’s whole-
of-government effort including AusAID and the AFP, 




Defence Minister Smith announced that all four infantry 
kandak of the Afghan National Army’s 4th Brigade were 
now operating independently and had taken control of 
forward operating bases and patrol bases in Uruzgan.
7 February 
2013
Defence Minister Smith addressed parliament on 
Australia’s commitment to the conflict, including 
transition arrangements, the reconciliation process, 
Australia’s post-2014 mission, and support for veterans, 
including mental health problems such as PTSD.
20 February 
2013
Defence Minister Smith discussed the transition progress 
with senior Afghan officials (including President 
Karzai) and ISAF commanders. Also discussed was the 






The Prime Minister and Minister for Defence welcomed 
the ISAF decision to close the Multi-National Base–
Tarin Kowt at the end of 2013. Following this closure, 
the majority of Australian forces would return home 
from Afghanistan.
16 April 2013 Defence Minister Smith’s speech covered a range of 
topics, including the current status of the ADF transition 
in Afghanistan, Australia’s post-2014 mission, Australian 
relations with the United States and NATO, and support 
for veterans, particularly addressing mental health issues.
3 May 2013 Prime Minister Gillard provided a summary of the 
current ADF transition arrangements and indicated 
that Australia would be prepared to provide training 
(and possibly special forces) assistance post-2014.
16 May 2013 Defence Minister Smith once again updated the 
parliament on the status of Australia’s commitment to 
the conflict, largely regarding detainee management and 
his responses to allegations of misconduct by Australian 
personnel while in Afghanistan.
19 June 2013 Defence Minister Smith addressed parliament again on 
Australia’s commitment to the conflict, including current 
strategy and mission and transition arrangements, 
Australia’s post-2014 role, the Afghan-led peace and 
reconciliation process, and awards from operations in 
Afghanistan.
28 July 2013 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited Afghanistan to 




The Prime Minister attended the opening of an 
Afghanistan exhibition at the Australian War Memorial 
and provided personal reflections on Australia’s 
involvement in the conflict.
23 October 
2013
Defence Minister David Johnston addressed the ISAF 
Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, and discussed 
Australia’s ongoing training mission in Afghanistan 





Prime Minister Tony Abbott visited Afghanistan for a 
ceremony to mark Australia’s drawdown in the conflict, 
and the cessation of the PRT. He also reaffirmed that 
Australia would support Afghanistan beyond 2014.
12 November 
2013
The Prime Minister addressed parliament to discuss his 
recent visit to Afghanistan with the Opposition Leader, 
Bill Shorten. In acknowledging the progress made so far, 




Defence Minister David Johnston updated parliament 
on the conclusion of operations in Uruzgan, as well as 
Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan post-2014.
15 December 
2013




Four hundred ADF personnel remain on Operation 
SLIPPER in Kandahar and Kabul tasked with training, 
advising and assisting Afghan National Security Forces.
December 
2014
The final Heron UAV detachment leaves Afghanistan.
31 December 
2014
Operation SLIPPER concludes, and the remaining 
troops undertaking train, advise and assist tasks with 











US, UK and Australian forces invade Iraq.
9 April 2003 US troops capture Baghdad. Saddam Hussein disappears.
21 April 2003 General Jay Garner becomes the civilian leader of Iraq 
when his Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance is established.
1 May 2003 US President George W. Bush, aboard USS Abraham 
Lincoln, declares an end to major combat operations.
12 May 2003 L. Paul Bremer (appointed US Presidential Envoy and 
Administrator) arrives in Iraq as the head of the newly 
formed Coalition Provisional Authority and replaces 
General Jay Garner as civilian leader of Iraq.
22 May 2003 UN Security Council Resolution 1483 passed. The 
resolution empowers the US- and UK-led coalition, 
making it the legitimate and legal governing and 
peacekeeping authority in Iraq and recognising the 
creation of a transitional governing council of Iraqis.
14 June 2003 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez assumes command 
of Combined Joint Task Force 7.
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13 July 2003 The Iraqi Governing Council (comprising 25 Iraqis 
chosen under the supervision of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority) holds its inaugural meeting in Baghdad.
14 August 
2003
UN Security Council Resolution 1500 passed, 
establishing the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq.
19 August 
2003
Suicide truck bomb wrecks UN headquarters in 




US troops capture Saddam Hussein near Tikrit. Paul 
Bremer breaks the news with the announcement: 
‘We got him.’
2 March 2004 Almost 200 killed in a series of bomb blasts in Baghdad 
and Karbala at the climax of the Shia festival of Ashura.








First battle of Fallujah.
April 2004 Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal breaks.
15 May 2004 Headquarters Combined Joint Task Force 7 disbands, 
and Headquarters Multi-National Force – Iraq and 
Headquarters Multi-National Corps – Iraq are established.
28 May 2004 Iyad Allawi is chosen as Prime Minister of the Iraqi 
interim government.
1 June 2004 Iraqi Governing Council dissolved to make way for Iraqi 
Interim Government led by Ayad Allawi. Ghazi al-Yawar 
is named President.
8 June 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted 
unanimously by the UN Security Council, establishes 
the multinational force in Iraq. This provides a mandate 
for the coalition’s occupational mission in Iraq.
June 2004 General George Casey assumes command of Multi-
National Force – Iraq.




23 June 2004 John D. Negroponte appointed US ambassador to Iraq.
28 June 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority transfers sovereignty 
to Iraqi Interim Government. Coalition Provisional 
Authority is dissolved. Bremer leaves Iraq.
November 
2004
Second battle of Fallujah.
19 December 
2004
A suicide car bomb blast in Najaf, 300 metres from the 
Imam Ali shrine and near crowds of people, kills 52 
and wounds at least 140. On the same day a car bomb 
explodes in Karbala, killing 14 and injuring at least 52.
31 January 
2005
Iraqis elect the Iraqi Transitional Government in order to 
draft a permanent constitution. Although some violence 
and a widespread Sunni boycott mar the event, most of 
the eligible Kurd and Shia populace participates. The 
Shia-led United Alliance dominates election for interim 




Iraqi National Assembly holds its first meeting.




Referendum ratifies new Iraqi constitution by 78 per cent 
despite Sunni Arab opposition, which almost vetoes it.
19 October 
2005
Saddam Hussein goes on trial charged with crimes 
against humanity for the killing of 148 Shia men and 




UN Security Council Resolution 1637, brought 
forward by Denmark, Japan, Romania, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, is passed, allowing the 




Parliamentary elections. Sunnis vote in strength.
10 February 
2006
Final results give Shia Alliance a near majority with 128 





Al-Qaeda destroys Shia al-Askari mosque in Samarra, 
which sparks widespread sectarian violence, provoking 
fears of civil war.
21 May 2006 New Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki chairs his first 
cabinet meeting.




Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi forms the Anbar 
Awakening Council (also known as ‘Anbar Awakening’) 
to counter the influence of al-Qaeda. The  Anbar 
Awakening Council is trained and equipped with 
assistance from coalition forces.
5 November 
2006
A court in Baghdad finds Saddam Hussein guilty of 
crimes against humanity and sentences him to be hanged 
because of the Dujail killings.
18 November 
2006
UN Security Council Resolution 1723, submitted by 
Denmark, Japan, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, extends the Multi-National Force – Iraq’s 
mandate until 31 December 2007.
23 November 
2006
Suspected Sunni Arab militants use suicide car bombs 
and mortar rounds on the capital’s Shia Sadr City slum, 
killing at least 215 people and wounding 257.
6 December 
2006
Iraq Study Group Report released. The bipartisan Iraq 
Study Group, led by former US Secretary of State 
James Baker and former Democratic Congressman Lee 
Hamilton, concludes that ‘the situation in Iraq is grave 
and deteriorating’ and that ‘US forces seem to be caught 
in a mission that has no foreseeable end’.
30 December 
2006
Saddam Hussein is executed.
23 January 
2007
In the 2007 State of the Union address, George W. Bush 
announces that he has decided to deploy reinforcements 
of more than 20,000 soldiers and marines to Iraq.
10 February 
2007
General David Petraeus replaces General George Casey 





Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launches a US-backed 
crackdown in Baghdad aimed at pulling Iraq back from 
the brink of civil war.
26 March 
2007
Ryan Crocker replaces Zalmay Khalilzad as US 
ambassador to Iraq.
28 May 2007 Iranian and US ambassadors to Iraq meet in Baghdad to 
discuss ways to improve security in the country. The talks 
end a three-decade diplomatic freeze between the two 
nations.
15 June 2007 US military completes its troop build-up, or ‘surge’, 
to 160,000 soldiers.
Mid-2007 Following the success of the Anbar Awakening Council, 
the coalition begins a controversial program to recruit 
Iraqi Sunnis for the formation of ‘Guardian’ militias to 
secure various Sunni neighbourhoods, a form of armed 
neighbourhood watch of concerned local citizens. 
The militias are later named the ‘Sons of Iraq’.
1 August 
2007
Main Sunni Arab bloc pulls out of Prime Minister 
al-Maliki’s cabinet, plunging the government into crisis.
14 August 
2007
Numerous al-Qaeda bomb attacks against the minority 
Yazidi community in Qahtaniya kill 411 people. More 
than 100 homes and shops are destroyed in the blasts.
29 August 
2007
Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr imposes ceasefire on Mahdi 
Army militia for six months after clashes with police.
17 September 
2007
Iraqi government announces that it is revoking the licence 
of the US security firm Blackwater USA over the firm’s 
involvement in the deaths of eight civilians, including 
a  woman and an infant, in a firefight that followed a 
car-bomb explosion near a State Department motorcade.
18 December 
2007
At the request of the Iraqi Government, the UN 
Security Council passes Resolution 1790, which extends 




Parliament votes to allow members of Saddam’s Baath 
Party to return to government jobs, winning US praise 






Thousands of Turkish troops cross into northern Iraq 
to hunt for Kurdish PKK guerrillas. Eight days later, 
Turkish forces withdraw.
March 2008 The Green Zone in Baghdad comes under repeated 
rocket attack, killing two US government officials and 
injuring several others. 
25 March 
2008
Al-Maliki launches crackdown on militias in Basra, 
sparking pitched battles with Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi 
Army. Fighting rages for a week in southern Iraq and 
Baghdad. Hundreds are killed.
7 July 2008 For the first time, Al-Maliki raises the prospect of setting 
a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops as part of 
negotiations over a new security agreement with the 
United States.
July 2008 Sons of Iraq grow to number 103,000. A program to 
integrate them into the Iraqi Army or police forces or 
to find alternative employment is developed.
19 July 2008 In a political breakthrough, Iraq’s main Sunni Arab bloc 
rejoins the government after parliament approves its 
candidates for several vacant ministerial posts.
1 September 
2008
The US military hands over the province of Anbar to 
Iraqi security forces—the first Sunni Arab province to be 
returned to Iraqi control since 2003.
16 September 
2008
General Raymond Odierno replaces General David 
Petraeus as commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq.
24 September 
2008
Parliament approves a provincial elections law. 
The presidency approves it formally on 7 October, paving 
the way for the election to take place by 31 January 2009.
15 October 
2008
US forces announce that they have killed the second-in-
command of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Moroccan named Abu 
Qaswarah, in a raid in Mosul on 5 October.
4 November 
2008





Iraq and the United States sign an Iraqi–US Security 
Agreement, requiring the United States to withdraw its 
forces by the end of 2011. The agreement gives the Iraqi 
Government authority over the US-led mission for the 
first time, replacing the UN Security Council Resolution.
27 November 
2008
Iraqi parliament approves the Iraqi–US Security 
Agreement after protracted negotiations between rival 
factions, removing the last major hurdle to the agreement. 
The Presidency Council subsequently endorses the Iraqi–
US Security Agreement on 4 December.
14 December 
2008
During a joint press conference with Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad, President Bush dodges two 
shoes thrown at him from the audience.
30 December 
2008




UN Security Council Resolution 1790 expires.
1 January 
2009
Iraqi–US Security Agreement comes into effect. 




Provincial elections held in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.
27 February 
2009
President Obama gives his ‘Responsibly Ending the War 
in Iraq’ speech at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina.
March 2009 Ryan Crocker stands down as US ambassador to Iraq.
21 April 2009 Christopher Hill is confirmed as US ambassador to Iraq.
30 April 2009 The United Kingdom declares an end to its combat 
operations in Iraq.
30 June 2009 In accordance with the Iraqi–US Security Agreement, all 
US combat forces are withdrawn from cities. Other non-
combat US military advisers and trainers remain.
28 July 2009 Last group of 11 Australian Defence Force members, 




30 July 2009 Last group of 11 Australian Defence Force members, 
serving as part of Operation CATALYST, arrive in 
Australia.
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